Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 935 Del
Judgement Date : 17 February, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Date of Judgment: 17.02.2011
+ R.S.A.No.98/2008 & C.M.Nos. 6226/2008 (for stay) and
14819/2008 (for discharge of stay order)
M/S DELHI AUTOMOBILES & LTD. ...........Appellant
Through: Mr. Girdhar Govind, Advocate.
Versus
KISHAN GOPAL AHUJA & ANR. ..........Respondents
Through: Mr. Vijay Gupta, Advocate for
respondent No. 1
Mr. Sandeep Sethi, Sr. Advocate
with Mr. Syed Naqvi, Advocate for
respondent No. 2.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to
see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
Yes
INDERMEET KAUR, J. (Oral)
CM No. 754/2011 in R.S.A.No.98/2008
1 By way of this application, the appellant/defendant seeks an
amendment in the written statement which had been filed by him in
the present suit proceedings in the trial court. The present suit was a
suit for possession, mesne profits and damages. It had been filed on
01.06.2001. Written statement had been filed on 09.06.2001. Suit
was decreed in favour of the plaintiff on 23.04.2005. Regular First
Appeal (RFA) filed against the said proceedings had been dismissed on
13.03.2008. Present Regular Second Appeal (RSA) was filed on
25.04.2008. Present application seeking amendment of the written
statement had been filed on 10.01.2011 i.e. after a lapse of more than
one decade. These facts are admitted and not in dispute.
2 The amendments sought for in the present application are
contained in paras 4, 5 & 6. They read as under:-
"That on or about 01.07.1984, the owner of the premises added a mezzanine floor and the respondent landlord let the mezzanine floor existing in between the ground floor and the first floor of the building of which entrance was from the staircase existing in the main entrance to the building at a monthly rent of `2,050/- and thus a separate tenancy was created by the plaintiff in regard to the mezzanine floor. The parties agreed that the defendant shall pay the rent for the ground floor at the rate of `1,473/- per month and for the mezzanine floor at the rte of `2,050/- per month. Effective from 01.04.1985 the rent payable by the defendant was `1,583/- per month for the ground floor and `2,050/- for the mezzanine floor. From 01.04.1989 the rent payable was `1,628/- for the ground floor and `2,150/- per month for the mezzanine floor. From 01.04.1990 the parties agreed that the defendant shall pay at rent at the rate of `1,856/- for the ground floor and at the rate of `2,300/- per month for the mezzanine floor.
That the defendant company was not functioning for four/five years in a regular manner. The notice alleged to have been sent by the plaintiff was not tendered nor received by the defendant nor by its any Director, Chairman or the principle officer. The alleged signatures on the A.D. is not of any authorized person.
That the plan also shows that the mezzanine floor let to the defendant has a separate and independent entrance from the staircase located in the lobby (main entrance). The defendant is a tenant in respect of ground floor and mezzanine floor. As stated in the preliminary objection there are two separate tenancies and the amount of rent payable in respect of both the tenancies is `1,856/- per month for the ground floor and `2,300/- per month for the mezzanine floor. The site plan supplied to the defendant shows that there are two separate premises constituting two separate tenancies."
3 By way of this amendment what the defendant seeks to
incorporate in the written statement is to state that there was a
distinct and separate tenancy for the ground floor as also for the
mezzanine floor; rate of rent of the ground floor and mezzanine floor
was also distinct and separate; for the ground floor, the rate of rent
was `1,856/- per month whereas for the mezzanine floor, the rate of
rent was `2,300/- per month. He has further sought to incorporate a
submission that the defendant company was not functioning for the
last 4-5 years; notice had not been served upon the company. In para
7 it has been stated that the amendments are in the nature of an
explanation/narration in the written statement and do not change the
character of the suit; no new defence has been raised; these
amendments are necessary to decide the real controversy in question.
4 Application is vehemently opposed. 5 The original written statement filed 10 years ago has been
perused. In this written statement, a specific contention has been
raised that on 01.07.1984, the owners of the premises had added a
mezzanine floor and it had been agreed that separate rent would be
paid for the ground floor and separate rent would be paid for the
mezzanine floor; there was a clear and categorical averment that there
are two separate tenancies qua the ground floor and the mezzanine
floor; the rate of rent was Rs.1,856/- per month for the ground floor
and Rs.2,300/- was being paid per month for the mezzanine floor. In
para 3 of the original written statement, there was a specific denial
about the receipt of the notice dated 09.05.2001; it had been denied
that any such notice has been received.
6 The perusal of the original written statement with the
amendment application (which seeks to incorporate new pleas by way
of this application) shows that these pleas have already been taken in
the original written statement. Even presuming that this application is
allowed as on date, it will not serve any purpose as this has been the
defence of the defendant in the original written statement; there is
nothing more either added or subtracted.
