Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 4068 Del
Judgement Date : 9 October, 2009
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
Reserved on : September 15, 2009
Decision on : October 9, 2009
CS(OS) No. 915 of 2007
M/S. ANIL RAI ELECTRONICS ENTERPRISES (P)
LTD. ..... Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sachdeva with
Dr. Saif Mahmmood and
Mr. Preet Pal Singh, Advocates.
versus
M/S. ANAND INTERNATIONAL INDIA & ORS. ..... Defendants
Through: Mr. Sanjay Jain, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Parveen Chauhan, Advocate.
AND
CS(OS) No. 1283 of 2008
M/S. ANAND INTERNATIONAL INDIA & ORS. ..... Plaintiffs
Through: Mr. Sanjay Jain, Senior Advocate with
Mr. Parveen Chauhan, Advocate.
versus
M/S. ANIL RAI ELECTRONICS ENTERPRISES (P)
LTD. ..... Defendant
Through: Mr. Sanjeev Sachdeva with
Dr. Saif Mahmmood and
Mr. Preet Pal Singh, Advocates.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. MURALIDHAR
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? No
CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 1 of 17
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest? Yes
JUDGMENT
S. Muralidhar,J.
IA No. 8704 of 2008 in CS(OS) No. 915 of 2007 (under Order I Rule 10 CPC)
1. In this application the Plaintiff states that on 16th July 2008 (wrongly
typed as 15th July 2008) when an application IA No. 1400 of 2008, under
Order XII Rule 6 CPC, was listed before the Court a statement was made to
the effect that the Plaintiff is not urging the ground of sub-letting. The order
passed on 16th July 2008 reads as under:
"IA No.1400/2008 in CS (OS) No. 915 of 2007
Today the case was fixed for hearing on this application made by the plaintiff under Order XII Rule 6 CPC. Learned counsel for defendant Nos. 1 to 6 states that defendant Nos. 7 to 9 remains to be served and, therefore, till they are served, this application should not be heard whereas learned counsel for the plaintiff states that in view of the admission made by defendant Nos. 1 to 6 in their written statement, the plaintiff is ready to drop defendant Nos. 7 to 9 from the array of the plaint. Ordered as such. Amended memo of parties be filed within three days.
List for hearing of this application on 28th July, 2008."
2. Pursuant thereto, an amended memo was filed on 23rd July 2008 dropping
Defendants 7 to 9. Thereafter the present application has been filed on 26th
July 2009 seeking to drop Defendants 2 to 6 as well from the array of CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 2 of 17 parties. There has been no reply filed to this application. The application is
allowed and the Defendants 2 to 6 are dropped from the array of parties.
3. The application is disposed of.
IA No. 1400 of 2008 in CS(OS) No. 915 of 2007 (under Order XII Rule 6 CPC) and IA No. 8774 of 2008 in CS(OS) No. 1283 of 2008 (under Order XII Rule 11 CPC)
4. CS(OS) No. 915 of 2007 is a suit filed by Anil Rai Electronics Enterprises
Pvt. Ltd („AREEPL‟) against Anand International India („AII‟) and 8 others
for recovery of possession of the immovable property No.B-II/63, Mohan
Co-operative Industrial Estate, New Delhi (hereinafter the suit premises)
comprising a basement, ground floor, mezzanine floor and first floor.
Defendants 2 to 4 are the partners of Defendant No.1, AII. Defendants 6 to 8
are the Directors of Defendant No.5 company. It is stated that Defendant
No.1 firm, through its Managing Partner Defendant No.2, has illegally sublet
and assigned the tenancy rights in the suit premises to Defendants 5 to 8.
Defendant No.9, a company incorporated in Mauritius, holds the major
shareholding stake of Defendant No.5 and has fundamental control of the
management and affairs of Defendant No.5.
5. The suit premises was let out on 8th October 2002 by AREEPL to AII and
Defendants 2 to 4 for a period of three years on rent of Rs.3,40,000/- per
month. The tenancy was to commence on 1st December 2002 with a lock-in
period of 24 months. It is agreed that the tenancy may be renewed for a
period of six years at an increased monthly rent of Rs.3,91,000/- with effect
from 1st December 2005. It is stated that thereafter the rent stood increased CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 3 of 17 to Rs.4,56,000.
