Union Of India vs Ogilvy & Mather Ltd. & Anr.
2009 Latest Caselaw 801 Del

*          HIGH COURT OF DELHI : NEW DELHI

+          IA No. 6734/2008 in OMP No.291/2008

                      Judgment reserved on:      12th January, 2009
%                     Judgment decided on :       13th March, 2009

Union of India                            ......Petitioner
            Through : Mr. Parag Tripathi, Addl. Solicitor General
                      with Ms. Arti Gupta, Ms. Prem Lata Bansal
                      and Mr. Sanjeev Rajpal, Advocates

                      Versus

Ogilvy & Mather Ltd. & Anr.          .....Respondents
          Through: Mr. Vinoo Bhagat with Mr. Amiet
                      Andlay, Advs.

Coram:

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANMOHAN SINGH

1. Whether the Reporters of local papers may
   be allowed to see the judgment?                                Yes

2. To be referred to Reporter or not?                             Yes

3. Whether the judgment should be reported                        Yes
   in the Digest?

MANMOHAN SINGH, J.

1. By this order, I shall dispose of application under Section 5

of the Limitation Act read with Section 151CPC being I.A. No. 6734/08

for condonation of delay in re-filing of the petition under Section 34 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for setting aside the award

dated 2nd June, 2007 passed by the learned arbitrator.

2. It is contended by the applicant that the impugned award was

passed on 2nd June, 2007 by the learned sole Arbitrator in Arbitration

Application No. 241/03 wherein the learned Arbitrator passed an award

of Rs. 52,05,367/- with interest @ 12% p.a. thereon from 2nd June, 2007

till date of payment as per terms of the award.

3. The petition under Section 34 of the Act was initially filed in

the court on 9th August, 2007 vide diary No. 103209 which is within the

time period prescribed under the Act. The Dealing Assistant on 13 th

August, 2007 raised certain objections:-

(a) Caveat report be obtained;

(b) Memo of Party be filed ; and

(c) Urgent application not signed

4. The objections were removed and it was re-filed again on 31st

October, 2007. It was mentioned that the urgent petition was not being

filed and the petition may be listed on ordinary basis. However, the

registry again raised the objection that the application for condonation of

delay in re-filing be filed giving the details of the delay in filing of the

petition. The petition was again refiled only in the second week of April,

2008 and again an objection was raised by the registry that the caveat

report had not been taken and the details of the delay in re-filing of the

petition were not correct. On 23rd May, 2008 the registry again raised the

objections that the objections already raised have not been removed and

on 26th May, 2008 the petition was re-filed again and came up before

court on 28th May, 2008, whereby notice was issued in I.A. No.6734/08

under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay.

5. In the instant application under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, condonation of delay has been sought in re-filing of original

miscellaneous petition filed against the award dated 2 nd June, 2007 in

respect of 258 days delay beyond the period of 90 days on the ground

that the senior Standing counsel looking after the matter had to undergo

surgery followed by prolonged recovery period seeking constant attention

and the file was also mixed up with other files in his office and the said

delay which occurred in re-filing is bonafide and unintentional and the

same be condoned.

6. In reply to the application by the respondent, it is stated that

the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not maintainable

and the delay of more than 30 days after the expiry of the prescribed

period of 90 days cannot be condoned. It is also contended that Section

5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the petition under Section 34

of the Act. The application lacks in detail as it does not give the dates

of surgery undergone by the counsel and his recovery from it nor it is

explained why the alternative counsel was not engaged earlier as was

done later and mixing of files is not a ground for condonation of delay.

The delay must be explained day-by-day. It is alleged that it is

irrelevant whether the delay is intentional or unintentional as the court

does not have the power to extend the time limit prescribed by section

34 of the Act and the delay under any circumstances cannot be

condoned.

7. It is argued by learned counsel for the respondent that

Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act does not refer to

different kinds of delay-some that can, and others that cannot, be

condoned beyond the time limit prescribed in it. Even one day‟s delay

(beyond 30 days‟ delay condonable under the said Section) cannot be

condoned. Decisions of the Supreme Court for a liberal approach to

condoning the delay do not apply to matters governed by the special

provisions of Section 34 of the Act.

