Delhi High Court
M/S Nepc India Ltd. vs Capt. Kersy Ratonsha Driver on 2 May, 2011
Author: V. K. Jain
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 26.04.2011
Judgment Pronounced on: 02.05.2011
+ CS(OS) No. 2643/2008
M/S NEPC INDIA LTD. .....Plaintiff
- versus -
CAPT. KERSY RATONSHA DRIVER ....Defendant
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Plaintiff: Mr. Ajay Kr. Agarwal
For the Defendant: Mr. Janendra Lal and Ms. Yasmin
Tarapore
CORAM:-
HON'BLE MR JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported Yes
in Digest?
V.K. JAIN, J
1. This is a suit for recovery of Rs 50 lakhs as
damages alleged to have been suffered by the plaintiff on
account of illegally grounding of its aircraft, pursuant to an
order passed by Bombay High Court. The plaintiff-company,
which was earlier known as M/s NEPC Micon Limited,
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 1 of 23
claims to be the owner of Beach Craft King Air C-90-A
Aircraft having purchased it in the year 1995. Vide its
interim order dated 25th August, 2008, passed in Notice of
Motion No. 220 of 2007 in Writ Petition No. 2763 of 2003
filed by the defendant, seeking attachment, impounding and
sale of the above-referred aircraft, an order came to be
passed for attachment of the above-referred aircraft. The
case of the plaintiff is that the defendant had falsely alleged
before Bombay High Court that the aforesaid aircraft
belongs to Skyline NEPC Limited, whereas, in fact, it
belonged to the plaintiff-company. The aircraft came to be
attached at Delhi on 03rd October, 2008. The case of the
plaintiff is that it suffered huge losses and undue hardship
on account of attachment of the aforesaid aircraft and,
therefore, is entitled to damages amounting to Rs 50 lakhs
from the defendant.
2. The defendant has contested the suit and has
taken preliminary objections including that this Court has
no territorial jurisdiction to try the present suit.
3. The following issues were framed on the
pleadings of the parties:-
1. Whether the suit is barred in law as alleged in
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 2 of 23
preliminary objection No.1 of the written statement?
OPP
2. Whether the Delhi Court does not have territorial
jurisdiction to try the suit as alleged under
preliminary objection No.2 of the written statement?
OPP
3. Whether the plaint has been signed, verified and the
suit instituted by the competent person? OPP
4. Whether order of attachment of the aircraft of the
plaintiff company was obtained by the defendant by
playing fraud and on misrepresentation, as alleged
in the plaint? OPP
5. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any damages
from the defendant and, if so, to what amount? OPP
6. Relief.
Arguments have been heard on the issues of territorial
jurisdiction.
4. During the course of arguments, the learned
counsel for the plaintiff contended that in view of the
provisions contained in Section 16(f), 19 and 20(c) of the
Code of Civil Procedure, this Court has jurisdiction to try
the present suit.
5. Section 16 of the Code of Civil Procedure, to the
extent it is relevant, provides that suits for the recovery of
movable property actually under distraint or attachment,
shall be instituted in the Court within the local limits of
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 3 of 23
whose jurisdiction the property is situated.
6. This is not a suit for recovery of movable property.
Admittedly, the attachment of the aircraft has already been
revoked by the Bombay High Court. In the present suit, the
plaintiff is seeking recovery of damages on the ground that
the attachment was illegal as the aircraft belonged to it and
not to M/s Skyline NEPC Limited. Therefore, the suit is not
at all governed by the provisions of Section 16(f) of the Code.
7. Section 20(c) of the Code Civil Procedure provides
that subject to "the limitations aforesaid" every suit shall be
instituted in a Court within the local limits of whose
jurisdiction the cause of action, wholly or in part arises.
Section 19 of the Code, to the extent it is relevant, provides
that where a suit is for compensation for wrong done to
movable property, if the wrong was done within the local
limits of jurisdiction of one Court and the defendant resides
or carries on business, or personally works for gain, within
the jurisdiction of another Court, the suit may be instituted,
at the option of the plaintiff, in either of the said Courts. The
contention of learned counsel for the defendant is that since
the provisions of Section 20 of the Code, have been made
subject to limitations contained in other provisions, which
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 4 of 23
would include Section 19 thereof, clause (c) of Section 20
would not apply, in case Section 19 of the Code applies to
the present suit.
