Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 747 Del
Judgement Date : 8 February, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP(C) No.11851/05 & WP(C) No.11854/05
% Date of Reserve : 13th January, 2011
Date of Pronouncement: 08th February,2011
1. WP(C) No.11851/05
MOOLCHAND KHAIRATI RAM HOSPITAL & AYURVEDIC RESEARCH
INSTITUTE ...... Petitioner
Through: Mr. M.Y.Khan, Advocate
VERSUS
VIJENDER SINGH & ORS. ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. Atul T.N., Advocate
2. WP(C) No.11854/05
MOOLCHAND KHAIRATI RAM HOSPITAL & AYURVEDIC RESEARCH
INSTITUTE ...... Petitioner
Through: Mr. M.Y.Khan, Advocate
VERSUS
VIJENDER SINGH & ORS. ...... Respondents
Through: Mr. Atul T.N., Advocate
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
1. Two Writ Petitions between the same parties are being
disposed of by this common judgment. Writ Petition No.11851/2005 is
filed by the Management challenging the impugned order dated 1.12.2004
by which the complaint under Section 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (the Act) filed by the respondent no.1/workman was allowed holding
the termination of the workman to be illegal as the workman was found to
be a protected workman. By the Writ Petition No.11854/2005 challenge is
laid to the impugned order dated 24.2.2005 whereby the application of
the Management seeking approval of the action of the dismissal of the
workman under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act was dismissed. The impugned
order dated 1.12.2004 is the detailed order and the impugned order dated
24.2.2005 is a short order which only dismisses the application of the
Management on the ground that the workman's complaint under Section
33A of the Act was allowed.
2. The only real issue which is called for determination in the
present case is as to whether the workman becomes a protected workman
as per Section 33 read with Rule 61 of the Rules under the Act if within a
period of 15 days of intimation having been given by the Union there is no
response by the Management, and consequently, the workman
automatically gets the status of a protected workman. Putting it
differently, is the workman not a protected workman unless an order is
passed by an appropriate authority under Rule 61(4) although the
Management fails to respond to the notice issued to it under Rule 61(2).
3. So far as this Court is concerned, the issue is no longer res
integra and has been pronounced upon by two decisions of two learned
single Judges of this Court in the judgments reported as Sunder Lal Jain
Hospital Karamchari Union vs. UOI, 95(2002) DLT 640; 2002 LLR
17 and Batra Hospital & Medical Research Centre vs. Batra
Hospital Employees Union, 111 (2004) DLT 801. Both the decisions
in the cases of Sunder Lal Jain Hospital and Batra Hospital (supra)
hold that the workman becomes a protected workman if no response is
sent by the Management under Rule 61(2) within 15 days of the receipt of
the notice from the union. It has been held that by virtue of Rule 61(2)
onus is on the Management to respond within 15 days and the legal
provisions do not envisage a reversal of roles i.e. the Management
proposing and the Union disposing.
4. In the facts of the present case, it has been established on
record that the Union gave the notice to recognize the workman as a
protected workman by notice/list dated 21.2.2000. There cannot be any
cavil that there was no response by the Management to deny the
entitlement of the workman to be a protected workman and nor was any
other challenge laid to the notice/list dated 21.2.2000 on any other
ground of Section 33 read with Rule 61. Applying therefore the ratio of
the decisions in the cases of Sunder Lal Jain Hospital and Batra
Hospital (supra), the workman became a protected workman for the
relevant period and it cannot be disputed that with respect to a protected
workman, a subsequent approval cannot be sought for under Section
33(2)(b) and what was required was a prior permission under Section
33(3) of the Act. The Trial Court has also held accordingly relying upon
the decision in the case of Batra Hospital (supra) and also referring to
the provision of Section 33(3) of the Act. I therefore do not find any
violation of law or gross perversity in the impugned order dated 1.12.2004
to call for interference by this Court in exercise of its powers under
Articles 226 and 227 of Constitution of India. The petitioner is also not
correct in submitting that a detailed order ought to have been passed
dismissing an application under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act and the
application of the Management could not have been dismissed by the
short order dated 24.2.2005 which simply relied upon the factum of
allowing of the application of the workman under Section 33A of the Act.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner sought to urge firstly that
the order of the Assistant Labour Commissioner dated 14.6.2000 declaring
the workman to be a protected workman is an order without jurisdiction
because as per Rule 61(4) such an order could only have been passed by
the Regional Labour Commissioner(Central) or the Assistant Labour
Commissioner(Central) whereas the order dated 14.6.2000 is passed by
the Assistant Labour Commissioner of the Government of National Capital
Territory of Delhi. This contention in my opinion is clearly misconceived
though it may appear on the first blush to be a valid argument because
the provision of Rule 61(4) refers only to the Regional Labour
Commissioner (Central) or the Assistant Labour Commissioner (Central)
and not to any of the State Authority, however, the officers/authorities
stated under Rule 61(4) are not the only authorities which can pass
necessary orders inasmuch as under Section 39 of the Act there can be
delegation of powers to the State Authorities. I note that before the
Assistant Labour Commissioner no such objection was raised by the
management questioning the jurisdiction of the Assistant Labour
Commissioner to pass the order dated 14.6.2000 declaring the workman
to be a protected workman and therefore, there was no opportunity to the
workman to rebut such stand and nor for the Assistant Labour
Commissioner to deal with it. In fact, it is very much possible that the
Central Government would have delegated its powers under Section 39 of
the Act to the State Authority/Officer and which therefore must have
passed the order dated 14.6.2000. I also note that this issue was also not
raised in response to the complaint filed by the workman under Section
33A of the Act. I therefore reject the contention that the order passed on
14.6.2000 by the Assistant Labour Commissioner is an order in violation of
Rule 61(4) and hence the workman could not be said to be a protected
workman. In any case, in view of the decisions in the cases of Sunder
Lal Jain Hospital and Batra Hospital (supra) it is the non-response to
the notice under Rule 61(2) by the Management within the statutory
period of 15 days which gives the deemed status of a protected workman
and the Management cannot argue that although it did not challenge the
notice/list sent by the Union seeking protected status to a workman, yet it
can claim that the workman was not a protected workman.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner also sought to place
reliance upon various decisions including that of a Division Bench of the
Madras High Court in the case reported as N.Parathasarathy vs. Blue
Star Ltd. 2000 LAB IC 1081 in support of the proposition that there is
no automatic status to a protected workman merely because the
Management does not respond within 15 days. So far as this Court is
concerned, I am bound by the earlier decisions of this Court in the cases
of Sunder Lal Jain Hospital and Batra Hospital (supra) and therefore
the decision in the case of N.Parathasarathy will not be applicable.
Reliance is also placed upon certain points and judgments in the written
arguments however, none of these were relied upon during the course of
hearing and therefore I refuse to rely upon the same because the
workman's counsel had no opportunity to meet the same. In any case,
the additional point raised and the judgments cited would not have
bearing to the facts of the present case in view of the decisions in the
cases of Sunder Lal Jain Hospital and Batra Hospital (supra).
7. In view of the above, I do not find any merit in the petitions,
which are therefore dismissed, leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
February 08, 2011 VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J. ak
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