Delhi High Court
Ajay Kumar Sanghi vs Lt. Governor Of Delhi & Ors. on 1 September, 2009
Author: V. K. Jain
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ (1) W.P.(C) 7641/2009 & CM Nos. 3794/2009 &
8937/2009
Reserved on: 25th August, 2009
Pronounced on: 1st September, 2009
# AJAY KUMAR SANGHI ..... Petitioner
! Through: Mr Sandeep Sethi, Sr Adv. with
Mr Virender Goswami and
Mr Vaibhav Kumar, Advs. for Petitioner
No.1,
Mr S.Paul, Advocate for Petitioner No.2
Versus
$ DELHI POLICE & ORS. ..... Respondent
^ Through Mr Sanjay Poddar with Mr.
N.S. Benipal, Advocates for R-2/LAC
Mr Najmi Waziri and Mr
Saleem Ahmed, Advs.for R-3 with SHO
V.P.Dahiya from P.S. Badarpur
Mr Rajesh Mahajan, Adv.for DDA
2. W.P. (C) no. 10518/2009 & CM 9287/2009
# AJAY KUMAR SANGHI ..... Petitioners
! Through Mr Sandeep Sethi, Sr Adv. with
Mr Virender Goswami and Mr Vaibhav
Kumar, Advs. for Petitioner No.1,Mr
S.Paul, Adv.for Petitioner No.2
VERSUS
$ LT. GOVERNOR OF DELHI & ORS. .....Respondents
^ Through: Mr Sanjay Poddar with Mr. N.S.
Benipal, Advocates for R-2/LAC
W.P.(C) No. 10518/2009 Page 1 of 47
Ajay Kumar Sanghi v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.
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Mr Najmi Waziri and Mr
Saleem Ahmed, Advs.for R-3 with SHO
V.P.Dahiya from P.S. Badarpur.
Mr Rajesh Mahajan, Adv.for R-3/DDA
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIKRAMAJIT SEN
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. JAIN
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed
to see the Judgment? YES
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? YES
3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the
Digest? YES
V.K.Jain, J.
By this common Order, we will dispose of both the Petitions
referred above.
The brief facts, as stated in the petitions, are as follows: The
Petitioners are owners of land comprised in Khasra No.97 of
Tajpul Village on Mathura Road, Delhi. Initially, the Petitions were
filed only by Shri Ajay Kumar Sanghi, impleading the other co-
owners namely, Shri Akshay Kumar Sanghi, Shri Nitin Kumar
Sanghi and Shri Ashwin Kumar Sanghi. Since it was admitted
before us that the Petitioner and Respondents No.4 to 6, namely,
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Shri Akshay Kumar Sanghi, Shri Nitin Kumar Sanghi and Shri
Ashwin Kumar Sanghi, claim to be in joint possession of land in
question and there was no lis between them as regards this land,
we directed transposition of Respondents No.4 to 6 as co-
Petitioners. It was alleged in WP(C) 7641/09 that on 7.3.2001,
Respondent No.1 Delhi Police entered the property of the
Petitioner without any authority of law and refused to vacate the
same. From Newspaper Reports, the Petitioner came to know that
since Police Station Badarpur needs to be relocated on account of
the existing land on which it is situated being required for
Commonwealth Games, the Petitioner apprehends that
Respondent No.1 intends to erect a Police Station on their
property. The prayer made in the Writ Petition No.7641/2009 is to
direct Respondent No.1 Delhi Police to vacate the aforesaid
property.
2. Vide an interim order dated 20.3.2009, the learned Single
Judge restrained the Respondents from disturbing the status quo
with regard to the possession of the property and also restrained
them from carrying any construction, altering the existing
structure or parting with possession.
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3. Respondent No.1 filed a Reply, contesting the Petition. It
was stated in the Reply that the entire land of Police Station
Badarpur is required by National Highway Authority of India for
construction of elevated highway at Badarpur and instructions
were accordingly issued to Respondent No.1 to shift Police Station
Badarpur to an alternative location. On enquiry from concerned
Revenue Authority, it was revealed that five and a half bighas of
land with Gaon Sabha Tajpul under Section 81 of Delhi Land
Reforms Act was, available in Khasra No.97, for a Police Station. A
request was accordingly sent to Government of NCT of Delhi, to
allocate the aforesaid land to Delhi Police for construction of
Police Station Badarpur. Vide letter dated 6.3.2009, the land
measuring 5 bighas and 5 biswas, comprised in Khasra No.97 of
Village Tajpul, was allotted to Respondent No.1, physical
possession of the land was also handed over by the concerned
Authority to Delhi Police on 7.3.2009 and, therefore, land in
question is in exclusive possession of Delhi Police.
4. During pendency of Writ Petition No.7641/2009, land in
question was acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition
Act, which led to filing of W.P.(C) 10518/2009. It has been stated
in this Petition that the Petitioners came across Notification
published in Hindustan Times dated 7.7.2009, issued under
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Sections 6 and 7 of Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of the
aforesaid property and they later discovered a Notification dated
19.6.2009 issued under Section 4(1) of the Act notifying that the
aforesaid property was likely to be acquired and also notifying
dispensing with mandatory provisions of Section 5 of Land
Acquisition Act simultaneous with publication of Notification under
Section 6 and 7. Respondent No.1 also issued a Notification under
Section 9(1) and 17(1) directing Respondent No.2 Land Acquisition
Collector to take possession of the aforesaid property within
fifteen days from the publication of the Notice.
5. The acquisition has been challenged primarily on the
grounds that
(1) The Notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition
Act was not published in accordance with law.
(2) Notice as required under Section 9 of Land Acquisition
Act was not given to the Petitioners.
(3) Land belonging to the Government and placed on their
disposal of Respondent DDA being available in the
vicinity, there was no necessity of acquiring land of the
Petitioners.
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(4) The acquisition was mala fide having been made only
with a view to defeat the status quo order passed by
this Court in W.P.(C) No.7641/2009.
6. It has also been stated in the Petition that requirement of
land for a Police Station is not a public purpose and there was no
such urgency, as would justify resort to the urgency provision of
Section 17 of Land Acquisition Act. The Petitioner has sought
quashing of the Notifications dated 19.6.2009 issued under
Section 4 as well as the subsequent Notifications dated 1.7.2009
under Sections 6, 7 and 17 of the Act.
