Sh.S.S.Bhal vs Delhi Tourism & Transport ...
2010 Latest Caselaw 596 Del

*               IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                         W.P. (C.) No.704/2010

%                      Date of Decision: 03.02.2010

Sh.S.S.Bhal                                              .... Petitioner
                      Through Mr.L.B.Rai, Advocate.

                               Versus

Delhi Tourism & Transport Development                  .... Respondent
Corporation Ltd
            Through           Mr.P.C.Sen, Advocate.

CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOOL CHAND GARG

1.    Whether reporters of Local papers may be             YES
      allowed to see the judgment?
2.    To be referred to the reporter or not?               NO
3.    Whether the judgment should be reported in           NO
      the Digest?



ANIL KUMAR, J.

*

The petitioner challenges the order dated 25th November, 2009

passed in T.A No.712/2009 titled Sh.S.S.Bhal v. Delhi Tourism &

Transport Development Corporation Ltd dismissing his petition seeking

quashing of the departmental enquiry against the petitioner on account

of delay in concluding the enquiry from 15th May, 2000 to 29th June,

2000 (about 44 days) as the Court had granted time to the respondent

to complete the enquiry by 15th May, 2000.

A chargesheet dated 5th November, 1985 was issued to the

petitioner pursuant to which departmental enquiry was initiated and an

order of dismissal was passed which was, however, set aside in a writ

petition filed by the petitioner and the respondent was directed to hold a

fresh enquiry. While directing the fresh enquiry the time was restricted

to complete the enquiry.

The enquiry could not be completed till 31st July, 1999, the time

granted by the Court and consequently extension of time was sought

which was allowed and time was granted uptil 15th May, 2000.

Thereafter though the enquiry was not concluded by 15th May, 2000,

however, it was completed by 29th June, 2000 and the copy of enquiry

report was also furnished to the petitioner.

Since the time to complete the enquiry was up till 15th May, 2000

and the enquiry was completed on 29th June, 2000, therefore, a petition

being CM (C) No.608/2000 was filed by the respondent for extension of

time which was decided on 20th August, 2000 holding that the petition

has become infructuous as the enquiry has already been concluded on

29th June, 2000 and a copy of the enquiry report was also given to the

petitioner.

After the conclusion of the enquiry in June, 2000, the petitioner

did not approach the Court seeking quashing of enquiry against him for

delay of about forty four days and filed the petition in 2009 seeking

quashing of the disciplinary proceedings against him on the ground

that the time to conclude the enquiry had expired on 15th May, 2000,

however, the enquiry was concluded on 29th June, 2000.

The Tribunal while considering the pleas and contentions of the

parties noted and relied on Suresh Chandra v. State of M.P, (2005) 12

SCC 355 holding that the enquiry proceedings/disciplinary proceedings

do not become null and void merely because the enquiry has not

concluded within the time granted by the Court. Reliance has also been

placed on Bharat Coking Coal Ltd v. Bibhuti Kumar Singh and Ors,

1994 Supp. (3) SCC 628 holding that if there is an extension of time

and the reason for extension of time is satisfactory then the enquiry

must proceed and the disciplinary proceedings cannot be set aside and

the prayer for extension of time should not to be rejected.

The respondent had filed the application for extension of time

from 15th May, 2000 to 29th June, 2000 which was taken up and the

prayer was not rejected rather it was held that the petition has become

infructuous since the enquiry had been completed and the copy of the

enquiry report had also been given to the petitioner. Holding that the

application for extension of time has become infructuous connotes in

the present facts and circumstances that the time for concluding the

enquiry till 29th June, 2000 was extended and consequent thereto it

was held that the application had become infructuous. In the

circumstances, it cannot be inferred that the prayer for extension of

time from 15th May, 2000 to 29th June, 2000 was declined or rejected.

The learned counsel for the petitioner is very vociferously relied

on (2005) 12 SCC 355, Suresh Chandra v. State of M.P and Ors in

which the Apex Court had set aside he order of the High Court holding

that the disciplinary authority could not proceed with the proceeding

after the period granted by the State Administrative Tribunal. The

Supreme Court had set aside the proceedings conducted after 15th May,

1999 the time given by the State Administrative Tribunal and had

directed to continue the proceeding after 15th May, 1999 afresh. In

contradistinction in the case of the petitioner the respondent had

approached the High Court for extension of time and since the enquiry

had already been concluded and the copy of the enquiry report had

been given to the petitioner so, therefore, instead of rejecting the claim

of the respondent for extension of time it was held that the application

for extension of time has become infructuous since the enquiry had

already been concluded and consequently the time from 15th May, 2000

to 29th June, 2000 was extended by implication. On the basis of the

ratio of the said judgment the petitioner is not entitled for any relief.

The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically contended

that since the petition was disposed of as infructuous it does not

tantamount to extension of time to conclude the enquiry from 15th May,

2000 to 29th June, 2000.

The plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner is without any

rationale and is not sustainable. The learned counsel for the petitioner

is also unable to give any cogent reason for not approaching the Court

for almost 9 years after the enquiry was concluded on 29th June, 2000.

In the facts and circumstances there is no such illegality or irregularity

in the order of the Tribunal dated 25th November, 2009 which will entail

any interference by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Rather the writ petition is an

abuse of the process of law. In the facts and circumstances the writ

petition is, therefore, dismissed. The petitioner shall also be liable to

pay a cost of Rs.5000/- to the counsel for the respondent who has

appeared on advance notice.

ANIL KUMAR, J.

February 03, 2010                                 MOOL CHAND GARG, J.
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