6. According to the Plaintiff, the aforementioned lease deed was
unregistered and as a result thereof the tenancy of Defendant Nos. 1 to 4 in
the suit premises was a month-to-month tenancy terminable with 15 days‟
notice as envisaged in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882
(„TP Act‟).
7. It is stated that as the Plaintiff did not wish to continue the tenancy on 10th
February 2007, a lawyer‟s notice was issued by the Plaintiff to Defendants 1
to 4 terminating the tenancy with effect from 1st March 2007 thus giving
them 15 days‟ clear time to vacate the suit premises and handover
possession. The Defendants replied to the notice on 25th February 2007
through their counsel denying that they had sub-let the premises as alleged
by the Plaintiff. It was further denied that the rent had been enhanced to
Rs.4,56,000. It was asserted that the rent had been enhanced to Rs.3,91,000/-
per month with effect from 1st December 2005 and remained as such. The
termination of the lease was challenged as being illegal and in violation of
the lease deed dated 8th October 2002.
8. The Plaintiff states that it did not accept any rent from the Defendants
after February 2007. It is submitted that since the Defendant had no defence
to offer, and the lease stood determined by the service of 15 days‟ advance
notice upon the Defendants in terms of Section 106 TP Act, the continued
occupation of the suit premises by the Defendants beyond the termination of
the lease was illegal and unauthorised. The Plaintiff therefore prayed for a CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 4 of 17 decree of possession. The Plaintiff also claimed mesne profits and damages
with effect from 1st March 2007 @ Rs.11,50,000/- per month which was the
prevalent market rent for the suit premises. Apart from the above reliefs, the
Plaintiff also sought a decree of permanent injunction.
9. A written statement was filed by Defendants 1 to 6 on 5 th December 2007.
Pursuant to orders dated 13th January 2009 passed in IA No. 8705 of 2008
filed by the Defendants 1 to 6 under Order VI Rule 17, the said written
statement was permitted to be amended. The amended written statement
was filed on 28th February 2009.
10. While in para 4 of the unamended written statement it was contended
that "there was a consensus ad idem between the parties to present suit that
the Plaintiff will not disturb the tenancy of the Defendant till the expiry of
the tenancy period" and further that "if this was not the intention between
the parties then what made the Plaintiff to execute a document granting 9
years lease right to Defendant No.1", in the amended written statement fresh
paras 5, 6, and 7 have been added in which it is contended that the Plaintiff
has taken benefit of the enhanced rent for the renewed lease period and that
having taken such benefit "the Plaintiff cannot resile from the agreement
which he was supposed to have performed." It is then contended that
"pursuant to the enhanced rent, the Defendant/Applicant is in the permissive
physical and legal possession of the property and the Plaintiff has been
treating the Defendant No.1 as his tenant." It is contended in para 6 of the
amended written statement that the Defendant has performed their part of the
contract and were ready and still willing to perform the remaining part. It is CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 5 of 17 claimed in para 7 that "acceptance of the enhanced rent creates a moral/legal
obligation of the Plaintiff not to disturb the possession of the Defendant till
the expiry of the renewed period." It is further stated that "payment of the
enhanced rent entitles the Applicant/Defendant to retain the physical
possession of the property as permissive possession may be not as lease but
surely as a Licensee till the expiry of the renewed period."
11. In the parawise reply to the plaint, it is stated in the amended written
statement that "para No.4 is not denied to the extent that the lease deed dated
08.10.2002 was unregistered document." It was further sought to be
clarified that at the time of execution of the said agreement, the Plaintiff had
"assured the Defendant that he will get the lease deed registered." It is
claimed that "whenever Plaintiff requested the Defendant to get the lease
deed registered, the Defendant on one pretext or the other denied the
registration of the lease deed." It is claimed that "since the relations of the
parties were cordial at that time Defendants did not initiate any legal
proceedings against the Plaintiff." It is claimed in para 6 of the reply on
merits that "in the guise of non-registration of the lease deed, the Plaintiff is
forcing the Defendant to vacate the premises without any cause of action."