8. The learned counsel for the plaintiff has referred to
decision of Allahabad High Court in Rani Amrit Kuar vs
(Maharaja) Gur Charan Singh, AIR 1934 Allahabad 226,
wherein it was held that a suit related to movable property
can be filed in whose jurisdiction movable property is kept.
In the case before Allahabad High Court, the suit was filed
for recovery of documents comprising a Government
Promissory Note, a Mysore Bond and an FDR. In the
alternative, the plaintiff had sought a decree for recovery of
amount equivalent to the value of the aforesaid articles.
Since the provisions of Section 20(c) are subject to the
provisions of Section 16 to 19 of the Code and the present
suit is squarely covered by the provisions of Section 19 of
the Code, this judgment in my view can be of no help to the
plaintiff.
9. In Dalpatri Jhanjhnari vs. West End Watch Co.
Bombay AIR 1953 MB 38, the Court held that the provisions
of Section 20 of the Code are subject to the limitations of
Section 19 as is evident from the opening words "Subject to
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 5 of 23
the limitation aforesaid" used in Section 20 of the Code.
10. In State of Meghalaya & Ors. vs. Jyotsna Das,
AIR 1991 Gau 96, in a suit filed for compensation for wrong
done to the moveable property, the High Court held that the
provisions of Section 19 of the Code were clearly attracted
and the provisions of Section 20 which commences with the
words "Other suits to be instituted" and "subject to the
limitations aforesaid" would not be attracted for
determination of the forum, where the suit could be filed. It
was held that the above noted words in Section 20 clearly
means that if a suit was to be regulated by the provisions of
Section 19, the provisions of Section 20 would not come into
operation. In Sreepathi Hosiery Mills (P) Ltd. Calcutta &
Anr. vs. Chitra Knitting Co. Tirupur AIR 1977 Mad 259,
the defendants who were residents of Calcutta gave a
complaint against the goods manufactured by the plaintiff
and sent to Bombay for sale and consumption. Bombay
police took action on the complaint and seized goods of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff filed a suit for permanent damages for
loss of reputation and business on the ground that the
defendants had misled the police. The defendants
contended that the Court in Tirupur from where the goods
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 6 of 23
were sent to Bombay had no jurisdiction to entertain the
action. The trial Court took the view that in view of the
provisions of Section 19 of the Code, the suit could be
instituted either at the place where the defendant resided or
worked for gain or at the place where the wrong was
committed. The trial Court took the view that it had
jurisdiction to try the suit. The High Court, however, felt
that there was no way out of limitation as to jurisdiction
envisaged in Section 20 of the Code. The witness of the
plaintiff in that case had deposed that he had heard about
the alleged damage to the plaintiff. The High Court was of
the view that if it was to create or vest jurisdiction in Civil
Court, then Section 19 would be otiose.
11. The next question which comes up for
consideration is as to whether wrong to the aircraft of the
plaintiff was done in the jurisdiction of Bombay High Court
or in the jurisdiction of this Court. There is no dispute that
the order was passed by Bombay High Court situated at
Mumbai, whereas the distraint order in respect of the
aircraft in compliance of that order was executed in the
jurisdiction of this Court, since the aircraft at that time was
parked/stationed at Delhi.
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 7 of 23
Para 24 of the plaint which deals with the cause of
action to file the present suit reads as under:-
"That the cause of action for filing the
present suit arose on 25.8.2008, when the
High Court of Bombay passed interim
orders dated 25.8.2008 in Notice of Motion
No.220/2007 in Writ Petition No.2763 of
2003 filed by Defendant abovenamed,
ordered attachment, impounding and sale
of Beach Craft King Air C-90-A Aircraft
having Registration No. VT-NEI and
Certificate No. 2668 dated 31.5.1995.
That the cause of action is of continuing
nature as the Air-Craft belonging to the
Plaintiff Company is grounded under the
garb of the order dated 25.8.2008."
It would thus be seen that the plaintiff itself does not claim
that the cause of action arose in the jurisdiction of this
Court on account of the aircraft having been stationed in
Delhi at the time it was subjected to distraint order. In para
21 of the plaint, the plaintiff has specifically alleged that the
defendant is guilty of playing fraud in procuring the
impugned judgment and order dated 25th August, 2008 by
misrepresentation of facts.
