Delhi High Court
Rajesh Kumar vs Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi on 19 December, 2011
Author: A.K.Sikri
$~8,62,63 (common order)
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Date of decision: 19.12.2011.
+ W.P.(C) 5128/2011
RAJESH KUMAR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vivek Sood, Advocate.
Versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Pawan Sharma, Standing
Counsel(Crl.) for Govt. of NCT of
Delhi.
+ W.P.(C) 8810/2011
MADAN LAL AND ANR ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vivek Sood, Advocate
Versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Neha Kapoor, Advocate for Mr.
Waziri, Standing Counsel for
GNCTD.
+ W.P.(C) 8811/2011
AJIT @ BHURE ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Vivek Sood, Advocate.
Versus
GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through: Ms. Neha Kapoor, Advocate for Mr.
Waziri, Standing Counsel for
GNCTD.
CORAM:
HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
A.K. SIKRI, ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE (ORAL):
1. In these writ petitions, the petitioners have challenged the vires of
Clause- 10 ( under the heading "Regular Parole") of the Parole/Furlough
Guidelines, 2010.
2. Clause-10 which is the bone of contention in these petitions, reads as
under:-
"It is clarified that where an appeal of a convict is
pending before the High Court, parole will not be
granted since the convict can seek appropriate
orders from the High Court."
Thus, once the appeal against conviction is pending in this Court,
Government is disentitled from considering the application for Regular
Parole.
3. The grounds on which the validity of the aforesaid Clause is
questioned are two fold. It is argued that regular parole is denied during
pendency of appeal before this Court for the reason of the convict being
able to seek appropriate orders from this Court; however the considerations
which prevail in granting suspension of sentence or interim bail during
pendency of appeal are entirely different from considerations for grant of
regular parole viz to maintain family and social ties, serious illness of a
family member, critical conditions in the family on account of accident or
death of a family member, marriage of any member of the family of the
convict, delivery of a child by the wife of the convict if there is no other
family member to take care of the spouse at home and serious damage to
life or property of the family of the convict including damage caused by
natural calamities. The petitioners contend that the right to regular parole
on aforesaid considerations is a valuable right and pendency of appeal is
no ground to deny the same and the convicts whose appeals are pending
before this Court are being discriminated against.
4. Other contention raised is that though pendency of appeal in the High
Court disentitles the convict to regular parole but if the appeal is pending in
the Supreme Court challenging the conviction order, no such embargo is laid
down.
5. Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, has drawn our
attention to the provisions of Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 which deals with suspension of sentence pending the appeal and
release of the convict on bail. It inter alia provides that the appellate Court
may for the reasons to be recorded by it in writing, order that the execution
of the sentence or order appealed against be suspended if he is in
confinement, that he be released on bail. On this basis, it is argued that when
the matter is pending before the High Court, the High Court can deal with
the situation and the convict is not rendered remediless, this is the genesis
and the rationale behind Clause-10.
6. The Supreme Court in Sunil Fulchand Shah Vs. UOI (2000) 3 SCC
409 though holding that parole has a different connotation than bail, yet
observed that substantial legal effect of both, bail and parole is the release
of a person from detention or custody. It was further observed that there
are no statutory provisions dealing with the question of grant of parole and
grant of parole generally speaking is an administrative action; parole does
not suspend the sentence or the period of detention but provides conditional
release from custody and changes the mode of undergoing sentence.
7. We are however of the opinion that even when application for interim
suspension of sentence or bail is filed by a convict in a pending appeal, it is
always open to the convict to seek suspension/bail from this Court on the
grounds as provided for regular parole and the High Court can always take
those grounds in consideration while entertaining applications for
suspension and/or interim suspension of the sentence. There is nothing in
Section 389 or otherwise in law, barring the appellate Court from granting
interim bail or suspending the sentence on considerations as for parole.
Clause 10 very clearly stipulates that the "convict can seek appropriate
orders from the High Court" which means that the convict can seek the
order on parity of grounds for regular parole. Thus, the premise on which
the petitioners impugn Clause 10, i.e of grounds as for regular parole
being not available while seeking "appropriate orders from the High Court"
is erroneous and thus the challenge to the vires of Clause 10 has no merit.