8. In rejoinder to the reply, it is stated by the petitioner that only

when the Execution petition No. 6/08 was listed and came up for

hearing before the court, the petitioner enquired about the application

filed by him under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside of the award.

The matter was re-filed after removing the objections along with the

application praying for condonation of delay. However, by this process

the delay of 258 days occurred which was not intentional but was

caused due to circumstances beyond the control of the petitioner and his

counsel.

9. It is again stated that the petitioner has filed the application

under section 34 within the limitation period prescribed under the Act.

The delay was only with respect to re-filing of the said application and

therefore, liberal approach may be taken by the Court.

10. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and also gone

through the record of the case. The case in hand is considered by me

while looking into the two propositions of law which are as under:-

a) Exclusion of Section 5 of Limitation Act from the

purview of Section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996.

b) Exclusion of Section 5 of Limitation Act while

considering the case of re-filing.

11. At the outset, it would be appropriate to consider the law in

relation to Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

which is as under:-

"34. Application for setting aside arbitral award. xxxxx (3) An application for setting aside may not be made after three months have elapsed from the date on which the party making that application had received the arbitral award or if a request had been made under Section 33 from the date on which that request had been disposed by the arbitral tribunal:

Provided that if the Court is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application within the said period of three months it may entertain the application within a further period of thirty days, but not thereafter."

12. A bare reading of Section 34(3) with the proviso makes it

abundantly clear that the application for setting aside the award on the

grounds mentioned in Sub-Section (2) of Section 34 will have to be

made within three months. The period can further be extended, on

sufficient cause being shown, by another period of 30 days but not

thereafter. It means that as far as application for setting aside the award

is concerned, the period of limitation prescribed is three months which

can be extended by another period of 30 days, on sufficient cause being

shown to the satisfaction of the Court.

13. In the present case, the award was passed by the learned

arbitrator on 02.06.2007 and the present petition under section 34 of the

Act for setting aside of the part of the award was filed on 09.08.2007.

As per the provisions of Section 34(3) of the Arbitration & Conciliation

Act, 1996, an application for setting aside may not be made after 3

months from the date on which the party making that application had

received the arbitral award. Thus the application under Section 34 of

the Act had been filed by the petitioner within the prescribed time.

14. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the case of

Union of India v. Popular Construction (2001) 8 SCC 470 to contend

that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to petitions under

Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996. Under the Act,

the Court has power to condone delay of only 30 days. Relevant paras

are reproduced herein below:-

"12. As far as the language of Section 34 of the 1996 Act is concerned, the crucial words are "but not thereafter" used in the proviso to sub-section (3). In our opinion, this phrase would amount to an express exclusion within the meaning of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, and would therefore bar the application of Section 5 of that Act. Parliament did not need to go further. To hold that the court could entertain an application to set aside the award beyond the extended period under the proviso, would render the phrase "but not thereafter" wholly otiose. No principle of interpretation would justify such a result.

13. Apart from the language, 'express exclusion' may follow from the scheme and object of the special or local law. "Even in a case, where the special law does not exclude the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act by an express reference, it would nonetheless be open to the Court to examine whether and to what extend the nature of those provisions or the nature of the subject-matter and scheme of the special law exclude their operation".

14. Here the history and scheme of the 1996 Act support the conclusion that the time-limit prescribed under Section 34 to challenge an award is absolute and unextendible by court under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Arbitration and Conciliation Bill, 1995 which preceded the 1996 Act stated as one of its main objectives the need "to minimise the supervisory role of courts in the arbitral process". This objective has found expression in Section 5 of the Act which prescribes the extent of judicial intervention in no uncertain terms:

"5. Extent of judicial intervention.--Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part."

15. The 'Part' referred to in Section 5 is Part I of the 1996 Act which deals with domestic arbitrations. Section 34 is contained in Part I and is therefore subject to the sweep of the prohibition contained in Section 5 of the 1996 Act.

