Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 598 Del
Judgement Date : 2 February, 2011
R-154 & R-15A
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment Reserved on: 31.01.2011
Judgment Delivered on: 02.2.2011
+ RSA No.26/2004 & CM No.5863/2010
M/S THY NEELKANT ENTERPRISES PVT. LTD.
...........Appellant
Through: Mr.Raman Kapur, Advocate.
Versus
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..........Respondent
Through: Ms.Sangeeta Chandra, Advocate.
AND
RSA NO.74/2004, CM No.3692-93/2004
DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY ..........Appellant
Through: Ms.Sangeeta Chandra, Advocate.
Versus
M/S THY NEELKANT ENTERPRISES PVT. LTD.
...........Appellant
Through: Mr.Raman Kapur, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE INDERMEET KAUR
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to
see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?
Yes
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
1. These are cross appeals filed by the Delhi Development
Authority (hereinafter referred to as „the DDA‟) on the one hand
and M/s Neelkanth Enterprises (hereinafter referred to as „the
plaintiff‟) on the other. Both have impugned the judgment and
decree dated 6.10.2003. This judgment had modified the judgment
of the trial judge dated 25.9.2001. Vide judgment and decree
dated 25.9.2001 the suit filed by the plaintiff Neelkanth
Enterprises seeking perpetual injunction against the DDA
restraining them from cancelling his auction bid and not acting
upon the letter dated 7.6.1983 (which was against the interest of
the plaintiff) was decreed in his favour. Vide the impugned
judgment and decree the finding of the trial court was modified
and the plaintiff had been directed to pay interest on the sum of
Rs.1,09,20,000/- which had been deposited by him (admittedly
after the stipulated dates) till the date of actual payment; which
interest would be determined by the DDA.
2. The factual matrix is not in dispute. The plaintiff, a duly
incorporated company, had bid at the public auction held on
09.11.1982 by the DDA. The subject matter of the auction was a
cinema-cum-commercial plot measuring 1750 sq. metre, Wazirpur
Industrial Area. Plaintiff was the highest bidder; his bid was
accepted on the spot and he had paid initial earnest money of
Rs.27,30,000/- on the same date. His bid having been accepted he
was issued the allotment letter dated 14.12.1982. Plaintiff was
required to pay the balance amount of Rs.81,90,000/- by 14.3.1983.
Contention of the plaintiff was that since the land was not
developed; there being no sewerage, electricity or water
connection, the plaintiff would not be in a position to carry out the
construction at the site, which in terms of their auction bid
mandated that the plaintiff would construct the building at the site
within two years from the date of the acceptance of the bid.
Accordingly, the plaintiff made representations dated 21.2.1983
and 14.3.1983 pointing out these discrepancies. No reply was
given. On 7.6.1983 the defendant extended time to the plaintiff to
deposit his amounts along with interest @18% per annum, or else
his bid would be cancelled.
3. Present suit was accordingly filed. In the course of the suit
proceedings under orders of the Court the plaintiff had deposited
the next 25% of the bid amount which was Rs.27,40,000/- on
14.07.1992. On 27.12.1999, the balance 50% of the bid amount
was, again under the orders of the court, deposited.
4. The contention of the DDA is that the parties had entered
into a contract in terms of the terms and conditions of the bid
document (page 105 of the paper book). 25% of the payment was
deposited on the fall of hammer which was on the date of the
auction i.e. 09.11.1982. However, further payment had not been
made as per the stipulated dates which had expired on 14.3.1983;
thereafter extension of time also stood expired on 12.6.1983. The
defendant is not bound to honour this commitment as the plaintiff
willfully defaulted in making the payment as per the terms of the
contract. Clause 10 of the said terms and conditions of the
auction bid entitles the department to forfeit the earnest money. It
is pointed out that the department is not bound by the terms of the
contract. Counsel for the department has placed reliance upon
105 (2006) DLT 829 Deluxe Estates (P) ltd. Vs. DDA as also another
judgment of the Division Bench of this court reported in 69(1997)
DLT 716(DB) Aggarwal Associates (Promoters)Ltd Vs. DDA & Anr.
to support his submission that where the plaintiff himself had failed
to adhere to the schedule of payments, the DDA could not be
restrained from cancelling the auction bid; the earnest money is
also liable to be forfeited. For the same proposition reliance has
been placed upon 126(2006) DLT 475 (Division Bench) DDA Vs.
