Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 2838 Del
Judgement Date : 27 May, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on: 21.04.2011
% Date of decision: 27.05.2011
+ WP (C) No.8271 of 2010
M/s. LORDS CHLORO ALKALI LIMITED ...PETITIONER
Through: Ms. Purti Marwaha, Ms. Jayashree
Shukla & Ms. Varsha Banerjee,
Advocates.
Versus
M/s. BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS
LIMITED & ANR. ...RESPONDENTS
Through: Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. A.K. Roy, Advocate for
Respondent No.1.
Respondent No.2 is a proforma party.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SHAKDHER
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers
may be allowed to see the judgment? YES
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the judgment should be YES
reported in the Digest?
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
1. The present writ petition raises the following question of law:
"Whether a Public Sector Enterprise/Undertaking (for short „PSU‟) having dues outstanding in respect of a commercial transaction from a sick company within the meaning of The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as „the SICA‟) falls within the definition of "other authority" for purposes of Section 19(1) of the SICA and is entitled to the benefit of sub-section (2) of Section 19 of the SICA of circulation of the scheme and entitlement to obtain its consent?"
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
2. Respondent No.1 Company supplied one unit of 12KA, 360V DC 6
Pulse Tyristor Converter System to the petitioner Company against a
purchase order dated 10.4.1996 for a plant at Alwar. Only some part
payments were made when the net worth of the petitioner Company was
wiped out and, thus, proceedings were initiated by the petitioner
Company under the SICA for being declared as a sick company. These
proceedings resulted in examination of a scheme for revival of the
petitioner Company and the final approved scheme in terms of the order
dated 30.11.2006 of the BIFR envisaged settlement of dues of secured
and unsecured creditors at 26.50 per cent and 10 per cent of the
principal amount respectively.
3. It is the case of respondent No.1 Company that it did not come to know
of these proceedings, and it is only after about two (2) years when an
appeal was filed before the AAIFR (aggrieved by the fact that
respondent No.1 Company was being treated under the head of
„unsecured creditors‟, which would entitle it only to 10 per cent of the
principal amount) did it become aware of the said proceedings. It is the
case of respondent No.1 Company that the said Company is a Central
PSU and has to be treated as "State" within the meaning of Article 12 of
the Constitution of India and would, thus, be covered within the
meaning of "other authority" under Section 19(1) of the SICA which
would entitle it to a prior notice under Section 19(2) of the SICA.
4. In order to appreciate the controversy, the relevant provisions are
reproduced as under:
"19. Rehabilitation By Giving Financial Assistance. (1) Where the scheme relates to preventive, ameliorative, remedial and other measures with respect to any sick industrial company, the scheme may provide for financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees or relief's or concessions or _____________________________________________________________________________________________
sacrifices from the Central Government, a State Government, any scheduled bank or other bank, a public financial institution or State level institution or any institution or other authority (any Government bank, institution or other authority required by a scheme to provide for such financial assistance being hereafter in this section referred to as the person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance) to the sick industrial company.
(2) Every scheme referred to in sub-section (1) shall be circulated to every person required by the scheme to provide financial assistance for his consent within a period of sixty days from the date of such circulation or within such further period, not exceeding sixty days, as may be allowed by the Board, and if no consent is received within such period or further period, it shall be deemed that consent has been given."
5. The plea of respondent No.1 Company found favour with the AAIFR in
terms of the impugned order dated 12.10.2010 on the premise that the
term "other authority" used in Section 19 (1) of the SICA will take its
colour from Article 12 of the Constitution of India. Respondent No.1
being a PSU was, thus, covered within the meaning of "other authority"
under Article 12 of the Constitution of India and consequently under
Section 19 (1) of the SICA.
6. Another fact taken note of by the AAIFR is that a subsequent order was
passed by the BIFR on 26.3.2010 in terms whereof the petitioner
Company was discharged from the purview of SICA/BIFR as its net
worth had become positive as on 31.3.2009 but simultaneously
directions were issued by the same order that the unimplemented
provisions of the sanctioned scheme, if any, should be implemented by
the concerned agencies and their implementation would be monitored
by the petitioner. The final directions, as pointed out by learned senior
counsel for respondent No.1, are, however, limited in their scope as the
scheme is not sought to be reopened, the provisions of which are to
remain unchanged. The only change in the sanctioned scheme that may
need to be effected would be on the basis of the decision of the BIFR _____________________________________________________________________________________________
taken after notice to respondent No.1 and considering the response of
respondent No.1 in respect of its claims.
