Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 856 Del
Judgement Date : 17 March, 2009
* THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Writ Petition (Civil) No.15698/2006
Date of Decision : 17.03.2009
Delhi Jal Board ......Petitioner
Through: Mr. Suresh Tripathi,
Advocate
Versus
Its Workman (Sri Balbir Singh) ...... Respondent
Through: Mr. Anuj Aggarwal,
Advocate
CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE V.K. SHALI
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be
allowed to see the judgment? NO
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not ? NO
3. Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? NO
V.K. SHALI, J. (Oral)
1. This is a writ petition filed by the Delhi Jal Board against
the award dated 27th September, 2002 passed by Labour Court-
VI in ID No.795/1998 titled The Management of Delhi Water
Supply & Sewage Disposal Undertaking (MCD) Vs. Its Workman
Sri Balbir Singh.
2. By virtue of the aforesaid award, the learned Labour Court
had held that not only the termination of services of Balbir Singh
by the petitioner/management was illegal but he was also
entitled to the same pay scale which was being granted to the
regular Beldars on the doctrine of equal pay for equal work. The
petitioner/management has challenged the said award on the
ground that the learned Labour Court has grossly erred in
passing the aforesaid award on account of the fact that there is a
distinction between a casual Beldar and a regular Beldar and
apart from the fact that the petitioner had not been able to
establish that he had completed 240 days of continuous working
in a year with the petitioner/management.
3. The respondent has filed its counter affidavit and contested
the claim of the petitioner. I have heard the learned counsel for
the parties and perused the record.
4. Before considering the submissions of the learned counsel
for the petitioner, they have to cross the hurdle of showing that
the present writ petition is filed within a reasonable time. A
perusal of the record shows that although the award was passed
on 27th September, 2002, the present writ petition has been filed
exactly after four years thereafter, i.e. on 28th September, 2006.
It is repeatedly laid down by the Apex Court that although in writ
petitions, there is no period of limitation prescribed, but
nevertheless the principles of limitation prescribed under the
Limitation Act broadly will govern the period for filing the writ
petition. Reliance in this regard can be placed on the case titled
State of M.P. Vs. Bhailal Bhai AIR 1964 SC 1006 wherein the
Supreme Court had observed as under:
"the provisions of the Limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the Legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in the Civil Court must be brought may
ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which the delay is seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This Court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a Civil action for the remedy but where the delay is more than the period it will almost always be proper for the Court to hold that it is unreasonable."
5. A perusal of the aforesaid authority would clearly show that
there is no straight jacket or formula for the purpose of exercise
of discretionary jurisdiction of writ in a given case. The
petitioner who comes to court seeking invocation of the writ
jurisdiction must show that there has been no inordinate delay
in approaching the Court. In the instant case, the very fact that
the award was passed on 27th September, 2002 and the writ
petition has been filed only on 28th September, 2006, i.e. the
expiry of four years, ex facie shows that there has been an
inordinate delay and latches in filing the writ petition. It also
shows that the finding of the learned Labour Court was accepted
by the petitioner/management both with regard to the
termination and the grant of equal pay to the
respondent/workman. It seems that the wisdom has dawned
late on the petitioner to challenge the said award. The petitioner
as a public body can ill-afford to sleep over its right in case it
feels aggrieved by an award passed by the Labour Court. There
is no justification or explanation given by the petitioner in the
entire writ petition as to why the public body did not deem it
proper to come to the Court earlier or what were the reasons
which prevented it to approach the Court earlier.
6. In the absence of the same, the Court is of the view that the
writ petition is hit by delay and latches and accordingly the same
is dismissed.
No order as to costs.
V.K. SHALI, J.
March 17, 2009 skw
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