Citation : 2011 Latest Caselaw 5912 Del
Judgement Date : 5 December, 2011
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) No.8526/2011
% Date of Decision: 05.12.2011
Signalman Kripa Shankar Tiwari .... Petitioner
Through Dr. H.B.Mishra, Advocate.
Versus
Union of India & Ors. .... Respondents
Through Mr. Anuj Aggarwal, Advocate.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA
ANIL KUMAR, J.
*
CM No. 19263/2011
Allowed subject to just exceptions.
WP(C) No.8526/2011
1. The petitioner, has challenged the order dated 1st April, 2011
passed by the Armed Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench in T.A
No.481/2009 titled as „K.S.Tiwari v. Union of India & Ors‟ dismissing
his petition seeking quashing of the Summary Court Martial (SCM)
against the petitioner, whereby he was held guilty of having committed
the offence under Section 64(c) of the Army Act and the sentence of six
months rigorous imprisonment in civil prison and his dismissal from
the service. The Tribunal also rejected his pray for directing the
respondents to hold a Military Medical Review Board to medically
examine the petitioner so as to make the consequential
recommendation to reinstate the petitioner.
2. The petitioner had joined the Army as Signalman on 2nd July,
1970 in the medical category AYE. The petitioner had completed the
training at First Military Training Course, Jabalpur, M.P and was
posted at 86, Infantry Brigade at the time of Indo-Pak war in 1970-71.
Later on, the petitioner was posted to 4 T.T.R Jabalpur (M.P) for
operator, Radio Key Board Training for advancement of service and on
completion of the training he was posted to 1st Armoured Division
Signal Regiment, Jhansi (M.P). In the course of his duties the petitioner
was moved from Jhansi to Ambala.
3. The petitioner contended that after the demise of his father a
property dispute had arisen in his family with his uncle who had a
dishonest intention towards his share of the property and, therefore, he
had sought discharge from the service when he was posted at Ambala.
However, his plea for discharge from service was declined. Thereafter,
the petitioner again sought discharge on compassionate grounds and
also gave various reminders. The petitioner was however, not
discharged from the service.
4. According to the petitioner, he had submitted another application
for discharge during October/November, 1973 which infuriated his
seniors and he was abused, beaten and tortured by the Unit Subedar
Major on 3rd March, 1974. The petitioner was also produced before his
Commanding Officer who instead of considering his grievances called
him a mad man and had sent him to the Unit doctor for medical
examination where he was forcibly administered medicines, injections
and electric shocks. The petitioner was, thereafter hospitalized in the
Mental Ward of Command Hospital, Chandigarh. There he was kept
under psychiatric treatment and observation from 19th November, 1974
up to 7th December, 1974. On account of the petitioner‟s medical
condition he was placed on lower medical category of CEE by a Medical
Board for six months from his earlier medical category of AYE.
5. The petitioner contended that after his release from the Mental
Ward on 7th March, 1975 he was produced before his Commanding
Officer. A Summary Court Martial was held in which he was sentenced
to undergo six months rigorous imprisonment in civil prison and he was
also dismissed from service. The punishment awarded to the petitioner
was communicated by letter dated 7th March, 1975 to his wife Smt.
Lalita Tiwari at village and Post Office Garhmalpur, Thana Ratsar,
District Balia (U.P). The petitioner contended that he was not supplied
any chargesheet, nor was any reasonable opportunity given to him to
defend himself and in any case since he was in a state of unsound mind
and had been placed in a lower category, therefore, he could not be
tried by the Summary Court Martial.
6. The petitioner pleaded that the copy of the chargesheet and Court
Martial proceedings were not provided to his wife, who had also made
various representations. Certificate of service was, however, forwarded
to wife of the petitioner stating, inter alia, that (i) "Dismissed from
service on 7th March, 1975 in consequence of Summary Court Martial"
and also (ii) "Not eligible for further employment for Government
Services".
7. The petitioner, thereafter, allegedly made various representations,
however, he did not receive any response. Subsequently, on account of
medical treatment received by him he became a fit person. According to
him, the alleged offences committed by him were under the state of
unsound mind, as he did not know what was wrong and right at the
time and thus the offences alleged against him could not be imputed to
him as per provisions of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.
8. The petitioner received a communication dated 28th July, 1997
from the Additional Directorate General Discipline and Vigilance, DV-3,
Adjutant General Branch, Army Headquarters advising him to submit a
petition through the proper channel entailing filing of a representation
dated 5th September, 1997 by him for redressal of his grievances. The
communication dated 28th July, 1997 was also accompanied by the
copy of the Summary Court Martial proceedings and a copy of the
chargesheet. The petitioner in his representation dated 5th September,
1997 sought the quashing of Summary Court Martial proceedings and
the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for six months and his dismissal
from service. The petitioner after his representation dated 5th
September, 1997 sent reminders dated 2nd February, 1998, 15th April,
1998 and 14th May, 1998, however, no action was taken by the
Competent Authority. The petitioner, therefore, filed a writ petition
being W.P(C) No.3599/1998 titled as „Signalman Kripa Shankar Tiwari
v. Union of India & Ors‟ in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi.