Prem Rani & Ors. as also 63(1996) DLT 467 (Division Bench)
K.Bhattacharjee Vs. DDA.
5. Arguments have been countered. Attention has been drawn
to the definition of "nazul land" as contained in Section 2(i) of the
DDA (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules 1981. Reference
has also been invited to Section 22 of the DDA Act. It is pointed
out that "nazul land" necessarily means developed land; in this
case both the fact finding courts have noted and observed that the
land in question was not developed; the impugned judgment had
recorded that the peripheral services were not available. It is
submitted that in the absence of essential services i.e. water,
electricity and sewerage not being available at the site it would not
have been possible for the plaintiff to complete the site within two
years of the auction bid; it was in these circumstances, that the
plaintiff was constrained to move representations seeking
extension of time which had arbitrarily been rejected. Counsel for
the appellant has placed reliance upon 2004 II AD Raj Kumar Vs.
DDA , 2002 V AD (Delhi) 592 Surender singh Oberio Vs. DDA and
1991 RLR (Note) 47 Reliable Lab (P) Ltd. Vs. DDA to support in
stand.
6. Record has been persued.
7. The dates as aforenoted are admitted. The bid document on
the basis of which, the plaintiff had bid laid down clear terms and
conditions. The terms and conditions were for the auction of a
commercial plot for a Cinema Hall at the Community Centre,
Wazirpur Industrial Area. Much emphasis has been laid on the
word „development‟ which finds mention in the title of the
document and which reads as follows:
„DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF AUCTION OF CINEMA PLOT IN COMMUNITY CENTRE AT WAZIRPUR (INDUSTRIAL AREA) UNDER THE DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (DISPOSAL OF DEVELOPED NAZUL LAND) RULE 1981"
The word "developed"; has reference to the Nazul Land
Rules and the reference to the word "developed" is in this context
alone.
8. Clause 10 of this document stipulates as under:
"10. As person fails to pay the balance amount of his bad to the Authority within fifteen days of acceptance of the bid or within such period as may have been specified otherwise in accordance with the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of Developed Nazul Land) Rules, 1981, shall forfeit the earnest money and it shall be competent for the Vice-Chairman to re-auction the plot."
9. Clause 18 reads as follows:
"Within a period of two years from the date of acceptance of the bid, the successful bidder shall, at his own expense construct building at the site for the purpose of a cinema with new and sound materials and shall complete the water, sanitary and electrical installations required for the said building."
10. Admittedly, the bid of the plaintiff was lowest; his bid had
been accepted; the agreed auction amount was of Rs.1,09,00,000/.
On 09.11.1982, the earnest money of Rs.27,30,000/- was deposited
by the plaintiff. The balance payments had not been made as per
the payment schedule. The contention of the plaintiff that he was
not liable to make the payment as the land had not been developed
and the bid document also making a reference to the developed
land which is also clear from the definition of nazul land under
Section 2(i) of the Delhi Development Authority (Disposal of
Developed Nazul Land) Rules as also Section 22 of the DDA Act,
1957 is an argument without any merit.
11. The two Courts below were the two fact findings Courts.
Seven issues had been framed by the trial judge. Oral and
documentary evidence had been adverted to. Trial judge was of
the view that since the land was not developed and the contract of
electricity, water and sewerage had been given only after the date
of auction, the plaintiff was entitled to the decree as prayed for by
him.
