Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 4016 Del
Judgement Date : 6 October, 2009
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CS(OS) No.580/2008
% Date of decision: 06.10.2009
M/S ALFA THERM LIMITED ....Plaintiff
Through: Mr. Rakesh Tikku & Mr. Aditiya
Bhardwaj, Advocate.
Versus
THE CANARA BANK & ANR. ... Defendants
Through: Mr. Azim H. Laskar, Mr. Rajneesh
Singh & Mr. D. Saikia, Advocates for the
Defendant No.2.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? Yes
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? Yes
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest? Yes
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. Issue No.3, of the issues framed on 13th February, 2009 and
ordered to be treated as a preliminary issue, as to the territorial
jurisdiction of this court to entertain the suit, is for consideration.
2. The plaintiff has instituted this suit for declaration and
permanent injunction vis-à-vis a bank guarantee, issued at the
instance of the plaintiff by the defendant No.1 bank in favour of the
Government of Assam (Defendant No.2).
3. The defendant No.2 Government of Assam had on 7th April,
2007 invited bids for supply of equipment installation,
commissioning etc. all at Assam. The plaintiff company, stated to be
having its registered office at Delhi was one of the bidders. The bank
guarantee with respect whereto the suit has been instituted is a bank
guarantee for EMD (bid security) issued by the defendant No.1 bank
having its branch at New Delhi and for the benefit of the Defendant
No.2 Government of Assam. The defendants No.1 bank under the
said guarantee bound itself to pay to the defendant No.2 the sum of
Rs.6 lacs in the event of the plaintiff withdrawing its bid during the
period of bid validity and/or if the plaintiff after having been notified
of the acceptance of its bid by the defendant No.2 during the period
of the bid validity fails or refuses to execute contract form or fails or
refuses to furnish the performance security in accordance with the
clauses of tender. The defendant No.2 invoked the said bank
guarantee; according to the plaintiff wrongfully. The plaintiff
instituted the suit for the relief of declaration that the plaintiff is not
at fault in executing/signing the proposed agreement/contract as
sent by the defendant No.2 and as a consequence to the said
declaration seeks permanent injunction restraining the defendant
No.1 from honouring and/or encashing and/or remitting Rs.6 lacs
covered by the said bank guarantee.
4. The plaintiff has in the plaint pleaded that this court has
territorial jurisdiction since the cause of action had accrued at Delhi;
the defendant No.1 had received the invocation letter at Delhi and
since the defendant No.1 had forwarded intimation thereof to the
plaintiff at Delhi; territorial jurisdiction of this court was also
justified since the defendant No.1 bank works and carries on
business at Delhi and the defendant No.2 Government of Assam also
has its office at Delhi through its Resident Commissioner at Delhi.
5. The suit was instituted on 29th March, 2008. The suit was
accompanied with an application for interim relief. The suit and the
application came up before this court first on 1st April, 2008 when
summons/notice thereof was issued to the defendant No.2, the
counsel for the defendant No.1 having appeared before this court.
The suit thereafter came up before this court on 8th April, 2008 when
it was inter-alia ordered "all actions of the defendant shall be subject
to order of this court". The defendant No.1 failed to file the written
statement and vide order dated 31st October, 2008 the right of the
defendant No.1 bank to file the written statement was closed. The
counsel for the defendant No.2 informed on that date that the bank
guarantee had already been encashed and the monies thereunder
received by the defendant No.2. Even though relief claimed in the
suit was for declaration and injunction only but notwithstanding the
encashment of the bank guarantee, the suit was held to have not
become infructuous for the reason of the order dated 8th April, 2008
making the action of the defendants subject to the orders of the
court.
6. The defendant No.2 in its written statement has contested the
territorial jurisdiction of this court leading to an issue with respect
thereto being framed. Since on the basis of the averments and the
documents, it was felt that the said issue of territorial jurisdiction of
this court did not require any evidence, the same was ordered to be
treated as a preliminary issue.
