Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 4056 Del
Judgement Date : 8 October, 2009
THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 08.10.2009
+ W.P.(C) 2114/1990
GARHWAL COOPERATIVE GROUP HOUSING SOCIETY
LTD ..... Petitioner
- versus-
REGISTRAR COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES & ORS ...Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:
For the Petitioner : Mr. N.K. Kantawala and Mr. Satyender, Advocates For the Respondent : None CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE VEENA BIRBAL
1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest?
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (ORAL)
1. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner. Nobody
appears on behalf of the respondents today. This is despite the fact that all
the respondents have been served, as indicated in the order dated
18.08.2009, whereby, in the presence of the counsel for the respondent Nos.
3 and 6, this Court had directed that this matter be listed in the category of
Regular Matters as per its own turn. In these circumstances, we have
thought it fit to hear the learned counsel for the petitioner and to decide this
matter on the basis of arguments advanced by him and the material already
on record. This is an old matter of 1990.
2. We may also note that in the first instance when this matter was
taken up by this Court on 09.07.1990, the same was dismissed in limine.
Being aggrieved by the said dismissal, the petitioner preferred a Special
Leave Petition before the Supreme Court being SLP (C) No.12153/1990
which was admitted and numbered as Civil Appeal No.5633/1990. The said
appeal was disposed of by the Supreme Court by an order dated 26.11.1990
whereby the order of dismissal in limine dated 09.07.1990 passed by this
Court was set aside and the case was remanded to this Court with a direction
that the petition be restored and the same be disposed of on merits and
according to law after giving parties an opportunity to file their affidavits.
Thereafter, parties have appeared and the pleadings have been completed.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the case is
one of no opportunity of hearing having been granted to the petitioner. He
submitted that the respondent No.4 was an allottee of a flat bearing No. B-44
in the petitioner Society. He submitted that sometime in 1985, a certificate
was issued by the Society for the purposes of computation of property tax
which indicated the cost of the flat to be Rs 86,000/-. The learned counsel
submitted that this figure of Rs 86,000/- excluded various other costs such as
cost of Community Centre, Development Charges, cost of Delhi Electricity
Supply Undertaking Sub-Station etc. As per the petitioner, the total sum
payable by the petitioner as on 31.12.1985 was Rs 1,02,900/-. The said
computation was arrived at in the following manner:-
"1. Towards Dev. & Const. Rs 52900.00
2. DCHFS loan given Rs 50000.00
(on 1.1.86) __________
Total Rs 1,02,900.00 - Cost of flat+
3. Extra Cost of top floor Rs 3000.00
4. DESU Sub Stn Cost Rs 7500.00
5. Cost of land Rs 4500.00
6. DCHFS Share money Rs 4355.00
7. Society Share money Rs 2100.00
8. Nine instalment paid by him Rs 16880.00 (Principal Rs 837/- +
Instt. Rs 16043/-)
9. Defaulted Interest Rs 29406.00 (from 1.8.78 to 31.12.85
Statement attached)
___________
Total Rs 1,70,641.00
+ NB Cost of flat is Rs 1,02,900/- including cost of Community Hall,
Garage, Water Pump House etc. If these are excluded the cost of flat comes to be Rs.86000/-."
4. It is indicated by the petitioner that the cost of the flat was Rs
1,02,900/- which included the cost of Community Hall, Garage, Water Pump
House etc. and that, if these are excluded, the cost of the flat would come to
Rs 86,000/-. As per the petitioner, the certificate indicating the cost of the
flat to be Rs 86,000/- had been given only for the purposes of assessment of
House Tax and was not the entire extent of liability of the respondent No.4
towards the said flat. The respondent No.4 was also liable to pay the Society
for the cost of Community Centre Development Charges, share money of
Delhi Cooperative Housing Finance Ltd., the interest payable thereon, the
cost of the DESU Sub-Station, the extra cost of the top floor as well as the
interest equalization amount on the delayed payment.