12. It is significant that in para 3 of the plaint the plaintiff averred that the
rent for the suit premises stood increased to Rs.3,91,000 per month with
effect from December 2005 and thereafter to Rs. 4,56,000 which was the
present rent. Both in the earlier as well as the amended written statement in
reply to para 3 of the plaint the defendant AII has stated that "para 3 is not
denied being the content of the lease deed dated 08.10.2002.‟ CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 6 of 17
13. After the unamended written statement was filed on 5th December 2007,
the Plaintiff AREEPL has filed the present application being IA No. 1400 of
2008 under Order XII Rule 6 CPC on 29th January 2008. It was submitted
that since Defendant No.1 has not denied the letting out of the suit premises
to it by the agreement dated 8th October 2002, or that the said lease deed was
unregistered or of the receipt of the notice dated 10th February 2007 or of the
rent being Rs.4,56,000/- per month, a decree for possession on admissions
should be passed.
14. In reply to this application, it is contended on behalf of the Defendants
that there is no unequivocal and unambiguous admission and therefore the
application is not maintainable as such.
15. At this stage, a reference must be made to the subsequent developments.
On 9th July 2008, over five months after the filing of the aforementioned
application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC by AREEPL in CS (OS) No. 915 of
2007, the Defendant No.1 AII along with Lilliput Kids Pvt. Ltd. („LKPL‟)
and Sanjeev Narula filed CS(OS) No. 1283 of 2008 for a decree of specific
performance directing AREEPL to renew the lease deed for six years as per
Clause 2 of the agreement dated 8th October 2002. In the said suit it was
claimed that AII used to be a close family unit and that Plaintiff No.3 Sanjiv
Narula was holding 75% stakes in the firm. It is claimed that by a sale
agreement dated 9th October 2006 LKPL acquired the business of AII and,
therefore, pursuant to that agreement AII transferred and assigned the
business/undertaking on sale basis in favour of LKPL. Shri Sanjeev Narula
was stated to be holding 77.5% shares of LKPL. It is claimed in para 6 of CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 7 of 17 the plaint in CS(OS) No. 1283 of 2008 that by the lease dated 8th October
2002 AII took on lease the suit premises from AREEPL "for a total period of
9 years for the purposes of setting up of the manufacturing unit." It is
claimed that although LKPL is not a party to the lease deed, "LKPL is there
at the lease premises" and that in order to show that LKPL is not a sub-
tenant, it is a proper and necessary party to the present suit." It is reiterated
that total lease period was for 9 years with clear understanding that after the
expiry of 3 years, the present agreement will be renewed for a "further
period of 6 years." It is mentioned that after the expiry of the first phase of
three years the rent stood increased with effect from 1 st December 2005, and
that AREEPL has accepted the enhanced rent and was treating AII as its
tenant. It is contended that it was understood by both the parties that the
lease stood extended for the next 3 years and that it only required the
execution of a fresh agreement, the responsibility for which was of
AREEPL. A mention was made of Suit No. 915 of 2007. It was stated that
the cause of action for filing the suit CS (OS) No. 1283 of 2008 arose when
the AREEPL issued the termination notice dated 10th February 2007 to AII.
16. AREEPL filed IA No. 8774 of 2008 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC in CS
(OS) No. 1283 of 2008 contending that since the lease deed was not
sufficiently stamped and since AII and the two others were seeking specific
performance on the basis of the unregistered lease deed, the said document
was liable to be impounded and AII should be asked to pay deficient stamp
duty. It was further stated that the plaint in CS (OS) No. 1283 of 2008 did
not disclose any cause of action.
CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 8 of 17
17. In both applications, i.e. IA No. 1400 of 2008 in CS (OS) No. 915 of
2007 under Order XII Rule 6 CPC and IA No. 8774 of 2008 in CS(OS) No.
1283 of 2008 under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the question that arises is
whether there is any subsisting tenancy in favour of AII as claimed by it.