7. In its reply filed in Civil Writ Petition No. 10518 of 2009,
respondent No. 3, Delhi Police, besides reiterating the averments
made in its reply in Civil Writ Petition 7641/09, has alleged that a
joint survey was conducted by Revenue Department and Delhi
Police at the sites which were identified as Gaon Sabha lands in
village Tajpul. These lands were i) Khasra No. 97 admeasuring
5.5. Bighas, ii) Khasra Nos. 104/2 (0-1), iii) 105/2 (4-11) and iv)
106 (1-14) in Village Tajpul. One land filling site abutting Jaipur
Road was also considered. The site abutting Jaitpur Road was
found having very deep pits and was far away from the main road.
After assessing the sites, their location, nature of the lands,
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accessibility, current user and other relevant factors, these lands,
except the land under khasra No. 97, were not found suitable by
Delhi Police for location of a Police Station. The land falling in
khasra No. 97 was found to be more suitable for the Police Station,
since it is located on main highway; it would provide the most
visibility, besides easy access to citizens and would also facilitate
quick response in deployment of police force. The proposed Police
Station is required to be near the interstate border for any
exigencies, as security concerns demand that minimum time
should be lost in deployment of the requisite police force. It has
also been stated that some other land belonging to DDA available
on Mathura Road were also shown to Delhi Police, amongst which
one was behind Kajaria and other one was at Ali Modh. The site
behind Kajaria was not suitable to Delhi Police and the site of Ali
Modh has already been handed over to DMRC by DDA.
8. In the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1, it
has been alleged that land in question is governed by the
provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act and since it was not being
used in accordance with the provisions of the Act, Revenue
Assistant initiated proceedings under the provisions of Section 81
of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, which culminated in order dated
29.5.1981, whereby the Revenue Assistant directed the petitioner
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to repair the damage within three months from the date of the
order, failing which the land was directed to be vested in Gaon
Sabha. Since the petitioner failed to comply with the directions of
the Revenue Assistant, the land in question came to be vested in
Gaon Sabha and entry was made accordingly in revenue record. It
has been further stated that since land underneath Police Station
Badarpur was required by National Highway Authority of India for
construction of a six lane elevated highway, the issue of providing
alternative site for the Police Station was discussed at the highest
level, including by the Cabinet Secretary. The Chief Secretary of
Delhi constituted a committee comprising of officers from nine
departments of the government to find out a suitable alternative
site. Upon inspection of various sites, land in question was found
most suitable for a police station. The matter was accordingly
placed before the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, for appropriate
order for allotment of the aforesaid land to Police Station, which is
a public purpose under the provisions of Delhi Land Reforms Act.
The Lieutenant Governor, in exercise of the power conferred upon
him under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, directed Gaon Sabha to
allot the land in question to the Police Department, for
construction of a police station. This decision of the Lt. Governor
was conveyed by Director (Panchayat) to the Commissioner of
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Police vide letter dated 6.3.2009 and pursuant thereto possession
was handed over to Delhi Police, by Revenue Authorities, on
7.3.09. It has been further alleged that since land was urgently
required for construction of police station, which has to be shifted
from its existing site, and resolution of dispute with regard to title
of the petitioner viz-a-viz Gaon Sabha was likely to take some time,
the Lt. Governor, in larger public interest, decided to acquire land
in question under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act, on
payment of compensation to the rightful owner. Permission of the
Lt. Governor was obtained on 28.5.09, for initiation of proceedings
under Land Acquisition Act and after carrying out necessary
survey and verifying the record, the matter was placed before the
Lt. Governor, seeking approval for issuing notification under
Section 4 read with Section 17(1) of Land Acquisition Act and to
dispense with inquiry under Section 5A of the Act, on account of
urgency involved in the matter. The Lt. Governor after being
satisfied of the requirement of Delhi Police and also about urgency
in the matter, passed an order dated 13.6.09 directing issue of
requisite notification. It has been further stated in the Reply that
notification under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act, read with
Section 17(4) thereof, was issued on 19.6.09 and was published in
two newspapers as well as in the locality on 25.6.09. The same
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was also published in the official Gazette, thereby complying all
the mandatory requirements of the Act regarding the publication
of the notification. Thereafter notification under Section 6 of the
Act was issued on 1.7.09, declaring the intention of the
Government to acquire land in question for a public purpose,
namely construction of Police Station, and the same was published
in „The Hindustan Times‟ on 7.7.09. Another notification was also
issued under Section 17(1) of Land Acquisition Act, authorising the
Land Acquisition Collector to take possession of the land in
question after expiry of 15 days from the date of issue of notice
under Section 9 of the Act. However, the Land Acquisition
Collector could not take possession of the land on account of
interim order passed by this court in CWP No. 7541 of 2009. It
has also been stated in the reply that the claim of the petitioner for
ownership right in land in question was being resisted by Gaon
Sabha on the strength of the order passed by the Revenue
Assistant and therefore in order to balance the rival claims and
rights of all the parties, it was decided to acquire the land in
question and pay current market value to the rightful owner.
9. In his counter affidavit, respondent No. 2, the Land
Acquisition Collector has taken stand, identical to the stand taken
in the counter affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 1. It has
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also been stated in his counter affidavit that Land Acquisition
Collector issued individual notice under Section 9 of the Act to the
recorded owner, besides issuing a public notice under Section 10
of the Act, asking the persons interested to file their claims before
him and pursuant thereto the petitioner has also filed his claim
before the Land Acquisition Collector.
10. The first arguments advanced before us by the learned
Senior Counsel for the petitioner was that the notification
purporting to be issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition
Act was not published in the prescribed manner. Section 4(1) of
Land Acquisition Act requires the notification to be published in
the official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in the
locality of which one has to be in the regional language. The
Collector is also required to cause the public notice of the
substance of such notification to be given at convenient places in
the locality. The learned counsel for respondents No. 1 and 2 has
placed before us the file relating to acquisition of land in question.
On perusal of the file, we find that the notification dated 19.6.09,
issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, was published
in „The Times of India‟ as well as in „Rashtriya Sahara‟ both dated
25th June, 2009. Newspaper „Rashtriya Sahara‟ being a Hindi
newspaper, the notification was published in it in Hindi which is
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the regional language of Delhi. We also find that the notification
dated 19th June, 2009, was also sent for publication in Part-IV of
Delhi Extraordinary Gazette. A perusal of the endorsement made
on the same day, on the notification dated 19.6.09 would show that
its copy was forwarded to ADM/LAC (South), M.B. Road, Saket
with the request that necessary publicity be also made in the
village. Therefore, we find no merit in the contention that
notification issued under Section 4 of Land Acquisition Act was not
published properly.
