Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 875 Del
Judgement Date : 18 March, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ CS(OS) No. 1030/2008
% Date of Decision: 18.03.2009
Badal & Ors. .... Plaintiffs
Through: Mr. Mike Desai, Advocate.
Versus
M/S Niranjan Proptech & Ors. .... Defendants
Through: Mr. Ashish Bhagat and Mr. Abdesh
Chaudhary, Advocates for defendant No. 1.
CORAM:
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may be YES
allowed to see the judgment?
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in NO
the Digest?
ANIL KUMAR, J.
*
IA No.8459/2008 in CS(OS) No. 1030/2008
1. This is an application by the defendants under Order VII Rule 11
(a), (b) and (d) read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 seeking rejection of the plaint.
2. The applicants/defendants have contended that the plaintiffs
have filed the above noted suit for declaration that the Sale Deed dated
21st September, 2007 executed by defendant No. 2 as an Attorney of the
plaintiff in favour of defendant No. 1 is void and illegal and seeking
cancellation of the same and also seeking declaration that the
Agreement to Sell dated 31st January, 2005 executed between the
plaintiffs and defendant No. 3 was void and ineffective and the
cancellation of the said Agreement to Sell and that the Power of
Attorney dated 31st January, 2005 executed by the plaintiffs in favour of
defendant No. 2 being void and ineffective and cancellation of the same
and perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from dispossessing
the plaintiffs from the suit land measuring 9 Bighas and 18 Biswas and
12 Biswanis out of the agricultural land/property forming part of
Mustatil No. 60, Kila No. 4/3 [1-12], 7 [4-8], 8 [4-16], 12 [4-9], 13 Min.
[4-2], 18 Min. [1-4], 23 Min. [0-12], 26 Min. [0-5], 28 [0-17], situated in
the Revenue estate of Village Bijwasan, Tehsil Vasant Vihar, New Delhi
or creating any third party interest over the same.
3. The applicants/defendants have contended that the plaintiffs‟
case is that they were the owners of suit land and entered into an
Agreement to Sell dated 31st January, 2005 with defendant No. 3 for a
total consideration of Rs. 15,10,000/- and the Agreement to sell was
registered being Registration No. 1304 in Book No. 1, Volume No. 1804
on pages No. 125 to 130, registered with the Sub-Registrar IX, New
Delhi. It is also contended that the plaintiffs had executed a General
Power of Attorney and Special Power of Attorney dated 31st January,
2005 in favour of defendant No. 2. The Special Power of Attorney was
also registered with the Sub-Registrar IX and the General Power of
Attorney was also registered with the Sub-Registrar IX. It is pleaded
that in part performance of the Agreement to Sell dated 31st January,
2005, plaintiffs were given an amount of Rs. 15,00,000/-
4. The applicants/defendants have contended that in the suit filed
by the plaintiffs it is alleged that the plaintiffs were not entitled/capable
of transferring the suit land in view of Section 33 of the Delhi Land
Reforms Act, 1954 and, therefore, the plaintiffs have allegedly revoked
the Power of Attorney dated 31st January, 2005 vide Deed of Revocation
dated 10th April, 2007 and a notice dated 15th April, 2007.
5. The applicants/defendants have sought rejection of the plaint on
the ground that the plaint is devoid of cause of action against defendant
No.1 because the plaintiffs have nowhere stated that they have not
received or are yet to receive the balance of Rs. 10,000/- in terms of
Agreement to Sell. It is contended that the plaintiffs had handed over
the suit land to defendant No.3 and possession letter dated 4th
February, 2005 had been issued in favour of defendant No. 3 and since
the date of possession i.e. 4th February, 2005, plaintiffs have
relinquished their rights to possession of the suit land and defendant
No. 3 had been enjoying the peaceful and vacant possession over the
land, It is asserted that the plaintiffs were left with no right or claim or
interest on the suit land.