16. Furthermore, section 34(1) itself provides that recourse to a court against an arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting aside such award "in accordance with" sub Section 2 and sub Section 3. Sub Section 2 relates to grounds for setting aside an award and is not relevant for our purposes. But an application field beyond the period mentioned in Section 34, sub-section (3) wold not be an application "in accordance with" that sub section. Consequently by virtue of Section 34(1), recourse to the court against an arbitral award cannot be made beyond the period prescribed. The importance of the period fixed under Section 34 is emphasised by the provisions of Section 36 which provide that "where the time for making an application to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34 has expired...the award shall be enforced and the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in the same manner as if it were a decree of a court". This is a significant departure form the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940. Under the 1940 Act, after the time to set aside the award expired, the court was required to "proceed to pronounce judgment according to the award and upon the judgment so pronounced a decree shall follow". Now the consequence of the time expiring under Section 34 of the 1996 Act is that the award becomes immediately enforceable without any further act of the Court. If there were any residual doubt on the interpretation of the language used in Section 34, the scheme of the 1996 Act would resolve the issue in favour of curtailment of the Court's powers by the exclusion of the operation of Section 5 of the Limitation Act."

15. He also relied upon the case of Damodaran Pillai v. South

Indian Bank Ltd., (2005) 7 SCC 300, wherein the Supreme Court held

as under:-

"It is also trite that the civil court in absence of any express power cannot condone the delay. For the purpose of condonation of delay in absence of applicability of the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the court cannot invoke its inherent power. .... .... The principles underlying the provisions prescribing limitation are based on public policy aiming at justice, the principles of repose and peace and intended to induce claimants to be prompt in claiming relief."

16. There can be no doubt in respect of the legal proposition that

the term „sufficient cause‟ in proviso to sub-section (3) to section 34

deserves to be liberally construed so as to advance substantial justice.

The question of condonation of delay in re-filing of an application has

to be considered from a different angle and viewpoint as compared to

consideration of condonation of delay in initial filing. The delay in re-

filing is not subject to the rigorous tests which are usually applied in

excusing the delay in a petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act, 1963.

17. The Apex Court while interpreting Section 34 and the

objections therein has held in the case of Popular Construction case

(supra) that the limitation prescribed under the provision of Section 34

is of sacrosanct nature and the expression used in Section 34 is "not

thereafter". It is clearly laid down that the delay in filing the objection

u/S 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot exceed the

limit of three months from the date of passing of award and one month

afterwards and not thereafter. Thus, the law in relation to objections

against the award is clear to the extent that the provisions of Section 5

of Limitation Act will not be invoked while considering the delay in

filing the objections u/S 34 of the Act.

18. Recently, the Hon‟ble Apex Court had occasion to discuss

the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act and its interplay with the

provisions of Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

in the case of Consolidated Engg. V. Principal Secy, reported in 2008

Vol 7, SCC 169, wherein the Apex Court has taken the view that the

provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act, are not applicable with

respect to the delay in filing the objections and the said Section 5 of the

Limitation Act is not applicable because of the provisions of Section 29

of the Limitation Act which clarifies that when there is a special law and

a general law prescribing the limitation, the provisions of special law

will prevail.

19. The Apex Court has discussed this point in great detail and

has come to the conclusion that although the provisions of Section 5 of

Limitation Act will not be applicable while adjudicating upon the delay

in filing the objections, that will not take away the applicability of entire

Limitation Act for considering the delay in filing the objections u/S 34

of the Limitation Act. In other words, any other circumstance which is

not covered u/S 5 of the Limitation Act, but covered in other provisions

of the Limitation Act, can be looked into by the Court while

adjudicating upon the delay in filing the objections and while holding

this view, the Apex Court was of the opinion that although the

provisions of Section 5 are not applicable but the provisions of Section

14 of the Limitation Act, will be applicable. The relevant paragraphs of

the judgment are reproduced as under:

"10. ..........When any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as well as provision for extension upto specified time limit, on sufficient cause being shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail and to that extent the provisions of the Limitation Act shall stand excluded. As the intention of the legislature in enacting Sub-section (3) of Section 34 of the Act is that the application for setting aside the award should be made within three months and the period can be further extended on sufficient cause being shown by another period of 30 days but not thereafter, this Court is of the opinion that the provisions

of Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable because the applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded because of the provisions of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act.