Mr.Sanjeev Sachdeva, learned counsel for AREEPL submits that the
admissions by AII are clear and unequivocal. He relies upon the judgment
in Surjit Sachdev v. Kazakhstan Investment Services Pvt. Ltd. 66 (1997)
DLT 54 (DB) to contend that the admissions can be either express or
constructive. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ram Rattan
v. Bajrang Lal (1978) 3 SCC 236, he submits that an insufficiently stamped
document cannot be admissible in evidence and cannot form the basis for
grant of the relief of specific performance. Relying on the judgments in
Asea Brown Boveri Limited v. Chiranjiv Lal Sharma 75 (1998) DLT 773
and Singer India Ltd. v. Amit Gupta 88 (2000) DLT 186 (DB) it is
submitted that an unregistered lease deed cannot give a right to the lessee to
continue to remain in the premises beyond the period of lease. He also
places reliance upon the judgment in Uptron Power Electronics Ltd. v. G.L.
Rawal 80 (1999) DLT 706 (DB) in this regard. Referring to the judgment in
Sarup Singh Gupta v. S. Jagdish Singh (2006) 4 SCC 205 he submits that
the mere acceptance of enhanced rent does not amount to waiver of the
notice to quit. Since it was a month-to-month tenancy and the requirements
of Section 106 TP Act stood satisfied, AII had to vacate the premises.
18. Appearing for AII, Mr. Sanjay Jain, learned Senior counsel submits that
where the landlord opts to sue on the basis of more than one plea, then it
cannot be permitted to withdraw one of the pleas particularly when the CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 9 of 17 decision on such plea would require the evidence to be led. He submits that
the plea that AII had sub-let the suit premises formed the very basis for the
eviction notice and the subsequent filing of the suit by AREEPL. Therefore
AREEPL cannot now be permitted to give up that plea and seek a decree on
admission vis-a-vis the other plea. According to him, the plaint has to be
read as a whole. It is then submitted that eviction of a tenant cannot be
sought only on the ground that the lease deed was not registered particularly
since that situation was brought about by AREEPL itself. He refers to the
decisions in Maneklal Mansukhbhai v. Hormusji Jamshedji Ginwalla &
Sons AIR (37) 1950 SC 1, Kedar Nath Dave (Deceased) Through Smt.
Vidya Dave v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. ILR 1971 (2) Delhi 374.
Referring to the judgment in S.Rajdev Singh v. Punchip Associates Pvt. Ltd
145 (2007) DLT 226 it is submitted that the suit filed by the AII was within
limitation. It is then submitted that unless the admissions are unambiguous
and clear, no decree can be sought on admissions in terms of Order XII Rule
6 CPC. Reliance is placed on the judgments in Puran Chand Packaging
Industrial P. Ltd. v. Sona Devi 154 (2008) DLT 111 (DB), Bhanu Mehra v.
Dato Brij Kishore 2001 (60) DRJ 1 (DB) and Deepak Chopra v. Raj
Kumar Adhupia 103 (2003) DLT 499.
19. The submissions of learned counsel have been considered. The fact that
a lease deed was executed on 8th October 2002 is not in dispute. The fact
that it remained to be unregistered is also not in dispute. AII does not deny
that it is a tenant of AREEPL. There also does not appear to be any dispute
about the amount of rent as well as the issuance of the notice dated 8 th
December 2007 on behalf of AREEPL requiring AII to vacate the premises.
CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 10 of 17 The question really is about the status of the document dated 8 th October
2002.
20. A perusal of the lease deed in the instant case shows that the suit
premises was a constructed one with a building thereon. The agreement
between the parties was that it would be "initially for a period of three (3)
years, w.e.f. 1st December 2002, and the same shall be renewed for another
period of six (6) years, subject to the conditions that after three years w.e.f.
1st December 2005 there shall be 15% (fifteen per cent) increase of rent, and
balance three (3) years, there shall 20% (twenty per cent) increase (or as
agreed mutually) of monthly rent i.e. w.e.f. 1 st December 2008 to 30th
November 2011." Para 15 of the agreement stated that the lessee shall not
sub-let the premises to any party without the written permission of the lessor
and that if the lessee failed to pay the monthly rent as agreed, the lessor
would have the right to get the leased premises vacated from the lessee.