6. Rejection of the plaint is also sought on the ground that under
Clause 4 of the Agreement to Sell dated 31st January, 2005, the
plaintiffs had to apply and obtain requisite „No Objection Certificate‟
under Section 8 of Delhi Land(Restriction on Transfer) Act, 1972 and to
check out the impediment under the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954. It
is asserted that on receipt of `No Objection‟ from the requisite
authorities, the plaintiffs had to execute the sale deed in respect of the
demised land in favor of the beneficiaries or the nominees of the
defendant No. 3. The plaintiffs allegedly had applied for requisite
permission before the concerned Additional District Magistrate for `No
Objection‟ which was granted vide No. 3929 dated 6th September, 2007
and thereafter, the sale deeds were executed on 21st September, 2007
within the period of validity as permitted by the competent authority. It
is alleged that the act of execution of the Deed of Revocation within the
period of such validity is a clear act of fraud and dishonesty on the part
of the plaintiffs to deprive the legitimate rights of defendant No.1. It is
contended that there is no legal defect in the Sale Deed dated 21st
September, 2007.
7. Rejection of the plaint is also sought on the ground that after over
three years of the Agreement to Sell, the plea of the plaintiffs that they
did not have the knowledge about the restrictions over land transfer
imposed by Section 33 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 is nothing
but a clear attempt to deprive the defendant No.1 of the rightful and
lawful ownership of the suit land only with an intention to sell the suit
land for a much higher prices, as the prices in that sector of real estate
have gone up manifold and, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitled for
the relief of decree of declaration and cancellation of Sale Deed dated
21st September, 2007.
8. Rejection of the plaint is also sought relying on Clause 5 of the
Agreement to Sell dated 31st January, 2005 contemplating that the
entire sale consideration has been received by the plaintiffs and the
Power of Attorneys, General and Special dated 31st January, 2005 could
not be revoked after two and a half years of the receipt of the sale
consideration by executing a Deed of Revocation which is also not
registered. Rejection is also sought on the ground that merely sending
a notice of revocation of the Power of Attorney does not entail revocation
of Power of Attorneys, General and Special which were executed in favor
of the defendants.
9. The applicants/defendants have also sought rejection of the
plaint on the ground that Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 envisages a restriction on the institution of frivolous
and vexatious suits so that no man gets the benefit of his own wrongs.
In the circumstances, it is asserted that the plaint does not disclose
cause of action and it is liable to be rejected. Rejection of the plaint is
also sought on the ground that it is barred by limitation. It is contended
that Agreement to Sell which was executed on 31st January, 2005
cannot be cancelled by instituting a suit on 22nd May, 2008, after three
years from the date of execution.
10. The applicants/defendants have also asserted that the plaintiffs
have misled this Court and have made false averments that they had
not given the possession of the suit land and are still enjoying the
possessory rights over the suit land. It is contended that the plaintiffs
have suppressed the material facts. It is also asserted that the Deed of
Revocation is vague as the plaintiffs had executed two Power of
Attorneys, Special and General and the Deed of Revocation does not
specify as to which Attorney or Attorneys have been cancelled.
11. The applicants/defendants have also sought rejection of the
plaint on the ground that the suit is nothing but an attempt to provide
a legal blanket to otherwise unlawful and illegal and nefarious designs
of the plaintiffs as allegedly the Power of Attorneys in favour of the
defendants have been revoked only on account of Section 33 of Delhi
Land Reforms Act, 1954. In the circumstances, it is contended that the
suit is barred under provisions of Order VII Rule 11 (a) CPC as it does
not disclose any cause of action.
12. The applicants/defendants have also sought rejection of the
plaint on the ground that the plaintiffs are seeking declaration and
cancellation of Agreement to Sell and the Sale Deed, however, ad
valorem court fees has been paid only on one document and in the
circumstances, it is claimed that the suit has not been properly valued
properly for the purpose of court fees and jurisdiction and appropriate
court fees has not been paid.
13. The application is contested by the plaintiffs/non-applicants. The
plaintiffs have contended that the application is nothing but a dilatory
tactics by the defendants to avoid filing the written statement and
proceeding with the matter. It is asserted that the defendants know
that the transactions between the plaintiffs and the defendants,
wherein Agreement to sell was executed and consequent thereof the sale
deeds were executed, were in violation of Section 33 of the Land
Reforms Act. It is also contended that the plea of defendant No. 1 that
the possession has been taken is false to the knowledge of defendants.
The plaintiffs have relied on the photographs filed with the plaint
showing that they are in actual and physical possession of the suit
land.