7. We have had the benefit of submissions of both the learned counsels for
the parties. The counsels have submitted before us that the exact
proposition of law as framed above is an unexplored terrain as there is
no direct pronouncement of the High Court or the Supreme Court in this
behalf though some judgements were referred to which may have
indirectly commented on the aspect in issue. It is also the common
cause of the parties that the AAIFR actually did not appreciate the
purport of the submissions and the correct question raised before it as
the issue was not one of applying the principles of Article 12 of the
Constitution of India to Section 19 of the SICA but the question to be
examined is as framed by us aforesaid.
8. The aforesaid being the position, we considered it appropriate to first to
hear the submissions of the learned senior counsel for respondent No.1
as to his plea that on a reading of Section 19 of the SICA, respondent
No.1 would be covered within the definition of "other authority".
Learned counsel fairly submitted before us that he was conscious of the
fact that the scope within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution
of India would be limited and the scope within Article 226 of the
Constitution of India would be wider in this behalf. It was, thus,
submitted that the question was not one as to whether the transaction in
question was in furtherance of any public duty but on the interpretation
of Section 19 (1) of the SICA.
9. Learned senior counsel for respondent No.1 submitted that Section 19
(1) of the SICA envisages a scheme for rehabilitation of the sick
company to be provided with financial assistance or sacrifices from: _____________________________________________________________________________________________
a. Central Government, State Government,
b. Any scheduled bank or other bank,
c. A public financial institution or State level institution or any
institution, or
d. Other authority.
10. Learned counsel also referred to the provisions of Section 3(1)(p) of the
SICA, which read as under:
"3. Definitions.
(1) In this Act, unless the context. otherwise requires, -
.... .... .... .... .... .... .... .... ....
(p) "State level institution" means any of the following institutions, namely :-
(i) State Financial Corporations established under section 3 or section 3A and institutions notified under section 46 of the State Financial Corporations Act 1951 (63 of 1951);
(ii) State Industrial Development Corporations registered under the Companies Act, 1956 (1 of 1956);
(iii) such other institutions, being companies and not being public financial institutions, engaged in the development or financing of industrial undertakings, as the Central Government may, by notification, specify :
Provided that no institution shall be so specified unless not less than fifty-one per cent of the paid-up share capital thereof is held by any State Government or Governments or by any institution or institutions mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) or partly by one or more public financial institutions or institutions mentioned in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) and partly by one or more State Governments."
11. It was, thus, submitted that while the expression „State level institution‟
used in Section 19 (1) of the SICA had been clearly defined, and the
expression „or any institution‟ must, thus, take colour from it, the
expression „other authority‟ has no similarity with the expression used
in Section 3 (1) (p) of the SICA.
12. All these entities aforesaid are collectively described as „the person
required by the scheme to provide financial assistance‟. (In order to _____________________________________________________________________________________________
indicate that the use of the phraseology „person‟ in other parts of
Section 19 of the SICA would include all these entities). Section 19 (1)
of the SICA makes no distinction between a secured and an unsecured
creditor. It gives certain special rights to a category of institutions as set
out therein irrespective of the fact that they have advanced any secured
or unsecured loans or carried out any other transaction.
13. Learned counsel submits that this Section is required to be broken into
four parts mentioned aforesaid. The expression "other authorities"
would have to have a reference to an entity other than an entity
mentioned in (a), (b) & (c) above and cannot stand alone. The
expression "other authority", it was submitted, will have to take colour
(a), i.e., the Central Government or State Government, as it does not fit
into the scheme of (b) or (c). It is in that context that the submission
was advanced that the expression "other authority" under Section 19(1)
will have the same meaning as in Article 12 of the Constitution of India.
The test whether a person or authority is discharging a public duty was
stated to be relevant in the context of maintainability of a remedy under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India but was not relevant in the
context of the meaning to be given to the expression "other authority"
and respondent No.1 being a creditor of a large amount of public money
was, thus, an "other authority" for purposes of Section 19 (1) of the
SICA and thus entitled to notice under Section 19 (2) of the SICA.