11. The publication of declaration/notification dated 1.7.09
issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, in newspapers,
has been admitted in the petition. The file produced for our
perusal also shows that the notification / declaration was duly
published in English in newspaper „The Hindustan Times‟ and in
Hindi in „Navbharat Times‟ dated July 7, 2009. A perusal of the file
shows that notification dated 1.7.2009 was sent for publication in
Part-IV of Delhi Extraordinary Gazette and a copy of the same was
also endorsed to ADM/LAC (South) with a request that necessary
publicity may also be made in the village. Copies of all the
newspapers are available in the file of the respondents, produced
for perusal of the court. Therefore, we are satisfied that the
notification dated 1.7.09 was also duly published. Another
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notification dated 1.7.09 was also published in newspaper
whereby, in exercise of the power conferred upon him under
Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Ld. Governor directed
the Land Acquisition Collector to take possession of land in
question on expiry of 15 days from the date of publication. This
notification was also sent for publication in Part-IV of Delhi
Extraordinary Gazette. Thus, there was due compliance of legal
requirements, in the matter of publication of notifications.
12. Now we come to the contention that the acquisition was bad
for want of issue of notice to the petitioner under Section 9 of
Land Acquisition Act, Section 17(1) of the Land Acquisition Act
reads as under:
"Section 17(1): In case of urgency, whenever the
[appropriate Government], so directs, the Collector,
though no such award has been made, may, on the
expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the
notice mentioned in Section 9, sub-section (1), [take
possession of any land needed for a public purpose].
Such land shall thereupon [vest absolutely in the
[Government]], free from all encumbrances."
It is quite clear from a bare perusal of the above referred
provision that if the Govt. invokes urgency provisions, the
possession can be taken on expiry of 15 days from the publication
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of notice mentioned in Section 9(1), and thereupon the land shall
vest absolutely in the Government, free from all encumbrances.
Notice under Section 9(3) is not required to be given before taking
possession, in exercise of emergency powers under Section 17(1)
of the Act.
13. In the present case, if the land in question is already in
possession of the respondent Delhi Police as is claimed by them,
though the case of the petitioners is that they are not as yet ousted
from possession of the entire land, public notice envisaged under
Section 9(1) of the Land Acquisition Act would not be necessary.
Moreover, as is evident from the acquisition file produced before
us, a notice was published in newspaper on 7th July, 2009
informing the public at large that the Lt. Governor was pleased to
direct Land Acquisition Collector (South) to take possession of the
land, the specifications of which were given in Notification No.
F.9(62)/09/L&B/LA/3130 dated 19.6.09 under Section 4 and
Notification No. F.9(62)/09/L&B/LA/3815 dated 1.7.09 under
Section 6 of the Act, on expiry of 15 days from publication of the
notice under Sub Section 1 of Section 9 of the Act. The copy of the
newspapers, in which Notification dated 1.7.09 was published on
7th July, 2009, has also been placed on record by the respondent.
A perusal of the endorsement made on the Notification dated
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1.7.09 shows that its copy was also forwarded to ADM / LAC
(South) with the request that necessary publicity may also be
made in the village.
14. Even if we assume that no notice as envisaged under Section
9(1) of Land Acquisition Act was given by the respondents, that by
itself will not vitiate acquisition as it has a bearing only on the
quantum of compensation. This question came up consideration
before a Division Bench of this court in Deepak Resorts & Hotels
P. Ltd & Anr. V. Union of India & Ors., 2008 V AD (DELHI) 466.
The contention before Division Bench was that taking over of
possession, even when authorized in terms of an order passed
under Section 17(1) was possible only if the requirement of
Section 9 of the Act were strictly complied with and failure to do
so had the effect of rendering the entire process illegal including
the notification issued earlier. Repelling the contention the
Division Bench inter alia held as under:
"6. A conjoint reading of Section 9(1) and Section
17(1) supra would leave no manner of doubt that
the very purpose underlying the issue of a public
notice is to invite claims for payment of
compensation to all those interested in the same.
The purpose behind the issue of such a public
notice is not to hear objections as to whether
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possession of the land should or should not be
taken over by the Collector. The purpose simply is
to invite claims for payment of compensation for all
interests held in the land under acquisition.
"It was next argued by learned counsel for the
petitioners that even a notice under Section 9(1) of
the Act had not been issued. This according to
them has the effect of vitiating the acquisition
proceedings. We do not think so for two precise
reasons. Firstly because the official record
produced by Mr. Poddar shows that a notice under
Section 9(1) was in fact issued by the Collector 15
days before the possession of the land was taken by
him on the 5th December, 2007. Secondly because
the failure of a notice under Section 9(1) does not
have the effect of vitiating the acquisition
proceedings themselves as was argued on behalf of
the petitioners. That is because the purpose
underlying the issue of the notice is simply to invite
claims for payment of compensation for the land
under acquisition. The non-issue of a public notice
in terms of Section 9(1) of the Act may be an
irregularity but the same does not have the effect
of nullifying the acquisition proceedings
themselves. The purpose underlying that notice is
as well served by a notice to the occupier and the
persons interested under Section 9(3) of the Act. It
is not the case of the petitioners that the Collector
has made an award without inviting claims as
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required under Section 9(3). The argument on the
contrary was that no award has been made by the
Collector hence, there was no occasion for him to
tender 80% of the compensation payable for the
land in question. We shall presently deal with the
later limb of the argument. Suffice it to say that so
long as the occupier or the owner of the land or any
person interested in the land is given a notice
under Section 9(3) before the making of the award
and so long as any such owner, occupier or person
interested has an opportunity to make a claim for
payment of compensation before the making of the
award, the absence of a public notice under Section
9(1) would not invalidate the proceedings. We are
supported in that view by a Division Bench decision
of this Court in Shyam Lal CWP No. 4260/1998
decided on 10th February, 2003, where the Court
observed:-
"By notice under Section (1) the Government
did authorize the Collector Land Acquisition
to take over possession and obviously
mandate was to take possession after
expiration of period of 15 days on publication
of notice under sub-section (1) of Section 9
but non-compliance of this requirement of
issuing notice under sub-section (1) of
Section 9 will not vitiate the act of taking
over possession by the Collector. It is merely
an irregularity and will not make the action of
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the Collector as void or non-est since he had
authorisation of the Government to take over
possession of the land sought to be acquired,
which pre-supposed the satisfaction of the
Government of the urgency. It is not shown
that any prejudice has been caused to the
petitioner due to non-compliance, since
compensation has yet to be paid and the
petitioner has already laid a claim, may be by
this very petition."
