Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 2725 Del
Judgement Date : 20 July, 2009
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
% Judgment delivered on: 20.07.2009
+ W.P.(C) No. 1745/1991
M/S R.K. BUILDERS ..... Petitioner
-Versus-
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ANR. ..... Respondent
AND
+ W.P.(C) No. 1840/1991
M/S R.K. BUILDERS ..... Petitioner
-Versus-
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI & ANR. ..... Respondent
Advocates who appeared in this case:-
For the Petitioner : Mr. B.B. Jain, Advocate For the Respondent : Ms. Amita Gupta, Advocate with Ms. Himani, Advocate CORAM:- HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BADAR DURREZ AHMED HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE VEENA BIRBAL
1. Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment ?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the judgment should be reported in Digest?
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J (oral)
1. Both these writ petitions have been filed by the same petitioner and
arise in respect of property tax assessment done by the Deputy Assessor and
Collector qua adjoining buildings which have been constructed by the
petitioner. Both the assessment orders which are the subject matter of
challenge were passed on the same day, that is, on 31.03.1991 and are
virtually identical in terms. It is for this reason that we are taking up the
consideration of these two petitions together.
2. Two issues have been raised by the petitioner. The first issue is with
regard to valuation and the computation of actual cost of construction. The
second issue pertains to the date from which the liability for property tax
arises. With regard to the issue of valuation, the learned counsel submitted
that in both the cases the valuation reports of the registered valuer Mr. S.B.
Bajpai had been submitted by the petitioner for computation of the total cost
of construction. The Deputy Assessor and Collector had rejected the
valuation reports on the ground that they were on the lower side. Thereafter,
he computed the cost of construction based on CPWD rates. According to
the petitioner, no reasons for rejecting the valuation reports have been given
in the impugned assessment orders apart from merely observing that they
were on the lower side. Consequently, it was contended that in such an
eventuality the Deputy Assessor and Collector ought to have got a fresh
valuation done and ought not to have merely computed the cost of
construction on the basis of estimation.
3. As regards the second issue of the date from which the liability of
property tax commenced, the learned counsel submitted that both the
properties were completed on 31.03.1988 and a notice was issued by the
petitioner on 04.04.1988. The said notice was in terms of Section 129 of the
Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. It was further contended by the
learned counsel for the petitioner that the property was also occupied from
01.04.1988. According to the learned counsel, the factum of occupation has
been accepted by the Deputy Assessor and Collector as would be apparent
from the last sentence of the impugned orders. The only question that needs
to be sorted out in this context is the issue as to when the building was
completed. According to the impugned orders, an inspection was carried out
on 14.03.1986 and the inspection report indicated that the building was
partly occupied and partly vacant. Thus, according to the Deputy Assessor
and Collector, the building stood completed on 14.03.1986 and, therefore,
the property tax was being assessed on and from 01.03.1986 and not from
01.04.1988. The learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
Deputy Assessor and Collector wrongly relied upon the inspection report
when the petitioner had not been given any notice of inspection nor had a
copy of the inspection report being supplied to the petitioner.
4. Considering the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the
petitioner and the stand taken by the respondent, we are of the view that
these petitions involve determination of disputed questions of fact. The
query as to whether the building was completed on a particular date is
certainly a question of fact. There is a dispute with regard to this date. It can
only be sorted out either by considering evidence in the first instance or in
an appeal. It is for this reason that, despite the fact that these are the matters
which have been pending since 1991, we are of the view that the petitioner
should be relegated to the alternative remedy of an appeal under Section 169
of the said Act.
5. Consequently, we are not inclined to entertain these writ petitions and
dismiss the same. However, we are granting liberty to the petitioner to
prefer appeals against the impugned orders of assessment provided such
appeals are filed within thirty days. We have not expressed any opinion on
the merits of the matter and it would be open to the petitioner to raise all
issues, both of fact and law, before the appellate authority, in case the
petitioner decides to file the appeals.
6. There shall be no order as to costs.
BADAR DURREZ AHMED, J
VEENA BIRBAL, J JULY 20, 2009 srb
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