Shri Homi Rajvansh vs Director Of Cbi & Ors.
2009 Latest Caselaw 410 Del

                   "REPORTABLE"
*            HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI

+            Writ Petition (Crl.) No.2648/2006

                                  Reserved on : 10.11.2008
                          Pronounced on : February 06, 2009

#     SHRI HOMI RAJVANSH                   ..... PETITIONER

!            Through : Mr. Aman Lekhi, Sr. Advocate
                          Mr. Jaspreet S. Rai,Adv.
                          Mr. Rakesh Kumar,Adv.

                             Versus

$     DIRECTOR OF C.B.I. & ORS.           .....RESPONDENTS

^            Through : Mr. Harish Gulati and Mr. Anindya
                          Malhotra, Advs. for CBI
                          Mr. G.B. Tulsiani,Adv. for R2 & R4
%

      CORAM:
      HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE ARUNA SURESH

     (1) Whether reporters of local paper may be
         allowed to see the judgment?

     (2) To be referred to the reporter or not?           Yes

     (3) Whether the judgment should be reported
         in the Digest ?                                  Yes


                          JUDGMENT

ARUNA SURESH, J.

1. Petitioner has filed the present writ petition under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with

Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

(hereinafter referred as „Cr.P.C.‟) seeking

directions to be issued to the Central Bureau of

Investigation (hereinafter referred to as „CBI‟) not

to continue with the investigation in RC No.

7/E/2006/CBI/EOW/MUM registered at Bombay on

a complaint received by it from National

Agricultural Coop. Marketing Federation of India

(hereinafter referred to as „NAFED‟) as it is

incompetent to hold the investigation of the case as

no part of offence to which the petitioner is

accused, had taken place within the jurisdiction of

Bombay.

2. Petitioner, an IRS officer, had joined NAFED as

Additional Marketing Director. As part of

diversification, NAFED entered into Public Private

Partnership/Tie up business with private

entrepreneurs in procuring domestic marketing

and international trade of agricultural and non-

agricultural items from 2003-2004 onwards. Under

this programme, NAFED entered into a tie up

business with accused M/s. Swarup Group of

Industries (hereinafter referred as „SGI‟), Crystal

Plaza, New Link Road, Andheri (West), Mumbai -

400053. SGI was extended facility for carrying out

export business of iron ore.

3. On 26.3.2004, NAFED received a proposal from

SGI signed by its proprietor and authorised

signatory, accused G.S. Srivastava and accordingly

a Memorandum of Understanding (hereinafter

referred as „MOU‟), containing the terms and

conditions of the Agreement, was executed

between the two. NAFED released substantial

amount to SGI on four different dates for the

purposes of export of iron ore. Another MOU dated

24.04.2004 was executed between NAFED and SGI

by virtue of signatures made thereon by the

petitioner as Divisional Head of Finance and

Accounts, even before the letter dated 28.04.2004

was received from SGI informing NAFED therein

that another contract with the same buyer for

export of iron ore was entered into by them and

sought extension of the earlier MOU on the existing

terms and conditions. Thereafter NAFED released

funds on different dates in favour of the SGI.

However, SGI failed to make payments against the

invoices as detailed in the complaint. SGI is

alleged to have misappropriated the funds released

by NAFED for purposes other than that for which

they were advanced. NAFED suffered a wrongful

loss to the tune of Rs. 149.50 Crores

approximately.

4. Consequently, NAFED sent a complaint dated

21.09.2006 through Shri M.V. Haridas, Manager

(Personal & Vigilance) to Deputy Inspector

General, CBI, Economic Offences Wing, Kitab

Mahal, Mumbai. This complaint is the basis of the

impugned FIR No. RCBE12006E0007 dated

21.09.2006. Petitioner has been named in the FIR

for having conspired with SGI and its proprietor

G.S. Srivastava, for having released substantial

funds to SGI without ensuring the fulfillment of the

terms and conditions of the MOU, which he signed

without even having received any letter from SGI.

The funds so released were purportedly utilized by

SGI for other purposes other than export of iron

ore. Instead of transferring the LCs in favour of

NAFED, SGI did not even remit the proceeds to

NAFED who had rendered the financial assistance

to them and this according to NAFED amounted to

cheating.