15. As regards the contention that in addition to notice under
Section 9(1), the respondents were also required to give notice to
the occupier under Section ((3) of the Act, we find the same to be
devoid of any merit. This issue was also examined by the Division
Bench in the case of Deepak Resorts & Hotels P Ltd. & Anr.
(Supra). Rejecting the contention, the Division Bench held as
under:
"Mr.Lekhi however argued that not only should a
notice be issued under Section 9(1) before
possession can be taken over by the Collector, but a
notice under Section 9(3) to the occupier of the
land and on all such persons known or believed to
be interested therein is also a mandatory condition
precedent. He urged that the failure of the
Collector to issue notice in terms of Section 9(3)
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was tantamount to a fatal procedural infirmity
which would vitiate the entire acquisition
proceedings. There is, in our opinion, no merit in
that contention whatsoever. Section 17(1) of the
Act is specific and refers only to notice under
Section 9(1) of the Act as a requirement before
possession can be taken by the Collector in exercise
of the special powers vested in the Government.
Section 17(1) does not in terms or by implication
howsoever far fetched required the Collector to
wait till a notice is served by him upon the occupier
of the land or persons interested in the same within
the comprehension of Section ((3) of the Act.
Accepting the submissions made by Mr.Lekhi that a
notice under Section 9(3) is also essential for taking
possession under Section 17(1) would amount to re-
writing the Statute. There is, in our view, no
juristic or any other rational basis for the
interpretation suggested by learned counsel for the
petitioners. The prayer for a declaration made by
the petitioners that a notice under sub-section 3 of
Section 9 of the Act is a sine qua non for taking
over actual physical possession must therefore fail
and is accordingly rejected."
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16. The Division Bench also referred to the following
observations of a Full Bench of this Court in Roshnara Begum v.
Union of India, 61(1996) DLT 206.
"In some of the cases, the plea taken was that
notices under Sections 9 & 10 have not been served
and thus the acquisition proceedings have become
void. In the case of Jatan Singh the Supreme Court
has held that even if there has been no service of
notices under Sections 9 and 10 which are meant
only for taking proceedings for determining
compensation even then the same would not affect
the acquisition proceedings. (para 113).
XXX
XXX
XXX
...... A large number of judgements lay down that
non-service of notices under Sections 9, 10 or
under Section 12 of the Act do not vitiate the
acquisition proceedings (See Ezra Vs. Secretary of
State (supra), Kasturi Pillai Vs. Municipal Council,
AIR 1920 Madras 417, Shivdev Singh Vs. State of
Bihar & Others, AIR 1963 Patna 201, Prasanna
Kumar Dass & Others Vs. State of Orissa, 1956
Orissa 114, Yousuf Begam Vs. State of Andhra
Pradesh & Others, AIR 1969 AP 10, P. K. Shaikh Vs.
State of West Bengal & Others, AIR 1976 Calcutta
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149, Lakhbir Chand Vs. Land Acquisition Collector,
Delhi & Others, AIR 1979 Delhi 53, State of Punjab
Vs. Gurdial Singh & Another, AIR 1984 P&H 1,
Manakchand Sarupchand Lunavat & Others V.
State of Maharashtra & Others, AIR 1989 Bombay
339 and Dr. G.H. Grant Vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1966
SC 237. (para 121)"
17. In view of the decision of the Full Bench of this court in the
case of Roshnara Begum (supra), even if it is assumed that the
notices envisaged u/s 9 of Land Acquisition Act were not issued by
the Collector, that by itself would not vitiate the acquisition
proceedings since the objective of such a notice is to enable the
persons interested in the land to submit their claims for
compensation and acquisition proceedings cannot be challenged in
response to the notice issued u/s 9 of Land Acquisition Act. In any
case, as far as present case is concerned, the affidavit of
respondent No.2 would show that Land Acquisition Collector has
issued individual notice u/s 9 of the Act to the recorded owner and
has also issued a public notice u/s 10 of the Act asking the persons
interested to file their claims before him. It has also been stated
in the counter affidavit of respondent No.2 that pursuant to these
notices, the petitioner has also filed his claim before the Land
Acquisition Collector.
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18. We, therefore, need not go into the question as to whether
notices under Section 9(3) of Land Acquisition Act were to be
issued to the petitioners, who claim to be in physical possession of
a part of land in question, or to Gaon Sabha, which is the recorded
owner of land in question as per Revenue Record, or to both of
them. We would, however, like to note that though physical
possession of the petitioners, prior to 7.3.09 is indicated by the
letter whereby this property was de-sealed, this is also a fact that
in last more than 10 years, the petitioners have not taken recourse
to legal proceedings, to get the mutation in the name of Gaon
Sabha, cancelled in Revenue Record.
19. The third contention of the learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioner was that the acquisition of land in question was
not necessary as sufficient land of DDA which is available in this
very area could have been used for construction of police station.
The argument is that there was no good reason to acquire the land
of the petitioner instead of using other land available in the area
for this purpose. We find no merit in the contention. As stated in
the counter affidavit of the respondents, a committee comprising
officers from nine departments of the government was constituted,
to identify a suitable alternative site for police station Badarpur.
The other lands available in the locality, including the land
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comprised in khasra No. 97 admeasuring 5.5. Bighas, ii) Khasra
Nos. 104/2 (0-1), iii) 105/2 (4-11) and iv) 106 (1-14) in Village
Tajpul and land fill site abutting Taitpur Road were inspected in
the process of identifying a suitable land for housing the police
station. However, it was the land in question which was found
most suitable for housing the police station, keeping in view the
fact that it is located on main Delhi - Mathura Highway. It cannot
be disputed that if the police station is located on the main
highway, not only will it be easily accessible to the citizens, it
would also facilitate better and quick response to meet any law
and order problem and carry out other police activities. No fault
can be found with the requirement to locate a police station near
interstate border so as to have stricter vigil on the movement of
people and transport from one state to other. If a police station is
located in the interior, it would be difficult for everyone including
a common citizen to locate it and then access it. As regards the
land belonging to DDA, the affidavits of the respondents disclose
that the piece of land which is situated behind the factory of
Kajaria is not suitable whereas the land at Ali Modh has already
been handed over by DDA to DMRC. No material has been placed
before us to show that any other site available for housing police
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station, Mathura Road is better or even equally suited for
constructions of Police Station Badarpur.