On the contrary, we are rather of the view that the Govt./Jail Authorities
cannot be permitted to exercise the powers to grant parole when this Court
is seized of the matter in statutory appeal and the same if permitted would
be in derogation of the Appellate Powers of this Court and may lead to a
conflict.
8. We are of the view that the period when the Court is in seisin of the
case, any other executive authority ought not to be allowed to pass any
order with respect to what the Court is seized of. We, in this regard are
guided by K.M. Nanavati Vs. State of Bombay AIR 1961 SC 112 which
was concerned with the exercise of power by the Executive to suspend the
sentence during the pendency of the matter before the Supreme Court. It
was held that suspension of the sentence when the Supreme Court was in
seisin of the case could have been granted by the Supreme Court itself and if
in respect of the same period the Executive were also to be held to have the
power to suspend sentence, it would mean that both the Judiciary and the
Executive would be functioning in the same field at the same time leading to
the possibility of conflict of jurisdiction which could not have been
intended.
9. We may however notice that a similar view taken by the Division
Bench of the Bombay High Court was set aside by a Full Bench of that
Court in S. Sant Singh @ Pilli Singh Vs. Secretary, Home Deptt, Govt. of
Maharashtra, 2006 Crl. L.J. 1515. It was held that the considerations in
grant of bail and parole are different and the two have different connotations
and operate in different spheres; that the powers of the Executive of parole
can be exercised notwithstanding refusal of bail or suspension of sentence;
the right of parole is attracted as soon as a person is in prison governed by
the Prisons Act, 1894 irrespective of the pendency of the appeal. K.M.
Nanavati (supra) was distinguished by holding that the same dealt with the
power of the Government under Section 432 Cr.P.C. to remit or suspend the
sentence and has no application to parole which does not fall under
remission of sentence.
10. With due respect to the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, we are
unable to concur. The ratio of K. M. Nanavati (supra) is that the Executive
is barred from granting the same relief which the Court is entitled to, when
seized of the matter and possibility of a conflict if the same were to be
permitted. Once the said ratio is found to be applicable to a situation as
before us, we fail to see as to how it matters whether the conflict is owing
to exercise of power by the Executive under Section 432 Cr.P.C. or to grant
parole. What we are concerned with is that what the Court has denied to
the convict/accused cannot be permitted to be granted by the Executive and
the same if permitted would be totally subversive of rule of law. We may
notice that the Supreme Court in Rakesh Kumar Pandey Vs. Udai Bhan
Singh (2008) 17 SCC 764 deprecated the High Court for releasing an
accused whose bail had earlier been cancelled by the Apex Court, in the
garb of parole. It would thus be seen that the Courts have always looked
down upon something which the Court seized of the matter has refused,
being allowed to be done otherwise. As noticed above, the effect of both
bail/suspension of sentence and parole is the release of person from
detention or custody. If this Court seized of the appeal, in the facts deems
it proper to keep the accused/convict behind bars, the Executive cannot be
permitted to allow such sentence to run outside the bars.
11. It may also be noticed that the Supreme Court in Kashmira Singh Vs.
State of Punjab (1977) 4 SCC 291 itself had suggested that so long as the
Court is not in a position to hear the appeal within a reasonable time, the
Court should ordinarily, unless there are cogent reasons for acting
otherwise, release the accused on bail, of course having regard to the gravity
of the offence. For this reason also, we are of the view that there is nothing
prohibiting this Court when seized of the appeal from granting bail or
suspending the sentence on grounds akin to those for grant of parole.
12. Insofar as challenge to the conviction order in the Supreme Court is
concerned, the difference is that such an order is challenged by filing SLP
under Article 136 of the Constitution and Leave to appeal has to be obtained
whereas filing an appeal in the High Court is a statutory right given to a
convict; therefore the two situations are not akin to each other.
13. Subject to the aforesaid clarification given by us, insofar as the prayer
made in this petition seeking quashing of Clause-10 is concerned, we do not
find any merit therein and the same is accordingly dismissed.
ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
(RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW)
JUDGE
DECEMBER 19, 2011
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