9. The writ petition filed by the petitioner was contested by the
respondents, inter-alia, on the ground that the petition was highly
belated as the petitioner was dismissed from service in 1975 and since
the petition suffers from delay and latches it could not be entertained. It
was subsequently contended on behalf of the respondents that it would
be difficult for the respondents to bring on record the evidence against
the petitioner as the records pertaining to the petitioner had already
been weeded out. From the available record it was submitted that the
petitioner was punished under Section 64(c) of the Army Act, and
sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six months and dismissed from
service. It was also admitted that the petitioner was hospitalized and
put for psychiatric treatment and he was placed in lower medical
category of CEE by a Medical Board. The respondents further
contended that even though the petitioner was categorized as CEE it
was not sufficient to exonerate him of the charges leveled against him.
According to the respondents, to take the benefit of Section 84 of the
Indian Penal Code the petitioner was liable to prove legal insanity and
not medical insanity and, therefore, reliance was also placed on the
decision of the Supreme Court, in Surendra Mishra v. State of
Jharkhand, JT 2011 (1) SC 83.
10. In the writ petition filed by the petitioner „RULE‟ was issued on
11th February, 1999. However, on 9th October, 2009 the writ petition
bearing W.P (C) No.3599/1998 was transferred to the Armed Forces
Tribunal, Principal Bench bearing TA No. 481 of 2009.
11. Before the Tribunal on 7th December, 2009 a doctor, namely one
Vaidya Basudev Tripathi was summoned to appear on 29th January,
2010. The doctor had appeared on the said date and he confirmed the
medical certificates and filed his affidavit as well. Whatsoever record
pertaining to the petitioner which could have been reconstructed was
reconstructed and produced before the Tribunal. The Armed Forces
Tribunal, Principal Bench after hearing the counsel for the parties and
after perusing the record dismissed the petition on account of delay and
latches by its order dated 1st April, 2011.
12. The petitioner has impugned the order dated 1st April, 2011
passed by the Principal bench, Armed Forces Tribunal contending,
inter-alia, that the Summary Court Martial was conducted in total
violation of the rules and regulations and that though an affidavit was
filed by Dr.Basudev Tripathi, the medical certificate has been ignored by
the Tribunal without any just reason. It is also contended that the
Tribunal has erred in treating the writ petition of the petitioner which
was transferred from the High Court to the Armed Forces Tribunal as
an appeal and that it should instead have been treated as a petition
under Section 14 of the said Act. The petitioner also contended that
adverse inference ought to have been taken against the respondents for
not producing the proceedings/summary of evidence and chargesheet
despite the directions given by the Tribunal. It has been pleaded that
thus the violation of statutory provisions of the Army Act, 1950 and
Army Rules, 1954 has been made out. The petitioner also asserted that
the proceeding in which he was punished for the offences alleged
against him, such a proceeding would be nonexistent in law, nor could
the decision in the same be taken as he was of unsound mind at that
time. The petitioner contended that the reliance by the Tribunal on the
judgment of Surendra Mishra (Supra) was misplaced.
13. The petitioner emphasized that an insane man is non-compos
mentis i.e. not of sound man and that the action of such a person who
is not in control of his mind and is not guided by the rational thoughts
of his brain, such a person cannot be punished for the acts committed
by him in such a state of mind. The petitioner contended that there are
two tests for determining legal insanity. The first is, „whether by reason
of unsoundness of mind the accused person was incapable of knowing
the nature of the act he was doing‟ and secondly, `whether by reason of
unsoundness of mind the accused person was incapable of knowing
that what he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law‟. The
presence of any of the abovementioned factors/ingredients are sufficient
to demonstrate legal insanity.
14. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties in detail.
Mr.Anuj Aggarwal, Advocate appeared for the respondents on advance
notice and reiterated that the petition has been dismissed rightly on
account of delay and latches as no sufficient cause has been made out
and pleaded by the petitioner before the Tribunal justifying the same.
According to him, even in the writ petition filed earlier before the High
Court which was transferred to the Armed Forces Tribunal no sufficient
ground was made out for the delay and latches. He also contended that
even in the present writ petition filed against the order dated 1st April,
2011 of the Armed Force Tribunal, Principal Bench the petitioner has
failed to explain the sufficient cause for delay of more than two decades.
15. The Tribunal while dismissing the petition had relied on Sawaran
Lata & Ors v. State of Haryana, JT (2010) 3 SC 602 holding that while
considering the question of delay and latches it should be seen whether
the matter has attained finality. The Tribunal relied on paragraphs 7
and 8 of the said decision which are as under:-
7. A Constitution Bench of this Court, in Aflatoon and Ors. v. Lt. Governor, Delhi and Ors. AIR 1974 SC 2077, while dealing with the issue, observed as under:
"...to have sat on the fence and allowed the government to complete the acquisition on the basis that notification under Section 4 and the declaration under
Section 6 were valid and then to attack the notification on the grounds which were available to them at the time when the notification was published, would be putting a premium of dilatory tactics. The writ petitions are liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches and delay on the part of the petitioner."
