Ramesh Chand Gupta & Ors. vs Union Of India & Anr.
2009 Latest Caselaw 419 Del

                "REPORTABLE"
*     HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+                   Crl.M.C. 3671/2007

                          Date of decision: February 06, 2009

#     RAMESH CHAND GUPTA & ORS.         ...... Petitioners
!             Through : Mr. Jayant Bhushan, Sr. Adv.
                               Mr. Subodh K. Pathak, Adv.
                               Mr. S.P. Tripathi, Adv.
                               Mr. Anil Dutt, Adv.

                             Versus


$     UNION OF INDIA & ANR.           ..... Respondents
^             Through : Mr. O.P. Saxena, APP
                               Mr. Anurag Kumar Aggarwal,
                               Adv.

%
      CORAM:
      HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ARUNA SURESH

     (1) Whether reporters of local paper may be
         allowed to see the judgment?

     (2) To be referred to the reporter or not?             Yes

     (3) Whether the judgment should be reported
         in the Digest ?                                    Yes

                          JUDGMENT

ARUNA SURESH, J.

1. This petition under Section 482 of Criminal

Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as Cr.P.C.)

read with Article 226 of the Constitution of India

has been filed by the petitioners seeking quashing

of FIR No. 621/2005 registered at Police Station

Shahdara on 20.12.2005 for offences under

Sections 420/465/468/471/34/120B Indian Penal

Code (hereinafter referred to as ‗IPC') as well as

order of the trial court dated 21.7.2007 whereby he

took cognizance of the said offences and

summoned the petitioners as accused persons.

2. Jan Sudhar Smiti (hereinafter referred to society) is

a registered society involved in the management,

operation and maintenance of Jan Suvidha

Complexes like providing toilets and lavatories to

the slums and Jhuggi Jhopries cluster colonies.

Petitioner No. 1 is the President and petitioner

Nos. 2 and 3 are the members of the governing

body. Complainant was erstwhile secretary of the

society and had filed a complaint in the court of

learned ACMM on 8.12.2005 which culminated into

registration of the impugned FIR No. 621/2005 at

Police Station Shahdara.

3. Office bearers and members of the society had

various internal problems relating to governance of

the society and management of funds of the society

deposited in the bank and these disputes arose

during the period when petitioner No. 1 Ramesh

Chand Gupta and complainant Subhash Chand

Roongta were the President and the Secretary of

the Society. On 8.3.1996 the executive body held

a meeting and unanimously resolved to enroll the

desirous persons as members of the society for

doing social work and for that purpose petitioner

No. 1 was given absolute discretionary authority to

enroll new members. The minutes of the said

meeting were also signed by the complainant. A

meeting was held on 20.5.1996 in which seven new

members were enrolled as members and in the

same meeting Smt. Saroj Sharma and S. Panna Lal,

the new inducted members, were unanimously

nominated as acting Vice President and acting

Secretary respectively. This meeting was also

attended and signed by the complainant. The said

minutes were approved by the governing body on

15.6.1996. On 26.7.1996, in another meeting of

the governing body three new members were

admitted in the presence of the complainant. Since

the treasurer of the society had resigned in the

meeting held on 28.9.1996, the executive body

unanimously authorised, later on ratified the

Secretary and President to operate the bank

account till January 2000. The resolution was

ratified in the meeting dated 8.10.1996.

Complainant also filed an affidavit on 26.7.2000

indicating that there was no dispute amongst the

members of the society. An amount of Rs.

22,65,000/- was withdrawn by the complainant in

between August 2000 to 3.10.2000. This became

bone of contention and disputes arose between the

parties.

4. On 4.10.2000 petitioner No. 1 filed a criminal

complaint against the complainant. Petitioner No.

1 also filed a civil suit for declaration and

injunction being suit No. 118/2001 tilted as

―Ramesh Chand Gupta & Anr. v. Subhash Chand

Roongta & Ors.‖ on 29.3.2001 along with an

application under order 39 rules 1 and 2 CPC.