12. Since the case of the plaintiff is that the aircraft
belonging to it was wrongfully got attached by the defendant
and, therefore, he is entitled to recover damages from the
defendant, this clearly is a suit for compensation for wrong
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 8 of 23
done to a movable property. Hence, if Section 19 of the
Code is applied, the suit, at the option of the plaintiff, can
be instituted either in the jurisdiction of the Court where
the wrong was done or in the jurisdiction of the Court where
the defendant resides or carries on business or personally
works for gain. Admittedly, the defendant does not reside,
carries on business or personally works for gain within the
local limits of the jurisdiction of this Court. Therefore, if the
suit is governed by Section 19 of the Code, it could have
been instituted only in the local limits of jurisdiction of the
Court where the wrong was done to its property.
13. It was contended by the learned counsel for the
defendant that the wrong in respect of the aircraft cannot be
said to have been caused in the jurisdiction of this Court
merely because at the time of its attachment/grounding by
the Civil Aviation Department in compliance of the order
passed by the Bombay High Court on 25 th August, 2008,
the aircraft was stationed/parked at Delhi. His contention
is that the wrong alleged to have been done to the aircraft
was done when the order dated 25 th August, 2008 came to
be passed by Bombay High Court on the basis of the
misrepresentation alleged to have been made by the
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 9 of 23
defendant with respect to the ownership of the aircraft. He
submitted that it also cannot be said that the alleged wrong
to the aircraft of the plaintiff-company was committed in the
jurisdiction of Bombay High Court where the order dated
25th August, 2008 for attachment of the aircraft was passed
as well as in the jurisdiction of this Court, where the aircraft
was stationed/parked at the time it was attached/ground
by the Civil Aviation Department. He pointed out that a
perusal of the order passed by Bombay High Court on 25th
August, 2008 in Notice of Motion No. 220 of 2007 in Writ
Petition No. 2763 of 2003 would show that it was Collector,
Mumbai Suburban District, who was directed to take all
steps for impounding and attachment of aforesaid aircraft.
A perusal of the communication dated 03 rd October, 2008
issued by Senior Airworthiness Officer, Civil Aviation
Department, Safdarjung Airport, Delhi would show that on
receipt of the order from Bombay High Court, Collector,
Mumbai Suburban District, approached the Civil Aviation
Department to distrain the aircraft immediately and
accordingly, the Director of Airworthiness requested the
Accountable Manager, Aerial Services Management, IGI
Airport, New Delhi that the aircraft is not to be released for
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 10 of 23
further flight from Delhi. The letter was written to Aerial
Services Pvt. Ltd. since the aircraft was maintained by that
company, as is evident from the communication dated 03 rd
October, 2008. It was thus pointed out that not only the
order of attachment was passed in the jurisdiction of
Bombay High Court even the communication to Civil
Aviation Department was issued within the jurisdiction of
that Court. In these circumstances, according to the learned
counsel for the defendant mere ministerial act of directing
the agency maintaining the aircraft not to allow the aircraft
to fly out of Delhi would not amount to causing wrong to the
aircraft in the jurisdiction of this Court.
14. The learned counsel for the plaintiff on the other
maintained that since the distraint order in respect of
aircraft came to be passed in Delhi, wrong to the aircraft
was done within the jurisdiction of this Court.
15. It cannot be disputed that once Bombay High
Court had passed an order for attachment of the aircraft,
the Civil Aviation Department, by which the aircraft was
grounded/attached, was performing only a ministerial act,
in compliance of that order. The Civil Aviation Department
was bound in law to dutifully carry out and obey the order
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 11 of 23
passed by the Bombay High Court and was, therefore,
required to attach/ground the aircraft irrespective of the
place where it was stationed/parked at the relevant time.
16. In The State of Maharashtra vs. Sarvodaya
Industries AIR 1975 Bom 197, the plaintiff had imported
raw material to Akola. Their grievance in the suit was that
their import of raw material was affected by an action taken
by defendant No.2 mala fide and without legal authority,
who stopped its movement and because of which their
business in Akola was affected and they suffered losses.