5. The respondent No.3 claiming to be the power of attorney
holder of the respondent No.4 filed an application before the Joint Registrar
under Section 60 of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972. The matter
was referred to arbitration by an order dated 06.11.1989. The first hearing
before the respondent No.2 Arbitrator was held on 18.12.1989. On
23.12.1989, the petitioner Society filed its written statement and the case
was adjourned to 06.01.1990 for filing of documents. On 06.01.1990,
nobody appeared on behalf of the petitioner Society before the Arbitrator
(respondent No.2). It is submitted before us that the Secretary of the
petitioner Society could not appear before the Arbitrator on that date on
account of certain unavoidable circumstances inasmuch as he was having
certain domestic problems with his wife. The Arbitrator, without giving any
further opportunity to the petitioner Society, concluded the hearing on
06.01.1990 itself and passed an award against the petitioner Society to the
extent of Rs 65,593/-. The award was based on the consideration that the
cost of the flat as per the certificate submitted was Rs 86,000/-. The
computation of Rs 65,593/- as awarded by the Arbitrator by virtue of the
award dated 06.01.1990 is as under:-
"a) Rs. 1,36,666/- paid upto Dec. 1989
Less Rs. 86,000/- cost of the flat
Balance Rs. 50,666/- Excess amount recovered by the Society.
Add Rs. 14,937/- Interest charged calculated.
Total Rs. 65,593/-"
6. Being aggrieved by the said award, the petitioner Society
preferred an appeal before the Delhi Cooperative Tribunal under Section 76
of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Act, 1972. In the said appeal, the
petitioner Society, inter alia, took the plea that both the parties had appeared
before the Arbitrator on 23.12.1989 and the Arbitrator/respondent No.2 had
directed the parties to produce the relevant papers/documents and in support
of their contentions and had adjourned the case to 06.01.1990. It was
submitted that on that date the petitioner could not appear due to some
unavoidable circumstances and that the Arbitrator instead of issuing another
notice to the petitioner giving a final opportunity, made the said award dated
06.01.1990. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the date
of 06.01.1990 was fixed for filing of documents and not for arguments and
that, the Arbitrator, if he felt that the petitioner was adopting dilatory tactics,
could have closed the right of the petitioner to file documents and ought to
have listed the case for arguments on another date. According to the learned
counsel for the petitioner, that would have met the ends of justice, however,
instead of doing so, the learned Arbitrator decided the matter on 06.01.1990
itself, the date on which the parties were to file their documents.
7. The Delhi Cooperative Tribunal dismissed the appeal filed by
the petitioner on three points. The first point being that the appeal was
incomplete as the copy of the impugned award had not been filed along with
the appeal. The second point was that the appeal was delayed. The third
point on which the appeal was dismissed was that it could not be said that
the Arbitrator had failed to offer an opportunity to the petitioner and that it
was the petitioner Society alone who was to be blamed for the wilful
absence of its representative on the date fixed. The Tribunal was of the
view that, in these circumstances, the Arbitrator had no option but to pass
the award after going through the material/evidence available before him.
On the basis of these three points, the appeal was dismissed.
8. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner
submitted that the copy of the impugned award could not be filed along with
the appeal as the same was not received till that time. The learned counsel
for the petitioner submitted that even before the Tribunal, the petitioner
Society had taken the plea that the Arbitrator after passing the award dated
06.01.1990 did not send a copy of the same to the petitioner. He submitted
that under Rule 89(4)(b) of the Delhi Cooperative Societies Rules, 1973, the
award was to be communicated to the petitioner Society by registered post.
Rule 89, to the relevant extent, reads as under:-
"Rule 89 Award of Decision.
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX
4. The award shall be communicated to the parties by
(a) pronouncement of the award, or
(b) registered post to any party which may be absent on such date.
XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX"
9. It is clear from a reading of the Rule that since the petitioner
Society was not present on the date of pronouncement of award i.e., on
06.01.1990, clause (a) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 89 would not apply.
Therefore, the award had to be communicated by registered post to the
petitioner Society in terms of clause (b) of sub-rule (4) of Rule 89. The
learned counsel for the petitioner drew our attention to the fact that the copy
of the award was received by the petitioner Society only from the respondent
No.3 and not from the respondent No.2 and, that too, along with a letter
dated 08.03.1990 as would be apparent from paragraph 13 of the appeal
memo before the Delhi Cooperative Tribunal. It is thereafter that the
petitioner applied for a certified copy of the award which was not available
with the petitioner Society at the time of filing of the appeal but was made
available to the petitioner Society during the pendency of the appeal and the
same was filed immediately thereafter, before the disposal of the appeal.
