Delhi High Court
V.L.S.Finance Limited & Anr. vs High Court Of Delhi on 24 May, 2010
Author: Valmiki J. Mehta
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) No. 7610/2007
Reserved on : 5th May, 2010
Pronounced on: 24th May, 2010
V.L.S.FINANCE LIMITED & ANR. ...... Petitioners
Through: Mr. Aman Lekhi, Sr. Adv. with
Ms. Meenakshi Lekhi, Mr. Vishal
Balecha and Mr. Ashok Kumar,
Advocates.
VERSUS
HIGH COURT OF DELHI ....Respondent
Through: Mr. Viraj R.Datar and Mr. Chetan
Lokur, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VALMIKI J.MEHTA
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? Yes
% JUDGMENT
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J
1. The issue raised in the present petition by the petitioner is if the Law Officer as
mentioned in Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred as
the Act or the said Act) refuses to grant permission to initiate action for criminal
contempt, then, if a petition is filed thereafter in the court for seeking initiation of
criminal contempt under the Act, is not such a petition bound to be listed on the
WP(C) 7610/2007 Page 1 of 10
judicial side for hearing. Putting it differently, the petitioner contends that when a
petition is filed seeking initiation of proceedings of criminal contempt, although
permission is refused by the Law Officer under Section 15 of the Act, then such a
petition cannot be treated only as an information to the court and the same has to be
treated as a substantive petition which cannot be dealt with by this court on the
administrative side.
2. The issue canvassed arises for determination because the petitioner had sought
permission of the Law Officer under Section 15 for initiation of proceedings of
criminal contempt against various persons on the ground that various repetitive
petitions were being filed and they were basically initiated at the behest of one Mr.
Satya Pal Gupta. It was alleged that the repeated criminal complaints filed by Mr.
S.P.Gupta although through Mr. Sudesh Kohli and Mr. Vijay Kaushik and which
complaints on identical facts constituted abuse of the process of court. It was sought
to be contended that by filing successive proceedings on identical allegations,
suppressing certain earlier orders and earlier proceedings made the repeat proceedings
frivolous and vexatious, amounting not only to scandalising the authority of the court
but also the same tended to interfere with the due course of judicial proceedings. On
the Law Officer refusing permission under Section 15 of the Act for initiating
proceedings for criminal contempt a petition was filed before this court under Article
215 of the Constitution of India read with Sections 2(c) and 15 of the Act, which
petition was not placed for hearing on the judicial side but was treated by the
respondent herein only as an information to the Chief Justice. Hon'ble the Chief
Justice thereafter marked the papers to a learned Single Judge of this court for his
WP(C) 7610/2007 Page 2 of 10
opinion and the learned Single Judge opined that no case of criminal contempt was
made out. Accordingly, the petition was not placed on the judicial side and was
rejected by the impugned order on the administrative side. The petitioner by means of
this petition challenges the said impugned order dated 20.8.2007 and seeks quashing
of the same.
3. The principal argument which was addressed by Mr. Aman Lekhi, learned
senior counsel for the petitioner was that the procedure adopted by the High
Court/respondent in treating the petition as only an information was defective
inasmuch as there are no rules which have been framed. It was contended that the
petition should have in fact been listed on the judicial side and not disposed of on the
administrative side in view of the observations of Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sabyasachi
Mukherjee, J in his concurring judgment in the case reported as P.N.Duda Vs. P. Shiv
Shankar , 1988 (3) SCC 167. It was contended that the decisions of the Supreme
Court in the case reported as Bal Thackrey Vs. Harish Pimpalkhute, AIR 2005 SC
396 would not apply inasmuch as the decision in the case of Bal Thackrey (supra)
will only apply when contempt proceedings are suo moto initiated by the court. It was
further contended that even in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta Vs. K. Suba Rao ILR
(1974) 1 Del 1 (DB), which case was approved by the Supreme Court in the Bal
Thackrey's case was also a case with respect to suo moto initiation of contempt
proceedings. Reliance was placed extensively on the judgment of Justice Sabyasachi
Mukherj ee in the case of P.N.Duda (supra) although the Supreme Court approved the
views of the other learned Single Judge Ranganathan J, given in P.N.Duda's case. It
was also sought to be argued that since there was ambiguity about the procedure and
WP(C) 7610/2007 Page 3 of 10
the state of law, the petitioner should not be put at a disadvantage by holding that the
contempt petition filed on refusing of the permission by the Law Officer under
Section 15 of the Act should only be treated as an information. It was contended that
if this was allowed, it would mean betrayal of substantive law by its subordination to
complexity and would cause multiplicity of proceedings by forcing a petitioner first to
file a writ petition seeking quashing of the decision of the Law Officer and only
whereafter proceedings for criminal contempt could be initiated. Reference was made
to Conscientious Group Vs. Mohd.Yunus (1987) 3 SCC 89 to contend that no
independent proceedings need to be filed to independently challenge the declining of
the grant of consent by the Law Officer under Section 15 of the Act.
