Citation : 2012 Latest Caselaw 688 Del
Judgement Date : 1 February, 2012
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 01.02.2012.
+ RC.REV. 242/2011 & CM No. 818/2012
SUSHIL MITTAL ..... Petitioner
Through Mr. Sameer Dewan, Adv.
versus
ARUN KUMAR ..... Respondent
Through Mr. Sudhir Nandrajog, Sr.
Advocate with Mr. Siddharth
Bhambha, Adv.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)
1 Order impugned before this Court is the judgment and decree
dated 23.05.2011 wherein in a pending eviction petition filed by the
landlord Arun Kumar seeking eviction of his tenant under Section 14
(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA) i.e premises comprising
one shop in property No. 2855, Sirkiwalan, Hauz Qazi, Delhi as
depicted in the red colour in the site plan filed by the petitioner had been
decreed. The triable issues sought to be raised in the application for
leave to defend filed by the tenant had been declined.
2 Record shows that the averments of the petitioner in his eviction
petition is that he is the owner of the premises; premises were earlier
owned by his grandfather Nihal Chand who had become owner by virtue
of a registered sale deed dated 08.01.1948; after his death on 21.10.1985
in terms of his Will dated 11.04.1980, the property in dispute was
bequeathed to his son Ramesh Kumar and to his grandson i.e the present
petitioner Arun Kumar. Further contention is that the tenant had also
attorned to the landlord and the accepted hiM as the landlord and owner
of the demised premises; further contention being that the petitioner is
carrying on business of iron and hardware in the name of „M/s Satyadev
and Company‟ being the sole proprietor thereof in a shop on the ground
floor of property No. 2855 at Sikriwalan, Delhi just beneath the
premises in dispute i.e. in contiguity with the premises which have been
tenanted out to the tenant. This factual position is not in dispute and is
also borne out from the site plan. Further averment of the petitioner in
his eviction petition is that he is using the said shop for storage of stocks
as also for sale as also as an office of the said business; he has huge
stocks which are kept in the shop which space is not sufficient to
accommodate the stocks as also to provide an office for the business of
the petitioner; he has no other accommodation except this shop in his
possession; he cannot conveniently run the aforenoted business as there
is an insufficiency of space; tenanted premises on the first floor are
accordingly bonafide required by him.
3 Application for leave to defend has been perused. The first
contention of the tenant is that the bonafide requirement of the landlord
is in fact malafide; he has concealed material facts and he has not come
to the Court with clean hands; contention being that he has not disclosed
the entire accommodation which is available with him; further
contention being that on the ground floor although there are admittedly
two shops, one with the present tenant and another with another tenant
M/s Gobind Ram & Sons yet that apart there is availability of space
even on the ground floor which space is adjoining the staircase;
photographs have been affixed along with the eviction petition in the
trial Court and the learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn attention
of this Court to the said photographs depicting the ground floor;
vehement contention being that there is a room measuring 16ft X 4.5
feet which is lying locked; there is another space which is below the
staircase which is in „L‟ shape and total space available is thus
approximately 100-120 square feet. In the corresponding para of the
reply, the landlord has denied this submission; the site plan and the
photographs placed on record have also been perused. Admittedly there
are only two shops on the ground floor, one of which is in occupation of
the landlord from where he carrying on his business; it measures 320
square yards; the other adjoining shop is tenanted out to M/s Gobind
Ram & Sons who is a tenant in the said premises for last more than 50
years. The L shaped space as pointed out by the petitioner is only a
passage which is accessing the staircase and is for the purpose of going
to the upper floors and can in no manner be said to be a space available
to the petitioner either for the purpose of running his business or for
storage of stocks or as a office space which are the requirements of the
landlord. The other space on the ground floor as per the contention of
the petitioner measures 16 X 4.5 feet; perusal of the site plan shows this
space to be a longitudinal passage which as per the submission of the
landlord (present in Court) is the passage containing the sewerage pipe
lines of the whole building which run through this space; this
submission of the landlord has not been disputed by the petitioner
(Sushil Mittal present in Court); thus in no manner can it be said that
this is an alternate space available to the landlord.
4 Further contention of the tenant is that there is a space measuring
6 feet X 8.5 feet which is locked and is part of the mezzanine floor.