The raw material in that case was stopped in the
jurisdiction of Bhandara. Defendant No.2 was said to have
acted on behalf of and under the authority of defendant
No.1. It was held by the High Court that since the loss by
the plaintiff was suffered within the territorial limit of Akola
Court, though because of a wrongful intervention outside
the limits of the Court, Akola Court had jurisdiction to try
the suit. During the course of judgment, the High Court
inter alia observed as under:-
"It is clear that the phrase "wrong done" is
not used in any narrow sense but has to
be understood in all its amplitude so as to
afford forum and necessary relief. That
clearly taken in both cause and effect.
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 12 of 23
Injury or actual wrong may occur at place
A but its effect may be felt at places other
than „A‟ and may effect places „B‟ or „C‟ Act
or actions taking place at a given place
may still give rise at places quite different
and at all these places and for all those
effects, cause would arise seeking
compensation. Without resultant loss or
its proof restitution justice may not afford
any relief nor there could be any remedy in
vacuum. Thus the phraseology used by
Section 19 about "the wrong done" would
clearly take in not only the initial action
complained on but its result an effect...
...Mere allegation of wrong is not the whole
cause of action. It is the resultant effect
that furnishes cause of action. Therefore,
the damages that was suffered by the
plaintiff, was the part of the cause of
action i.e., "the wrong done" and that arose
within the jurisdiction of Akola Court.
Though therefore, the complaint of the
plaintiff was against the action by
defendant No.2 being without the limits of
Akola Court, it follows that as he was
affected by that action for all purposes in
his business within the jurisdictions of
that Court all the requirements of Section
19 of the Code have been fully answered
and the suit was properly laid in Akola
Court."
17. In State of Meghalaya & Ors. vs. Jyotsna Das
(supra), the plaintiff was carrying business in non-levy
cement at Silchar in Assam. The husband of the plaintiff
purchased 500 bags of cement from Gauhati and it was
transported from Gauhati to Silchar by road, which ran
through the State of Meghalaya. At the check post of
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 13 of 23
Umkiang Police in the State of Meghalaya, the trucks
carrying the cement were stopped and the cement was
unloaded or partly unloaded. In the process, the cement got
damaged. In a suit filed by the plaintiff for recovery of
damages, it was contended on behalf of State of Assam that
since the cause of action had arisen at Umkiang Police, the
territorial jurisdiction for the suit was with the Courts in
Meghalaya and the suit could not have been filed in Silchar
in the State of Assam. The submission of the plaintiff, on
the other hand, was that cause of action had partly arisen
at Silchar where the plaintiff had found the damaged goods
and therefore the Court had jurisdiction. The High Court
held that though the trucks had been stopped in the State
of Meghalaya, the plaintiff had found at Silchar that some of
the cements had been damaged and had become useless
and, therefore, the wrong was also done at Silchar where
the goods were delivered to the plaintiff and consequently
the suit for compensation could be filed within the
jurisdiction of the Court at Silchar.
18. In Appeal from Order No.75/2005 decided by
Bombay High Court on 15th March 2010, the plaintiffs, who
were transporters entered into contract with the Cooperative
CS(OS)No. 2643/2008 Page 14 of 23
Sugar Factory to move the molasses from their premises at
Osmanabad to their factory site in Aurangabad District.
When the trucks were transporting the goods, they were
detained by the respondent/defendant and an amount of
Rs.7 Lac was also recovered. A suit was filed for the
compensation for the wrong committed by the defendant.
The suit was filed before Civil Court at Aurangabad. The
trial Court was of the view that territorial jurisdiction to try
the suit vested in Civil Court at Osmanabad and returned
the plaint. It was held by the High Court that the cause of
action about the loss occurred at Aurangabad on account of
use of the vehicles at Aurangabad and therefore, the suit
could be filed within the jurisdiction of Civil Court at
Aurangabad, though the vehicles were detained at
Osmanabad. In taking this view, the High Court relied
upon the provisions of Section 19 of the Code.
19. In G.Ayyappan Pillai vs. State of Kerala & Anr.
ILR 2009 (2) Kerala 522, the appellant purchased teak wood
for construction of his house and was transporting them in
a lorry to the construction site in Kanayannur Taluk. The
lorry was intercepted at Karukutty Sales Tax check post.