Another suit was filed by the society on 15.2.2002

seeking declaration and permanent injunction

being suit No. 380/2002 (new No. 178/03/02) titled

as ―Delhi Jan Sudhar Samiti v. Ramesh Chander

Gupta & Ors.‖ before this Court. Suit no. 380/2002

was consolidated with suit 118/2001 by virtue of an

order passed by this Court on 17.2.2003.

5. Justice Avadh Bihari (retired judge of this Court)

was appointed as Court Officer by the High Court

vide its order dated 12.3.2003 with the consent of

the parties for finalisation of membership of the

society and for conducting the elections. The court

officer/local commissioner submitted its report

dated 10.1.2004 and conducted elections of the

governing body of the society on 31.1.2004 and

accordingly submitted the results to which

objections were filed by the society through the

complainant. The objections were dismissed by

the learned ADJ vide his order dated 10.12.2004

and the results of the elections were accordingly

declared by the learned ADJ.

6. The society thereafter filed a civil miscellaneous

main No. 106/2005 titled as ―Delhi Jan Sudhar

Samiti v. Ramesh Chand Gupta & Ors‖ on

15.1.2005 against the said order of the learned

ADJ. However, the said civil miscellaneous main

was dismissed by this Court on 3.2.2005.

Aggrieved by the said order of this Court, society

filed an SLP in the Supreme Court which was

dismissed on 18.3.2005. Vide order dated

2..7.2005 the learned ADJ directed the complainant

to hand over the charge, management,

maintenance and operation of seven complexes of

the society to Ramesh Chand Gupta, petitioner

No.1. Complainant handed over the possession of

eight sites/complexes to petitioner No.1 on

5.3.2006 in compliance of the order dated

2.7.2005. This order was also challenged by the

complainant in this Court which was dismissed by

this Court on 1.3.2006.

7. Suit No. 380/2002 filed by the society through the

complainant was dismissed having become

infructuous due to appointment of new governing

body by the learned ADJ on 20.1.2007.

Complainant filed a revision petition against the

said order which was also dismissed by this court

being devoid of merits vide its order dated

26.4.2007. Against the said order of this Court an

SLP was filed in the Supreme Court which was also

dismissed on 27.7.2007. The civil litigation was

initiated and pursued by the complainant in the

name of the society against the members of the

society including the petitioners.

8. During the pendency of the civil litigation

complainant filed a criminal complaint titled as

―Subhash Roongta v. Ramesh Chand Gupta & Ors‖

on 8.12.2005 against the petitioners for having

committed offences under Sections

420/464/465/467/468/471/120B IPC. On the orders

of the learned MM dated 16.12.2005 FIR No.

621/2005 was registered on 20.12.2005. After

investigation of the case chargesheet has been filed

in the Court.

9. Allegations against the petitioner in the FIR are

that minutes of various meetings of the society

were recorded in the minute book by the

complainant in his own writing and the minutes of

meetings dated 21.10.1995, 20.5.1996, 26.7.1996

and 8.10.1996 have been tampered with by the

petitioners by filling the portion of the minutes in

between the place where he finished writing and

where he had put his signatures by inserting

certain lines. No such proceedings had taken place

nor petitioner No. 1 was so authorised by the

complainant to add to the minutes to fabricate

proceedings. Petitioner No. 1 had produced these

documents when the elections were to be

conducted by Justice Avadh Bihari (retired) and

used these forged minutes of the meeting to

appoint new members whose names were

subsequently added unlawfully and took over the

control of the society. This was done in conspiracy

with the new members, appointed after elections

were conducted by Justice Avadh Bihari (retired)

appointed officer by the Court.

10. Earlier, in 1996, petitioner had stated that minute

book was misplaced. Complainant, subsequently

started maintaining the minute book by himself

since 1997. Later on when the elections were

conducted, during the litigations between the

parties since 2000, when elections were conducted

by the order of the court, the minute book was

suddenly produced by petitioner No. 1 and was

claimed to be genuine. It is alleged that the

petitioners have tampered with the minute book

and also with the records kept with the registrar of

societies. The tampering has been done by adding

few lines and names of the new members in the

space between the last line of the minutes and the

place where signatures of the complainant appear.