12. The impugned judgment had however held otherwise.
Para 15 is relevant; it reads as follows:
"15.The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the plaintiff was well aware of the state of the land under auction as it was not reasonable that no inspection would have been carried out before bidding and that therefore it is not of much significance whether or not the land was developed or not, since the obligations of the parties rested on contract. If development is to be defined as provisions of peripheral services, then on the evidence on record, most certainly, on the date of auction, the land was not developed. However, the purpose of the auction was also to ensure development-as open vacant lands were to be utilized for the planned development of Delhi for use as per the Master Plan. Thus, commercial sites earmarked were auctioned also for development of the area as per specific land use to prevent the haphazard growth of the city. Nowhere in the invitation for bids, or in the contract was it mentioned that the DDA was auctioning the plots after having developed the peripheral services. Nor was such a promise held out that such services had already been provided or would be provided within a specific period. Moreoever, the auction bidder had every opportunity to inspect the site before bidding and having known the conditions and in the absence of any terms in the contract, it cannot be said that the
DDA was bound to provide these services before, any obligation could be enforced on the plaintiff. As rightly submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant, it was open to the plaintiff to not bid for the plot it if found that the plot was undeveloped. Having consciously entered into the contract, the plaintiff was bound to discharge its obligations under the contract. The state of development, or rather the lack of it, cannot be absolve the plaintiff from its duties under the contract."
13. The impugned judgment had rightly concluded that the
purpose of the auction was to ensure development; open
vacant lands were to be utilized for the planned development
of the Delhi as per the Master Plan. The bid document had
imposed no condition upon the DDA; the said terms and
conditions nowhere stated that it only after the provision of
electricity, water, sewerage and other facilities is made
available, will the bidder deposit the balance amounts. The
bid document is running into 28 Clauses. There is no such
mention. The specific dates of payment are however
contained therein. Clause 9 stipulated that after the
acceptance of the bid , the bidder will be informed of such
acceptance in writing and the bidder shall within 90 days
thereof pay to the DDA the balance amount of the bid in cash
or by bank draft. Admittedly this communication in writing
was the allotment letter dated 14.12.1982 issued by the
defendant to the plaintiff. The balance amounts were not
deposited by the plaintiff as per schedule. Clause 10
stipulated that in an eventuality where the bidder would not
make the payment of the balance amount of his bid within 15
days of his acceptance or such extended period as specified,
his earnest money shall be forfeited. Clause 11 stipulated
that the successful bidder will submit a dully filled in
application. This application had been submitted by the
plaintiff on 09.11.1982 itself (page-57 of the documents of
the respondent). Unequivocal undertaking signed by the
plaintiff inter alia reads as follows:
"I/We have read and understood the conditions of auction and those contained in the proforma of the perpetual lease deed and hereby unequivocally accept the same. I/we the intending purchaser(s) will pay the balance of the premium and other amounts and execute the lease deed in the prescribed form in accordance with the said conditions."
14. On 09.11.1982 when the plaintiff had deposited 25% of the
bid amount and had undertaken to pay the balance amount; he was
well aware of the terms and conditions stipulated in the said
undertaking. It is also difficult to conceive that a man would have
undertaken to invest a large amount of more than one crore in the
year 1982 for a 1750 sq. metre of plot without having inspected the
physical site of the premises. If the condition of the plot was not
suitable, nothing prevented the plaintiff from not making the bid; it
was obviously a fruitful commercial venture which the plaintiff had
entered into. There was no corresponding obligation on the DDA
to first develop the land and only then the balance payment would
be made by the plaintiff. The terms of the contract were clear and
unequivocal. There was no ambiguity. There being no such pre-
condition, the plaintiff had to necessarily adhere to the schedule of
payment which he admittedly did not do so. The last date of
payment as per the schedule was 14.3.1983; this was for the
balance payment of `81,90,000/-. Vide his letters dated 21.2.1983
Ex.PW-2/13 and the subsequent letter dated 14.3.1983 (Ex.PW-
2/14) the plaintiff addressed communications to the DDA stating
that it was not profitable to proceed with the venture as the land
was not developed. There was no justification on the part of the
plaintiff to have made such requests. Even otherwise vide Ex.DW-
1/3 the DDA had extended the time of payment up to 12.6.1983.