14. The non-applicants/plaintiffs have contended that the Agreement
to sell dated 31st January, 2005 contemplated that the possession of
the land shall be handed over later on and in fact the possession was
never handed over by the plaintiffs to the defendants. It is contended
that for consideration whether the plaint is liable to be rejected or not,
the pleas raised by the plaintiffs only have to be taken into
consideration and not the defense raised by the defendants. In the
circumstances, it is contended that there are no grounds to reject the
plaint as the plaint discloses the cause of action and the Agreement to
Sell and the Sale Deed being the same transaction, the court fees is not
to be paid separately for cancellation of Agreement to Sell and the Sale
Deed. It is pleaded that on the basis of the pleadings it is apparent that
the total land holding of the plaintiffs was more than what was sold to
the defendants and consequently the transaction between the plaintiffs
and defendants is hit by section 33 of Delhi Land Reforms Act and the
suit for declaration and cancellation of documents, agreement to sell
and sale deed is maintainable and is not liable to be rejected.
15. This cannot be disputed that plaintiffs in the plaint have alleged
that they are owners and in possession of agricultural land measuring
22 Bighas and 5 Bighas comprised in Mustatil No. 60, Kila No. 4/3 [1-
12], 7 [4-8], 8 [4-16], 12 [4-9], 13 Min. [4-2], 18 Min. [1-4], 23 Min. [0-
12], 26 Min. [0-5], 28 [0-17], situated in the Revenue estate of Village
Bijwasan, Tehsil Vasant Vihar, New Delhi. From the plaint, it is also
apparent that the Agreement to Sell with the defendants was for 9
Bighas, 12 Biswas and 12 Biswanis, out of total 22 Bighas and 5
Biswas which was agreed to be sold to the defendant No. 3 for a total
sale consideration of Rs. 15,10,000/- and out of this amount, an
amount of Rs. 15,00,000/- was paid by defendants to the plaintiffs as
earnest money. The plaintiffs have also alleged that they agreed to sell
a part of the balance portion of the agricultural land to Sh. Abhay
Aggarwal S/o Shri M.C. Aggarwal and Shri Sudhir Kumar Makkar S/o
Shri A.N. Makkar by another Agreement to Sell dated 31st January,
2005 for a total sale consideration of Rs. 22,60,000/-.
16. The plaintiffs have categorically pleaded that since their land
holdings was less than 8 standard acres, they could not sell part of the
land, as the same was in violation of Section 33 of the Delhi Land
Reforms Act, 1954 and it was not known to the plaintiffs at the time of
the execution of the Agreement to Sell.
17. Section 33 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 is as under:-
"33. Restrictions on the transfers by a Bhumidhar. - No Bhumidhar shall have the right to transfer by sale or gift or otherwise any land to any person, other than a religious or charitable institution or any person in charge of any such Bhoodan movement, as the Chief Commissioner may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify , where as a result of the transfer, the transferor shall be left with less than eight standard acres in the Union Territory of Delhi :
Provided that the Chief Commissioner may exempt from the operation of this section, the transfer of any land made before the 1st day of December, 1958, if the land covered by such transfer does not exceed one acre in area and is used or intended to be used for purposes other than those mentioned in clause (13) of section 3.
(2) Nothing contained in sub section (1) shall preclude the transfer of land by a Bhumidhar who holds less than eight standard acres of land, if such transfer is of the entire land held by him;
Provided that such Bhumidhar may transfer a part of such land to any religious or charitable institution or other person referred to in sub section (1)
Explanation - For the purposes of this section, a religious or charitable institution shall mean an institution established for a religious purpose or a charitable purpose, as the case may be."
18. In the circumstances, it is contended that the transfer in favor of
defendants is void and immediately coming to know about it, a notice
dated 15th April, 2007 was sent after General Power of Attorneys were
revoked by a Deed of Revocation dated 10th April, 2007.
