Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 4178 Del
Judgement Date : 15 October, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Judgment delivered on: October 15, 2009
+ Crl.A No.125/1996
VINOD KUMAR @ DOLLY ..... Appellant
Through: Ms.Meena Chaudhary Sharma,
Advocate.
Versus
STATE OF DELHI ..... Respondent
Through: Mr.Pawan Sharma, APP.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KISHAN KAUL
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE AJIT BHARIHOKE
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ?
3. Whether the judgment should be
reported in Digest ?
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.(ORAL)
1. One Bhagirath (deceased) was gainfully employed as a TSR
driver. On 20.6.1992, Bhagirath along with Uma Shankar (PW1) and
Kishan Lal (PW3) was standing near the Godbin Lodge at about 4.30
p.m. Since these persons wanted to have some water, they fetched
two empty tumblers from Raja Ram (PW2) who was a juice seller and
then he went to Godbin lodge to bring some water. The deceased met
Crl.A.No.125/1996 Page 1 of 7
the appellant at the counter and asked for some water, which is stated
to have been declined by the appellant. This resulted in an altercation
and the deceased gave a slap to the appellant. The appellant feeling
humiliated left in anger and came back after 5-6 minutes, whipped out
a dagger from the dub of his pant and stabbed the deceased on the left
side of the chest whereafter the appellant ran away. The endeavour to
apprehend the appellant proved futile as it is alleged that he even
attacked PW1 in order to escape.
2. The appellant was charged for offence under Section 302 IPC
read with Section 307 IPC and Section 27 of the Arms Act and was
found guilty for offences under Section 302 IPC and Section 27 of the
Arms Act while being acquitted of the charge under Section 307 IPC in
terms of judgment dated 29.6.1996 and was sentenced to undergo
rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay Rs.100/- as fine and in default
of fine, to undergo RI for a period of two months under Section 302 IPC
and was sentenced to undergo RI for 3 years under Section 27 of the
Arms Act, both sentences running concurrently.
3. The case of the prosecution is that after the aforesaid incident,
PW1 went to the house of the deceased and brought his brother to the
spot and the deceased was taken to the LNJP Hospital where he was
declared brought dead.
Crl.A.No.125/1996 Page 2 of 7
4. The constable on duty in the hospital passed on the information
of the death of the deceased to P.S. Nabi Karim where DD No.18/A was
recorded and SI Jai Kishan was entrusted with the investigation, who
went to the place of occurrence first and thereafter proceeded to the
hospital where he recorded the statement of PW1. The Rukka was sent
through Constable Kulwant Singh, PW20 for registration of the case.
The blood samples were lifted from the site as also the glasses which
were lying broken at the site. The appellant had left the chappals
behind, which were also taken into possession. The shirt of PW1, which
was stained with blood in the process of lifting the deceased was also
taken into possession by the IO.
5. The appellant made no confession in the statement under Section
313 Cr.P.C. The appellant is produced in custody in Court and states
that he did inflict the injury on the deceased which caused his death
but the circumstances so developed in respect of the incident that the
appellant was enraged. The appellant claims that the provocation for
his conduct was the slapping by the deceased. The appellant claims
that he is from the Scheduled Caste community and it is the deceased
who objected to take water from him. Be that as it may, when the first
opportunity was available, the appellant did not plead any such
defence and come out with the truth. The appellant now confessed to
having inflicted the injury but learned counsel for the appellant pleads
Crl.A.No.125/1996 Page 3 of 7
that the present case is not one for conviction under Section 302 IPC
but the 4th Exception to Section 300 IPC would come into play and as it
is not a case of culpable homicide with any pre-mediation but rather an
incident in a sudden fight in the heat of passion and thus would be
governed by Section 304 Part 1 of the IPC.
6. The relevant provision of Section 300 is as under:-
"300. Murder
Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if
the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing
death, or-
---
---
---
Exception 4-Culpable homicide is not murder if it is committed without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and without the offenders having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner."
Section 304 reads as under:-
"Section 304. Punishment for culpable homicide not amounting to murder
Whoever commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder shall be punished with [imprisonment for life], or imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine, if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,
Or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, or with fine, or with both, if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death, but without any intention to cause death, or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death."
7. In order for the case of the appellant to fall within the 4th
Exception to Section 300 IPC, all the ingredients have to be satisfied:-
(i) Committed without pre-meditation
(ii) In a sudden fight in the heat of passion and upon a sudden
quarrel
(iii) Without the offender having taken undue advantage or
acted in a cruel or unusual manner
8. If the evidence is perused, it has come on record that there was a
hiatus period of about 5 to 6 minutes between the incident of slapping
by the deceased and the appellant rushing to his house picking up a
knife and using it to inflict the injury on the deceased. It is trite to say
that the time gap between the quarrel and the fight should be
minimum so as not to give enough time for passion to subside and the
accused to come to normalcy. We are fortified by the views expressed
by the Apex Court in Sukhbir Singh Vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2002
SC 1168 where such a view was taken in similar facts. The accused in
that case upon a sudden quarrel went home and came armed in the
company of others though without telling them his intention to commit
the ultimate crime of murder. There was a lapse of a few minutes but
it was found that there was no sufficient lapse of time between the
quarrel and the fight and the occurrence could be categorized as
'sudden' within the meaning of Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC.
9. On the same reasoning is the judgment of Shanmugam Vs.
State of Tamil Nadu, 2002 10 SCC 4 where the accused on being
questioned by his deceased brother as to why he was whistling at a
place frequented by ladies, all of a sudden entered his house and came
out with a spear and attacked the deceased, inflicting several injuries
which caused his death. The conviction and sentence was modified to
one under Section 304 Part 1 of the IPC instead of Section 302 IPC.
10. We are of the considered view that the present case is
paramateria to the factual matrix of above said two cases inasmuch as
the deceased slapped the appellant. The appellant was enraged and it
appears that the lifting of the hand by the deceased may have also
occurred on account of their being some quibble over caste allegations
as contended on behalf of the appellant. The appellant saw red and
rushed to his house and was back in a couple of minutes to inflict the
fatal blow. The lapse of time period was not sufficient to cool down the
temper of the appellant and the incident occurred in one sequence in a
sudden manner. We are thus inclined to accept the contention of
learned counsel for the appellant that though the finding of guilt under
the impugned judgment against the appellant is liable to be sustained,
the conviction is altered to one under Section 304 Part 1 IPC and not
Section 302 IPC.
11. Now coming to the issue of sentence, we feel that the sentence
of 8 years imprisonment would suffice apart from sustaining the fine of
Rs.100/-. The appellant is not sure whether he has paid the fine but in
any case if the sentence undergone by the appellant of 8 ½ years
which includes remission of about 9 to11 months is taken into account,
the period of sentence coupled with the period required to undergo on
account of default for payment of fine already stands served.
12. The appellant be thus released if he is not wanted in any other
case. The appeal is accordingly allowed.
13. Copy of the order be sent to the Superintendent Tihar Jail.
SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.
October 15, 2009 AJIT BHARIHOKE, J. gm
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