20. It is for the authorities concerned including Delhi Police, to
decide which land, out of those available for the purpose, is most
suitable for construction of a police station. It is not the function
of the court, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, to go into area , location and local conditions of
various lands and take upon itself the task of deciding as to which
of them is most suitable for construction of a police station. This
function is in the domain of the Executive Authorities and has to
be left to them. It has to be appreciated that a Writ Court does not
sit in appeal over the administrative decions of the court. In
judicial review of administrative decisions, the court would not
interfere with the decision taken by the Executive Authorities,
unless it is shown that it was arbitrary, illegal malafide, or without
jurisdiction. The petitioner has not placed any material before us
which would justify drawing an inference that the decision taken
by respondents, in the matter of selection of suitable site for
construction of police station Badarpur, was arbitrary, illegal or
malafide. In fact, the averments made in the counter affidavits
would show that the selection of site was made after due
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available sites. Therefore, we find no fault with the decision taken
by the respondents in this regard.
21. Now, we come to the last contention raised by the learned
senior counsel for the petitioner, that the acquisition is malafide,
having been resorted to in order to circumvent the order of status
quo passed by Learned Single Judge in CWP No. 7641 of 2009 on
20.3.2009. As noted earlier, the case of the respondents in this
regard is that since there was dispute between the petitioner, who
is claiming ownership and possession of land in question on one
hand, and Gaon Sabha, which is claiming vesting in it under
Section 81 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, in terms of the order
passed by the Revenue Assistant dated 29.5.81, on the other hand,
they decided to acquire the land in question, on payment of
compensation to the rightful claimant, under Section 23 of the
Land Acquisition Act. The decision to acquire land has to be
viewed in the context of the urgency to start construction of a
building for housing Police Station Badarpur, which has to be
immediately shifted from its existing site, so as to make it available
to National Highway Authority of India (NHAI) for construction of
six lane elevated highway, which is required to be completed
before the commencement of Commonwealth Games 2010. The
apprehension of the respondents was that final adjudication of
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disputes between the petitioner and the Gaon Sabha Tajpul as
regards the title of the land in question, was not likely in near
future. The respondents could reasonably apprehend that the
decision, if taken in CWP No. 7641/09 on the issue of title of land
in question might take considerable time to come and even if the
decision were to be in their favour, it was likely to be challenged
before superior court. They could not have been sure that the
final decision in CWP No. 7641/09 and in appeals that could arise
from the orders passed in that petition would come soon enough.
Therefore, their anxiety to have unfettered possession of the land
and to commence construction of police station building, which
can brook no delay, is quite understandable and has to be
recognized. They probably were left with no better option in the
facts and circumstances of the case.
22. In any case, the law recognises the power of the state to
acquire land in order to release itself, of its obligation under an
adverse decree or judgment, in wider public interest.
23. In State of UP & Anr. v. Keshav Prasad Singh, 1995 (5) SCC
587, it was found that PWD had built a compounding wall on the
land which had not been validly acquired. The civil court directed
demolition of the boundary wall and restoration of the land to the
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owner. Thereupon the government issued fresh acquisition,
acquiring the land. The acquisition proceedings were challenged
by the owners before the High Court which held the acquisition to
be mala fide, holding that the power to acquire had been exercised
for extraneous reasons. Reversing the decision of the High Court,
the Hon‟ble Supreme Court observed as under:-
"Having considered the respective contentions, we
are of the considered view that the conclusion of
the High Court was clearly illegal. It is seen that
the land acquired was for a public purpose.
Admittedly, the same land was acquired in the year
1963 for building a PWD office and after
construction a compound wall was also constructed
to protect the building. As found by the civil court,
on adducing evidence in a suit that the Department
had encroached upon the respondent‟s land which
was directed to be demolished and delivery of
possession to be given. It is seen that when that
land was needed for a public purpose, i.e., as part
of public office, the State is entitled to exercise its
power of eminent domain and would be justified to
acquire the land according to law. Section 4(1)
was, therefore, correctly invoked to acquire the
land in dispute.............. It can neither be said to be
colourable exercise of power nor an arbitrary
exercise of power."
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24. In First Land Acquisition Collector and Ors. V. Nirodhi
Prakash Gangoli and Anr., 2002 (4) SCC 160, the government lost
litigation and was directed by court to deliver physical possession
of land in question. The acquisition proceedings initiated by the
State in respect of that land were quashed by the High Court on
the ground that exercise of power vested in the State was mala
fide. The decision of the High Court was set aside by the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court observing that when the acquisition of the land is
challenged on the ground that it was mala fide, the court is to find
out whether the purpose for which the acquisition was being made
was the real purpose or a camouflage and that exercise of power
of acquisition cannot be said to be mala fide so long as the purpose
of acquisition continued to be a public purpose. By no stretch of
imagination the exercise of power for acquisition can be held to be
malafide, so long as the purpose of acquisition continues.
25. In State of A.P. V. Goverdhanlal Pitti 2003(4) SCC 739, the
government was tenant in respect of a school building. The
landlord sought eviction of the government from the school
building on the ground that it had become dilapidated and
required reconstruction. Eviction order was passed against the
government and in the course of a writ petition filed by the owner,
seeking early eviction of the State, the government was directed to
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vacate and hand over possession of the school building to the
owner within a specified period. An undertaking was also given by
the State to deliver the possession by a specified date. Thereupon
land was acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. A
writ petition was filed challenging the acquisition, which was
allowed by a Single Judge on the ground that exercise of power u/s
4(1) of Land Acquisition Act was not fair and was only to scuttle a
valid decree passed by the civil court which amounted to "malice
of law". The Division Bench agreed with the Single Bench and
concluded that the acquisition suffered from land of bona fide and
was an attempt to undo the consequences of the judicial decision.
The decision was reversed by the Hon‟ble Court.
During the course of the judgment, the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court noted as under:-
"12. The legal meaning of malice is "ill-will or
spite towards a party and any indirect or improper
motive in taking an action". This is sometimes
described as "malice in fact". "Legal malice" or
"malice in law" means "something done without
lawful excuse". In other words, "it is an act done
wrongfully and wilfully without reasonable or
probable cause, and not necessarily an act done
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from ill feeling and spite. It is a deliberate act in
disregard of the rights of others".
