Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 2735 Del
Judgement Date : 21 July, 2009
`* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ W.P.(C) 23284/2005
Date of decision : 21.07.2009
IN THE MATTER OF :
MCD ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr. Himanshu Upadhyaya, Advocate
versus
SUNITA DEVI GUPTA ..... Respondent
Through: Mr. Apurb Lal, Advocate
CORAM
* HON'BLE MS.JUSTICE HIMA KOHLI
1. Whether Reporters of Local papers may be allowed to see the
Judgment? No.
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not? No.
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest? No.
HIMA KOHLI, J. (ORAL)
1. The petitioner MCD has filed the present writ petition assailing
the order dated 24.11.2003 passed by the learned ADJ in an appeal
preferred by the respondent/assessee under Section 169 of the Delhi
Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred to as „the Act‟)
against a bill dated 15.02.2000 raising a demand of property tax in respect
of Flat No. 2, on the ground floor of premises bearing No. 1535/1(1/3), East
Patel Nagar, New Delhi. By the impugned order, the assessment order
dated 30.06.1997 issued by the Joint Assessor and Collector was quashed on
account of the same violating the statutory provisions of Section 126 of the
Act. The learned Additional District Judge held that the petitioner/MCD
could not have passed the assessment order in respect of a notice issued on
22.02.1992, signed on 30.06.1997 and received by the respondent/assessee
on 15.02.2000, the same being time barred.
2. Counsel for the petitioner/MCD submits that the learned ADJ
erred in passing the impugned order for the reason that the order dated
30.06.1997 was in fact a rectification assessment order, rectifying the
ratable value fixed by an order dated 20.03.1991 and that it was not an
order passed for deciding the notice dated 22.02.1992 issued to the
assessee under Section 126 of the Act. He states that the order dated
30.06.1997, being a rectification order, there is no question of the
assessment order being time barred as there is no limitation prescribed for
the purpose of rectification and hence, sub section (1)(a) of Section 126 of
the Act is not applicable.
3. A rectification order can be passed only in terms of the
provisions of Section 176 of the Act. The said provision is reproduced
hereinbelow for ready reference:
"176. Immaterial error not to affect liability - No assessment and no charge or demand on account of any tax shall be impeached or affected by reason only of any mistake in the name, residence, place of business or occupation of any person liable to pay the tax or in the description of any property or thing, or of any mistake in the amount of the assessment,
charge or demand, or by reason only of clerical error or other defect of form, if the directions contained in this Act and the bye-laws made thereunder have in substance and effect been complied with; and it shall be enough in the case of any such tax on property or any assessment of value for the purpose of any such tax, if the property taxed or assessed is so described as to be generally known; and it shall not be necessary to name the owner or occupier thereof."
4. A perusal of the aforesaid provision shows that any formal defect
in the name, residence, place of business or occupation of any person liable
to pay the tax or any mistake in the amount of the assessment, charge or
demand, by reason only of clerical error or other defect of form can be
rectified by invoking the said provision. However, under the garb of
rectification, the petitioner/MCD cannot attempt to amend the assessment
list and rectify the assessment order dated 20.03.1991, as the same is not
permissible under the provisions of Section 176 of the Act. In the present
case, admittedly, the assessee did not approach the petitioner MCD seeking
rectification of the assessment order. Rather, the petitioner MCD suo moto
decided to rectify the assessment orders for the years w.e.f. 01.04.1984,
01.12.1988 and 01.04.1994. The petitioner/MCD by rectifying the
assessment orders for the relevant years, upwardly revised the ratable value
for the aforesaid period. The said rectification can by no stretch of
imagination, be termed as a correction of a formal defect.
5. The said act of upward revision of the ratable value, by passing
the purported rectification order, amounts to amending the assessment list
which could only have been done under the provisions of Section 126 of the
DMC Act, but not after the expiry of three years from the end of the year in
which, notice is given under sub section (2) or sub section (3) of Section 126
of the Act as mentioned in sub section (4)(b) thereof. Any other
interpretation would amount to making the provisions of Section 126 of the
Act redundant. The aforesaid ground taken by the petitioner/MCD to assail
the impugned order dated 24.11.2003 is untenable as the order dated
30.06.1997 is violative of Section 126 of the Act, three years having already
lapsed on 31.03.1995, after issuance of the notice dated 22.02.1992 to the
respondent/assessee.
6. It is also pertinent to note that a perusal of the purported
rectification order dated 30.06.1997 (Annexure-5) shows that it neither
mentions that the same was passed under Section 176 of the DMC Act, nor
does the term „rectification‟ appear in the said order. In the absence of any
such mention made in the order dated 30.06.1997, it is difficult to accept
the contention of the counsel for the petitioner, that the said order was one
passed for rectification. Rather, in para 6 of the writ petition, the petitioner
has stated that since the respondent had applied for mutation and for
assessment on purchased price, the assessing authority rectified the ratable
value vide order dated 30.06.1997. Be that as it may and assuming that the
said order was one of rectification, the same does not satisfy the
requirements imposed by Section 176 of the Act, as it was not passed to
remove any formal defect in the assessment or demand. Rather, the said
order substantially affects the liability of the respondent/assessee to pay
property tax for the relevant years, by enhancing the same. The
respondent/assessee cannot be permitted to be put to a disadvantage, by
adopting such a mode.
7. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the ground taken to assail
the impugned order dated 24.11.2003 is turned down as being devoid of
merits. It is held that the impugned order does not suffer from any
perversity, illegality or arbitrariness that requires interference by this Court
in the present proceedings.
8. In view of the fact that the writ petition is rejected, the
petitioner is directed to refund the amount of Rs.76,847/- deposited by the
respondent with it, within a period of four weeks from today, failing which,
the petitioner shall pay simple interest @ 8% per annum, till the said
amount is realized by the respondent. The writ petition is dismissed with
costs quantified at Rs.7,000/-.
HIMA KOHLI,J JULY 21, 2009 rkb
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