5. In this writ petition, petitioner has made the

following prayer:

a. „Declare that investigation by CBI into RC

No. 7/E/2006/CBI/EOW/MUM is in

complete abuse of the process of law and is

wholly vitiated by malafides the dominant

purpose behind its registration being

harassment and humiliation of the

Petitioner the said RC, on its very face,

failing to disclose the ingredients of the

offence of which the Petitioner is accused,

being deliberately filed at the place

incompetent to entertain it and being dealt

with by the CBI in total disregard of its

own manual as governs the exercise of its

functions; and consequently.‟

b. „Direct respondent No. 1 to ensure further

abuse of the legal process is not continued

and prohibit proceeding under RC No.

7/E/2006/CBI/EOW/MUM registered by

Respondent No. 1.‟

6. In short, petitioner has sought transfer of the

investigation of the case to Delhi as according

to him NAFED has its office at Delhi.

Petitioner was employed in NAFED at Delhi

and the money was released in favour of SGI

at Delhi.

7. Mr. Aman Lekhi, learned senior counsel for

the petitioner has submitted that CBI at

Bombay had no jurisdiction to register an FIR

on the complaint of the NAFED, nor had any

power to investigate the case as no offence

took place within the territorial jurisdiction of

CBI, Bombay.

8. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel

for the petitioner that filing of the complaint

by NAFED at Bombay and consequent

registration of the case at Bombay has been

done with malafide intentions, with a view to

cause harassment to the petitioner.

9. It is further argued that the Economic

Offences Wing is part of the Special Crime

Division for the CBI and works under the over

all direction and supervision of the Director.

He has to be informed of all the matters and

his advise and instructions have to be

obtained for offences concerning business

frauds, frauds of the like nature exceeding

Rs. 1 Crore in particular have to be referred

to him and this procedure has not been

adopted by the CBI in this case and the FIR

has been registered by the CBI contrary to the

procedure prescribed in the CBI manual.

10. It is further argued that the release of funds

by NAFED were between April 2004 and

December 2005 i.e. on 50 different occasions

indicating that NAFED was consciously acting

upon the contract and no offence of cheating

is made out against the petitioner on the basis

of the facts and accusations narrated in the

FIR. It is urged that the complaint was

originated from New Delhi but it was

entertained by CBI at Mumbai where no part

of the process originating with the application

in culminating the sanction took place at

Mumbai and in fact, the situs of the process

was Delhi not Mumbai and therefore the

choice of Mumbai indeed was mischievous

and strange especially when the complainant

has its registered office at Delhi. The

transactions were carried out at Delhi and the

office of CBI is also at Delhi which is

competent to entertain the complaint.

11. It is emphasised that NAFED has its

registered office at Delhi. The claim of SGI

for funds was received and processed at Delhi

and the funds as narrated in the FIR were also

released in Delhi and the alleged deception

mentioned in the FIR was practiced upon

NAFED at Delhi and no part of the transaction

entered into with SGI took place at Mumbai.

12. It is also submitted that investigation of the

case involved scrutiny of the process by which

funds were released and the investigation

would involve many senior officers of NAFED

constituted at Delhi and all expenses, losses

and damages allegedly suffered by NAFED as

per the auditors were to be accounted at

Delhi. Under the circumstances, the

investigation of allegations in the complaint,

therefore could appropriately and

conveniently to be conducted at Delhi.

13. It is argued that mere default in payment by

SGI would not constitute the offence of

cheating in the absence of dishonest intention

of cheating causing wrongful loss to the

NAFED at the inception of the contract.

14. To support his submissions, learned counsel

for the petitioner has placed reliance on S.N.

Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari and Ors.

1970 (1) SCC 653, Navinchandra N.

Majithia v. State of Maharashtra & Ors.

(2000) 7 SCC 640, Niraj Trivedi v. State of

Bihar and Ors. (Writ Petition (Crl.) No.