11. However, merely because it is held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act is not applicable to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act for setting aside an award, one need not conclude that provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act would also not be applicable to an application submitted under Section 34 of the Act of 1996."

20. As noticed earlier, in the Act of 1996, there is no express

provision excluding application of the provisions of Section 14 of the

Limitation Act to an application filed under Section 34 of the Act for

challenging an award. Further, there is fundamenetal distinction

between the discretion to be exercised under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act and exclusion of the time provided in Section 14 of the said Act.

The power to excuse delay and grant an extension of time under Section

5 is discretionary whereas under Section 14, exclusion of time is

mandatory, if the requisite conditions are satisfied. Section 5 is broader

in its sweep than Section 14 in the sense that a number of widely

different reasons can be advanced and established to show that there

was sufficient cause in not filing the appeal or the application within

time. The ingredients in respect of Section 5 and 14 are different. The

effect of Section 14 is that in order to ascertain the date of expiration of

the „prescribed period‟, the days excluded from operating by way of

limitation have to be added to what is primarily the period of limitation

prescribed.

21. The above discussion makes it clear that although the

provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are not applicable while

adjudicating upon the delay in filing the objections u/S 34 of the Act,

however, that will not debar the Court from looking into any other

circumstance which may be incidental in nature which may not be

covered u/S 5 of the Limitation Act.

22. In the case in hand, the second issue which requires

consideration is as to whether the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation

Act are applicable while considering the delay in re-filing the

petition/objections/documents. In the case of Smt. Parvati & Ors. v.

Shri Anand Parkash alias Nand Lal, AIR 1987 Delhi 90, this Court

has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be attracted to a

case wherein appeal and objections have been initially filed within the

prescribed period of limitation and the same does not suffer from any

infirmity of vital nature if there is a delay in refiling the

appeal/objections after removing the defects. The relevant portion of

the judgment is reproduced as under:-

"Section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be attracted to a case where an appeal/objection has been initially filed within the prescribed of limitation and the same does not suffer from any infirmity of a vital nature but there is delay in re-filing the appeal after removing the defects as pointed out by the Deputy Registrar. The rigours of law of limitation regarding condonation of delay would not apply to such a situation and the court has simply to satisfy itself that there is a plausible explanation for the delay. But it cannot be said that there is no sanction behind R 5(1) of Punjab High Court Rules and Orders and the Court will be powerless to reject the memorandum of appeal or impose any other appropriate penalty if the appellant behaves in a totally negligent, reckless or erratic manner in not re-filing the appeal after removing the defects within a reasonable time......"

23. This leads me to consider the case in hand wherein the

objections were filed within the prescribed period of time and the same

did not suffer from any discrepancy/infirmity of vital nature. Therefore,

the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act will not be applicable

to the objections which were initially filed within the prescribed time

but later on re-filed after removing the defects beyond the prescribed

time. Precisely, it means that while seeing the condition of delay in re-

filing, the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act and rigours of law

of Limitation will not be applicable.

24. Coming back to the earlier discussion of Arbitration Act and

while seeing the same in consonance with the case in hand, it can easily

be gauged that the provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act are neither

applicable while adjudicating the condonation of delay in filing the

objections u/S 34 nor in the case wherein they were filed within the

prescribed time but refiled at the later date. Following the judgment of

the Apex Court in the case of Consolidated Engg.'s case (supra) which

says that mere inapplicability of Section 5 of Limitation Act will not

debar the Court from looking into any other circumstance or extra

ordinary circumstance wherein the delay can be condoned. In the case

of re-filing, the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, are not

applicable, therefore, the case of re-filing will not be covered under the

provisions of Section 5 of Limitation Act and in such case, the rigours

of Section 5 of Limitation Act and the explanation therein shall not be

of any assistance while condoning the delay and the delay will be

looked into considering the circumstances in hand. It, however, does

not make the Court powerless to reject the petition of a person who is

totally negligent, reckless or erratic, but surely the said case of re-filing

will be excluded from Section 5 of Limitation Act.