4. We are unable to agree with the arguments as raised by the learned senior
counsel for the petitioner. This is for the reason that the matter is no longer res
integra. The decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Bal Thackrey is given by a
Division Bench of three judges and which specifically approved the ratio and
observations of Ranganathan, J in the case of P.N.Duda and which in turn approved
the procedure as laid down by a Division Bench of this court in the case of Anil
Kumar Gupta's case.
5. Since the decision in Bal Thackrey's case refers to the cases of Anil Kumar
Gupta and also the judgment of Ranganathan . J in the case of P.N.Duda, we may
straight away refer to the relevant observations and the ratio of the Supreme Court in
the Bal Thackrey's case which is indeed conclusive of the matter. It is not possible
for this court to agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel for the
petitioner that the Supreme Court has incorrectly appreciated the decision in
WP(C) 7610/2007 Page 4 of 10
P.N.Duda's case and seemingly ignored the observations of Sabyasachi Mukherjee, J.
The relevant paragraphs of the decision in Bal Thackrey's case are as under:-
"3. The Delhi High Court in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta v. K. Suba &
Anr. [ILR (1974) 1 Del 1] issued following directions:
"The office is to take note that in future if any information is lodged even in
the form of a petition inviting this Court to take action under the Contempt
of Courts Act or Article 215 of the Constitution, where the informant is not
one of the persons named in Section 15 of the said Act, it should not be
styled as a petition and should not be placed for admission on the judicial
side. Such a petition should be placed before the Chief Justice for orders in
chambers and the Chief Justice may decide either by himself or in
consultation with the other judges of the Court whether to take any
cognizance of the information."
4. In P.N. Duda v. P. Shiv Shanker & Ors. [(1988) 3 SCC 167] this Court
approving the aforesaid observation of the Delhi High Court directed as
under:
".....the direction given by the Delhi High Court sets out the proper
procedure in such cases and may be adopted, at least in future, as a practice
direction or as a rule, by this Court and other High Courts."
13. In P.N. Duda case (supra) it was held that:
"54. A conjoint perusal of the Act and Rules makes it clear that, so far as
this Court is concerned, action for contempt may be taken by the Court on
its own motion or on the motion of the Attorney General (or Solicitor
General) or of any other person with his consent in writing. There is no
difficulty where the Court or the Attorney General choose to move in the
matter. But when this is not done and a private person desires that such
action should be taken, one of three courses is open to him. He may place
the information in his possession before the Court and request the Court to
take action (vide C.K. Daphtary v. O.P. Gupta and Sarkar v. Misra); he
may place the information before the Attorney General and request him to
take action; or he may place the information before the Attorney General
and request him to permit him to move the Court."
14. The direction issued and procedure laid down in Duda's case is
applicable only to cases that are initiated suo motu by the court when some
information is placed before it for suo motu action for contempt of court.
