Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 28 Del
Judgement Date : 9 January, 2009
"REPORTABLE"
* HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 1593/2006 and
Crl.M.A. No. 6859/2006
Date of decision: 9.01.2009
# ASHWANI KUMAR ...... PETITIONER
! Through : Mr. Hitender Kapur, Advocate
Versus
$ STATE & ANR. .....RESPONDENTS
^ Through : Ms. Mukta Gupta, Standing
Counsel.
Mr. Vipin Kumar Gupta, Adv.
for R-2 with respondent No. 2
in person.
%
CORAM:
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ARUNA SURESH
(1) Whether reporters of local paper may be
allowed to see the judgment?
(2) To be referred to the reporter or not? Yes
(3) Whether the judgment should be reported
in the Digest ? Yes
JUDGMENT
ARUNA SURESH, J.
1. This writ petition has been filed by petitioner;
Ashwani Kumar seeking quashing of FIR No.
266/2006 under Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of
Atrocities) Act 1989 (hereinafter referred to as
SC/ST Act) registered at Police Station Tilak Marg.
2. Petitioner was working as Manager with North
Zone Railway Employees, CTC Society Ltd., Baroda
House, whereas complainant Amit Chauhan was
working as assistant with the said society.
Petitioner had come to know that there was some
misappropriation of funds and fraud in the
organization as the LIC premium of Rs. 50/- paid by
the members of the society was never paid to the
Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC) on
account of insurance. Petitioner filed complaints
with LIC and other agencies and because of these
complaints, Chairman Anil Kumar Rajpal, North
Zone Railways Employees, Baroda House was
unhappy as he apprehended being caught for fraud
during investigation of the said complaints.
Petitioner was suspended from service on
21.12.2005 by the Chairman and petitioner filed a
suit against suspension order on 23.1.2006. In the
said case the Chairman was issued notice for
appearance on 1.2.2006. The said suit is pending
adjudication.
3. In brief, the case of the prosecution is that on
2.2.2006 complainant Amit Chauhan made a
complaint alleging that on 27.1.2006 at about
11.15 AM he had gone to the upper floor of the
offices, when intercom no. 27 installed in the office
cabin of the petitioner started ringing and since the
door was open, complainant entered the office
cabin of the petitioner to receive the phone. Upon
questioning by the petitioner, complainant replied
that he had entered the cabin to receive the phone
as nobody was there, on which petitioner started
abusing him saying ―Pata Nahin Is Karyaliya Mein
Kahan - Kahan Se Chure Bharti Kar Liye Saale
Bina Puchche Mere Cebin Mein Ghus Aate Hain‖
(from where-where Chure have been employed
saale entered into my cabin without my
permission) and pushed the complainant out of the
cabin. This alleged act of lewdness was done and
the offending words were spoken by the petitioner
when Sh. Subhash Chander, Sh. Umesh Sharma,
Sh. Kishore Kumar, Sh. Ajay Kumar, Smt. Sonia
and Sh. Kishan Kumar were sitting in the office.
After preliminary enquiry FIR No. 266/2006 under
Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act was registered against
the petitioner on 4.7.2006.
4. Petitioner has sought quashing of the FIR on the
following grounds:
(1) The FIR does not contain the ingredients
contained in Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act
i.e. the FIR does not disclose that the
petitioner was aware that complainant
belonged to Scheduled Caste/Scheduled
Tribe. Even the FIR does not disclose that
complainant belonged to Scheduled
Caste/Scheduled Tribe.
(2) Complainant alleged that the offence took
place inside the cabin and as such the
incident did not take place within the ambit of
public view as required under the provisions
of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act.
(3) The present FIR is an abuse of process of law
as the same has been filed by the complainant
to take revenge against the petitioner on
behest of the Chairman of the organization,
where the petitioner and complainant
worked.
(4) There is a delay in filing of the complaint
dated 2.2.2006 as the alleged date of
occurrence of the incident being 27.1.2006.
(5) Allegations mentioned in the FIR are
implausible and false as the petitioner was
suspended from service on 21.12.2005 and
had handed over charge of the office cabin to
the officer as directed in suspension letter.
During the course of suspension petitioner
could not have entered the office.
(6) Under Section 3(1)(x) it is mandatory that the
alleged insult or intimidation should be done
with an intent to humiliate, by the person
against whom the complaint has been lodged.