21. The question whether a lessee can claim a right of renewal particularly
when it the lease deed is not a registered document was examined by this
Court in Singer India. It was held therein that such a document of tenancy
beyond one month can be sought to be enforced only if is registered in terms
of Section 107 TP Act. It was held that even if Section 53-A TP Act
permitted the tenant to retain possession on the doctrine of part-performance,
Section 53-A had to be read subject to Section 107 TP Act and should be
held not to permit retention of possession by a lessee beyond the period of
one month where the lease deed is not registered. It did not automatically CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 11 of 17 follow that the Appellant, by paying the enhanced rent, acquired the right to
stay in the leased premises for another period of three years. It was held that
the period of renewal would be available only if the agreement was reduced
to writing and the written instrument which is duly stamped and registered.
In the absence of registration the lease became a month-to-month tenancy
and the lessor had a right to terminate such a tenancy in accordance with the
provisions of Section 106 of the TP Act.
22. In Delhi Motor Company v. U.A. Basrurkar (dead) by his Legal
Representatives AIR 1968 SC 794 it was emphasized that Section 53-A is
only available as a defence and cannot be invoked for enforcing the rights on
the lessee sought to be derived from an unregistered agreement. The entire
suit of the AII i.e. CS (OS) No. 1283 of 2008 (filed on 9th July 2008) is for
specific performance of an unregistered lease deed. It was observed (AIR,
P.798):
"6. In these circumstances, an argument was put forward on behalf of the firm that, though this contract to lease had not been registered, the firm could claim possession under it in view of the provisions of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, because, in this case, the Company would be debarred from enforcing against the firm any right in respect of that property of which the firm had already taken possession, viz., part of the Show-
Room and a portion of the Balcony. In our opinion, this argument proceeds on an incorrect interpretation of Section 53A, because that section is only meant to bring about a bar against enforcement of rights by a lessor in
CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 12 of 17 respect of property of which the lessee had already taken possession, but does not give any right to the lessee to claim possession or to claim any other rights on the basis of an unregistered lease. Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act is only available as a defence to a lessee and not as conferring a right on the basis of which the lessee can claim rights against the lessor. This interpretation of Section 53A was clearly laid down by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Probodh Kumar Das and Others v.
Dantmara Tea Company Limited & Others 66 I.A. 293 = (AIR 1940 PC 1)."
23. The above position in law has been reiterated in other judgments of this
Court as well as of the Supreme Court. In Ram Rattan, it is emphasized that
an insufficiently stamped document cannot be tendered in evidence. In
Uptron Electronics, it was held in similar circumstances that in the absence
of a registered instrument, tenancy was only month-to-month and that the
lessor could terminate the tenancy by a notice under Section 106 TP Act.
24. In Maneklal Mansukhbhai it was held that where in an action to eject a
lessee the Defendant takes the plea of part performance and proves that he
had taken a possession in terms of the agreement and had built a factory on
the land and also that he was paying rent to the Plaintiff in terms of the
agreement, the Defendant was entitled to retain possession despite the
absence of a registered lease deed. What is important to notice in the said
case is that after taking possession of the land, which was a vacant plot, the
lessee "put up thereupon a ginning and a pressing factory, a bungalow,
CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 13 of 17 engine rooms and other structures." In para 18 of the judgment, the Court
noted that the factory could not have been built before the sanction of the
government was received. It further noted that not only did the lessee take
possession in part performance of the agreement but he also offered the rent
agreed upon and paid it not only to the Talukdari Settlement Officer but to
all those who subsequently managed the interest of the talukdars in the
survey numbers in dispute. The original lessee effected a mortgage of the
property in favour of the Defendant after entering into possession thereof.
The equity of redemption was sold at an auction sale. The court observed
that the Defendant and his predecessor in interest had performed their part of
the contract and it was only the execution of the lease deed in favour of the
lessee and its registration that remained to be done. It was in pursuance of
this lease agreement that all the subsequent acts were done. The facts of the
said case are entirely different when compared with the facts of the instant
case.