7 Learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance upon AIR
2009 SC 2544 Sushil Kumar Jain Vs. Manoj Kumar & Anr. as also
upon 30 2009 (9) Scale Olympic Industries Vs, Mulla Hussainy Bhai
Mulla Akberally & Ors. to support his submissions that mere delay is
not sufficient to refuse to allow amendment of pleadings; wherever a
good case is made out, the court should allow the amendment.
8 Arguments have been countered by learned counsel for the
respondent. Attention has been drawn to the proviso of Order 6 Rule
17 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the „Code‟)
(which stood amended by the Amendment Act, 2002). It is pointed out
that there is not a whisper in the present application that after the
exercise of "due diligence", the defendant had been prevented from
making this amendment in the courts below. It is submitted that this
statutory provision itself bars the prayer made in the present
application. Reliance has also been placed upon JT 2011 (1) SC 315
Gayathri Womens Welfare Association Vs. Gowramma & Anr. wherein
the Apex Court had indicated that one of the circumstances which
must be taken into consideration before an amendment is granted is
the delay in making the application for such an amendment and if it
is made, at the appellate stage, the reason why it was not made in the
trial court. In this case, the amendment which had been permitted by
the High Court of the counter claim had been set aside.
9 This is a second appeal Court. The date of filing of original
written statement and the present application seeking an amendment
shows that there was an intervening gap of more than one decade.
That apart as already noted supra, the amendments sought for clearly
show that this is only a delaying tactic on the part of the
appellant/defendant as the pleas now sought to be incorporated
already form a part of his written statement; neither is there any
submission nor there is new fact sought to be brought on record.
There is also no explanation whatsoever on the point of delay.
10 There is no dispute that the amendment of pleadings can be
allowed at any stage and if need be, even at the second appeal stage.
However, each case depends upon on its facts; essential requisites are
that the application must overcome the hurdle of delay in making the
application; the reasons thereof should be given; there should be no
prejudice to other side. None of these has been adhered to. There is
not a single averment in the body of this application as to why this
amendment was not sought earlier while the proceedings were
pending in the trial court or even before the first appellate Court. That
apart as already aforenoted this amendment would serve no purpose.
11 The result is that the application is liable to be dismissed. It is
accordingly dismissed.
R.S.A.No.98/2008
12 This second appeal has impugned the judgment and decree
dated 13.03.2008 which has confirmed the findings of the trial Judge
dated 23.04.2005 whereby the suit filed by the plaintiff Kishan Gopal
Ahuja seeking possession of the suit property and arrears of rent had
been decreed in his favour. The suit premise is bearing No. 3/15-A,
Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi. The plaintiff is undisputedly the owner
landlord of the suit property. The defendant had been let out this
property in the year 1959. The contention was that it was monthly
tenancy. The ground floor and the mezzanine floor had been given to
the defendant. They had defaulted in payment of rent. They had
refused to vacate the suit property inspite of legal notice dated
09.05.2001 terminating its tenancy w.e.f. 10.05.2001. Suit was
accordingly filed.
13 The defence of the defendant as is evident from the written
statement is that there are two separate tenancies i.e. of the ground
floor and the mezzanine floor and separate rent was being paid for
each of the two distinct tenancies. It was stated that the civil Court
has no jurisdiction as bar of Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act,
1958 (hereinafter referred to as the „DRCA‟) is attaracted rent being
below `3,500/- per month. Ownership of the plaintiff was not
disputed.
14 On the pleadings of the parties, following five issues were
framed:-
"1. Whether the separate tenancies were created in respect of ground floor and mezzanine floor and in view of the same whether the present suit is barred under Delhi Rent Control Act? OPD
2. Whether the present suit is bad for non-joinder of the necessary parties? OPD
3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the decree for recovery of possession as claimed? OPP.
4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the pendentelite and future mesne profits as claimed? OPP.
5. Relief."
15 Trial Judge on the basis of oral and documentary evidence
which included the statement of PW-1 and deposition of DW-1 held
that there was single tenancy which had been created by the plaintiff
in favour of the defendant; rent was being paid by a single cheque; the
documents Ex. PW-1/2 and Ex. PW-1/3 which were the covering
letters tendering the rent had advanced this submission. DW-1 had
himself admitted that the rent of the whole premises was being paid to
the plaintiff by way of a single cheque. The cross-examination of PW-1
by the defendant‟s counsel was also to the effect that the cheques
were being sent to the plaintiff by a single cheque.
16 While dealing with issue No. 2, the Court had returned a finding
that the defendant had attorned to plaintiff No. 2; a single co-owner
can also file a suit without impleading other co-owners. This legal
proposition is not disputed before this Court even today.