"13. Where malice is attributed to the State, it can
never be a case of personal ill-will or spite on the
part of the State. If at all it is malice in legal sense,
it can be described as an act which is taken with an
oblique or indirect object. Prof. Wade in his
authoritative work on Administrative Law (8th Edn.,
at p. 414) based on English decisions and in the
context of alleged illegal acquisition proceedings,
explains that an action by the State can be
described mala fide if it seeks to "acquire land" "for
a purpose not authorised by the Act". The State, if
it wishes to acquire land, should exercise its power
bona fide for the statutory purpose and for none
other."
"14. Legal malice, therefore, on the part of the
State as attributed to it should be understood to
mean that the action of the State is not taken bona
fide for the purpose of the Land Acquisition Act and
it has been taken only to frustrate the favourable
decisions obtained by the owner of the property
against the State in the eviction and writ
proceedings."
26. In State of Bihar v. Maharajadhiraja Sir Kameshwar Singh of
Darbhanga, AIR 1952 SC 252 the Hon‟ble Supreme Court
recognised the right of the State of "eminent domain" i.e. the right
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of compulsory acquisition of any private property. This power of
eminent domain of the State is sovereign power, over powers and
rights of private persons to properties.
27. In Jagat Singh and Ors. Vs. UOI & Ors., 2008(103) DRJ 651,
a Division Bench of this court passed a decree against the
respondents directing it to remove the tin shed in which a school
was being run by the respondents. On being approached by
Directorate of Education and DDA, the government initiated fresh
proceedings for acquisition of the suit land taking recourse to
Section 4 and 17 of Land Acquisition Act. The acquisition was
challenged on the ground that invocation of the provisions of Land
Acquisition Act for defeating the purpose of the decree was not
permissible in law. Repelling the contention, the Division Bench
held that once the directions of civil court for removal of the
boundary wall was received, the respondents had no option but to
either vacate the area as directed or to validly acquire the same.
Inasmuch as there was litigation between the parties in which the
land was held to be in the ownership of the petitioners and not
validly acquired by the respondents, the same did not mean that
any attempt at acquiring the said land by following the procedure
established by law would be mala fide.
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28. In Saroj Bhatnagar & Ors. Vs. Union of India & Ors.; 2008
(103) DRJ 429 (DB), a decree for possession was passed by the
court of Civil Judge, Delhi, against MCD in respect of land which
was being used for running a veterinary hospital and MCD store.
Thereupon land was acquired invoking the provisions of Land
Acquisition Act. Acquisition was challenged being mala fide
exercise of power, on account of MCD having lost a legal battle in
a suit for possession. It was held that under the Statute,
discretion vests with the government to acquire any land and
under the circumstances, it could not be said that acquisition was
a colourable/mala fide exercise.
29. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the
petitioners that the respondents were required to tender 80% of
estimated compensation to the petitioners before taking
possession of land in question, as required by Section 17(3A) of
Land Acquisition Act. It would be appropriate at this stage to
examine the order dated 29th May, 1981 passed by the revenue
assistant u/s 81 of Delhi Land Reforms Act in case No.87/RA/80. A
perusal of the order shows that a report was received by the
Revenue Assistant from Halka Patwari regarding using of land in
question for non-agricultural purposes. Thereupon notice was
issued to the respondents to appear before the Revenue Assistant.
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Since they did not turn up despite service of notice, the matter
was taken ex-parte against them. The Revenue Assistant held that
the respondents had violated the provisions of Section 81 of Delhi
Land Reforms Act and ordered their eviction from land in question.
It was further directed that the decree shall not be executed if the
respondents repair the damage within 3 months and that if they do
not do so, land in question shall stand vested in the Gaon Sabha
from after 3 months after the date of decree/order. It was
contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the notice
mentioned in the order of the Revenue Assistant was never served
upon the petitioners as it was sent at the address of 7, Hanuman
Road where none of them was residing and in fact only one of
them was residing at 7, Humayun Road, New Delhi. It was also his
contention that the land did not vest in Gaon Sabha as the
petitioners were not ejected from the land in question despite
order passed by the Revenue Assistant on 29 th May, 1981. In our
view, the question as to whether the notice mentioned in the order
of the Revenue Assistant was served or not cannot be assailed in
these proceedings. If the petitioners are aggrieved from the
ejectment order passed by the Revenue Assistant u/s 81 of the
Delhi Land Reforms Act, they have to take recourse to the remedy
provided in the Act. In these proceedings, the petitioners cannot
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assail the order of the Revenue Assistant on the ground that the
notice mentioned in the order of the Revenue Assistant was not
actually served upon the petitioners. So long as the order passed
by the Revenue Assistant on 29th May, 1981 stands, it remains
binding on the petitioners. Though, there is no specific provision
in Delhi Land Reforms Act to the effect that on passing of
ejectment order u/s 81 of Delhi Land Reforms Act, the land,
subject matter of the ejectment order would vest in Gaon Sabha,
the scheme of the Act, in our view, indicates such an effect. It
cannot be accepted that even after passing of ejectment order, the
person against whom ejectment order is passed continues to enjoy
the status of a Bhumidar or an Aasami, as the case may be. In fact
the order of the Revenue Assistant, which has not been challenged
so far in appropriate proceedings expressly directs that if the
respondents do not repair the damage within 3 months from the
date of order, the land shall stand vested in Gaon Sabha after 3
months from the date of the order. It is also not in dispute that
pursuant to the order passed by the revenue assistant, land in
question was entered in the name of Gaon Sabha, in the revenue
records. The respondents have placed copies of Khatoni for the
year 1988-89 which shows that the land comprised in Khasra
No.97 of Village Tajpul stands mutated in the name of Gaon Sabha
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u/s 81 of Delhi Land Reforms Act. It cannot be said that even if the
land in question vested in Gaon Sabha, Tajpul, in view of the order
of the Revenue Assistant, the 80% of the estimated compensation
envisaged in Section 3(A) of Land Acquisition Act was required to
be tendered only to the petitioners, and not to Gaon Sabha.
