Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 2875 Del
Judgement Date : 30 May, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of decision: 30.05.2011
+ WP (C) No.3752 of 2011
M/s. J.B. TEXTILE INDUSTRIES PVT. LTD. ...PETITIONER
Through: Ms. Maneesha Dhir with
Mr. R.S. Paliwal &
Mr. Mayank Grover, Advocates
Versus
THE GENERAL MANAGER,
CENTRAL BANK OF INDIA & ORS. ...RESPONDENTS
Through: Mr. Mukesh Anand &
Ms. Shuchismita, Advocates
for Respondent No.4.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be YES
reported in the Digest?
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J. (Oral)
CM No.7856/2011
Allowed subject to just exceptions.
WP (C) No.3752/2011
1. The writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is
directed against the impugned order dated 19.5.2010 passed by the
AAIFR on an appeal of the petitioner. We may note that since some
common questions of law were involved a number of appeals had _____________________________________________________________________________________________
been dealt with in this common order though facts of each case had
been dealt with separately.
2. We may note that the petitioner had laid a challenge to the impugned
order earlier by filing WP (C) No.613/2011, which was listed for the
first time on 1.2.2011 when learned counsel sought to withdraw the
writ petition with leave to file a proper petition setting out the
complete facts along with the relevant documents. We have recorded
that the ambiguity in the writ petition inter alia was on account of the
issue whether there was not even a second charge created in favour of
Central Bank of India (for short „CBI‟). The present writ petition has
now been filed after three and a half months of that order. We may
also note that even the initial challenge was, thus, laid after about
seven (7) months and the present challenge has been laid three (3)
months thereafter. The result is that the present petition has come up
as a proper petition after a period of more than one year and in our
considered view this petition suffers from delay & laches.
3. That apart we have also heard learned counsel for the petitioner on
merits. The challenge laid by the petitioner before the AAIFR was to
the order of the BIFR dated 14.10.2008 whereby the BIFR had abated
the reference pending against the petitioner company in accordance
with the 3rd proviso to Section 15 (1) of The Sick Industrial
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as
the „SICA‟) on the ground that the CBI had already taken action
under Section 13 (4) of The Securitization and Reconstruction of
Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002
(hereinafter referred to as the „SARFAESI Act‟).
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4. The petitioner company claimed to have fallen into financial
difficulties and thus had approached the BIFR under SICA. On
consideration of the matter a scheme for rehabilitation was framed
and sanctioned by the BIFR on 17.2.1993. However, in the
subsequent proceedings held on 26.6.2000 the BIFR formed a prima
facie opinion that the petitioner company was not likely to make
its net worth exceed its accumulated losses and hence it was just,
equitable and in public interest for the petitioner company to be
wound up, for which, a show cause notice was issued to the petitioner
company. Thereafter a fresh rehabilitation proposal filed, was
examined, and thus the petitioner was permitted the opportunity of
making its net worth positive latest by 31.3.2003; keeping the
winding up proceedings in abeyance. Even these directions were not
complied with but the petitioner succeeded in the challenge laid
before the AAIFR for reconsideration by the BIFR. However, in the
proceedings of 14.10.2008, the CBI informed of the action taken
under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act by taking over possession
of the charged assets which resulted in the impugned order.
5. It was the say of the petitioner that the proceedings under the
SARFAESI Act had not attained finality as the same had been stayed
by an order of the DRT dated 18.11.2008 and thus the action for
abatement was premature. The petitioner also sought to challenge the
creation of charge in favour of CBI which was the substratum of the
action taken under the SARFAESI Act.
6. The factual position was explained in the impugned order, that the,
interim order granted stay against physical possession of assets with _____________________________________________________________________________________________
the condition to deposit `5.00 lakh within four (4) weeks. The
petitioner company having failed to deposit the amount the interim
order had dissolved.