14. Learned counsel referred to the observations of the Constitution Bench
of the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of
Chemical Biology & Ors. (2002) 5 SCC 111 to emphasise the expansion
of the functions of the Government in a welfare State resulting in
forging of a new instrumentality or administrative device for handling _____________________________________________________________________________________________
these new problems which resulted in creation of public corporations as
observed in Sukhdev Singh Vs. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi
(1975) 1 SCC 421. Thus, it was held that neither the form of the
corporation, nor its ostensible autonomy would take away from its
character as „State‟ and its constitutional accountability under Part III
vis-à-vis the individual. In para 40 it was observed as under:
"40. The picture that ultimately emerges is that the tests formulated in Ajay Hasia Vs. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi (1981) 1 SCC 722 are not a rigid set of principles so that if a body falls within any one of them it must, ex hypothesi, be considered to be a State within the meaning of Article 12. The question in each case would be whether in the light of the cumulative facts as established, the body is financially, functionally and administratively dominated by or under the control of the Government. Such control must be particular to the body in question and must be pervasive. If this is found then the body is a State within Article 12. On the other hand, when the control is merely regulatory whether under statute or otherwise, it would not serve to make the body a State."
15. We may note at this stage itself that the emphasis is on an accountability
of such a State authority to rights conferred in Part III of the
Constitution of India.
16. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, canvassed before
us that respondent No.1 Company despite being a Government
Company was not covered within "other authority" in Section 19 (1) of
the SICA as it had entered into a mere commercial transaction in
pursuance to a purchase order. There were other companies sailing in
the same boat. A transaction which is purely commercial in nature
without any public function or duty attached to it does not entitle
respondent No.1 Company to interfere into the revival scheme of a sick
industrial company merely on the ground that it is a Government
Company and thus while entering into such a commercial transaction a
Government Company cannot seek a better dispensation by virtue of _____________________________________________________________________________________________
being a PSU. Learned counsel sought to draw strength from the
observations made in WP (C) No.7341/2009 titled National Small
Industries Corporation Limited Vs. Singer India Limited & Anr. decided
on 30.8.2010 (reported in 2010 (103) SEBI & Corporate Law 385
Delhi), which is a judgement of the Division Bench of this Court. It
could, however, not be disputed that the issue which was adjudicated
upon in that case is slightly different. A PSU had invested money in the
sick company in the form of share capital and it was held that such
investment could not be said to be a financial assistance to a sick
company by way of loan, advance, guarantee, sacrifice, relief or
concession by a financial institution. Such a PSU which invests in the
share capital would not come within the meaning of Section 19 (1) of
the SICA. The case being one of dilution of shareholding of the
petitioner therein in the sick company was held not to come within the
purview of Section 19 (1) of the SICA.
17. Learned counsel for the petitioner also referred to the judgement of the
Supreme Court in Life Insurance Corporation of India Vs. Escorts
Limited & Ors. (1986) 1 SCC 264 wherein it was observed in para 102
as under:
"102. For example, if the action of the State is political or sovereign in character, the court will keep away from it. The court will not debate academic matters or concern itself with the intricacies of trade and commerce. If the action of the State is related to contractual obligations or obligations arising out of the tort, the court may not ordinarily examine it unless the action has some public law character attached to it. Broadly speaking, the court will examine actions of State if they pertain to the public law domain and refrain from examining them if they pertain to the private law field. The difficulty will lie in demarcating the frontier between the public law domain and the private law field. It is impossible to draw the line with precision and we do not want to attempt it. The question must be decided in each case with reference to the particular action, the activity in which the State or the instrumentality of the State is engaged _____________________________________________________________________________________________
when performing the action, the public law or private law character of the action and a host of other relevant circumstances. When the State or an instrumentality of the State ventures into the corporate world and purchases the shares of a company, it assumes to itself the ordinary role of a shareholder, and dons the robes of a shareholder, with all the rights available to such a shareholder. There is no reason why the State as a shareholder should be expected to state its reasons when it seeks to change the management, by a resolution of the Company like any other shareholder."
