Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 4102 Del
Judgement Date : 12 October, 2009
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI
+ CS (OS) No. 941/2002
Reserved on: 7th October, 2009
% Decided on: 12th October, 2009
Mr. Roop Lalwani & Ors. ...Plaintiffs
Through : Mr. Dheeraj Malhotra, Adv.
Versus
Ms. Sunita Lalwani & Ors. ...Defendants
Through : Ms. Karuna Nandi, Adv.
Coram:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to Reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? No
MANMOHAN SINGH, J.
1. By this order I shall decide Issues 3, 4 and 5 of the present
suit. The present suit has been filed by the plaintiffs for recovery of
possession under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.
2. Brief facts as per plaint are that Mr. M.N. Lalwani was the
owner of property no. R-719, New Rajinder Nagar, New Delhi
(hereinafter referred to as the „suit property‟). Mr. M.N. Lalwani died
issueless and his wife Mrs. Radhika Lalwani predeceased him. Plaintiff
no. 1 is the brother of the deceased Mr. Lalwani and plaintiff nos. 2 and
3 are his sisters. After his wife‟s death on 26 December, 2001 the late
Mr. M.N. Lalwali was brought to Mumbai on 10 January, 2002 by
plaintiff no. 2, with whom he stayed till his death. On the day that he
went to Mumbai, late Mr. Lalwani handed over the keys of the suit
property to the plaintiff and after that, the plaintiffs have been in actual
possession of the suit property. The defendants visited the suit property
on 18 April, 2002 and without the plaintiffs‟ consent, changed the locks
and dispossessed the plaintiffs by force. Repeated requests to return the
suit property yielded no result, and therefore the present suit was filed.
3. In their written statement, the defendants have stated that the
present suit is not maintainable on two grounds. First, that the suit has
not been properly valued as the suit property has not been valued per its
market value. Second, that the suit under Section 6 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963 is not maintainable as such a suit cannot be filed against the
owners of the relevant property. The facts of the case as submitted by the
defendants are that father of defendant no. 1 and 2 and husband of
defendant no. 4 late Mr. P.N. Lalwani, younger brother of late Mr. M.N.
Lalwani, purchased the suit property out of his own funds vide a
perpetual lease deed dated 28 December, 1961 executed by the President
of India. After the death of Mr. P.N. Lalwani on 2 February, 1980, the
suit property devolved upon his legal heirs being defendant nos. 1, 2
and 4.
4. The late Mr. M.N. Lalwani at this point of time fraudulently
got his name inserted in the perpetual lease deed of the suit property, i.e.
he showed defendant no. 4 an unsigned Will of late Mr. P.N. Lalwani
bequeathing the suit property entirely to him and convinced defendant
no. 4 to sign a letter to the L & DO in the same regard and affix an
affidavit thereon. Defendant no. 4 had no reason to disbelieve the older
brother of her deceased husband, and in her state of shock over her
husband‟s premature death, did as she was asked. The names of
defendant nos. 1 and 2, being minors, were also added.
5. The defendants have further stated that when they attained
majority, they were shown the Will of their late father by late Mr. M.N.
Lalwani, who persuaded them to execute power of attorneys in his
favour allowing him to sell the suit property. The said defendants were
even made to sign blank stamp paper, stating that the same was to be
used with regard to the L & DO department. On the basis of the power
of attorneys and the stamp paper, the suit property was converted into a
freehold property and a fresh conveyance deed dated 2 January, 2002
was executed in the names of defendant nos. 1 and 2 and late Mr. M.N.
Lalwani. In a suit for partition being CS (OS) No. 872/2002 filed by the
plaintiffs, (which was later withdrawn) the plaintiffs have relied upon the
said conveyance deed and are therefore aware that the defendants are co-
owners in the suit property.