7. The counsel for the parties have been heard.
8. The counsel for the plaintiff has contended that since the bank
guarantee was furnished by the defendant No.1 bank from Delhi and
since the communication of the defendant No.2 invoking the bank
guarantee was addressed to the defendant No.1 bank at Delhi this
court would have territorial jurisdiction.
9. Per contra, the counsel for the defendant No.2 has pointed out
that the bank guarantee as per its terms is payable at Guwahati. He
has also drawn attention to Clause 46 of the invitation for bids which
is as under:-
"All disputes shall be subject to the jurisdiction of appropriate court situated at Guwahati. The contract shall be interpreted in accordance with the laws of India."
10. He has also contended that the payment under the bank
guarantee was received by the defendant No.2 from the defendant
No.1 bank, at Guwahati on 7th April, 2008 i.e. before the order dated
8th April, 2008 making the action of the defendants subject to the
order of the court. He has further contended that the place of
issuance of the bank guarantee is irrelevant. Reliance is placed on;
(i) Union Bank of India Vs. Seppo Rally OY (1999) 8 SCC 357
though in relation to Consumer Protection Act, holding that the
consumer fora at a place where the office of the party at whose
instance the bank guarantee is furnished would have no jurisdiction
to entertain the complaints qua the bank guarantee furnished by a
branch of the bank situated outside Delhi; (ii) A.B.C. Laminart Pvt.
Ltd. Vs. A.P. Agencies (1989) 2 SCC 163 on the proposition of the
parties being entitled to restrict the territorial jurisdiction to one of
the many courts having jurisdiction to entertain the disputes.
11. I may at the outset comment on a disturbing feature of this
case. The plaintiff along with the plaint and the application for
interim relief filed a list of documents dated 29th March, 2008 with
documents. At serial No.1, the document is "true photostat copy of
the bid document"; the same in the list of documents itself is
described as comprising of seven pages. The defendant No.2 along
with its written statement has also filed a list of documents dated
20th May, 2008 along with documents and at serial No.1 whereof also
is the bid document. The same is a original/printed copy. A perusal of
the bid document filed by the plaintiff and the bid document filed by
the defendant No.2 shows that the plaintiff has been selective in
filing portions of the bid document. The plaintiff has not filed the
page of the bid document containing Clause No.46 aforesaid relating
to territorial jurisdiction. Not only did the plaintiff conceal the
relevant portion of the bid document as to territorial jurisdiction but
also did not disclose the clause as to territorial jurisdiction in the
plaint. Such action of the plaintiff is found to be deliberate, to obtain
an order of injunction from this court to exclusion of whose
jurisdiction the plaintiff had agreed. The plaintiff has indulged in
judicial adventurism. The plaintiff, particularly Shri Harjot Singh
Chatha, Director of the plaintiff company who has instituted the suit
and signed and verified the plaint are thus found to be guilty of
abusing of the process of this court and which this court in Satish
Khosla Vs. M/s Eli Lilly Ranbaxy Ltd. 71 (1998) DLT 1 has held to
be amounting to contempt of the court. The plaintiff owed a duty
before approaching this court to make a clean breast of the state of
affairs. The plaintiff sought ex parte interim relief from this court.
The court relies upon the averments in the plaint and the documents
filed therewith and grants such relief wherever the plaintiff is found
entitled thereto. The plaintiff who seeks such a relief cannot be
permitted to indulge in such practices. If the plaintiff felt that
notwithstanding the aforesaid Clause 46 in the bid document it was
entitled to invoke the territorial jurisdiction of this court, the plaintiff
ought to have placed the same before this court and then made its
submissions. On the contrary, the plaintiff attempted to gain an
unfair advantage and steal a march.
12. The plaintiff has in the replication to the written statement of
the defendant No.2 not controverted the aforesaid clause in the bid
document. The question which arises is whether in view of such
clause in the invitation for bid, this court even if has jurisdiction,
would have jurisdiction to entertain the suit. Undoubtedly, the clause
aforesaid qua territorial jurisdiction does not use the words
"exclusive" or "alone" or "only" or the like. However, the Supreme
Court in A.B.C. Laminart Pvt. Ltd.(Supra) and subsequently
reiterated in Hanil Era Textiles Ltd. Vs. Puromatic Filters (P)
Ltd. AIR 2004 SC 2432 has held that the absence of such words is
not determinative; even without such words, in appropriate cases the
maxim 'expressio unius est exclusio alterius' applies.