30. Be that as it may, even if there was non-compliance of the
provisions of the Section 17(3A) of Land Acquisition Act that by
itself would not invalidate the acquisition proceedings. In the case
of Satendra Prasad Jain and Others Vs. State of U.P. and Others,
(1993) 4 SCC 369, it was contended before the Hon‟ble Supreme
Court that requirement of Section 17 (3A), namely, the tender of
80% of the estimated compensation for the land having not been
complied with, the taking of possession of the land from the
appellants was illegal and, therefore, there was no vesting of land
in the government. Rejecting the contention, the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court, inter alia, held as under:-
"In the instant case, even that 80 per cent of
the estimated compensation was not paid to
the appellants although Section 17(3A)
required that it should have been paid before
possession of the said land was taken but that
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does not mean that the possession was taken
illegally or that the said land did not
thereupon vest in the first respondent."
31. This question also came up for consideration before a
Division Bench of this court in the case of Deepak Resorts &
Hotels P. Ltd. & Anr. (Supra) and the Division Bench held as
under:-
"It was next argued by Mr. Lekhi that tender of
80% of the compensation payable for the land in
terms of Section 17(3A) was a mandatory
requirement, the failure whereof would render the
taking over of possession as also the acquisition
proceedings legally bad. It was contended that
even when the term ''compensation'' used in the
Act has not been defined, the term must be given
the same meaning wherever it appears in the entire
enactment. Viewed thus, the payment of
compensation referred to in Section 17(3A), argued
Mr. Lekhi, must necessarily mean compensation
which is found to be payable upon the making of an
award by the Collector under Section 11 of the Act.
This, according to Mr. Lekhi, would lead us to the
conclusion that possession under Section 17(1)
cannot be taken over by the Collector so long as the
Collector has not made an award under Section 11
of the Act, 80% whereof must then be offered to the
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land owner before the possession can be taken over
from him. That contention appears to us to be
totally fallacious and is based on a complete
misreading of the provisions contained in Section
17. We say so for three distinct reasons. Firstly
because Section 17(1) itself provides that the
appropriate Government may direct the Collector
to take over possession of the land in question even
though no award has been made by him. The
words "though no such award has been made" are
significant and imply that taking over of possession
by the Collector is a process that is not in the least
dependent upon the making of an award. Secondly
because compensation referred to in sub-section 3A
of Section 17 is the estimated amount of
compensation and not the amount eventually
determined as payable under the Award. This is
evident from the use of the words "tender payment
of 80% of the compensation for such land as
estimated by him". The difference between
compensation payable in terms of the award and
that payable under Section 17(3A) is that while
compensation determined by the award attains
finality qua the Collector in view of the provisions
of Section 12, compensation payable under Section
3A is only an estimate which the Collector makes,
out of which 80% has to be tendered to the owner
before taking possession. Indeed if the
interpretation offered by Mr. Lekhi were to be
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accepted and making of a final award taken as a
condition precedent for dispossession of the owner,
there would be no rationale behind withholding
20% compensation from him once the said
compensation has been determined. That is
particularly so when Section 31 of the Act obliges
the Collector to tender the payment of
compensation awarded by him to the persons
interested thereto according to the award and to
pay it to them unless prevented by someone or
more of the contingencies mentioned in sub-section
2 thereof. Suffice it to say that payment of only
80% of the compensation is provided for by the Act
only because what is being paid is only an estimate
made at a point of time when the award has yet to
be made and published by the Collector.
Thirdly because in terms of sub-section 3B of
Section 17, the amount paid or deposited under
Section 3A has to be taken into account for
determining the amount of compensation required
to be tendered under Section 31. The provision
clearly envisages recovery of the excess, if any,
paid as arrears of land revenue unless the same is
refunded by the person who has received the same
. The question of receiving excess or refunding
would not arise if the payment under Section 17
(3A) is a payment strictly in accordance with the
award made under Section 11. The scheme of the
Act and in particular Section 17 is that payment of
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80% estimated compensation is what is required as
a condition precedent for taking of possession and
not the compensation finally held payable under the
award."
32. In that case, Land Acquisition Collector stated that in fact
the amount of compensation was tendered to the land owners.
The petitioners, however, denied receipt of any such letter.
Dealing with the legal issue, the Division Bench held as under:-
"Although Mr. Lekhi denied the receipt of any such
letter, the same need not halt us in answering the
question raised by Mr. Lekhi on the legal principles
that now stand settled by the decision of the
Supreme Court in Satendra Prasad Jain v. State of
U.P. (1993) 4 SCC 369. One of the issues that fell
for consideration in that case was whether failure
on the part of the authorities to tender 80% of the
estimated compensation for the land would vitiate
the acquisition proceedings or render illegal the
process of taking over of possession. Answering
the question in the negative, their Lordships
observed:
"16. Further, Section 17(3-A) postulates that
the owner will be offered an amount equivalent to
80 per cent of the estimated compensation for the
land before the Government takes possession of it
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under Section 17(1). Section 11-A cannot be so
construed as to leave the Government holding title
to the land without the obligation to determine
compensation, make an award and pay to the
owner the difference between the amount of the
award and the amount of 80 per cent of the
estimated compensation.
17. In the instant case, even that 80 per cent
of the estimated compensation was not paid to the
appellants although Section 17(3-A) required that it
should have been paid before possession of the said
land was taken but that does not mean that the
possession was taken illegally or that the said land
did not thereupon vest in the Ist respondent. It is,
at any rate, not open to the third respondent, who,
as the letter of the Special Land Acquisition Officer
dated 27th June, 1990 shows, failed to make the
necessary monies available and who has been in
occupation of the said land ever since its
possession was taken, to urge that the possession
was taken illegally and that, therefore, the said
land has not vested in the first respondent and the
first respondent is under no obligation to make an
award."
15.From the above, it is evident that if the
amount of compensation is not paid or deposited on
or before taking possession of the land, the
consequence that follows is in the nature of a
liability to pay interest. That consequence cannot,
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in our opinion, be enlarged on any juristic
principles to render the taking of possession itself
to be illegal especially in a case like the present
where the validity of the acquisition proceedings
has been examined by this Court and upheld."
33. In the case of Jagat Singh (Supra), also it was contended by
the petitioners that the respondents had not tendered 80% of the
estimated amount of compensation. The contention was repelled
by the Division Bench with the following observations:-
"it is well settled that non-payment of the estimated
amount of compensation does not by itself vitiates
the acquisition proceedings. That aspect of the
controversy is squarely covered by the decision of
the Supreme Court in S.P. Jain and Ors. Vs. State of
U.P. & Ors. (1993) 4 SCC 369."
34. The last contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners
was that if the ownership of the land in question already vested in
the Government, this could not have been subject matter of
acquisition. The argument, in our view is devoid of any merit.