The new members so appointed had also put their

signatures subsequently beneath the signatures of

the complainant. The petitioners and the other

accused persons in conspiracy with each other

have used the forged minute book as genuine and

succeeded in illegal induction of new members.

Since the offences of forgery and cheating have

been committed in connivance with each other, to

cause wrongful loss to the complainant and

wrongful gain to themselves, petitioner and other

accused persons have committed offences under

Sections 420/464/465/467/468/471/120B IPC.

11. Mr. Jayant Bhushan, learned senior counsel for the

petitioners, has made following submissions:

(a) In the documents alleged to be forged, the

complainant admitted that there were gaps

between the written matter and his signatures

and his handwriting has been admitted by the

civil court and the court had passed orders on

the same.

(b) The allegation that minute book was

misplaced and thereafter he started to keep

minute book with himself raised by the

complainant are false as in earlier civil

litigations no minute book was reported as

misplaced and neither did complainant placed

minute book on record which is stated to have

been maintained by him.

(c) Factum of prior civil litigations has not been

disclosed in the FIR and disputes between the

parties are related to the functioning and

elections in the society and are purely of civil

nature.

(d) The charge sheet was filed and the same does

not constitute or make out any offence

committed by petitioners against complainant

as alleged in the FIR. The FIR and

subsequent chargesheet are without collateral

evidence for supporting allegations against

the petitioners and upon the evidence

gathered during investigation the prosecution

had himself submitted that there is no

evidence per se against the accused.

(e) The civil proceedings were already initiated

by complainant against the petitioners and

during the course of these litigations the

present FIR was registered on the same crux

of the disputes contained in the civil

litigations thus attracting sections 40 to 42 of

the Indian Evidence Act (hereinafter referred

to as ‗Act').

(f) The order of issue of summons against the

petitioners is passed by the learned

Metropolitan Magistrate without application

of mind and perusal of facts. The impugned

order suffers from perversity, illegality and

infirmity, as the factum that civil disputes

inter-se the parties were decided against the

complainant and upheld till the Supreme

Court, is not considered at all.

12. It is also argued by the learned senior counsel for

the petitioners that FIR has been used as a tool by

the complainant for his ulterior motive and to

hinder the smooth functioning of the society. The

FIR does not disclose any offence under Sections

420/469 IPC as neither an act of delivery of

property, or inducement for the benefit by

conversion into valuable security by an act of

deceit, or fraud to induce any other person, have

been alleged in the FIR. It is also emphasised that

offence under Section 465 of the IPC are not made

out against the petitioners in the FIR. It is urged

by learned senior counsel for the petitioners that,

FIR has been lodged because of retribution and

absurd and improbable allegations have been

levelled against the petitioners therein.

13. Mr. Anurag Kumar Aggarwal, learned counsel for

the complainant has argued that civil litigation has

no bearing on the criminal litigation i.e. the FIR in

question as, by virtue of Sections 40, 41 and 42 of

the Act, the judgments passed in the civil cases

inter se the parties have no relevancy. Therefore,

judgments in the civil suits cannot be taken into

consideration by the Court as relevant fact for

deciding the present petition on merits.

14. The dispute was amongst the members of the

society and the complainant, who has since

resigned from the membership of the society,

because of differences among themselves

regarding the mannerism in which the

management of the society and the society funds

were handled by petitioner No. 1. Complainant has

admitted that he had left blank space before

placing his signature on the minute book dated

20.5.1996 and 26.7.1996. Petitioner No. 1 Ramesh

Chand Gupta has not disputed that the names of

the members were inserted by him in the minutes

book in his own hand. Why the space was left in

between the last line written by the complainant

and his signatures is a mystery and probably this

mystery could not be solved; that the Investigating

Officer filed a closure report before the learned

MM.