Respondent No.2 refused permission to the appellant to
proceed further with the timber to its destination. He was
permitted to leave only on next date on payment of some
charges. A suit was filed for recovery of Rs.50,000/- on the
ground that the act of respondent No.2 was mala fide. The
suit was filed in the Court at Ernakulam. The respondent
contended that the Court at Ernakulam had no jurisdiction
since the incident occurred at Karukutty beyond its
territorial jurisdiction. In the plaint, it was stated that the
cause of action arose when respondent No.2 stopped the
lorry at Karukutty. The trial Court was of the view that the
Court at Ernakulam did not get territorial jurisdiction to try
the suit merely because the amount recovered from the
plaintiff/appellant was refunded under order of the Sales
Tax Officer at Ernakulam. Referring to Section 19 of the
Code, the Court was of the view that the suit could be filed
either at the place where wrong was done or at the place
where respondent was resided or carried on business or
personally worked for gain. The Court was of the view that
since the effect of the alleged wrongful act of respondent
No.2 was felt at Ernakulam as well, Section 19 of the Code
would apply and the Court within whose jurisdiction such
effect was felt also has jurisdiction to entertain the suit.
During the course of the judgment, the High Court inter alia
observed as under:-
"A "wrong" involves the violation of one‟s
right. "Wrong done" includes the effect of
the act and the resultant damage. If the
act does not lead to any consequence or
damage, such act may not be actionable.
Therefore, the phrase "wrong done"
occurring in Section 19 of the Code should
be understood as including the effect of the
act."
20. It is difficult to dispute that despite order of
attachment having been passed at Mumbai, wrong to the
aircraft was done partly at Delhi where the aircraft at the
relevant time was parked and an order of its grounding was
issued by Civil Aviation Department of Government of India.
In fact had the aircraft not been grounded, the plaintiff
might not have even sought damages from the defendant. It
was the actual grounding of the aircraft, prohibiting it from
flying out of Delhi, which is alleged to have been caused
pecuniary loss to the plaintiff, which could not utilize the
aircraft till the order of attachment was revoked by the High
Court. Even if the Court proceeds on the assumption that
wrong to the aircraft was done at Mumbai when the order of
attachment of aircraft was passed by the Mumbai High
Court, it is difficult to dispute that consequences of the
aforesaid order of the High Court ensured in Delhi where
the order was executed/implemented by
grounding/detaining the aircraft. Therefore, from whatever
angle I may take, it is difficult to dispute that the wrong to
the aircraft of the plaintiff was at least partly caused within
the jurisdiction of this Court. The issue therefore is decided
against the defendant and in favour of the plaintiff. The
issue is decided accordingly.
21. In Callipers Naigai Ltd. And Ors. vs Government
Of NCT Of Delhi And Ors., 2004 II AD (Delhi) 293, relied
upon by the learned counsel for the defendant, petitioner
No. 1 took a loan from respondent No. 3 M/s Pradeshiya
Industrial and Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. (PICUP).
The registered officer of petitioner No. 1 was situated at
Delhi and petitioner Nos. 2 and 3 who were guarantors for
the loan taken by petitioner No. 1 were also residing in
Delhi. PICUP, however, did not have any office in Delhi. A
recovery notice was issued by respondent No. 1 Assistant
Collector, Grade-I, Saket, New Delhi to the petitioners. The
respondent PICUP took an objection that this Court has no
territorial jurisdiction to hear the petition. Regarding issue
of recovery notice at Delhi, it was submitted by PICUP that
it was only a ministerial act which could not be subject
matter of a writ of Certiorari and if the petitioners were
aggrieved, they ought to go to Lucknow Bench of Allahabad
High Court which was the proper forum of adjudication of
the disputes raised in the petition. The recovery notice of
that case was issued by respondent No. 1 from Delhi on the
basis of a recovery certificate issued in Uttar Pradesh Public
Monies (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1972 which provided that in
case of default in repayment of loan, the Managing Director
of PICUP could send the certificate to the Collector
mentioning the sum due and requesting that such sum
together with costs of proceedings be recovered as it were
arrears of land revenue. The certificate sent to the Collector
is final subject to the exceptions provided in the Act.