17 On the receipt of notice, the Court had returned a finding that
the legal notice dated 09.05.2001 (Ex. PW-1/5) was a valid
termination of the tenancy of the defendant under the provisions of
Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as
the „TPA‟). The postal receipts had been exhibited as Ex. PW-1/6 &
Ex. PW-1/7. UPC receipt was also exhibited as Ex. PW-1/8. AD Card
receipt was Ex. PW-1/10. This bore the signature of one Ghani. There
was no specific denial by the defendant that no person by the name of
Ghani had worked with it or that Ex. PW-1/10 was not signed by his
employee. The trial Judge had also noted that the defendant had not
denied the receipt of notice at the residence of Chairman/MD. Receipt
of notice had been validly proved.
18 These fact findings of the trial Judge had been affirmed by the
first appeal court. It had been reaffirmed that the tenancy was a
month to month tenancy. The rent had been tendered by the
defendant to Kishan Gopal Ahuja and Arjun Lal Ahuja. The
arguments urged before this Court that the mezzanine floor was
constructed in the year 1984, had also been gone into in the
impugned judgment. It was noted that it was never the case of the
defendant that there was a floor between the ground floor and the first
floor which was later on let out to the defendant by means of any oral
tenancy; mezzanine floor was already in existence at the time when
the premises had been let out to the defendant; PW-1 in his cross-
examination had clarified that this mezzanine floor was in existence at
the time of letting out of the premises upon which the defendant had
made channels and wooden plans unauthorizedly. The first appellate
court had also noted a fact finding that there was no separate floor
which was let out separately to the defendant and the mezzanine floor
constructed subsequently was a part of the premises which had been
let out to the defendant. There were no two separate and distinct
tenancies; there was a single tenancy; a single cheque was being paid
by the defendant and being received by the plaintiff for the suit
property. Documentary evidence including Ex. PW-1/3 & Ex. PW-1/4
had been adverted to. The defendant had also attorned to Radha Rani
after the death of Arjun Lal; suit filed by a single co-owner was also
maintainable.
19 This is a second appeal Court. It is not a third fact finding
Court. The fact findings have been delved into in detail after scrutiny
of both oral and documentary evidence. It had been established and
proved before the courts below that a single tenancy of the suit
property had been created by the plaintiff in favour of the defendant
for which a single cheque of rent was being paid; it was a monthly
tenancy. Legal notice dated 09.05.2001 had validly terminated the
tenancy of the defendant; it was duly received by the defendant. The
suit for possession and mesne profits was rightly decreed in favour of
the plaintiff.
20 It calls for no interference. At this stage, it is also relevant to
state that three applications had been preferred by the appellant
before the first appellate court; an application under Order 6 Rule 17
of the Code, the second application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the
Code to lead additional evidence and the third application under
Section 151 of the Code directing the plaintiff to file the lease
agreements dated 24.02.1956 and 25.08.1959. All the aforenoted
applications had been dismissed. The application seeking amendment
had been dismissed on the premise that the plea sought to be
incorporated by way of the amendment was already a part of the
written statement which was on the plea of a monthly tenancy. The
application under Order 41 Rule 27 of the Code was dismissed as it
was noted that this provisions cannot be used to fill in any lacuna.
The third application which was an application under Section 151 of
the Code directing the plaintiff to place on record two lease deeds had
also been dismissed on the ground that the tenancy was a monthly
tenancy. Further even if there was any discrepancy in the dates of
termination, in view of provisions of Section 106 of the TPA (which
stood amended by the amendment of 2002 applicable to pending
matters), the requirement of co-incidencing of dates was no longer
necessary.
21 The substantial questions of law have been formulated at page
6 of the body of the appeal. They read as follows:-
"1. Whether the payment of rent of two different tenancies of two different tenanted portion for convenience of Land Lord, would extinguish two different tenancies and make it a single tenancy?
2. Whether the matter which was within the jurisdiction of Delhi Rent Control Act could be entertained by a Civil Court?
3. Whether the tenancy of Limited Company could be taken as terminated by determining the signatures of some stranger on A.D. Card?
4. Whether the tenancy could be terminated by a notice sent by not all the co-owners of Property without having the consent or permission of remaining co-owners?
5. Whether the suit could be filed by only two co-owners, without joining all the co-owners or without having the consent and knowledge or authorization of all the co-owners.
6. Whether the Court could assume and presume on its own the rate of mesne profit without there being any evidence of the plaintiff claiming the mesne profits on a particular rate and admittedly leading no evidence?"
22 They are all facts based.
23 No substantial question of law having arisen; this appeal as also
pending applications are dismissed in limine.
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
FEBRUARY 17, 2011
A
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