(emphasis supplied)
18. Learned counsel submitted that undisputedly respondent No.1 is a
creditor of the petitioner Company having a claim of Rs.73.49 lakh. As
to how such a creditor is to be treated has to take its colour from Section
18 (3) (b) of the SICA which mandates circulation of the draft
rehabilitation scheme for knowledge of the creditors. There is no
mention of creditors in Section 19 (1) of the SICA. Respondent No.1
Company being an unsecured creditor would, thus, have to stand at the
end even in the event of winding up of the petitioner Company under
the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956. Out of the total dues which
were outstanding from the petitioner Company, the extent of dues
payable to respondent No.1 were 11.47 per cent and thus the sanctioned
scheme could not be interfered with on the pretext of a minority stake
qua the dues.
19. We may, once again, at this stage point out that the aforesaid plea is
really not of much relevance as the expressions used in Section 19 (1) of
the SICA are not in respect of unsecured or secured creditor but the
benefit of Section 19 (2) of the SICA being made available to the
entities envisaged under Section 19 (1) of the SICA.
20. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions
advanced by learned counsels for the parties. We are also conscious of
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
the fact that the impugned order does not reopen the chapter of the
sanctioned scheme which stands partly implemented and the petitioner
Company having come out of the woods. The rights in terms of the
impugned order have been given to respondent No.1 Company limited
to a hearing before the BIFR to examine as to how its debts are to be
treated keeping in mind that it is a PSU. However, the issue is not
whether a limited right is given or not but as to whether respondent
No.1 could fall within the definition of "other authority" as used in
Section 19 (1) of the SICA for it to enjoy certain special rights under
Section 19 (2) of the SICA even though it is an unsecured creditor.
Another connected question which would arise for consideration would
be whether the unpaid balance price for goods supplied would fall
within the definition of „Financial Assistance‟ by way of loans,
advances, or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices. For the
said purpose construction would have to be given to Section 19 of the
SICA.
21. In our view the provisions of Section 19 of the SICA are clear in their
terms reflecting the intent of the legislature and there is no need to give
it an extended meaning by seeking resort to provisions of Article 12 or
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The principles of literal
construction would apply in such a case. The plain, literal and
grammatical meaning have to be given effect to and if that is so done it
is not inconsistent with any expressed intention or declared purpose of
the SICA. The species specify in one category „a public financial
institution or State level institution or any institution or other authority‟.
The expression „any institution or other authority‟, thus, take their
colour from a „public financial institution or State level institution‟. _____________________________________________________________________________________________
22. We may also clarify that learned senior counsel for respondent No.1
was right in his contention that the bracketed portion of Section 19 (1)
of the SICA is for purposes of defining the expression „the person‟
required by the scheme to provide financial assistance when used in
other parts of the Section so that repeatedly it is not necessary to use
"any Government bank, institution or other authority required by a
scheme to provide such financial assistance". It is, thus, a defining
clause for the expression „the person‟.
23. Section 19 (1) of the SICA envisages the issue of financial assistance by
way of concession or sacrifices from certain entities and those entities
are, thus, required to have the benefit of the scheme being circulated and
the consent obtained under Section 19 (2) of the SICA. Thus, Central
Government and State Government are specifically mentioned in it.
Similarly, there is a mention of scheduled bank or other bank. After
„Central Government‟ there is a comma (,) whereafter the expression „a
State Government‟ is used, again breaking the sentence by a comma (,)
and thereafter „any scheduled bank or any other bank‟, which again is
followed by a comma (,). Thereafter the expression used in continuity
is „a public financial institution or State level institution or any
institution or other authority‟. We are, thus, unable to accept the plea of
learned counsel for respondent No.1 that the financial assistance by way
of concessions or sacrifices is from four different nature of entities as
canvassed. The different entities are broken up by inserting a comma (,)
and wherever similar nature of entities are there the expression used is
„or‟. Thus, the concessions or sacrifices are sought from:
a. Central Government,
b. State Government, _____________________________________________________________________________________________
c. any scheduled bank or other bank,
d. a public financial institution or State level institution or any
institution or other authority.
24. The petitioner cannot be permitted to break and create a separate
category of "other institution" when the word used is „or‟ prior to it.
The expression "other authority", thus, has to take a cue from the prior
expressions „a public financial institution or State level institution‟,
which is followed up by „or any institution or other authority‟ and must
be read ejusdem generis. The particular words in respect of the class,
category or genus are followed by the general words and thus must be
limited to things of the same kind as those specified. It is these nature
of institutions which fall within one category. The objective is also very
clear - these are institutions which may be providing financial
assistance in more manner than one to a sick company and may be
called upon to give concessions or sacrifices at the stage of
rehabilitation scheme.