However, no such averment is contained in
the FIR.
5. Mr. Hitender Kapur, learned counsel for the
petitioner, has argued that ingredients of Section
3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act are not made out in the
present case as petitioner did not know that
complainant belonged to Scheduled Caste/
Scheduled Tribe on the date of the alleged
incident and the complainant obtained and
produced the scheduled caste certificate only after
the registration of the FIR; and that petitioner had
no intention to offend the complainant nor he was
present in the cabin at the time of alleged incident.
It is further argued that there was no occasion for
the petitioner to use the offending words as
narrated in the FIR with a view to insult or
intimidate or with an intention to humiliate the
complainant. It is also emphasized by the counsel
for the petitioner that as per the FIR itself the
incident had allegedly taken place in the cabin of
the petitioner and in front of the persons named in
the FIR as witnesses who were sitting in the office
at the relevant time, therefore, it could not be said
that the offending words were used at the place
within public view. It is further submitted that
petitioner has been falsely implicated in this case
because he had made complaints against the
Chairman of North Zone Railway Employees and
others for misappropriating the funds and
committing fraud in the organization by not
depositing the LIC premium paid by the members
of the society to the LIC on account of insurance.
It is also argued that petitioner was involved by the
complainant in a number of other cases with a view
to pressurize the petitioner to withdraw his
complaint filed against the Chairman for offence of
cheating, fraud and misappropriation etc. in which
the investigating agency have already filed closure
reports. Learned counsel for the petitioner has
referred to:
1. Mukesh Kumar Saini v. State (Delhi administration) - 2001 Cr.L.J. 4587.
2. Daya Bhatnagar & Ors. v. State - 2004 (2) JCC 1136.
3. Smt. Deepa Bajwa v. State - 2004 (3) JCC 1754.
6. Before examining the question whether on the
allegations made in the FIR prima facie any offence
under Section 3(1)(x) is made out against the
petitioner, it is necessary to examine provisions of
Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act. It reads:
―3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.-- (1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe, --
(i) to (ix) ....
(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view.‖
Thus the basic ingredients for making an offence
under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act are:
a. There must be an intentional insult or
intimidation;
b. Insult must be with intent to humiliate
SC/ST member by a non SC/ST member.
c. This insult must have been done in any
place within public view.
7. The expression ‗intentional insult or intimidation
with intention to humiliate' contained in the
aforesaid Section makes it crystal clear that
mensrea is an essential ingredient of the offence
and it must be established that accused had the
knowledge that the victim was an SC/ST member
and the offence was committed for that very
reason. If a person is merely called by caste, it
would not attract the provisions of SC/ST Act.
There should be specific accusation of calling the
person by caste with an intention to humiliate
against the accused. Provisions contained in this
Section are penal in nature and therefore, have to
be given a strict interpretation. In case any of the
ingredients are found to be missing or lacking, it
would not constitute an offence under SC/ST Act.
8. In Mukesh Kumar Saini and others v. State
(Delhi Administration) - (supra), wherein
accused had uttered humiliating words to the
complainant and his brother and FIR under Section
3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act was registered. The Court
observed that as per the FIR, humiliating words
were uttered by the accused while brother of the
complainant was being dragged inside before the
arrival of the neighbours, these words could not
have been said to have been uttered in the public
view and ingredients of the offence under Section
3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act were not made out. This
Court interpreted Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act as
below:
―7. The basic ingredients of the offence under Clause (x) of sub- section (1) of Section 3 of the SC/ST Act are: (a) that there must be an ―intentional insult‖ or ―intimidation‖ with ―intend‖ to humiliate SC/ST member by a non-SC/ST member; (b) and that insult must have been done in any place within the ―Public view‖. The use of expression ―intentional insult or intimidation‖ with ―intention‖ to humiliate, makes it abundantly clear that the mens rea is an essential ingredient of the offence and it must also be established that the accused had the knowledge that the victim is the SC/ST and that the offence was committed for that reason. Merely calling a person by caste would not attract the provisions of this Act. There must be specific accusation alleged against each of the accused. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code cannot be pressed into service. Omnibus statement that all the accused persons uttered allegedly humiliating words may not be enough. This being a penal
provision has to be given a strict interpretation. If any of the ingredients is found lacking, it would not constitute the offence.......‖
9. Proposition of law thus is clear. Simply because
Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act finds mention in the
FIR by itself cannot be a ground to conclude that
prima facie an offence under the alone said Section
of SC/ST Act has been made out. Judicial scrutiny
of the documents in such like cases is permissible
to evaluate whether the material relied upon by the
prosecution revealed the existence of basic
ingredients of the offence or not. For that limited
purpose, the Court can sift and weigh the material
placed before it, before examining the question
whether on the allegations made in the FIR, prima
facie any offence under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST
act is made out.