415/2004) and Ishar Das v. Emperor 8

Crl.L.J. 75 and State v. Chuni Lal Begani

AIR 1965 Patna 103

15. Mr. Harish Gulati, learned counsel for CBI has

submitted that CBI had jurisdiction to

entertain the complaint received by it from

NAFED at Bombay, register the FIR and

investigate the matter in view of provisions

contained in Section 179 of the Cr.P.C. as a

part of offence was committed at Bombay.

SGI, the principal accused and its proprietor

G.S. Srivastava are carrying on their business

through Andheri (West), Mumbai and the

funds were released by NAFED in favour of

SGI through Banks located at Noida and Delhi

and transferred to other locations, majority of

it to Mumbai, SGI and its proprietor G.S.

Srivastava in conspiracy with the petitioner

invested the amounts so released by NAFED

and received by SGI at Mumbai and therefore,

registration of FIR at Bombay under Section

154 read with Section 179 Cr.P.C. cannot be

labeled as violative of Article 21 of the

Constitution.

16. It is further submitted that after registration

of the case at Bombay, petitioner had filed

anticipatory bail application before Hon‟ble

Special Judge, CBI on 14.11.2006 which was

granted to him vide order dated 4.1.2007 on

the basis of parity with the other accused G.S.

Srivastava who was granted partial relief on

4.10.2006. It is also submitted that accused

G.S. Srivastava had filed a writ petition before

the Hon‟ble High Court of Mumbai on

16.10.2006 for quashing of the FIR which was

dismissed on 19.12.2006, against which G.S.

Srivastava filed special leave petition before

Hon‟ble Supreme Court of India for quashing

of the FIR which has since been dismissed on

26.11.2007. However, while issuing an ex-

parte order dated 20.04.2007, the Supreme

Court had stayed the investigation and further

proceedings of the case which now stands

vacated.

17. Mr. G.B. Tulsiani, learned counsel for

respondent No. 2, while adopting contentions

of the learned counsel for CBI further argued

that signing of MOU dated 24.03.2004 by the

petitioner without obtaining approval of the

competent authority in NAFED before receipt

of letter dated 26.03.2004 from SGI clearly

indicate the criminal intent of the principal

accused SGI in conspiracy with the petitioner

in facilitating the commission of an economic

crime to the wrongful loss of NAFED to crores

of rupees.

18. It is further argued that transactions worth

crores of rupees finalized by the petitioner in

undue haste for facilitating the crime, without

even having received the necessary

documents, on the basis of MOU dated

24.04.2004 reflect on the conduct of the

petitioner, clearly indicating his conspiring

with the other accused persons in cheating

with a view to cause wrongful gain to SGI and

therefore, the complaint against the petitioner

was made bona fidely with no malice against

him. It is prayed that under these

circumstances, the petition deserves

dismissal.

19. Chapter XIII of the Cr.P.C. speaks of

jurisdiction of the criminal courts in inquiries

and trials. By virtue of Section 177, every

offence has to be inquired into and tried by a

court within whose local jurisdiction it was

committed. Section 178 envisages a position

where it is uncertain in which of several local

areas an offence was committed or, where an

offence is committed partly in one local area

and partly in another or, where an offence is a

continuing one, and continues to be

committed in more local areas than one or,

where it consists of several acts done in

different local areas, it may be inquired into

or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over

any of such local areas. Section 179 speaks of

a situation where an act is done at one place

and consequence ensues at the other place.

In such eventuality, an offence can be

inquired into or tried by the Court within

whose local jurisdiction such thing has been

done or such consequence has ensued.

20. There is no dispute that offence under Section

420 IPC in the present case would be

governed by Section 179 Cr.P.C. Learned

counsel for the petitioner has submitted that

neither deception nor consequence thereof

occurred in Mumbai and that creation of

artificial jurisdiction at Mumbai would not

justify the registration of RC by the CBI at

Mumbai. Reference is made to 2008 (2) JCC

1344 titled Naresh Kavarchand Khatri v.

State of Gujarat & Anr.

21. Admittedly, the principal accused SGI and its

proprietor G.S. Srivastava; accused No. 3 are

based at Mumbai and the said company is

carrying on its business at Mumbai.

Therefore the money which was disbursed to

SGI in terms of MOU executed between the

parties was, though released from Delhi and

Noida was received by SGI and G.S.