Upholding the objection taken by PICUP, the petition was
dismissed by this Court. During the course of judgment,
this Court, inter alia, observed that the Collector, who
receives the recovery certificate has no role to play except to
recover the amount stated in the recovery certificate as
arrears of land revenue and he merely performs a
ministerial function without deciding any lis and the action
taken by him does not have the trappings of a quasi-judicial
services.
Similar view was taken by this Court in Yogesh
Saraf and Ors. vs. The Pradeshiya Industrial and
Investment Corporation U.P. Ltd. & Anr. 2005 (VIII) AD
(Delhi), 240 and it was held that mere recovery certificate
issued from Delhi does not form an integral part of cause of
action and does not vests territorial jurisdiction in the Court
where the recovery certificates are received for adjudication.
In Indo Gulf Explosives Ltd. & Anr. Vs. U.P.
State Industrial Devp. Corpn. & Anr. 79 (1999) DLT 193,
a demand notice was issued by UPSIDC threatening
recovery and forfeiture of the rights of the petitioner to run
their Industrial State Unit. The notice was received by the
petitioner at its registered office at New Delhi. It was alleged
in the writ petition that since the notice was received at New
Delhi, the cause of action had accrued within the territorial
jurisdiction of this Court, as notice was an integral part of
the whole transaction as also the cause of action. After
taking into consideration the decision of Supreme Court in
State of Rajasthan vs M/s. Swaika Properties and
Another AIR 1985 S.C.1289, a Division Bench of this Court
held that mere service of notice on petitioners‟ registered
office at Delhi would not be an integral part of the
transaction of cause of action.
However, in none of these cases, the property of
the petitioner was attached within the jurisdiction of this
Court and in none of them the Court examined the matter
in the light of the provisions contained in Section 19 of the
Code. Therefore, these judgments to my mind do not apply
to the factual situation prevailing before this Court.
22. In his written synopsis, the learned counsel for the
defendant also referred to Kusum Ingots & Alloys vs.
Union of India & Anr. (2004) 6 SCC 254 where it was
observed that if a small part of cause of action arises within
the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court, the same might
not be considered to be determinative factor compelling the
High Court to decide the matter on merits and in
appropriate cases, the High Court may refuse to exercise its
discretionary jurisdiction by invoking the doctrine of Forum
Conveniens. This judgment, however, is of no help to the
defendant since the wrong to aircraft of the plaintiff was
partly done in the jurisdiction of this Court when the
aircraft stationed/parked at Delhi airport was grounded,
which would give jurisdiction to the plaintiff to file the suit
within the jurisdiction of this Court. The learned counsel
also referred to Rashtriya Mahila Kosh vs. The Dale View
& Anr. 2007 IV AD (Del.) 593 where the Court was of the
view that it is a substantial part of cause of action. accrual
of which gives jurisdiction to this Court. Again this
judgment is of no help to the defendant since grounding of
the aircraft cannot be said to be a minor part of the cause of
action giving rise to the filing of the suit. The learned
counsel for the defendant has next referred to Lohia
Starlinger Ltd. & Anr. vs. Govt. of NCTD & Ors. 2006 V
AD (Del.) 732, where it was observed that even if a part of
cause of action arises, the Court may on the principle of
Forum Non Conveniens refuse to exercise jurisdiction.
These observations came to be made in a writ jurisdiction
and have no applicability where the statutory provisions
give discretion to the plaintiff to file the suit within the
jurisdiction of this Court. The learned counsel as lastly
referred to ABN AMRO Bank NV Vs. CBDT 131 (2006) DLT
248 (DB), which again was a writ petition and the Court was
of the view that merely because Mandamus was sought
against the authorities at Delhi, that would not give
jurisdiction to Delhi Courts when other reliefs can be
agitated effectively at Kolkata where the genesis in the
proceedings were conducted. Since this a suit covered by
Section 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure and wrong to the
property of the plaintiff was partly done in the jurisdiction of
this Court, it is difficult to say that this Court has no
jurisdiction to try the present suit.
23. In view of my finding on issue No.2, affidavit by
way of evidence be filed within four weeks. The parties to
appear before the Joint Registrar on 4th July 2011 for fixing
date for cross-examination of the witnesses of the plaintiff.
(V.K. JAIN)
JUDGE
MAY 02, 2011
bg/Ag