10. In the present case, alleged occurrence took place
when the complainant went inside the cabin of the
petitioner to attend phone call to which petitioner
objected and when complainant tried to explain
why he had entered the cabin, humiliating and
offending words were used by the petitioner.
Under these circumstances, prima facie it cannot
be said that petitioner had any intention to
humiliate, insult or intimidate the complainant.
11. Learned counsel for the petitioner has pointed out
that even the Scheduled Caste certificate was
obtained by the petitioner after registration of the
FIR and at the time of alleged occurrence
petitioner was not in the know that complainant
was a SC/ST member. As per the status report
filed by respondent No. 1, the caste certificate was
placed on record on 17.7.2006 and statement of
the witnesses were recorded thereafter and the
chargesheet was filed on 30.8.2006. The incident
had taken place on 27.1.2006 and FIR was
registered on 4.7.2006 i.e. after about 5-6 months
of the incident.
12. In the FIR there is no mention of the fact that
complainant was an SC/ST member and this fact
was known to the petitioner at the time of
commission of the offence. At the time of
registration of the FIR, complaint must disclose
essential ingredients of the offence and in case a
complaint lacks or is wanting in any of the
essential ingredients, the lacuna or deficiency
cannot be filled up by obtaining additional
complaint or supplementary statement of the
witnesses and thereafter proceed to register an
FIR. If such a latitude is allowed, it would create
undue advantage as well as opportunity for
unscrupulous complainants to nail others by hook
or by crook, inspite of the fact that their initial
complaint did not make out the offence as
complained of. This would also encourage misuse
of process of law. First narration of facts in the
FIR is always an important factor for adjudicating
as to whether an accused has committed an
offence.
13. Status report filed by respondent No. 1, as pointed
out above, shows that complaint was kept pending
as ingredients of offence under Section 3(1)(x) of
the Act were not complete and after obtaining the
legal opinion and after holding enquiry and
recording of supplementary statements of the
complainant and other witnesses in which they
stated that petitioner had knowledge about the
complainant being SC/ST member, the FIR in
question was registered.
14. In Smt. Deepa Bajwa v. State & Ors. - (Supra)
under such like circumstances, it was observed:
―6. After considering the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the considered view that a complaint, on the basis of which the complainant seeks registration of an F.I.R., must disclose essential ingredients of the offence and in case a complaint lacks or is wanting in any of the essential ingredients, the lacuna or deficiency cannot be filled up by obtaining additional complaint or supplementary statement and thereafter proceed to register the F.I.R. If such a course is permitted, it would give undue latitude as well as opportunity to unscrupulous complainants to nail others by hook or by crook in spite of the fact that their initial complaint does not make out the offence complained of.
Such a course would be utter abuse of the process of law.
First version as disclosed in a complaint is always important
for adjudicating as to whether an accused has committed or not an offence.‖
15. Under these circumstances, enquiry conducted by
the Investigating Officer and the statements
subsequently recorded by him to the effect that
petitioner knew that complainant was an SC/ST
member was, probably with a view to falsely
implicate the petitioner in this case, might be on
behest of Chairman; Anil Kumar Rajpal, North
Zone Railways Employees, CTC Society. False
implication of the petitioner in other cases by the
complainant wherein closure reports have been
filed also indicates that this complaint was filed by
the complainant with a view to falsely implicate the
petitioner by subsequently alleging that petitioner
knew that he was an SC/ST member.
16. Now it is to be seen if the words uttered by the
petitioner were within ‗public view'. ‗Public view'
does not necessarily mean that there should be
large number of persons present at the time of the
incident. Even few members of the public can hear
and view the offending words being used and in
that case also the offence would be made out,
provided other ingredients of the section are
satisfied.