25. When the said case of re-filing is excluded from Section 5 of

Limitation Act, I am of the view that the Court can look into the facts

and circumstances of each case and condone the delay as it will not be

covered by Section 5 of Limitation Act but the court cannot look into

any circumstances which are covered under Section 5 of Limitation Act

while seeing the delay in filing the objections. The case of re-filing is

clearly not covered by Section 5 of Limitation Act.

26. In the case of S.R Kulkarni v. Birla VXL Limited 1998 V

AD (DELHI) 634, following observations are made in para 8:-

"8. Notwithstanding which of the aforesaid Rules are applicable, the question of condonation of delay in re- filing of an application has to be considered from a different angle and viewpoint as compared to consideration of condonation of delay in initial filing. The delay in re-filing is not subject to the rigorous tests which are usually applied in excusing the delay in a petition filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act..........

On the facts of the case, the effect of negligence or „casual approach‟ which would be appropriate term to be used here, of the counsel on his client, does not deserve to be so rigorous so as to deny condition of delay in re-filing the application. The casual approach of the counsel is evident as no timely efforts were made firstly to find out after filing application on 19 th August, 1995 as to whether the Registry had raised any objection or not. Secondly, despite order of the Joint Registrar dated 9 th January, 1996, the objection was removed only on 4 th March, 1996 i.e. after the date which the Joint Registrar had fixed for the application being posted for hearing

before the Court............ When there is negligence or casual approach in a matter like this in re-filing of an application, though the Court may not be powerless to reject an application seeking condonation and may decline to condone the delay but at the same time, passing of any other appropriate order including imposition of cost can be considered by the court to compensate the other party from delay which may occur on account of re-filing of the application."

27. The discussion above makes it clear that the court can look

into any circumstance other than the circumstances falling under section

5 of the Limitation Act to condone the delay and certainly, the case of

re-filing of the objections is not falling under section 5 and can be

looked into by the court. The courts have time and again stated that the

question of re-filing of the objections is not subject to strict rigours of

the law of limitation. However, the courts have also reminded

themselves that they are not powerless to condone the delay in the facts

and circumstances of the case merely because it is a case of the re-filing

of the documents.

28. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued on the point

of condonation of delay in re-filing of the petition under Section 34 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and stressed that the delay in

re-filing of the petition be not allowed because of the following

reasons:-

a) That there is no whisper in the application filed by the

petitioner as to why the two other Advocates on record did

not cure the defects for 258 days and it shows that it is a

case of gross negligence on the part of the petitioner.

b) That the main reason given in the application for

condonation is delay is the surgery undergone by Senior

Standing Counsel but the Vakalatnama on behalf of the

petitioner has been filed and re-filed by other two

advocates also. The illness of the counsel other than the

one handling the case cannot be an excuse for condonation

of delay and no ground in this regard has been stated in the

application for condonation of delay.

c) That the petitioner has also failed to give any relevant dates

of the illness of counsel and even after the surgery was

conducted on him, the dates of his illness and resumption

of work subsequently are not given in the application.

d) That the petition under Section 34 of the Act was filed

initially on 9th August 2007 and returned under objections

on 13th August 2007. The first re-filing of the petition was

on 31st October 2007 i.e. 80 days after it was returned as

defective. Under Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 5 of Chapter I of

Delhi High Court Rules and Orders the first re-filing after

more than 30 days in the aggregate is to be construed as a

case of fresh institution. In view of sub rule (3) the

petitioner‟s application was barred by limitation.

29. In reply to sub-rule (3) of Rule 5 Chapter I of the Delhi High

Court Rules and Orders, learned senior counsel has made his submission

that the said Chapter I and Rule 5 is applicable only regarding filing of

the appeal against the order or judgment and not the petition filed on the

Original Side. Learned counsel for the petitioner has relied on Rule 2 of

Chapter IV of Delhi High Court (Original Side) Rules which read as

under:-

"......If on scrutiny, the document is found to be defective the said document shall after notice to the party filing the same be placed before the Registrar. The Registrar may for sufficient cause return the said document for rectification or amendment to the party filing the same and for this purpose may allow to the party concerned such reasonable time as he may consider necessary."

