Delhi High Court
Sanjay Goel vs Lions Club International And Anr. on 9 August, 2012
Author: M. L. Mehta
* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CM(M) 784/2012 & CM 11734/2012, 11733/2012
and Cav.693/2012
Date of Decision: 09.08.2012
SANJAY GOEL
...... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sudhir Nandajog, Sr.
Advocate with Mr. Rakesh
Kumar Garg, Advocate
Versus
LIONS CLUB INTERNATIONAL AND ANR. ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. Anil Goel, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.L. MEHTA
M.L. MEHTA, J. (Oral)
1. This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is directed
against the order dated 08.06.2012 of Additional District Judge (ADJ-
05), Central, Delhi, whereby appeal against the order dated 19.05.2012
of Senior Civil Judge-cum-Rent Controller (SCJ-cum-RC), Central,
Delhi, was allowed.
2. In the Execution Petition No. 37/2012 filed by the petitioner
herein, the learned Trial Court Judge dismissed the petitions of the
respondent Lion's Club International (LCI).
3. Facts in brief are that the petitioner had filed a suit against the
respondent LCI and its District Governor T.S. Arora for permanent and
mandatory injunction to restrain them to conduct elections scheduled on
25th and 26th February 2012 and also for directions to LCI to provide list
of delegates having the voting rights in the said elections as well as the
list of members of the club having their dues cleared by 10.02.2012. In
the said suit Mr. T.S. Arora, the District Governor of LCI, appeared in
the Court on 7th March 2012 and made a statement to the following
effect:
"That I am the District Governor of
Lions Club International, district-321A-1. My
term is going to expire on 30.06.2012. The
previous notification for the election of
second Vice-District Governor has been
withdrawn for which the elections were
schedules to be held on 25th and 26.02.2012.
The fresh election for the second Vice-District
Governor will be held as per constitution of
District and International. Prior to the holding
of such election list of eligible and registered
delegates will be supplied to the plaintiff
before 10 days of such election. The plaintiff
has supplied his E-Mail which is as under:-
[email protected] I shall start the
process for notification of election schedule
within 30 days for the post of second Vice-
District Governor, 321A-1."
4. The petitioner Sanjay Goel also made a statement and withdrew
his suit. Thereupon the Court disposed of the suit noting as
compromised and withdrawn. It was also recorded that the parties shall
be bound by the statements made in the Court.
5. The petitioner being aggrieved, that Mr. Arora did not abide by
his statement, moved two contempt applications against the respondents
and Naveli Mahta. Certain orders came to be passed by the Trial Court
in those contempt petitions which were assailed in this Court and those
orders of the Trial Court came to be set aside by this Court vide order
dated 19th April 2012.
6. On 27.04.2012 the petitioner filed execution of the order of the
Trial Court whereby the suit was finally disposed alleging the
respondent having failed to abide by the statement made on 7th March
2012. In the said Execution Petition, objections were filed by the
respondents herein; the main objection being that since there was no
decree passed by the Court, the execution was not maintainable. The
objections came to be dismissed by the executing Court vide order dated
19.05.2012. The respondents carried the matter in appeal vide MCA
No. 06/2012 which came to be allowed by the ADJ vide the impugned
order of 08.06.2012. This order is challenged by the petitioner in the
instant petition in this Court.
7. The only question that arise for consideration of this Court is
whether there was a decree passed by the Trial Court while disposing
the case as withdrawn on the statements made by the parties. If it was a
decree, then undisputedly, the same could be executed at the instance of
the Decree Holder, namely the petitioner. If it was not, then could the
petitioner carry execution of the said order?
8. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the
suit came to be disposed as withdrawn on the statement made by the
respondent Mr. T.S. Arora on 7th March 2012 in the manner as
reproduced above, and this being the adjudication of the controversy of
the subject matter of the suit, it would be within the definition of decree
under Section 2 CPC, and thus executable. Learned counsel relied upon
Single Judge decision of this Court in Kerala State Coir Corpn. Ltd.
Vs. Delhi Intercontinental (Hotels) Pvt. Ltd., 51(1993) DLT 676.
9. The appellate Court of ADJ while holding that the suit was
disposed as withdrawn and there being no decree passed by the Trial
Court, the same was not executable, relied upon the Division Bench
decision of this Court in Mohd. Amin Vs. Mohd. Iqbal, 158(2009)
DLT 531. In the case of Kerala State Coir Corpn. Ltd. (supra) the
contention was raised on behalf of the petitioner that since the suit was
withdrawn and there being no decree in the eyes of law, the same is not
executable. It was, however, noticed from the record that the decree
had, in fact, been drawn by the Trial Court and which has not been
challenged before the High Court and thus had become final. It was in
this context that it was held that once the decree had been drawn and
which had become final, the same becomes executable.
10. The Division Bench of this Court in Mohd. Amin (supra) had
occasion to deal with similar proposition as before me in the instant
petition. In that case, it was noted that the object of the parties was
clear, as it is in the instant case, that they wanted to place on record the
compromise arrived at between the parties, but, did not seek to obtain a
decree in terms of the compromise which can be executable. It was in
these circumstances that it was held that though the parties were to be
bound by the terms of compromise, but the suit was dismissed as
withdrawn and the suit dismissed in such a way can hardly give rise to
execution of decree.
11. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner tried to distinguish
the decision rendered in Mohd. Amin (supra) by stating that in that case
the settlement was arrived at between the parties as per the written
agreement, a clause whereof provided reference of disputes and
differences to the Arbitrator. In other words, the submission is that as
per the written agreement there was an alternative mechanism of
reference to the Arbitrator, whereas in the instant case the suit was
withdrawn on the statements made by the parties. The contention that is
sought to be raised by learned senior counsel is extraneous and
misplaced. In that case, what was sought to be referred to the Arbitrator
was the disputes or differences arising out of or in connection with the
settlement agreement or the interpretation thereof. In that case also, as
in the instant case, the suit was disposed of as withdrawn and it could
not make any difference if the suit was withdrawn by way of a written
agreement between the parties or on their statements made in the Court.
In both the cases, the parties had agreed to remain bound by the terms of
the compromise and they never intended to obtain a decree in terms of
the compromise. I do not find any reason to differ with the decision
rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mohd.
Amin (supra). Having said so, I do not find any infirmity or illegality in
the impugned order of the appellate Court. The petition has no merit
and is hereby dismissed.
M.L. MEHTA, J.
AUGUST 09, 2012
awanish