6. When late Mr. M.N. Lalwani‟s wife expired, the former came
to Mumbai where he met defendant nos. 2 and 4. Allegedly, shaken by
the deaths in the family, late Mr. M.N. Lalwani for the first time
confessed to the said defendants that the Will had been a fabricated one
and the attorneys, signatures etc. of the defendants were obtained on the
basis of this fraud. Thereafter late Mr. M.N. Lalwani became unwell and
expired on 24 February, 2002. Being issueless, his brother and sisters
inherited his estate. The defendants brought late Mr. M.N. Lalwani‟s
confession to the plaintiffs‟ notice and stated that they were the owners
of the suit property, but to no avail.
7. The defendants have denied that the keys to the suit property
were handed over to late Mr. M.N. Lalwani. It is submitted that there
were two sets of keys, and only one was handed over to Mr. M.N.
Lalwani who was allowed to reside therein, while the other set was kept
with late Mr. P.N. Lalwani. Further, it has been denied that late Mr.
M.N. Lalwani gave the possession of the suit property to the plaintiffs. It
is submitted that when he arrived at Mumbai on 10 January, 2002 he was
in good health and there was no occasion to give the keys of the suit
property to anybody. On 11 February, 2002 late Mr. M.N. Lalwani
suffered a heart stroke and went into coma. In these circumstances, a son
of the predeceased brother of late Mr. M.N. Lalwani and late Mr. P.N.
Lalwani, namely Mr. Naresh Lalwani, took into his possession all the
papers and belongings of Mr. M.N. Lalwani. 8. To avoid the
usurpation of the suit property, defendant nos. 2, 3 and 4 arrived at Delhi
on 16 April, 2002 to stay therein. Mr. Naresh Lalwani then arrived with
unsocial elements and demanded vacation of the suit property. A
complaint was lodged by the defendants against the plaintiffs, and the
conveyance deed was shown to the Assistant Commissioner of Police,
after which the plaintiffs stated that they had been unaware of the
defendants‟ status and would not be any more trouble. However, visits
from unsocial elements continued and then the plaintiffs filed a suit for
partition and subsequently withdrew the same. As per the defendants, the
present case has been filed only to harass them.
9. In the replication, the plaintiffs have submitted that the
defendants never met late Mr. M.N. Lalwani during his stay in Mumbai
and that they have concocted this fact to support their lie about the
alleged confession of late Mr. M.N. Lalwani.
10. I have perused the rival contentions of both parties as well as
the pertinent documents. By this court‟s order dated 9 May, 2002 an
injunction was granted restraining the defendants from selling, alienating
or transferring the suit property. On 18 March, 2003, this court noted
that as the suit property had been let out before passing of the restraint
order, status quo would be maintained and the rent receipts and
maintenance expenses would be filed quarterly. On 4 March, 2008
Issues were framed. As per order, Issue Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are to be treated
as preliminary issues. I shall deal with each Issue separately.
11. Issue no. 3 being "Whether the plaint is liable to be rejected
on account of deficiency of Court fee?" does not arise for consideration
as it was not opposed by the Learned Counsel for the defendants during
the course of hearing of the other two issues. This being the case, I shall
now take up the other two preliminary issues.
"Whether any claim can be made by the plaintiffs qua the suit property as a consequence of the unconditional withdrawal of CS (OS) No. 872 of 2002 "Roop Lalwani & Ors. Vs. Sunita Lalwani & Ors.?"
Counsel for the plaintiffs has submitted a copy of order dated 3 May,
2002, on which date CS (OS) No. 872/2002 was withdrawn. The said
order is reproduced hereinbelow :
"Learned counsel for the plaintiff wants to withdraw the suit with liberty to file fresh suit. Suit is dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to file fresh suit."
13. No further submissions as regards this Issue are required to
be considered in view of the above-stated order. The withdrawal of CS
(OS) No. 872/2002 was not unconditional and liberty had been granted
to file a fresh suit. This Issue is decided in favour of the plaintiffs and
against the defendants.
"Whether the suit as framed is not maintainable under Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act against the defendants?" Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 provides as under :
"6. 1) If any person is dispossessed without his consent of immovable property otherwise than in due course of law, he or any person claiming through him may, by suit, recover possession thereof, notwithstanding any other title that may be set up in such suit.