30. These rules have also been discussed in the case of

S.R.Kulkarni‟s case (supra) wherein the Division Bench has observed

that the question of condonation of delay in re-filing of the application

has to be considered from a different angle and view point as compared

to consideration of condonation of delay in initial filing and

notwithstanding which of the aforesaid Rules are applicable.

31. It needs no mention that the ground of illness of the Senior

Standing counsel stated in the application for condonation of delay

seems to be good reason for the Court for condoning the delay.

However, it cannot lose sight of the fact that the application under

Section 34 of the Arbitration & Conciliation Act,1996 was filed on 9 th

August, 2007. The dealing assistant of the Registry had first time raised

the objection on 13th August, 2007. The details of the said objections

are mentioned in para 3 of the judgment. The said objections are stated

to have been removed on 30th October, 2007. But it appears, from the

record that all the objections raised by the Registry were not removed

and the application under Section 34 was again returned. The petitioner

this time re-filed the petition on 10th April, 2008 i.e. after more than five

months. On the same date, objections were raised again for the third

time by the dealing assistant of the Registry stating that objections were

not removed by the petitioner. The petition was again re-filed on 25th

April, 2008. On re-filing the petition, again on 23rd May, 2008 the

dealing assistant of the Registry fourth time returned the petition stating

that objections were not removed. The said process of removing the

objections ended ultimately on 28th May, 2008 when the petition was

re-filed. The sequence of events in re-filing of the petition several times

and nature of the objections raised by the registry reveals that the

objections were not very vital in character and were merely relating to

"Caveat report not obtained, Memo of party not signed and Urgent

application not signed". The said objections being merely minor in

nature and non vital could have been removed by the other two counsel

without any instructions from the counsel looking after the matter,

especially since they were already holding vakalatnama in their favour.

32. The ground of condonation of delay has to be looked into in

the backdrop of the fact that this court is dealing with the objections for

challenge of Award under section 34 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996. This Act is a special law, consolidating and

amending the law relating to arbitration and matters connected therewith

or incidental thereto. The Act does not prescribe the period of limitation,

for various proceedings under that Act, except where it intends to

prescribe a period different from what is prescribed in the Limitation

Act. The interference of the court in the arbitral award has been limited

by prescribing the period of limitation under Section 34 of the Act.

33. The objections for challenging the award are a valuable right of

the parties and if they are not filed within time, it takes away the said right

to the benefit of the other. It is pertinent to mention here that although the

Court can look into the issue of re-filing for condoning the delay and is not

powerless under those circumstances to reject an application seeking

condonation and may decline to condone the delay as held by Division

Bench of this Court in S.R. Kulkarni's case (supra). I am of the view that in

the present case, the delay of 258 days is exorbitant and the said delay cannot

be condoned as it would amount to delaying the very object and purpose of

prescribing the limitation for challenging the Award under section 34 of the

Act and frustrating the scheme of the Act. The circumstances of

condonation of delay in re-filing therein have to be in consonance with the

aims and objects of the Act. The period of 258 days delay is too excessive to

be condoned on the ground pleaded by the petitioner. The re-filing

circumstance gives the court power to condone the delay in special

circumstances, but the said aspect cannot give any party a leverage period

of limitation for filing the objections against the award.

34. The court in the issue of re-filing also looked into the question

of sufficient cause and good grounds for condoning the delay. The illness of

the counsel can be a good ground to condone reasonable delay but cannot be

overstretched to condone the excessive delay of 258 days, especially where

the defects in objections are not vital in character and can be easily handled

by the associate counsel having vakalatnama in their favour.

35. I find no merit in the contention of the petitioner. The

application IA No.6734/2008 under Section 5 of Limitation Act is

dismissed.

OMP No. 291/2008

In view of the order passed in IA No.6734/2008, this OMP

No.291/2008 is also dismissed being time barred.

No costs.

MANMOHAN SINGH, J March 13, 2009 SD/nn