7. In so far as the issue of the charge in favour of the CBI is concerned,
the DRT had passed the decree in favour of the CBI and held that
the bank had a second charge on the property of the petitioner. This
order dated 1.4.2004 has remained unchallenged to date. The DRT in
the said judgement noticed the relevant facts in para 5, which reads as
under:
"5. Defendant No.1 is the owner of fixed assets located at Plot No.E-45/46, MIDC, Tarapur, District Thane. Defendant No.4 had granted Term Loan to Defendant No.1. In consideration thereof, Defendant No.1 has charged the said fixed assets by way of first charge in favour of Defendant No.4 by letter dated 27.7.1993. Defendant No.4 consented to have a second charge of the Applicant Bank on the same terms and conditions as per the letter dated 27.7.1993."
8. The DRT thereafter concluded as under:
"11....There is valid and subsisting second charge of the Applicant Bank over the assets of Defendant No.1 company as there is first charge of Defendant No.4, who too (illegible) Defendant No.1. So, it is hereby declared that the Applicant bank having second charge over the hypothecated plant, machinery and other assets to Defendant No.1 company...."
9. Learned counsel for the petitioner seeks to raise the same issues
before us by contending that the undisputed position was that the
State Industrial and Investment Corporation of Maharashtra Limited
(for short „SICOM‟) had the first charge in the share of the debt and
the debt of SICOM was 72 per cent while that of CBI was 28 per
cent. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner company has
settled the matter with SICOM and only the debt of CBI remained.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
Learned counsel seeks to refer to a letter of SICOM dated 28.3.2011
to the effect that the loan given to the petitioner was not secured.
10. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended before us
that even though the judgment of the Division Bench of this court in
the case of Punjab National Bank and Others Vs. AAIFR and others
AIR 2008 Delhi 1992 has held that the issue, as to whether the
measures taken under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act have been
rightly taken by the secured creditors, can only be determined in
consonance with the provisions of the SARFAESI Act or by a Writ
Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, the said principle has been whittled down by
the Supreme Court in the appeal preferred against the very same
judgment.
11. We may only notice that one of the parties in the case of Punjab
National Bank (supra) was Bestavision Electronics Limited, which
had carried the matter in appeal to the Supreme Court.
12. We have considered the aforesaid submission made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner. We find no merit in the said submission.
13. However, in order to appreciate the contention of the learned counsel
for the petitioner, it may be pertinent to extract the observations of
the Division Bench of this court in the case of Punjab National Bank
(supra) as contained in paragraph Nos.10(a) and 10(b). These
observations read as follows:
"10(a) We are also of the view that once the jurisdiction of the BIFR was divested by the mandatory impact of the 2nd (sic) proviso to Section 15(1), the BIFR could not pass any orders under the SICA notwithstanding the subsequent developments. Orders sought by the petitioner from the BIFR _____________________________________________________________________________________________
could have been passed either under the SARFEASI or by a writ court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
10(b) The phrase have taken measures obviously contemplates a measure already adopted and cannot be construed to mean that the jurisdiction of the BIFR would depend upon subsequent alteration in the composition of the consortium of the creditors once such measures are taken. The submission of the petitioner that subsequent events such as the reduction in the percentage of creditors, could enable continuance of the proceedings in the BIFR would mean that there would be a constant reshuffling of jurisdictions between the SARFAESI Act and SICA depending entirely upon the varying percentage of debtors based upon subsequent satisfaction of such debts by the debtor. Such a meaning could never have been intended by the legislature and the jurisdiction of the BIFR/AAIFR once divested by the operation of the 2nd proviso to Section 15(1) could not resuscitate by virtue of subsequent developments. We, Therefore, agree with the conclusion of the Bombay High Court but for the reasons enumerated above."
14. As would be apparent on a bare perusal of the observations made by
the Division Bench that this court categorically observed that it was
not for the BIFR to determine as to whether measures under section
13(4) of the SARFAESI Act had been correctly triggered by the
secured creditors. The ratio of the decision of the judgment is, if
any party were to join an issue as to whether or not the measures
under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act have been correctly taken
then, the appropriate forum would be that which is provided under
the SARFAESI Act or the High Court which is vested with
jurisdiction to deal with such like matters under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India.