There is categorical denial by the landlord to this submission of the
tenant; submission being that this is only a kolki measuring 4feet X
5feet having a height of 6 feet and before this Court both the parties do
not dispute this factual position. This area even as per its dimensions
also can in no manner be said to be an alternate place possible for the
landlord to use it either as an office space or for any other business
activity.
5 On the first floor, it is not in dispute that there are two shops, one
of which is with the present petitioner and the other has been let out to
another tenant; contention of the tenant is that on the first floor, there is
one chajja measuring 4feet X 9feet which is also available with the
petitioner; this has been vehemently denied in the corresponding para of
the reply; moreover photographs as depicted and relied upon by the
tenant nowhere shows that this chajja has an available space of 4feet X
9feet space available on which any activity of the petitioner (as has been
averred in ground 18-A of the eviction petition) can be carried out. This
plea of alternate space available to the landlord on the first floor is thus
clearly negatived. There is no dispute that there is one bathroom on the
first floor.
6 The second floor has depicted two rooms; it is not in dispute that
both these rooms are tenanted out; they are admittedly with the tenants;
contention of the petitioner is that the back portion is with the petitioner;
this is contrary to his earlier stand as admittedly the second floor has not
been divided and the entire second floor has been tenanted out to two
different tenants; contention of the landlord that he has no portion on the
second floor has to be accepted.
7 Same is the position with the mumty/third floor. This is a mumty
area. There is no construction on the third floor. The photographs show
that there is an asbestos sheet covering on either side of the mumty but
again the submission of the landlord that this mumty area which is on
the third floor is neither feasible and nor suitable to the landlord for the
purpose for which he has filed the present eviction petition is
substantiated. The landlord cannot be expected to extend his business
activity (admittedly being carried out from the ground floor) to the tin
shed on the mumty floor.
8 These are by and large the contentions which have been raised by
the petitioner qua the alternate accommodation which is available with
the petitioner. The vehement contention of the tenant being that there
has been concealment of material facts there which by itself entitles the
petitioner for grant of leave to defend thus becomes a triable issue; for
this proposition he has placed reliance upon a judgment reported as 184
(2011) DLT 590 Mohd. Illyas Vs. Nooruddin & Others.
9 Perusal of the record of this case shows that there has been no
concealment of facts by the landlord. The landlord is admittedly
carrying out his business of sale of hardware material; he is using the
premises available with him which is a 320 square yards area on the
ground floor for the purpose of sale as also for the storage of his
business as also for an office space. His contention is that this
accommodation which is available with him is falling short; to support
his submission he has placed on record certain documents which include
the balance-sheet of the company (M/s Satyadev & Company) for the
year ending 31.03.2008, income tax records and the Statement of
Account. The assets of the company as per schedule is worth
` 5,14,028.25 with evidence of cash in hand of `1,49.390.65 and cash
in the Canara Bank is `29,876.30; contention of the petitioner being that
he has more than `2 lacs of cash in hand but he is not able to buy the
stocks as the business space available with him is insufficient for
stocking these stocks; although he has the means to expand his business
yet he cannot do so because of insufficiency of space. This submission
of learned counsel for the petitioner is prima-face borne out from these
documents placed on record. The profit & loss account for the year
31.03.2008 also shows that opening stock of the company is to the tune
of `5,56,285/- and purchases of `35,44,004.44 have been made; gross
profit for the year ending 31.03.2008 is `47,24,964.61. Area presently
available with the petitioner is 320 square yards; tenanted portion with
the present petitioner is contiguous and in line with the office space
from the petitioner is presently functioning; by making an opening in
the roof in between present space in occupation of the landlord and that
in occupation with the tenant, an area of 640 square yards can be made
available to the landlord which will serve his business need for his
tripartite purpose i.e. for storage of stocks as also for sale of his goods
and for office of the said business which requirement as detailed by him
in his is eviction petition. His bonafide need has been established.
Merely because he has a kolki measuring 20 square feet on the
mezzanine floor and even presuming a small space on the ground floor
(denied by the landlord) this would not be sufficient to serve his needs
and requirements; moreover learned counsel for the landlord has pointed
out that this „L‟ shape passage on the ground floor is the space from
where the sewerage line of the entire building passes to which
submission there has been no dispute.