15. A useful reference can also be made to some observations made in J.R.
Parashar, Advocate and others v. Prasant Bhushan Advocate and Others
[(2001) 6 SCC 735]. In that case noticing Rule 3 of the Rules to Regulate
Proceedings for the Contempt of the Supreme Court, 1975 which like
Section 15 of the Act provides that the Court may take action in cases of
criminal contempt either (a) suo motu; or (b) on a petition made by the
Attorney General or Solicitor General; or (c) on a petition made by any
person and in the case of a criminal contempt with consent in writing of the
Attorney General or the Solicitor General as also Rule 5 which provides that
only petitions under Rules 3(b) and (c) shall be posted before the Court for
preliminary hearing and for orders as to issue of notice, it was observed that
the matter could have been listed before the Court by the Registry as a
petition for admission only if the Attorney General or Solicitor General had
granted the consent. In that case, it was noticed that the Attorney General
had specifically declined to deal with the matter and no request had been
made to the Solicitor General to give his consent. The inference, therefore,
is that the Registry should not have posted the said petition before the Court
for preliminary hearing. Dealing with taking of suo motu cognizance in para
28 it was observed as under:
" Of course, this Court could have taken suo motu cognizance had the
petitioners prayed for it. They had not. Even if they had, it is doubtful
whether the Court would have acted on the statements of the petitioners had
the petitioners been candid enough to have disclosed that the police had
refused to take cognizance of their complaint. In any event the power to act
suo motu in matters which otherwise require the Attorney General to initiate
proceedings or at least give his consent must be exercised rarely. Courts
normally reserve this exercise to cases where it either derives information
from its own sources, such as from a perusal of the records, or on reading a
report in a newspaper or hearing a public speech or a document which
would speak for itself. Otherwise sub-section (1) of Section 15 might be
rendered otiose."
17. In the light of the aforesaid, the procedure laid and directions issued in
Duda's case are required to be appreciated also keeping in view the
additional factor of the Chief Justice being the master of the roster. In State
of Rajasthan v. Prakash Chand and Others [(1988) 1 SCC 1] it was held that
it is the prerogative of the Chief Justice of the High Court to distribute
business of the High Court both judicial and administrative. He alone has
the right and power to decide how the Benches of the High Court are to be
constituted; which Judge is to sit alone and which cases he can and is
required to hear as also to which Judges shall constitute a Division Bench
and what work those Benches shall do."
6. A conjoint reading of the aforesaid paras clearly show that the Supreme Court
in Bal Thackrey's case has approved the procedure as laid down by a Division Bench
of this court in Anil Kumar Gupta's case and as was followed by Ranganathan , J in
P.N.Duda's case. The observations in para 15 reproduced above make the issue
crystal clear that the Supreme Court approved the procedure in Anil Kumar Gupta's
case by holding that only when the Law Officer grants permission, a petition which is
filed can be listed on the judicial side. Where the Law Officer declines the consent,
the matter is placed before the court not as a petition on the judicial side but only
taking the petition as information for possible suo moto cognizance by the court. The
Supreme Court finally in para 18 concluded that the procedure of Anil Kumar Gupta
as approved by Ranganathan,J in P.N.Duda's case should be followed by the High
Courts to ensure smooth working and streamlining of the procedure for cognizance of
cases pertaining to criminal contempt.
7. We therefore are of the clear view that the procedure as laid down in Anil
Kumar Gupta's case and as reproduced in para 3 in the decision in Bal Thackrey's
case above is the correct procedure that where the Law Officer declines consent and a
contempt petition is filed in spite of the refusal, such a petition should not be treated
as a petition and should not be placed for admission on the judicial side. Such a
petition should only be treated as information to the court and should be placed before
the Chief Justice for orders in chambers and the Chief Justice may decide either by
himself or in consultation with the other judges of the court whether to take any
cognizance of the information or not.
8. We do not agree with the contention of Mr. Lekhi that the ratio in Bal
Thackrey's case will not hold the field upholding the procedure as laid down in Anil
Kumar Gupta's case on the ground that in the cases of Anil Kumar and also Bal
Thackrey, proceedings were initiated suo moto by the court. The ratio of the
judgment of the Supreme Court, the findings and observations are more than clear,
which are general in nature, and in fact the Supreme Court in para 18 of the judgment
agreed that the procedure as stated in Anil Kumar Gupta's case should be followed by
the High Courts to ensure smooth working and streamlining of such contempt actions
which are though filed in the form of a petition to the High Court, are in fact only to
be treated as an information to the court for any suo moto action which the High Court
may seek to take.
9. We are further unable to appreciate the contention raised on behalf of the
petitioner that there would be unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings or alleged
prevailing of complexity over substantive law by declining to treat the petition on the
judicial side, for the reason that the ratio of the judgment in Bal Thackrey's case
clearly stares us in the face. The counsel for the respondent has conceded during the
course of hearing that the decision of the Law Officer declining consent is justiciable
by filing an independent Writ Petition. We agree with the stand of the respondent. It
is not permissible to argue against the said ratio. Further, we do not agree that there is
any ambiguity in the procedure and which has caused any prejudice to the petitioner.