25. The law as explained in the subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court
in Delhi Motor Company and Ram Rattan and of this Court in Uptron
Powertronics and Singer India are apposite and in terms thereof it is held
that AII cannot be granted the relief of specific performance in its suit. To
this extent the application made by the AREEPL under Order VII Rule 11
seeking dismissal of the said suit for want of cause of action has to be
allowed. The resultant position would be this that on the basis of such
unregistered lease deed since no relief can be granted to AII, it cannot seek
to continue to be in possession of the suit premises in terms of the said lease
deed. The suit by AII should fail for not disclosing a cause of action.
CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 14 of 17
26. Turning to AREEPL‟s application under Order XII Rule 6 CPC, it seen
that the AII has not denied the tenancy or the current rent. It also does not
deny receipt of the notice to quit issued by AREEPL to it. It appears to this
court that the requirement of law as explained in the following passage in
Surjit Sachdev stands satisfied:
"17. The question now is that whether there is any admission or not so as to entitle the plaintiff to have a decree for possession. The factors which deserve to be taken into consideration in order to enable the Court to pass a decree in plaintiff's favor as regards possession in such like suit. are: (a) existence of relationship of Lesser and lessee or entry in possession of the suit property by defendant as a tenant; and (b) determination of such relation in any of the contingency, as envisaged in Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. One of the modes stated therein is by efflux of time limited by the lease. Only on unequivocal admission of the above two factors will entitle the plaintiff to a decree on admission. Admission need not be made expressly in the pleadings. Even on constructive admissions Court can proceed to pass a decree in plaintiff's favour."
27. It was sought to be contended by learned Senior counsel for AII that by
accepting the enhanced rent, the lessor had impliedly agreed to the renewal
of the lease for a further period of three years after 1 st December 2008. In
Sarup Singh Gupta, it was held by the Supreme Court that "mere
acceptance of rent" cannot be said to amount to waiver of notice to quit
"unless there is any other evidence to prove or establish that the landlord so
intended." Here it is plain from the correspondence between the parties that
CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 15 of 17 the landlord had throughout been maintaining that there was renewal of the
lease deed. In the absence of any registered leased deed giving the right to
the Plaintiff to continue in the premises for the extended period, the
continued occupation of the suit premises by the tenant cannot be held to be
permissible in law. There is no merit in the contention of learned Senior
counsel for AII that the plea of sub-letting must be considered, and evidence
awaited for that purpose, notwithstanding AREEPL having given up that
plea. If AREEPL chooses not to press that ground, the Court cannot compel
it to lead evidence to prove it. The prayer for a decree on admissions has to
be considered on the basis of the pleadings de hors such plea.
28. For all of the above reasons, this Court allows I.A. No. 1400 of 2008 in
CS (OS) No. 915 of 2007 filed by AREEPL under Order XII Rule 6 CPC
and CS (OS) No. 915 of 2007 will stand partially decreed in terms of prayer
(a). In other words, a decree is issued in favour of AREEPL and against AII
for possession of the suit premises i.e. B-II/63, Mohan Co-operative
Industrial Estate, New Delhi comprising a basement, ground floor,
mezzanine floor and first floor. Decree be drawn up accordingly.
29. For the remaining prayers in the suit, CS (OS) No. 915 of 2007 is set
down for trial. List CS (OS) No. 915 of 2007 before the learned Joint
Registrar for admission/denial of documents on 26th November 2009. It is
made clear that the parties should complete the admission/denial of
documents on the date fixed by the learned Joint Registrar for that purpose.
If for some reason they are unable to do so, then each party will file an
affidavit within two weeks thereafter indicating in a separate column CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 16 of 17 alongside the index of documents filed by the other party, which of the
documents is admitted or denied. List CS (OS) No. 915 of 2007 before Court
for framing of issues on 17th December 2009.
30. IA No. 8774 of 2008 filed by AREEPL under Order VII Rule 11 CPC in
CS (OS) No.1283 of 2008 is allowed. The plaint in CS (OS) No.1283 of
2008 is rejected and CS (OS) No.1283 of 2008 is accordingly dismissed.
S.MURALIDHAR, J
OCTOBER 9, 2009
dn
CS (OS) Nos. 915 of 2007 & 1283 of 2008 page 17 of 17
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