15. On a reading of the order of the Supreme Court dated 24.04.2001
passed in SLP Nos.20026-20029/2008 entitled M/s. Bestavision
Electronics Ltd. Vs. Punjab National Bank and Ors., we have not
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
been able to persuade ourselves to come to the conclusion that
Supreme Court has taken a view contrary to that of the Division
Bench of this Court. If a reference abates on the ground that the
secured creditors have taken measures under section 13(4) of the
SARFAESI Act, it is not for the BIFR to determine whether the
requisite conditionalities contained in SARFAESI Act are fulfilled in
particular, as to whether the secured creditor singly or in a
consortium hold 3/4th or more of the value of the amount outstanding
on the record date. In our opinion, the observations of the Division
Bench in the case of Punjab National Bank (supra) are clear and these
observations have not been upset by the Supreme Court as contended
by the learned counsel for the petitioners. In the said case all that the
Supreme Court did was to remit matter to the BIFR to consider the
petitioner‟s reference under Section 15 of the SICA since most of the
creditors had settled with the petitioner; the remaining debts of the
creditors were satisfied; and only the issue of payment of interest was
outstanding. It is only for that limited purpose, the matter was
remitted to the BIFR.
16. In our view, the judgement of this Court has not been disturbed. The
reason being; firstly, this is only an order in the facts of the case and
no principle of law has been laid down for it to constitute a
precedent; secondly, there is, in fact, no such direction issued even in
this order, as is sought to be canvassed by learned counsel for the
petitioner. The ratio of the judgement of the High Court has not been
upset.
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner also refers to the judgement of the
Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in WP No.2049/2010
titled Nouveaw Exports Pvt. Ltd. Vs. AAIFR & Ors. decided on
19.5.2010. In para 12 of the judgement there are observations that
BIFR can examine the issue as to whether the party claiming to have
more than 75 per cent of the secured debt, in fact, have that
percentage of debt. We may note that this is a passing reference
made in the judgement, which, in any case, has no relevance in the
facts of the present case since the undisputed position is that there
were only two secured creditors out of which one has been satisfied
and thus CBI being the only remaining secured creditor holds 100 per
cent of the secured debt. The issue is, thus, squarely covered by the
decision of this Court in Punjab National Bank & Ors. case (supra)
dealing with M/s. Bestavision Electronics Limited case.
18. In so far as the plea of CBI being a secured creditor or not, we cannot
rely upon a communication of SICOM as is sought to be canvassed
by learned counsel for the petitioner before us. This issue is no more
res integra in view of the judgement of the DRT dated 1.4.2004.
Undisputedly, this judgement has never been assailed to date before
any forum and is, thus, binding inter se the parties. Even SICOM
was a party in those proceedings and thus none of the parties can
dispute the findings recorded therein; (though the learned counsel for
the petitioner states that SICOM was proceeded ex parte).
19. We may note that the petitioner does not dispute CBI‟s second charge
over the plant and machinery. The petitioner only seeks to dispute
CBI‟s second charge on the land in respect of which action has been _____________________________________________________________________________________________
taken under Section 13 (4) of the SARFAESI Act. A finding has
been, however, recorded in the order dated 1.4.2004 passed by DRT
that even in respect of plant and machinery CBI has 2nd charge.
20. We are, thus, of the considered view that the writ petition has no
merit and is one more endeavour of the petitioner to evade the
liability to pay public money which has been advanced by the CBI to
the petitioner. We would have imposed costs for the benefit of the
CBI but for the fact that the said entity is unrepresented before us.
21. Dismissed.
CM No.7855/2011 (Stay)
In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, the application does not
survive for consideration and the same is also dismissed.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
MAY 30, 2011 RAJIV SHAKDHER, J. b'nesh
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