10 No concealment of any material fact by the landlord as has been
vehemently contended by the tenant is made out. An accommodation
which is useless or which is of no consequence is not specifically
required to be averred in the eviction petition; kolki forming a part of
the mezzanine floor or the inadequate space on the ground floor are
accommodations which can in no manner be said to be accommodations
which are alternate availabilities which can serve the purpose of the
landlord i.e. either for storage or sale or for office space. Admittedly in
this case, this business is already being carried out in an area of 320
square yards; the portion with the tenant is also 320 square yards; by
joining it with the accommodation available with the landlord it will
become a spacious space i.e. 640 square yards which would serve the
need of the landlord. In these circumstances, the landlord cannot be held
guilty of any concealment. The judgment of Mohd. Illyas (Supra) is
inapplicable.
11 A Bench of this Court in 1988 (2) RCJ 179 R.D. Aggarwal Vs.
Smt. Arjan Kaur in this context has held as under:-
"In an eviction petition on the ground of bona fide requirement it is only where a particular landlord intentionally conceals the residential accommodation available to him from the court that he/she can be non-suited on this ground. Concealment of innocuous accommodation which cannot be used as a regular room should not result in dismissal of her/his claim for more accommodation."
12 Thus the submission of the petitioner that the space presently
available with the petitioner is sufficient for his need is an argument
clearly without any merit.
13 A bald plea has also been taken by the tenant that the petitioner is
not the landlord; tenant has however not disputed the fact that the
grandfather of the petitioner was the owner of these premises and after
his death by virtue of a Will the present premises have fallen to the share
of the present petitioner and to his father. It is also not in dispute that the
present petitioner has attorned to the landlord and he has been paying
rent to him. In this view of the matter, this submission of the tenant is
clearly without any force. Provisions of Section 116 of the Evidence Act
are also attracted; tenant is estopped from questioning the ownership or
title of the landlord.
14 In 1995 RLR 162 Jiwan Lal Vs. Gurdial Kaur & Ors. a Bench of
this Court while dealing with the concept of ownership in a pending
eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the DRCA had noted as
follows:
"There is a tendency on the part of tenants to deny ownership in cases under Section 14(1)(e). To test the substance of such a plea on the part of the tenants the Courts have insisted that they should state who else is the owner of the premises if not the petitioner. In the present case it is not said as to who else is the owner. Further these cases under Section 14(1)(e) are not title cases involving disputes of title to the property. Ownership is not to be proved in absolute terms. The respondent does not claim the owner of the premises."
15 The last submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is qua his
averments in para 7-A of his application for leave to defend; submission
being that in terms of the Will of the grandfather, the petitioner has
inherited one fourth share in shop No. 2883-84, Teliwara, Bahadurgarh
Road, Delhi. In the corresponding para of the reply, it has been stated
that this shop had been sold by the grandfather Nihal Chand during his
lifetime itself and as such the question of the petitioner having a share in
the aforenoted shop does not arise.
16 No other argument has been urged. Triable issues as sought to be
raised cannot be and should not in a routine manner be granted.
17 In (1982) 3 SCC 270 Precision Steel & Engineering Works &
another Vs. Prem Devi Niranjan Deva Tayal the Apex Court has held
that the prayer for leave to contest should be granted to the tenant only
where a prima-facie case has been disclosed by him. In the absence of
the tenant having disclosed a prima-facie case i.e. such facts as to what
disentitles the landlord from obtaining an order of eviction, the Court
should not mechanically and in routine manner grant leave to defend.
18 In Nem Chand Daga Vs. Inder Mohan Singh Rana 94 (2001) DLT
683, a Bench of this Court had noted as under:-
"That before leave to defend is granted, the respondent must show that some triable
issues which disentitle the applicant from getting the order of eviction against the
respondent and at the same time entitled the respondent to leave to defend existed.
The onus is prima facie on the respondent and if he fails, the eviction follows."
19 In these circumstances, impugned order decreeing the petition of
the landlord and dismissing the application of the tenant seeking leave to
defend does not suffer from any infirmity. Petition is without any merit.
Dismissed.
INDERMEET KAUR, J FEBRUARY 01, 2012 A
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