Delhi High Court
State & Ors. vs State & Ors. on 27 May, 2011
Author: V.K.Shali
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of Decision : 27.05.2011
+ CRL. M.C. No. 1791/2011
ANUJ SHARMA ...... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vinod K. Singh, Adv.
Versus
STATE & ORS. ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. O. P. Saxena, APP
CRL. M.C. No. 1792/2011
ANUJ SHARMA ...... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vinod K. Singh, Adv.
Versus
STATE & ORS. ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. O. P. Saxena, APP
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? YES
V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)
1. These are two petitions filed by the petitioner under Section
482 Cr.P.C. bearing nos. 1791/2011 and 1792/2011 titled
Anuj Sharma Vs. State & Ors. The petitioner in each of the
present petitions has made three prayers in the prayer
clause. These three prayers are (i) to quash the complaint
nos. CC/3922/2010 and CC/3935/2010 dated 27.10.2011
registered by P.S. Karol Bagh, New Delhi under Section 138 of
the Negotiable Instrument Act, (ii) for quashing the order
passed on 15.04.2011 imposing a cost of Rs.10,000/- each in
both cases, (iii) that the petitioner may be permitted to be
exempted for appearance in the above mentioned complaints
pending before the learned Trial Court.
2. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and have
gone through the record.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner although has made
three prayers as stated hereinabove, however, he has
essentially confined his prayer for quashing/setting aside the
order dated 15.04.2011 where the cost of Rs.10,000/- each
was imposed in both the cases by the learned Magistrate.
4. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent no.
2 is purported to have filed the aforesaid two complaints titled
Excel Softech Private Limited Vs. Mr. Anuj Sharma
bearing complaint nos. CC/3922/2010 and CC/3935/2010
dated 27.10.2011 registered by P.S. Karol Bagh, New Delhi
under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act against
the present petitioner.
5. The allegations made in the complaint were that the petitioner
had issued certain cheques on account of discharge of his
debt to the respondent no.2 herein, however, on presentation
all these cheques were dishonoured. After completing, the
statutory formalities the respondent had sent a notice under
Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act calling upon the
petitioner to pay the amount. The respondent no. 2 chose to
file the aforesaid two complaints against the present
petitioner. The petitioner was served and he had and put in
appearance for the first time on 04.02.2011 and sought
exemption on the ground that he was ill. The learned
Magistrate granted the exemption and the matter was
adjourned to 26.03.2011 directing the present petitioner to
disclose his defence and to lead his defence in terms of
Section 145 of the Negotiable Instrument act.
6. On 26.03.2011, the present petitioner also did not appear
and sought further exemption, though his counsel was
present. The request seems to have been dealt with favorably
by the learned Magistrate and the matter was adjourned to
15.04.2011.
7. It is on 15.04.2011 that the present petitioner did not appear
once again, and consequently, the Court was constrained to
take an adverse view in the matter and observed that the
present petitioner was trying to indulge in dilatory tactics and
the minimum which was expected from him was that even
though he may not be in a position to come, he ought to have
disclosed his defence and adduce his evidence. The learned
Magistrate on account of three consecutive dates going waste
drew the inference and rightly so, that the present petitioner
was indulging in dilatory tactics and delaying the disposal of
the case. This was not approved of by the learned
Magistrate, and accordingly, it chose to impose a cost of
Rs.10,000/- in each case on the petitioner in terms of Section
309 Explanation II of the Negotiable Instrument Act while
granting yet another exemption to the petitioner and
adjourned the matter to 18.04.2011.
8. It is against this backdrop that the order dated 15.04.2011
has been assailed before this Court. I have dealt with the
factual matrix in which the cost has been imposed by the
learned Magistrate. I, prima facie, do not find anything
improper, illegal or unreasonable in the impugned order being
passed by the learned Magistrate in dealing with the
recalcitrant accused who is not putting his appearance
despite opportunities having been given and filing repeated
application seeking exemption only with a view to delay the
disposal of the trial.
9. Section 482 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power conferred on
the High Court, which has to be exercised only with a view to
prevent the abuse of process of law or to secure the ends of
justice. I fail to comprehend that in a contingency like this
where there is an abuse of processes of law and hence what
order other than the one which was passed by the leaned
Magistrate could have been passed for securing the ends of
justice.
10. On the contrary, I feel that the learned Magistrate has been
undoubtedly indulgent in accommodating the petitioner in
giving an adjournment and letting him off lightly, and
therefore, I find no merit in the contention of the learned
counsel for the petitioner in seeking the quashing of the order
dated 15.04.2011 is concerned. So far as the question of
quashing of the complaint itself is concerned, no point has
been urged.
11. I have gone through the complaint as well as the other
documents on record. I do not find that there exists any
ground for quashing the complaint in terms of State of
Haryana Vs Ch. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 (604). Thus, so far as
the prayer with regard to the exemption of the petitioner
pending in the Trial is concerned, I feel that this prayer must
be dealt with by the learned Trial Magistrate as and when the
petitioner has put in appearance and moves an application in
this regard.
12. For the reasons, mentioned hereinabove, I feel that there is no
merit in the contention of the learned counsel and
accordingly, both the petitions are dismissed.
V.K. SHALI, J.
MAY 27, 2011
KP