25. Section 19 (1) of the SICA deals only with a provision made for
financial assistance by way of "loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs
or concessions or sacrifices" from the relevant entities. Thus, the words
"financial assistance" are qualified by such financial assistance only by
way of loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or
sacrifices. The unpaid price for goods supplied certainly does not fall
within the definition of a loan or an advance or a guarantee. The
question arises as to whether it would fall within a relief or concession
or sacrifice. In our view, the mode and manner of use of these words in
the provision make it clear that the last three words take their colour
from the nature of transactions reflected specifically in the first three _____________________________________________________________________________________________
words, i.e., they have to be read in ejusdem generis. A financial
assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees is a positive act by
which some more amount is given or guarantee is given for
rehabilitation of the company. On the other hand, reliefs, concessions,
sacrifices are acts where something is given up, i.e., in respect of loans,
advances, or guarantees by way of relief, concession or sacrifice. The
entity, thus, takes a lesser amount than due towards the loan, advance or
a guarantee. A pure commercial transaction of supply of goods and the
corresponding entitlement to recover the balance unpaid price would,
thus, not fall within this category and thus even otherwise the benefit of
the provisions of Section 19 (2) of the SICA are not available to
respondent No.1.
26. There is no doubt that respondent No.1 is a PSU. There is also no doubt
that there is no character of a public function attached to the transaction
in question which is a pure commercial transaction of sale of goods for a
price where part payment has been made and the remaining payment
undisputedly remains due. It is in that context that for the remaining
unpaid price respondent No.1 has been treated as an unsecured creditor
as it was not an entity which had lent any money against security. This
categorization of respondent No.1 under the heading of „unsecured
creditors‟ can, thus, not be doubted. It will make no difference that in
respondent No.1, being a PSU, the funds, control and management are
of the Central Government. The expression "other authority" cannot be
construed by clubbing it with „Central Government‟ or „State
Government‟ as it sought to be done by learned senior counsel for
respondent No.1 and thus there cannot be any question of taking any
colour from the meaning attached to "other authority" where that _____________________________________________________________________________________________
expression follows a different nature of expression used in Article 12 of
the Constitution of India for purposes of adjudication of rights in Part III
of the Constitution of India. In Article 12 of the Constitution of India
the expression "the State" has been included to define „Government and
Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of
the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India
or under the control of the Government of India‟ and the same have
been construed to include PSUs for that purpose. Similarly, the unpaid
price will not also fall within the definition of a financial assistance by
way of loans, advances or guarantees or reliefs or concessions or
sacrifices.
27. The pronouncements of the Supreme Court cited by both the learned
counsels for the parties in Pradeep Kumar Biswas Vs. Indian Institute of
Chemical Biology & Ors. case (supra) and Life Insurance Corporation
of India Vs. Escorts Limited & Ors. case (supra) have, in fact, a
common thread running through it which distinguishes the nature of
commercial transactions which may be carried out by PSUs merely as a
contracting party which are distinguishable from actions which have a
State character or where the rights under Part III of the Constitution of
India are enshrined.
28. We are, thus, of the considered view that respondent No.1 is not entitled
to be covered within the definition of "other authority" within the
meaning of Section 19 (1) of the SICA nor can the unpaid price be
categorized as financial assistance by way of loans, advances or
guarantees or reliefs or concessions or sacrifices and thus is not entitled
to the notice under Section 19 (2) of the SICA. Respondent No.1 is,
thus, liable to be treated as an „unsecured creditor‟, as has been done by _____________________________________________________________________________________________
the BIFR, and in view of the scheme which has been duly approved in
accordance with law the entitlement is restricted to 10 per cent of the
principal amount being in the category of an unsecured creditor. We
may notice that it was pointed out to us that the petitioner has not paid
even that amount but then learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out
that the said amount had to be paid at certain stages and the installment
of the same has been brought to the Court by learned counsel for the
petitioner.
29. The writ petition is accordingly allowed and the impugned order of the
AAIFR dated 12.10.2010 is set aside making the rule absolute.
30. Parties are left to bear their own costs.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
MAY 27, 2011 RAJIV SHAKDHER, J. b'nesh
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
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