17. Expression ―public‖ is a poli-morphus word which
has different meanings, which is used as noun or as
an adjective. As noun, ―public‖ means a body of
people at large; the community at large, without
reference to the geographical limits of any
corporation like a city, town or country, the people;
the whole body politics, or all the citizens of the
state. In other words, the word public does not
mean all the people or most of the people nor very
many of the people of a place, but so many of them
as contradistinguishes them from a few.
Therefore, public means inhabitants of a particular
place, may be all or few or the people of the
neighbourhood. As an adjective, ‗public' would
have meaning upon the subjects to which it is
applied. SC/ST Act has been enacted with a view
to protect a weaker section of the society from
various kinds of atrocities that might be
perpetrated against SC/STs which find
enumeration in Section 3 of the SC/ST Act as
constituting an offence. Court has to keep in mind
that offence under the SC/ST Act are quite grave
and provide stringent punishment and therefore,
stronger proof is required. Court has to adopt an
interpretation which suppresses or evades the
mischief which might have been played and
advances the object of the Act. Therefore, ‗public
view' appearing in Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act has
to be interpreted to mean the presence of the
public persons, however small may be, and those
persons are independent and impartial and not
interested in any of the parties. In other words,
persons having any kind of close relationship or
association with the complainant have to be
excluded from the definition of ‗public view'.
18. In Daya Bhatnagar & Ors. v. State (supra) while
in agreement with the interpretation put on the
expression ―public view‖ by B.A. Khan, J., in the
said case on reference for interpretation of the
expression ―public view‖ appearing in Section
3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act by the Division Bench, while
hearing the petition seeking quashing of the FIR
registered under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act against
the petitioners in the said case Sh. S.K. Aggarwal,
J. reproduced the relevant portion of the views of
B.A. Khan, J., in his order which reads:
―I accordingly hold that expression within ‗public view' occurring in Section 3(1)(x) of the Act means within the view which includes hearing, knowledge or accessibility also, of a group of people of the place/locality/village as distinct from few who are not private and are as good as strangers and not linked with the complainant through any close relationship or any business, commercial or any other vested interest and who are not participating members with him in any way. If such group of people comprises anyone of these, it would not satisfy the requirement of ‗public view' within the meaning of the expression used.‖
19. In the reference public view was also further
interpreted to mean:
――Public view‖ envisages that public persons present there should be independent, impartial and not having any commercial or business
relationship, or other linkage with the complainant. It would also not include persons who have any previous enmity or motive to falsely implicate the accused persons. However, merely because a witness, who is otherwise neutral or impartial and who happens to be present at the house of the victim, by itself, cannot be disqualified.‖
20. In the present case, witnesses named in the FIR
are employees of North Zone Railways Employees,
CTC Society and were allegedly sitting in the
office. They being employees of the Society were
subordinates to the Chairperson Anil Kumar Rajpal
and therefore, can be termed as interested
witnesses. Besides, the cabin was made of glass,
though as stated it was open from the top. The fact
remains that the alleged offending/humiliating
words used by the petitioner while addressing the
complainant could not have been heard or viewed
by any of these witnesses, cabin being a closed
space. Also, the petitioner had already handed
over the keys of the Almirah etc. to Sh. U.S. Bhalla,
the branch Manager, in compliance with the
suspension order. The petitioner was under
suspension at the relevant time and as per the
attendance register, his presence was not marked
in the attendance registered for the said day.
Under these circumstances, when petitioner denies
his presence at the spot and denies the incident
having taken place, possibility of his false
implication in this case by the complainant cannot
be ruled out. The fact that complainant had
previously got registered two FIRs against the
petitioner and the parties were inimical to each
other before the registration of the FIR can also be
a reason for false implication of the petitioner in
this case.
21. Essential ingredients of Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST
Act are not made out from the narration of the
incident in the FIR and the complaint lacks
material particulars. The prosecution cannot be
allowed to fill in lacuna or deficiency by obtaining
additional complaint or supplementary statement
and thereafter proceed to register an FIR against
the petitioner. Since complaint lacks essential
ingredients to make out an offence under Section
3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act, it is a fit case for the Court to
exercise its power under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India read with Section 482 Cr.P.C.
and quash the FIR and the proceedings initiated in
consequence thereof.
22. Hence, Petition is allowed. FIR No. 266/2006 under
Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act Police Station Tilak
Marg is hereby quashed.
Attested copy of the order be sent to the Trial
Court as well as to the State.
( ARUNA SURESH ) JUDGE January 09, 2009 jk
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