15. In the meeting held on 8.3.1996, duly attended by

accused petitioner No. 1 Ramesh Chand Gupta and

complainant Subhash Roongta, it was resolved to

induct new members in the society and President

was authorised to enroll new members as some

social workers wanted to join the society. Minutes

dated 8.3.1996 were unanimously approved by the

governing body in its meeting dated 20.5.1996.

Petitioner No. 1 happened to be the President of

the Society at the relevant time. It was in the

meeting dated 20.5.1996 that seven new members

were enrolled; two of them were made acting vice

president and acting secretary respectively. These

minutes were signed by the complainant on the

same day and below his signatures the other

members who had attended the meeting including

the new enrolled members signed the minutes. It

is pertinent that in the meeting on 15.6.1996,

minutes of meeting held on 20.5.1996 were

approved. This meeting was also attended by the

complainant, who signed the same, besides other

members. Thus, prima facie it is clear that

complainant was in the know of the proceedings

conducted in the meetings held on 20.5.1996 and

15.6.1996 but, he never took any objection to the

enrollment of seven members named in the

meeting dated 20.5.1996. Complainant, as per his

own case, had written the minutes and has only

disputed the entry of names of seven persons,

allegedly made subsequently by the petitioner. Out

of these seven members, three were present in the

meeting dated 15.6.1996. In the minutes dated

26.7.1996 the names of three newly enrolled

members find mention below the recorded

proceedings and above the words ―The General

body meeting will be held on 28-09-96‖. Below this

seven members including the complainant and

petitioner No. 1 had appended their signatures

against their names.

16. Under these circumstances, it is to be seen if prima

facie an offence under Section 420 IPC is made out

against the petiitoners. Section 415 IPC defines

cheating in the following words:

―415. Cheating.--Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to ―cheat‖.‖

17. The gravamen of grievance of the complainant is

that new members were appointed in the society

illegally by tampering with the minute book

records by the accused/petitioners and the

complainant was against the induction of new

members in the society. Hence, essentially it is a

dispute which involves induction of new members

without proper procedure and without obtaining

sanction of other members, specially, when

complainant was admittedly secretary of the

society at the relevant time. Might be that

complainant was against enrollment of ten new

members in the society, the fact remains he had

signed the minutes of the governing body without

recording his objection to the enrollment of new

members when a decision was taken that President

was empowered to enroll new members. Petitioner

No. 1, who was the president at the relevant time,

accordingly enrolled ten members. It is not in

dispute that these names were squeezed in

between the space left by the complainant while

signing the minutes.

18. As discussed above, the minutes were subsequently

approved in the second meeting which were also

attended by the complainant and the names of the

newly enrolled members were in his knowledge

when he approved the minutes of the meeting

dated 20.5.1996, 15.6.1996 and 26.7.1996. He

never raised any objection to the enrollment of the

new members by the President in any of these

meetings, duly attended by him. Therefore, prima

facie the basic ingredient of cheating in this case is

missing. There is no evidence on the record to

suggest that petitioners had fraudulently enrolled

ten new members in the society with a view to

deceive, or dishonestly induce complainant to sign

the minutes, which, he would not have done, if he

was not so deceived and the said act of omission

was likely to cause any damage or harm to him in

body, mind, reputation or property. There is no

dishonest concealment of facts by the petitioners

from the complainant. Petitioner No. 1 prima facie

enrolled ten members in view of the powers vested

in him by the governing body in the meeting of the

society held on 8.3.1996, bonafidely.

19. For the similar reasons, it cannot be said that

petitioners fabricated and forged the minutes dated

20.5.1996 and 26.7.199 with intent to use the said

forged and fabricated minutes for purposes of

cheating the complainant i.e. to cause wrongful

loss to the complainant and wrongful gain to

themselves. Hence prima facie, ingredients of an

offence of cheating punishable under Section 420

IPC are not made out on the record.