8. Same view has been reiterated by this Court observing that acquisition proceedings should be challenged before the same attain finality, in State of Mysore v. V.K. Kangan AIR 1975 SC 2190; PT. Girdharan Prasad Missir v. State of Bihar (1980) 2 SCC 83; Bhoop Singh v. Union of India AIR 1992 SC 1414; State of Orissa v. Dhobei Sethi and Anr. (1995) 5 SCC 583; State of Maharashtra v. Digambar AIR 1995 SC 1991; State of Tamil Nadu v. L. Krishnan AIR 1996 SC 497; and C. Padma and Ors. v. Dy. Secretary to Govt. of Tamil Nadu and Ors. (1997) 2 SCC 627.
16. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that on the
advice of the Additional Director General (Discipline & Vigilance) the
petitioner had submitted the petition on 5th September, 1997 and that
repeated reminders were also sent requesting an action in the matter.
Since there was no response from the respondents, therefore, the
petition had been filed by the petitioner without losing any further time
in July, 1998 and, therefore, the cause of action in the case of the
petitioner would start from 5th September, 1997 when the
representation was made by the petitioner.
17. The learned counsel for the respondent has relied on C.Jacob v.
Director of Geology and Mining and Anr, 2008 (10) SCC 115 to contend
that it was held by the Supreme Court that the department can reject a
stale case on the ground of delay alone without examining merits of the
case. It was further held that the reply given to an individual by the
department on his representation does not give rise to fresh cause of
action or acknowledgement of jural relationship. In the instant case, the
employee was terminated 18 years back and he made a representation
after 18 years and filed a petition before the Administrative Tribunal
which was disposed off. Pursuant to the directions given by the
Administrative Tribunal to dispose of the representation within four
months, the representation was declined. On the basis of the order
passed on the representation which was passed pursuant to the
directions of the Tribunal, it was held by the Supreme Court that the
staleness of the claim of the employee was not considered and a
detailed speaking order was passed in favour of the employee. The
Supreme Court had set aside the order of the Tribunal holding that
where an employee reappears after two decades he cannot be treated as
having continued in service, nor can he be given the benefit of
qualifying service for pension. This has not been disputed that the
petitioner was dismissed after Summary Court Martial on 7th March,
1975. Even if the petitioner was of unsound mind, though no evidence
to such a fact has been produced by the petitioner nor alleged, it is not
disputed that the wife of the petitioner had made a representation
against the dismissal of the petitioner in 1995. No cogent reason has
been disclosed for waiting for more than two decades before filing a writ
petition in the High Court which was later on transferred to the Armed
Force Tribunal and which was dismissed by the Tribunal on account of
delay and latches. Perusal of the petition which was decided by the
Tribunal reveals that no cogent or sufficient reason had been given
which would have entitled the petitioner for condonation of delay and
would have rectified the lacunae of latches. Even in the present writ
petition, filed by the petitioner challenging the order of the Tribunal, no
sufficient grounds have been made out which will entitle the petitioner
for relief after the delay of more than two decades. In C. Jacob v.
Director of Geology and Mining (Supra) in para 9 the Supreme Court
had held as under:-
"9. The courts/tribunals proceed on the assumption, that every citizen deserves a reply to his representation. Secondly they assume that a mere direction to consider and dispose of the representation does not involve any `decision' on rights and obligations of parties. Little do they realize the consequences of such a direction to 'consider'. If the representation is considered and accepted, the ex-employee gets a relief, which he would not have got on account of the long delay, all by reason of the direction to `consider'. If the representation is considered and rejected, the ex-employee files an application/writ petition, not with reference to the original cause of action of 1982, but by treating the rejection of the representation given in 2000, as the cause of action. A prayer is made for quashing the rejection of
representation and for grant of the relief claimed in the representation. The Tribunals/High Courts routinely entertain such applications/petitions ignoring the huge delay preceding the representation, and proceed to examine the claim on merits and grant relief. In this manner, the bar of limitation or the laches gets obliterated or ignored."
18. The order of the Tribunal dismissing the petition of the petitioner
by order dated 1st April, 2011 is based on the correct appreciation of the
facts and law and it has not been demonstrated that it suffers from any
irregularity or illegality or any such perversity which will entitle the
petitioner to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of
the Constitution of India. The writ petition in the facts and
circumstances is without any merit and it is, therefore, dismissed.
Parties are, however, left to bear their own cost.
ANIL KUMAR, J.
SUDERSHAN KUMAR MISRA, J.
DECEMBER 05, 2011 'k'
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