This is not the case of the respondents that land in question is
owned by the government. Their case is that in view of the order
passed by the Revenue Assistant on 29.5.81, land in question came
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to be vested in Gaon Sabha, Tajpul. Gaon Sabha is not the
government and is a separate equal entity constituted u/s 150 of
Delhi Land Reforms Act which provides for establishing Gaon
Sabha in each Gaon Sabha Area. It further provides that Gaon
Sabha shall be a body corporate, with capacity of suing and being
sued in its corporate name, or acquiring, holding administering
and transferring property and of entering into contracts. As
provided in Section 150(3) of Delhi Land Reforms Act, the property
of Gaon Sabha vests in the government only if the whole of a Gaon
Sabha area ceases to be rural area, by virtue of notification u/s
507 of Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. Therefore, there was no
legal embargo acquiring the land irrespective of whether it
belonged to Gaon Sabha as the case of respondents is or it
continued to belong to the petitioners, as claimed by them.
35. The question whether a land owned by the government can
be acquired or not has been subject matter of judicial
pronouncements. In Dalbir Singh Vs. Land Acquisition Collector &
Ors. 142(2007) Delhi Law Times 159, it was contended before a
Division Bench of this court that land in question being
government land cannot be acquired. Repelling the contentions,
the Division Bench held as under.
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"The above observations leave no doubt that the
Court have distinguished the matters where the
Government has title as well as possession and he
entire bundle of rights in the land and there is
nothing to be acquired, and where it has only title
and not possession meaning thereby that it can
acquire possession also by way of acquisition.
Needless to say, that the process of acquisition
encompasses in itself the taking over of all interests
and rights including title and possession because
the land has to vest in the Government free from all
encumbrances. If the Land Acquisition Act is to be
interpreted in its letter and spirit, then no other
meaning can be attributed to the acquisition. If the
Government has already got the title, as admitted
in this case, it cannot be deprived of other interests
including the possession and the said interests can
be acquired through the Land Acquisition Act
culminating in taking over of physical possession.
A perusal of the above judgments leave no
doubt that it has been unequivocally held that even
after having the title, other interests, and rights
which are still with a private person can be
acquired and compensation paid for the said rights
and interests in the land including deprivation of
the physical possession. The Hon‟ble Supreme
Court has held as under in Sharda Devi case
(supra):
Ajay Kumar Sanghi v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.
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Ajay Kumar Sanghi v.Delhi Police & Ors.
".... The power to acquire by the State, the
land owned by its subjects hails from the right of
eminent domain vesting in the State which is
essentially an attribute of the Sovereign Power of
the State. So long as the public purpose subsists
the exercise of the power of the State to acquire
the land of its subjects, without regard to the
wishes and willingness of the owner or person
interested in the land, cannot be questioned."
36. In Collector of Bombay Vs. Musserwanji Rattanji Mistri &
Ors, AIR 1955 SC 298, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court held that when
the government acquires land under the provisions of Land
Acquisition Act, it acquires the sum total of all private interest
subsisting in them and if the government has itself the interest in
the land, it has only to acquire the other interests outstanding
thereof so that it might be in a position to pass it on absolutely for
public user.
37. Though the grounds taken in the petition include that
requirement for a police station was not a public purpose, no
arguments on this ground, was adduced before us. In our opinion,
requirement of land for construction of a police station is
undisputedly a public purpose and, therefore, it was very much
permissible for the respondents to acquire land in question for
Ajay Kumar Sanghi v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.
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Ajay Kumar Sanghi v.Delhi Police & Ors.
using it for a police station. Another ground taken in the appeal,
though not agitated during arguments, was that there was no
urgency involved so as to justify invoking the emergency powers
conferred upon the government u/s 17 of the Land Acquisition Act.
In the case of Nirodhi Prakash Gangoli (Supra), the Hon‟ble
Supreme Court held that invoking urgency powers u/s 17(1) and
(4) of Land Acquisition Act was a matter of substantive satisfaction
of the government with which the court would not ordinarily
interfere unless it comes to the conclusion that the appropriate
authority had not applied its mind to the relevant factors or that
the decision taken by the appropriate authority was malafide. The
following observations made by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in this
regard are pertinent:
"The question of urgency of an acquisition under
Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act is a matter of
subjective satisfaction of the Government and
ordinarily it is not open to the court to make a
scrutiny of the propriety of that satisfaction on an
objective appraisal of facts. In this view of the
matter when the Government takes a decision,
taking all relevant considerations into account and
is satisfied that there exists emergency for invoking
powers under Sections 17(1) and (4) of the Act, and
issues notification accordingly, the same should not
Ajay Kumar Sanghi v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.
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Ajay Kumar Sanghi v.Delhi Police & Ors.
be interfered with by the court unless the court
comes to the conclusion that the appropriate
authority had not applied its mind to the relevant
factors or that the decision has been taken by the
appropriate authority mala fide. Whether in a
given situation there existed urgency or not is left
to the discretion and decision of the authorities
concerned. If an order invoking power under
Section 17(4) is assailed, the courts may enquire
whether the appropriate authority had all the
relevant materials before it or whether the order
has been passed by non-application of mind. Any
post-notification delay subsequent to the decision of
the State Government dispensing with an enquiry
under Section 5-A by invoking powers under
Section 17(1) of the Act would not invalidate the
decision itself specially when no mala fides on the
part of the Government or its officers are alleged."
38. As far as the present case is concerned, since land on which
the building of police station Badarpur presently stands
constructed is urgently required for six lane elevated highway, the
government has to immediately provide land for construction of
another building to house the police station. Therefore, it cannot
be denied that land in question, which has been found most
suitable for the police station, after inspecting a number of sites,
was urgently required by the government. Therefore, invoking the
Ajay Kumar Sanghi v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.
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Ajay Kumar Sanghi v.Delhi Police & Ors.
emergency powers granted u/s 17 of Land Acquisition Act was
eminently justified in this case.
39. No other point was urged before us.
For the reasons given in the preceding paragraphs, we find
no merit in the petitions. Both the petitions as well as pending
CMs are hereby dismissed. The interim order stands vacated.
V.K.JAIN, J.
VIKRAMAJIT SEN,J.
September 1, 2009
acm/sk
Ajay Kumar Sanghi v. Lt. Governor of Delhi & Ors.
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Ajay Kumar Sanghi v.Delhi Police & Ors.