19. The plaintiffs have also contended that they offered to pay back
the earnest money/sale consideration, however, the defendants refused
to accept the same and the defendant No.2 acting fraudulently,
executed the sale deeds in favour of defendant No. 1 and the said fact
came to the knowledge of the plaintiffs in April, 2008. It is contended
that at the time of execution of the Agreement to Sell dated 31st
January, 2005, the possession of the property was not given to the
Attorney, defendant No. 3 and, therefore, when the Sale Deed dated 21st
September, 2007 was executed by defendant No.2 in favour of
defendant No.1, the possession could not be transferred to the
defendant No.1. The plaintiffs have valued the suit for purpose of
declaration for the Sale Deed dated 21st September, 2007 being void
executed by defendant No. 2 in favour of defendant No. 1 at Rs.
37,77,000/- and ad valorem court fees have been paid thereof.
20. The learned counsel for the defendants/applicants has relied on a
copy of Khasra Girdawari filed on behalf of the plaintiffs for year 2006-
07 contending that the entire land shown in the said Khasra Girdawari
was sold to them except in 60/18 comprising 3 Bighas and 12 Biswas
being Banzar land which vested in the Gaon Sabha, which is apparent
from the Khasra Girdawari. Consequently, it is contended that the
plaintiffs had sold their entire land holdings and, therefore, the
transaction between the parties was not barred under Section 33 of the
Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and therefore, the plaint is liable to be
rejected.
21. Rejection of plaint is a serious matter as it non suits the plaintiff
and kills the cause of action and consequently it cannot be ordered
cursorily without satisfying the requirements of the said provision.
Order VII Rule 11 contemplates that a plaint can be rejected where the
plaint does not disclose a cause of action or where the relief claimed is
undervalued or where the relief claimed is properly valued but the
plaint is written upon an insufficiently stamped paper or where the suit
appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law. In
ascertaining whether the plaint discloses cause of action and that the
suit has been properly valued or not, the pleas raised in the plaint only
have to be considered. For this purpose the defense which is raised by
the defendants is not to be considered on merits nor is the court
competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated
question of law. The mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to
succeed is no ground for striking it out on the ground that it does not
disclose cause of action or inferring that the plaint has not been
properly valued.
22. The purported failure of the pleadings to disclose a cause of
action is distinct from the absence of full particulars. The court has not
to see whether the claim made by the plaintiff is likely to succeed. It has
merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the plaint, if
accepted as true, would entitle the plaintiff to the relief he claims. So
long as the plaint discloses some cause of action or raises some
questions fit to be decided by a judge, the plaint is not to be rejected. If
accepting the allegations made in the plaint are accepted as true and
still no case is made out for granting relief, no cause of action would be
shown and the plaint must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the
plaint shows cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the
issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the plaintiff. It cannot
take into consideration the defenses which the defendant may raise
upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate
enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact.
23. The effect of dismissal of suit is altogether different and distinct
from the effect of rejection of the plaint. In case plaint is rejected under
Order 7 Rule 11, CPC, filing of a fresh plaint in respect of the same
cause of action is specifically, permitted under Order VII Rule 13, CPC.
Altogether different consequence follows in the event of dismissal of
suit, which has the effect of precluding the plaintiff from filing a fresh
suit on the same cause of action.
Rejection of plaint takes away the very basis of the suit rendering
as if there was no suit at all or that no suit was instituted. Order of
dismissal of suit while recognizing the existence of a suit indicates its
termination. In D. Ramachandran v. R.V. Shanker Raman and Others,
(1999) 3 SCC 267, the Apex Court had held that the effect of dismissal
of a suit is altogether different and distinct from the effect of rejection of
the plaint. For considering whether the plaint discloses cause of action
or not, the pleas and documents of the defendants are not to be
considered. The apex court had held as under:-
"Learned Single Judge fell in error in placing reliance upon the material supplied by the defendant, which alone is sufficient to set aside the impugned order. Learned Single Judge instead of proceeding to reject the plaint dismissed the suit, which approach is also erroneous. The effect of dismissal of suit is altogether different and distinct from the effect of rejection of the plaint. In case plaint is rejected under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC, filing of a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action is specifically, permitted under Rule 13 of Order 7, CPC. Altogether different consequence follows in the event of dismissal of suit, which has the effect of precluding the plaintiff to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action. Rejection of plaint takes away the very basis of the suit rendering as if there was no suit at all or that no suit was instituted. Order of dismissal of suit while recognising the existence of a suit indicates its termination. While deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC, learned Single Judge ought not and could not have dismissed the suit. Even in the decision of the Supreme Court in T.Arvindandam's case (Supra), relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant, it was held that if on a meaningful-not formal-reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and merit-less, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, the Trial Court should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11, CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. In order to fulfill that ground bare allegation made in the plaint and documents filed therewith were required to be looked into, which in the instant case clearly disclosed at least a cause of action against the defendant that defendant was liable for damages for its acts of omission and commission. It would be an altogether different situation that the plaintiff might not ultimately succeed in
obtaining a decree against the defendant or that Court might come to the conclusion that suit would not be maintainable against the defendant and that plaintiff had a cause of action only against defendant's principal and its parent until in Hong Kong, but such aspect could not have been gone into at this stage. Three paragraphs of the plaint quoted above in our view do clearly disclose cause of action for the plaintiff to claim damages."