Thus, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the non-filing of
the copy of the award along with the appeal could not be a ground for
rejection of the appeal of the petitioner. Insofar as the question of delay is
concerned, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that an
application for condonation of delay had been filed along with the
memorandum of appeal as recorded in the impugned order dated 24.05.1990
itself. However, the said application has not at all been discussed in the
impugned order. The only reference to the said application is that such an
application was filed. The Tribunal has not considered the said application
on merits and, therefore, the rejection of the appeal on the ground of the
delay could not be sustained.
10. As regards the decision of the Tribunal on the question of
opportunity not having been granted to the petitioner before the Arbitrator,
the learned counsel for the petitioner reiterated that the date of 06.01.1990
before the Arbitrator was only for filing of documents and not for arguments
and, therefore, the non-appearance on the part of the petitioner Society could
not have the entailed serious consequence of a decision on merits in the
absence of the petitioner. The petitioner Society ought to have been granted
an opportunity for presenting arguments.
11. We have considered the arguments advanced by the learned
counsel for the petitioner and have also examined the papers on record. We
feel that the impugned order passed by the Tribunal on 24.05.1990 as also
the award dated 06.01.1990 cannot be sustained. It is clear from paragraph 4
of the award dated 06.01.1990 itself that Sh. N.S. Negi, Secretary of the
petitioner Society also demanded certain information/documents "for which
purpose the case was adjourned for 06.01.1990". The Arbitrator also
directed the Society to produce the ledger and accounts concerning the case
as also to give photostat copy of the letter dated 22.12.1989. From these
statements contained in the award itself, it is clear that 06.01.1990 was the
date fixed for filing of documents and furnishing of information, it was not a
date fixed for hearing the final arguments in the case. We feel that the
Arbitrator ought to have given another opportunity to the petitioner Society
to represent its case. A peremptory notice could have been given and if
thereafter the petitioner Society did not appear, it would have been open to
the Arbitrator to have gone ahead and have made his award. However, we
feel that the Arbitrator rather acted hastily in this case and concluded the
case on 06.01.1990 itself, a date which was fixed for furnishing
documents/information. We also feel, prima facie, that it is not as if the
petitioner Society had no case at all. The counter claim of the petitioner with
regard to the amount due from the respondent No.4 also needed
consideration. This fact was also completely lost sight of. The figure of Rs
86,000/- towards cost of flat was certified only for the purposes of house tax
and did not reflect the total amount due from the respondent No.4. This
aspect of the matter needed consideration which had not been gone into by
the Arbitrator or the Tribunal.
12. Insofar as the impugned order dated 24.05.1990 is concerned,
we find that the findings given by the Tribunal on all the three points cannot
be sustained. While it is mentioned that the appeal was not accompanied by
a copy of the impugned award, the Tribunal has not taken account of the
facts mentioned in the appeal memo itself that the award was not
communicated to the petitioner in terms of Rule 89(4)(b) of Delhi
Cooperative Societies Rules, 1973. With regard to the question of delay,
we agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that, apart from
mentioning that a condonation of delay application had been filed by the
petitioner, there is no discussion as to whether the grounds for condoning
delay were acceptable or not. As regards, the question of lack of
opportunity, we have already indicated that the petitioner has been able to
demonstrate that a full and fair opportunity was not granted to the petitioner
Society to put forth its case before the learned Arbitrator. Thus, on all three
grounds, the impugned order dated 24.05.1990 deserves to be set aside.
13. Consequently, the writ petition is allowed, the impugned order
dated 24.05.1990 as also the award dated 06.01.1990 are set aside. The
respondent No.1 (Registrar of Cooperative Societies) is directed to refer the
matter afresh to a new Arbitrator to decide the disputes between the parties.
We hope that the award shall be finalized at an early date after giving full
opportunity to the parties. The parties shall bear their respective costs.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
VEENA BIRBAL, J OCTOBER 08, 2009 srb
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