20. Section 471 of IPC is attracted only when a person

fraudulently or dishonestly uses as genuine, any

document which, he knows, or has reason to

believe that it is forged. As discussed above, prima

facie there is nothing to indicate that minutes of

the meeting were forged and fabricated by

subsequently entering the names of ten members

as newly enrolled members. It cannot be said that

the minutes were fraudulently used as genuine by

the petitioners for the simple reason that

complainant was present in the meetings whereby

the minutes recorded in the relevant meetings

dated 8.3.1996 and 20.5.1996 were approved in his

presence and under his signatures. Complainant,

therefore, is deemed to have acknowledged the

newly enrolled members from the date of their

enrollment since the year 1996. The present

complaint was filed by him on 8.12.2005; after

about nine years of enrollment of the new members

or the alleged commission of forgery and

fabrication in the minutes by the petitioners,

specially petitioner No. 1. It would not be out of

place to mention that civil litigation inter se the

parties had started somewhere in the year 2001

and complainant had been raising the same

defences, as are his allegations in the FIR in all the

civil suits.

21. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal - 1992 SC

604 guidelines were laid down for the High Court

to be followed for quashing of FIR contained in

para 105 of the judgment, which is as follows:

―105. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this court in a series of

decisions relating to the exercise of the extra-ordinary power under Article 226 of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined any sufficiently channelized and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised:

1. Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same

do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

4. Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

5. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

7. Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.‖

22. The criminal proceedings in the present case have

been initiated maliciously and are being prosecuted

by the complainant malafidely with an ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused

persons with a view to settle his score with them

due to private and personal grudge. Complaint

therefore does not disclose any offence allegedly

committed by the petitioners punishable under

Section 471 IPC.

23. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has

emphasised that the civil suits have been finally

decided inter se the parties upto the Supreme

Court and the FIR was lodged after first round of

civil litigation was complete and second round of

litigation was also complete before the impugned

order dated 21.7.2007 was passed by the learned

trial court and, therefore, he urged that the trial

court should have taken into consideration the fact

that the dispute inter se the parties being common

in civil suit as well as in the criminal case have

been settled by the civil court in favour of the

petitioners. There was no substance in taking

cognizance of the offences against the petitioners

and thereby summoning them to face the trial.

24. Before deliberating on these arguments, I feel the

necessity to discuss relevancy of judgments and

their admissibility in criminal proceedings in the

light of provisions contained in Sections 40 to 43 of

the Act.

25. Section 40 of the Act reads as follows:

―40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.--The existence of any judgment, order or decree which by law prevents any courts from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial is a relevant fact when the question is whether such Court ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial.‖

26. Provisions of section 40 only exclude judgments as

pieces of conclusive evidence. They do not bar the

admission of judgments as proof of the fact of

litigation, or its results and effects upon the

parties, which make a certain course of conduct

probable or improbable on the part of the parties.

27. In a criminal trial it is for the Court to determine

the question of guilt of the accused and it must do

this upon the evidence before it and not basing its

conclusion upon judgments of civil courts. The law

of evidence does not make a judgment or decre as

admissible as a matter of course. The judgment is

generally admissible to show its date and

consequential results, specially when the parties,

who had been litigating in the civil suit are the

same, who are complainant and the accused

persons in a criminal trial.

28. However, a judgment of a civil court, though not

final, is relevant in a criminal case as an evidence

under Section 43 of the Act.

29. Sections 41 and 42 of the Act have no relevance to

the facts and circumstances of the present case as

they relate to relevancy of judgments given in the

exercise of probate, matrimonial, admiralty or

insolvency jurisdiction and judgments, orders of

decrees other than those mentioned in Section 41

of Act, if they relate to matter of a public nature

relevant to the enquiry.

30. Section 43 of the Act reads as follows:

―43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when relevant.--Judgments, orders or decrees, other than those mention in sections 40, 41 and 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provisions of this Act.‖

31. Bare reading of this Section indicates that

judgments, orders or decrees excluded by Sections

40, 41 and 42 of the Act as irrelevant unless the

existence of such judgment, order or decree is a

fact in issue, or is relevant under some other

provisions of this Act.

32. Relevancy of a previous judgment as provided

under Sections 40 to 43 of Act was interpreted by

Supreme Court in K.G. Premshankar v.