In Vijay Pratap Singh v. Dukh Haran Nath Singh, AIR 1962 SC
941, the Supreme Court had held at pages 943-44 as under:-
"By the express terms of Rule 11 clause (a), the court is concerned to ascertain whether the allegations made in the petition show a cause of action. The court has not to see whether the claim made by the petitioner is likely to succeed: it has merely to satisfy itself that the allegations made in the petition, if accepted as true, would entitle the petitioner to the relief he claims. If accepting those allegations as true no case is made out for granting relief no cause of action would be shown and the petition must be rejected. But in ascertaining whether the petition shows a cause of action the court does not enter upon a trial of the issues affecting the merits of the claim made by the petitioner. It cannot take into consideration the defences which the defendant may raise upon the merits; nor is the court competent to make an elaborate enquiry into doubtful or complicated questions of law or fact. If the allegations in the petition, prima facie, show a cause of action, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry whether the allegations are true in fact, or whether the petitioner will succeed in the claims made by him."
24. According to the defendants, the plaint does not disclose cause of
action and it is liable to be rejected. This cannot be disputed that the
plaintiffs have categorically asserted that they are the owners of 22
Bighas and 5 Biswas of the land. The details of the Mustatil No. 60,
Kila No. 4/3 [1-12], 7 [4-8], 8 [4-16], 12 [4-9], 13 Min. [4-2], 18 Min. [1-
4], 23 Min. [0-12], 26 Min. [0-5], 28 [0-17], situated in the Revenue
estate of Village Bijwasan, Tehsil Vasant Vihar, New Delhi, are also
given. This is also not disputed by the parties that only 9 Bighas, 18
Biswas and 12 Biswanis have been sold to the defendants. Even out of
balance portion of the land of 22 Bighas and 5 Biswas, only a part has
been sold to Sh. Abhay Aggarwal Aggarwal and Shri Sudhir Kumar
Makkar by another Agreement to Sell dated 31st May, 2005.
25. In the circumstances, the plea of the plaintiffs is that his total
land was 22 Bighas and 5 Biswas out of which a part of land measuring
9 Bighas, 18 Biswas and 12 Biswanis were sold to the defendants and a
part of the balance land, not the entire balance land, was sold to other
purchasers Sh. Abhay Aggarwal and Shri Sudhir Kumar Makkar and
therefore, the transaction between the plaintiffs and defendant is hit by
section 33 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act.
26. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be
pleaded and proved for the purpose of obtaining relief claimed in the
suit. Whether a plaint discloses a cause of action or not is essentially a
question of fact. But whether it does or does not must be found out
from reading the plaint itself. For the said purpose the averments made
in the plaint in their entirety must be held to be correct. The test is as
to whether if the averments made in the plaint are taken to be correct in
their entirety, a decree would be passed.
27. On perusal of the pleadings in the entirety, it is apparent that the
plaintiffs‟ plea is the alleged transfer, transfer by Agreement to Sell
dated 31st January, 2005 and the Sale Deed dated 21st September,
2007 are void in view of Section 33 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act,
1954. This also cannot be disputed that in the plaint it is alleged that
plaintiffs landholding was more than what was sold to the defendants.