Even in this extended period of time the plaintiff did not make the
balance payment.
15. The impugned judgment had correctly returned all these
findings. It was however swayed by the fact that the plaintiff had
deposited the balance 75% of the amount under orders of the
court. It had proceeded on the assumption that since entire
auction amount stood deposited; the only controversy left is the
payment of interest, if any, to be made by the plaintiff. It had
illegally and erroneously presumed that the DDA has no other
grievance with the plaintiff; this is not the position as is evident
from the defence of the defendant available before the trial judge
and before the arguments propounded the first appellate Court.
16. On 14.7.1992, a sum of Rs.27,30,000/- was deposited by the
appellant; balance 50% was paid much later i.e. on 7.12.1999.
There is no finding by the court, not even a prima facie finding that
the deposit of this payment on the aforenoted dates would in any
manner advance the case of the plaintiff in his favour. The terms
of the bid document rightly entitled the department to forfeit the
earnest money after the plaintiff did not make the balance payment
in time.
17. Judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the DDA
advance his case; once it is clear that the contract had not been
adhered to, the DDA is rightly entitled to forfeit the earnest money
which was also a specific term as contained in Clause 10 of the bid
document. The judgments relied upon by the appellant are all
distinct on facts. In the case of Raj Kumar (Supra), the question
was about the provision of amenities qua the allottees of houses;
i.e. the allotment of flats under the Expendable Housing Scheme of
1996; the challenge was to the right of the DDA to enhance the
price. The judgment of Surender Singh Oberoi (Supra) also related
to allotment of flats; basic amenities had admittedly not been
provided by the DDA; payment of 50% balance amount was
deferred till the amenities were provided. Facts are again distinct.
In the judgment of Reliable Lab (supra), balance amount had been
accepted by the DDA; some of the allottees were given possession;
it was held that such a discriminatory approach qua the petitioner
was illegal.
18. On all counts, this Court is of the view that the plaintiff has
no case. Admittedly the plaintiff had had not adhered to the
payment schedule in terms of their contract; he had committed a
flagrant violation of its terms. There was no plausible reason for
not doing so. Development of the land was not a pre-condition in
the making of balance payment by the plaintiff to the DDA. That
apart extension of time granted by DDA was not acceptable to the
plaintiff. The plaintiff presumably and understandably must have
inspected the site before his making the bid auction. It does not
now lie in his mouth that till the electricity, water and sewerage
facilities are granted to him he would not been in a position to
make the balance payment. In the case of Prem Rani (supra)
where the Single Judge of this Court had allowed refund of 50% of
forfeited amount to the party, the Division Bench had set aside the
said order and held that the Single Judge should not have
interfered in the terms and conditions laid down in the brochure of
the DDA which permitted the DDA to forfeit the earnest money in
terms of the contract between the parties.
19. In the instant case also the DDA is entitled to forfeit the
earnest money i.e. the sum of `27,30,000/-. This is in terms of their
admitted contract. The over and above balance amount which had
been deposited by the plaintiff is liable to be refunded back to him.
This excess amount of `27,30,000/- is lying deposited with the DDA
since 14.12.1992 and the other sum of `54,60,000/- is lying
deposited since 07.12.1999 which being over and above the
earnest money are liable to be refunded back to the plaintiff with
interest @ 9% per annum.
20. The appeal of the DDA is allowed. Appeal of M/s Neelkanth
Enterprises is dismissed. All pending applications are disposed of.
INDERMEET KAUR, J.
FEBRUARY 02, 2011 nandan
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