Inspector of Police and Anr. - AIR 2002 SC

3372. Learned counsel for the complainant has

heavily relied upon this judgment to insist that the

judgments passed in the civil suits inter se the

parties are not admissible in the criminal trial

though he admitted that judgments in the civil suits

are relevant for the purposes of the criminal trial.

33. In the said case it was observed:

―30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is - (1) the previous judgment which is final can be relied upon as provided under Section 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same parties, principle of res-judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 Cr.P.C. makes provision that once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the criminal caes and the civil proceedings are for the same cause, judgment of the civil Court would be relevant if conditions of any of the Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be relevant if conditions of any of the Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.

31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceedings, if relevant, as provided under

Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, Court has to decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by ‗A' on ‗B's property, ‗B' filed a suit for declaration of its title and to recover possession from ‗A' and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by ‗B' against ‗A' for trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would be relevant and Court may hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as possession of ‗B' over the property. In such case, ‗A' may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above makes the position clear. Hence, in each and every case, first question which would require consideration is--whether judgment, order or decree is relevant?, if relevant - its effect.

It may be relevant for a limited purpose. Such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon facts of each case.‖

34. Thus, careful reading of the provisions contained in

Act and the law as laid down in K.G.

Premshankar (supra) it emerges that there is no

compulsion on this Court to consider the

judgments of the civil court as binding on the

criminal matter inter-se the parties though final

civil judgment might be relevant as evidence for

the purposes of criminal case.

35. The crux of dispute which existed and was the bone

of contention decided in the civil suits was in

regard to elections as well as appointment of new

members. This dispute has been resurfaced by the

complainant in the form of impugned FIR. The

police in this case did conduct investigation with a

hope to find some incriminating evidence against

the petitioners but, failed to arrest the petitioners

in the absence of concrete evidence.

36. Complainant seemed to be heavily stuck or became

eccentric to the elections as well as to the present

constitution of the governing body of the society.

He did not participate in the election.

37. Since complainant had some disputes in

governance, he filed the civil suit as well as

objections to the finalisation of the list of members

and to the manipulated records of minutes book by

way of enrollment of new members, he had filed

civil suit as well as objections to the report of the

Local Commissioner appointed by this Court for

finalisation of list of members and for holding

elections and after failing in the civil court he filed

the complaint against the petitioners. The findings

of the civil court regarding filling in of the names of

the newly members in the space in between the

proceedings and the signatures of the complainant,

under the circumstances of this case, do become

relevant. As pointed out above petitioner No. 1 has

not disputed that he was the scribe of the names of

the newly enrolled members in the said space

appearing in the minutes of the meeting.

38. Prima facie there is no evidence to indicate that

complainant had to suffer wrongful loss at the

hands of the petitioners. Similarly there is no

circumstance to suggest that petitioners, in the

process, were successful in unlawful gain to

themselves.

39. True, that powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.

should be exercised by the Court with great care

and circumspection. However, in this case it is

manifest that complainant filed the complaint on

account of personal rancour, predilections and

prejudices. Chagrined and frustrated litigant

should not be permitted by the Court to give vent

to his frustration by invoking jurisdiction of a

criminal court in the manner in which the

complainant has done in this case. Invoking

jurisdiction of a criminal court under the

circumstances is misuse of process of law.

40. Under these circumstances, from the evidence as

placed on record, the contents of the FIR, the

investigation conducted by the Investigating

Officer and the allegations in the complaint, it is

clear that disputes are essentially of civil in nature

which have been given a cloak of criminal offence.

I find it a fit case and to secure the ends of justice

that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C., the impugned FIR and the proceedings

conducted therein are quashed. Hence, petition is

allowed.

41. FIR No. 621/2005 under Sections

420/465/468/471/34 read with Section 120 B IPC,

Police Station Shahdara and consequent

summoning order dated 21.7.2007 are hereby

quashed.

42. Attested copy of the order be sent to the trial court

as well as to the State.

(ARUNA SURESH) JUDGE February 06, 2009 jk