(2) No suit under this section shall be brought--
(a) after the expiry of six months from the date of dispossession; or
(b) against the Government.
(3) No appeal shall lie from any order or decree passed in any suit instituted under this section, nor shall any review of any such order or decree be allowed.
(4) Nothing in this section shall bar any person from suing to establish his title to such property and to recover possession thereof."
15. The case of the defendants is that the plaintiffs were never in
actual possession of the suit property as claimed by them. Further,
Section 4 (1) of the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 has
been referred to and the same is reproduced hereinbelow :
"4(1). No suit, claim or action to enforce any right in respect of any property held benami against the person in whose name the property is held or against any other person shall lie by or on behalf of a person claiming to be the real owner of such property."
As defendant nos. 1 and 2 are the true owners of 2/3 of the suit property,
no claim of possession is maintainable against them.
16. The actual possession of the suit property cannot by any
stretch of imagination be said to have been with the plaintiffs. They were
only in possession of the keys to the same. The plaintiffs‟ contention that
they had posted a security guard at the suit property and were therefore
in possession of the same is claimed to be unfounded and wrong as the
security guard was hired on 23 March, 2002 and was posted for only
about 26 days. Further, plaintiff‟s letter dated 22 March, 2002 to the
Delhi Vidyut Board for charging basic charges clearly states that „no one
is staying in the premises form January 2002 and hence there is no
consumption of electricity."
17. Counsel for the defendants has referred to Rame Gowda v.
M. Varadappa Naidu,(2004) 1 SCC 769, wherein the following was
observed:
"9. The possession which a trespasser is entitled to defend against the rightful owner must be settled possession, extending over a sufficiently long period of time and acquiesced to by the true owner. A casual act of possession would not have the effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner. The rightful owner may re-enter and reinstate himself provided he does not use more force than is necessary. Such entry will be viewed only as resistance to an intrusion upon his possession which has never been lost. A stray act of trespass, or a possession which has not matured into settled possession, can be obstructed or removed by the true owner even by using necessary force. In Puran Singh case the Court clarified that it is difficult to lay down any hard-and-fast rule as to when the possession of a trespasser can mature into settled possession. The "settled possession" must be (i) effective, (ii) undisturbed, and (iii) to the knowledge of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser.....The Court laid down the following tests which may be adopted as a working rule for determining the attributes of "settled possession" (SCC p.527, para 12):
(i) that the trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property over a sufficiently long period;
(ii) that the possession must be to the knowledge (either express or implied) of the owner or without any attempt at concealment by the trespasser and which contains an element of animus possidendi. The nature of possession of the trespasser would, however, be a matter to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case;
(iii) the process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final and must be acquiesced to by the true owner; and
(iv) that one of the usual tests to determine the quality of settled possession, in the case of culturable land, would be whether or not the trespasser, after having taken possession, had grown any crop. If the crop had been grown by the trespasser, then even the true owner, has no right to
destroy the crop grown by the trespasser and take forcible possession."
18. It is settled law that the question/existence of title in the suit
property is immaterial as far as Section 6 of the Specific Relief Act is
concerned. In view of the observation of the Supreme Court as stated
above, and under the circumstances of the present case, it seems to me
that it cannot be said that the plaintiffs were in „settled possession‟ of the
suit property. The plaintiffs never actually resided in the suit property
and are asserting their „actual possession‟ of the same on the basis of the
security guard deployed there for a mere 26 days. Though the defendants
did not reside in the suit property for much time either, the onus of
proving „settled possession‟ is on the plaintiffs and I believe that the
same has not been satisfactorily discharged.
19. Such being the circumstances of the present suit, I find that
the present suit is not maintainable under Section 6 of the Specific Relief
Act, 1963. Thus issue No.4 is decided in favour of the defendants and
against the plaintiffs. Consequently, the suit of the plaintiffs is
dismissed. All pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of in
view of the orders passed in Issue No. 4. No costs.
MANMOHAN SINGH, J.
OCTOBER 12, 2009 nn
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