13. I find from the entirety of the facts in the present case that the
parties had agreed to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts at
Guwahati. The terms of the invitation for bid were accepted by the
plaintiff by making a bid. It is not the plaintiff's case that its bid was
without agreeing to Clause No.46 (Supra). The defendant No.2 is the
Government of Assam. The invitation for bid was issued from
Guwahati for works to be performed in Guwahati and/or in the State
of Assam. In the circumstances, the Clause 46 aforesaid is to be read
as excluding the jurisdiction of courts at any other place even if
otherwise having jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of this court is ousted
for this reason alone and need is not felt to go into the question
whether this court would have jurisdiction for the reason of the
plaintiff as a bidder having furnished the bank guarantee of a bank
within the jurisdiction of this court even though guaranteeing
payment to the defendant No.2 at Guwahati. It does not stand to
logic that in such circumstances the place of bank issuing the
guarantee would have jurisdiction. The defendant No.2 while
entertaining the bids is not concerned with the address of the bank
issuing the guarantee so long as the payment under the guarantee is
assured at the place of residence of the defendant No.2 i.e.
Guwahati. It would be unfair to hold that territorial jurisdiction of
places where the branch of the bank issuing the guarantee is
situated can be invoked qua the disputes relating to the said
guarantee. In the present case, the plaintiff was free to arrange the
bank guarantee from a branch of the bank at any place and the
defendant No.2 cannot be made to run to that place for contesting a
suit. I also do not find any merit in the plea of the invocation letter
being issued to the defendant No.1 bank at Delhi. The invocation
letter would naturally be addressed to the bank issuing the bank
guarantee. However, the core dispute is between the plaintiff and
the defendant No.2. The relief of injunction claimed against the
defendant No.1 bank is consequent to the relief of declaration which
is qua the defendant No.2 only. If this court does not have the
territorial jurisdiction to entertain the dispute qua the relief of
declaration, the question of entertaining the lis even if this court
were to have jurisdiction qua the relief of injunction against the
defendant No.1 bank does not arise.
14. The preliminary issue qua territorial jurisdiction is thus
answered in favour of the defendant No.2 and against the plaintiff.
This court has no territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The
plaint is accordingly ordered to be returned to the plaintiff for
institution in accordance with law in the court of appropriate
jurisdiction.
15. The plaintiff and particularly its Director Mr. Harjot Singh
Chatha however, cannot be allowed to go scot free for their actions
aforesaid of abusing the process of this court and playing fraud on
this court and on defendant No.2. As aforesaid, they are liable to be
proceeded against for contempt of court. The law should not be seen
to sit by limply, while those who defy it go free and those who seek
its protection lose hope. The plaintiff has made the defendant No.2
incur expenses in contesting this suit in a city whose jurisdiction had
been agreed to be excluded. Following the dicta in G.E.
Countrywide Consumer Financial Services Ltd. Vs. Shri
Prabhakar Kishan Khandare MANU/DE/9276/2006, and in Nectar
U.K. Ltd. Vs. Herbs Shop India Ltd. 93(2001) DLT 383, an
opportunity is given to plaintiff and its Director aforesaid to purge
the contempt by paying costs of Rs.20,000/- to the counsel for the
defendant No.2 and of Rs.30,000/- to the Delhi Legal Services
Authority. If they fail to do so they would be liable to be proceeded
against therefor.
List for reporting compliance of the same on 30th October,
2009.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW (JUDGE)
October 6th , 2009 PP
Publish Your Article
Campus Ambassador
Media Partner
Campus Buzz
LatestLaws.com presents: Lexidem Offline Internship Program, 2026
LatestLaws.com presents 'Lexidem Online Internship, 2026', Apply Now!