From the averments made in the plaint it is also apparent that after
selling the land to the defendants, the landholding of the plaintiffs was
less than eight standard acres. In the circumstances it cannot be held
that the plaint does not disclose cause of action. Even on the basis of
the copy of Khasra Girdawari which is filed by the plaintiffs, which does
not reflect the entire land and only a portion of the land, which had
been sold to defendants leaving a part of the land, which is allegedly
vest with Gaon Sabha, it cannot be held that the entire land holding
was sold by the plaintiffs to the defendants or the plaintiffs was left with
more than eight standard acres of land. On this ground, therefore, the
plaint cannot be rejected.
28. The plaintiffs have also alleged that they have cancelled the
Attorneys executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendants by a
Deed of Revocation. The plea of the learned counsel for the defendants
that the Registered Deeds could not be revoked by a Deed of Revocation
which does not disclose that all the Power of Attorneys had been
cancelled and that the deed of revocation is not registered will also not
entail rejection of the plaint. Even if the power of attorney in favor of the
defendants have not been revoked, the suit will be maintainable and not
liable for rejection, if the transaction between the plaintiffs and
defendants is hit by provisions of Delhi Land Reform Act. The main
relief in the plaint is that the conveyance executed by them in favour of
defendants is hit by Section 33 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954
and after coming to know about the same, they offered entire sale
consideration to the defendants. However, they refused to take it back
and, therefore, the plaintiffs have also revoked the deeds by giving a
notice and the present suit for declaration and cancellation has been
filed. The plaint cannot be rejected on this ground that registered deeds
executed in favor of defendants have been cancelled by a deed of
revocation which is not registered and by sending a notice. The plaintiff
has claimed declaration and cancellation of the conveyance deed
executed in favor of defendant being hit by section 33 of the Delhi Land
Reforms Act in the plaint and therefore on the basis of defense put up
by the defendants, the plaint cannot be rejected.
29. The learned counsel for the applicants has also alleged that the
suit is barred by time and therefore, the plaint is liable to be rejected.
Agreement to Sell and Sale Deed by the defendants are part of the same
transaction for the same property. The Sale Deed was executed on 21st
September, 2007 and the suit for declaration and cancellation has been
filed on 23rd May, 2008 which is within time. In the circumstances,
prima facie the suit is not barred by time. On the basis of the pleas of
the defendants/applicants that the suit is barred by time, the plaint
cannot be rejected. Similarly, though the consideration which was
agreed between the parties was Rs. 15,10,000/-, however, for the
purpose of cancellation of the deeds, the suit has been valued by the
plaintiffs at Rs. 37,77,000/-. Since the Agreement to Sell and the Sale
Deed are part of the same transaction, whose cancellation is sought,
therefore, for the purpose of cancellation and declaration the suit is
valued at Rs. 37,70,000/- and the ad valorem court fees paid thereon,
which is prima facie not deficient and cannot be a ground to direct the
plaintiffs to pay the deficient court fees and on failure of the plaintiffs to
pay the alleged deficient court fees, the plaint is not liable to be
rejected. The plaint also cannot be rejected on the ground that the
plaintiffs have received the entire sale consideration as it is not stated
in the plaint that the plaintiffs have not received Rs.10,000/- balance
sale consideration. Merely on the basis of allegations made by the
defendants it cannot be inferred that the suit of the plaintiffs is
vexatious and frivolous and the plaintiffs shall not be entitled for the
benefits of their own wrongs.
30. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances, the application for
rejection of the plaint is without any legal basis and is misconceived
and is, therefore, liable to be dismissed. The application is therefore,
dismissed Parties are however left to bear their own costs.
CS(OS) No.1030/2008
The learned counsel for defendant No. 1 seeks time to file the
written statement.
Written statement be filed within four weeks. Replication to the
written statement, if any, shall be filed within four weeks thereafter.
Issue summons to defendants No. 2 and 3 by ordinary process
and registered A.D.post on plaintiffs‟ taking steps within one week,
returnable for 2nd July, 2009.
IA No. 6620/2008 in CS(OS) No.1030/2008
Learned counsel for defendant No. 1 seeks time to file the reply.
Reply be filed within four weeks.
Issue notices to defendants No. 2 and 3 by ordinary process and
registered A.D.post on plaintiffs‟ taking steps within one week,
returnable for 2nd July, 2009.
MARCH 18, 2009 ANIL KUMAR, J. sb
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