The judgment in the case of Anil Kumar Gupta (supra) has been followed for over 36
years by this court and it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to say that this
procedure which is adopted as stated in Anil Kumar Gupta's case cannot be said to be
a prescribed procedure.
10. One incidental issue we may mention with regard to limitation for filing of
proceedings for initiating action for contempt. The period of limitation for initiating
proceedings for contempt is a period of one year as per Section 20 of the Act. An
issue arose as to what happens if the consent is declined and considerable time is spent
till a writ petition is filed for quashing the decision of the Law Officer and only
whereafter a petition can be filed for initiating action for contempt, and by which time
it is definitely possible that the period of one year for initiating contempt under
Section 20 may have expired. Once again this issue has been pronounced upon by the
Supreme Court in the case of Pallav Sheth vs. Custodian and others, (2001) 7 SCC
549 and in which the Supreme Court has clearly held that once any proceedings are
initiated for contempt, which would include presenting of a petition to the Law Officer
seeking permission, the period of limitation would stop running. The observations in
paras 39 to 41 of the said judgment are relevant and which reproduced herein below.
"39. In the case of criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High
Court may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court
or on a motion made by the Advocate-General or the Law Officer of the
Central Government in the case of a Union Territory. This reference or
motion can conceivably commence on an application being filed by a
person whereupon the subordinate court or the Advocate-General if it is
so satisfied may refer the matter to the High Court. Proceedings for civil
contempt normally commence with a person aggrieved bringing to the
notice of the court the wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, order
etc. which could amount to the commission of the offence. The attention
of the court is drawn to such a contempt being committed only by a
person filing an application in that behalf. In other words, unless a court
was to take a suo motu action, the proceeding under the Contempt of
Courts Act, 1971 would normally commence with the filing of an
application drawing the attention of the court to the contempt having
been committed. When the judicial procedure requires an application
being filed either before the court or consent being sought by a person
from the Advocate-General or a Law Officer, it must logically follow
that proceedings for contempt are initiated when the applications are
made.
40. In other words, the beginning of the action prescribed for taking
cognizance of criminal contempt under Section 15 would be initiating the
proceedings for contempt and the subsequent action taken thereon of
refusal or issuance of a notice or punishment thereafter are only steps
following or succeeding such initiation. Similarly, in the case of a civil
contempt, filing of an application drawing the attention of the court is
necessary for further steps to be taken under the Contempt of Courts Act,
1971.
41. One of the principles underlying the law of limitation is that a litigant
must act diligently and not sleep over its rights. In this background such
an interpretation should be placed on Section 20 of the Act which does
not lead to an anomalous result causing hardship to the party who may
have acted with utmost diligence and because of the inaction on the part
of the court, a contemner cannot be made to suffer. Interpreting the
section in the manner canvassed by Mr Venugopal would mean that the
court would be rendered powerless to punish even though it may be fully
convinced of the blatant nature of the contempt having been committed
and the same having been brought to the notice of the court soon after the
committal of the contempt and within the period of one year of the same.
Section 20, therefore, has to be construed in a manner which would avoid
such an anomaly and hardship both as regards the litigants as also by
placing a pointless fetter on the part of the court to punish for its
contempt. An interpretation of Section 20, like the one canvassed by the
appellant, which would render the constitutional power of the courts
nugatory in taking action for contempt even in cases of gross contempt,
successfully hidden for a period of one year by practising fraud by the
contemner would render Section 20 as liable to be regarded as being in
conflict with Article 129 and/or Article 215. Such a rigid interpretation
must therefore be avoided."
11 We therefore, dismiss the petition and hold that once consent of the Law
Officer is refused as required under Section 15 of the Act, then, it is necessary that an
independent petition be filed for setting aside the decision of the Law Officer and it is
not permissible to file a contempt petition straight away including seeking therein the
relief of quashing of the administrative order declining taking of action for initiating
criminal contempt proceedings and seek its listing on the judicial side for hearing. The
procedure adopted by the respondent is correct that such petition can only be treated
as an information to the court which is to be dealt with by the Chief Justice on the
administrative side or to any Judge who is required to give the necessary opinion
which is acted upon by the Hon'ble the Chief Justice.
12. The petition is therefore dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs.
VALMIKI J. MEHTA, J.
MAY 24 , 2010 SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
ib