Srivastava at Bombay. There are allegations

that SGI diverted and misappropriated the

payment released by NAFED by investing in

the business of export, purchase of movable

assets and immovable properties and also in

sponsoring and financing the events like Film

Fare Awards and Femina Miss India contest

at Mumbai.

22. M/s. P.S. Shetty & Co., Chartered Accounts,

Mumbai were alleged to have prepared a

balance sheet of SGI for the year ending

31.03.2001, 31.03.2002, 31.03.2003 and

provisional balance sheet upto the year

31.12.2003 submitted by SGI to NAFED

seeking disbursement of second instalment of

Rs. 3.21.41,000/- as a soft loan for

procurement and other expenses of iron-ore

to be exported on Tie-up basis. These audited

reports are found to be forged and fabricated

documents as M/s. P.S. Shetty & Co.,

Chartered Accounts, Mumbai, during the

investigation has denied having audited the

accounts of SGI and prepared the said

balance sheet. Thus intention of cheating

NAFED of a huge amount by SGI is apparent

from the FIR and other documents and

investigation so far conducted by the CBI.

Allegations against the petitioner are that he

conspired with SGI for causing wrongful loss

to NAFED, in other words, wrongful gain to

SGI.

23. This court in exercise of its power under

Article 226 of the Constitution of India read

with Section 482 Cr.P.C. though can issue an

appropriate writ so as to restrain the police or

any other investigating agency from

exercising its authority in a manner

unwarranted by law. However, the court has

to exercise this power sparingly and should

not generally interfere in the investigation of

the case unless it is of the view that

interference is warranted because of police

officer conducting investigation in a malafide

manner.

24. In S.N. Sharma's case (supra), the Supreme

Court held:

"11. ................ It appears to us that, though the Code of Criminal Procedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate all cases where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can always seek a remedy by invoking the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Court could be convinced that the power of investigation has been exercised by a police officer mala fide, the High Court can always issue a writ of mandamus restraining the police officer from misusing his legal officer. The fact that the Code does not contain any other provision giving power to a Magistrate to stop investigation by the police cannot be a ground for holding that such a power must be read in Section 159 of the Code."

25. There is no dispute that this Court has the power

to issue a writ of mandamus restraining the

police officer if it is convinced that the power of

investigation has been exercised by the

investigating agency in a malafide manner.

However the issue before the Supreme Court in

the said case was whether a Magistrate had the

power to direct the police to stay the

investigation and decide to hold an enquiry

himself. Therefore, provisions of Section 156

and 159 of Cr.P.C. were discussed and

interpreted with.

26. In Navin Chandra's case (supra), it was

observed that High Court will have

jurisdiction if any part of cause of action

arises within its territorial jurisdiction even

though the seat of Government or authority or

residence of persona against whom direction

order or writ is sought to be issued is not

within the said territory. In the said case, the

Bombay High Court had dismissed the writ

petition filed by the petitioner before it

seeking quashing of criminal complaint filed

at Shillong on the ground that the complaint

was false and had been filed with the malafide

intention of causing harassment and putting

pressure on the petitioner to reverse the

transaction relating to transfer of company

shares, which had entirely taken place at

Mumbai holding that the Bombay High Court

had no jurisdiction to quash the complaint

filed at Shillong. Under these circumstances,

it was observed that since a part of cause of

action arose in Bombay, Bombay High Court

had the jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders

including transfer of the complaint for

investigation from Shillong to Bombay. In the

present case, it is not disputed that a part of

offence did take place at Delhi.

27. In Niraj Trivedi's case (supra), while

ordering the transfer of investigation of FIR

registered at Police Station Digha, Patna,

Bihar, this Court had taken into consideration

the fact that no part of cause of action arose

at Patna and Patna Police had no jurisdiction

to investigate the matter.

28. Learned counsel for the petitioner has

emphasised that since the offence of cheating

has been committed in Delhi, it can be

enquired into and tried by a Court at Delhi

only. However, I find no force in these

submissions of the learned counsel for the

petitioner. Since NAFED has its principal

office at Delhi some part of offence did take

place at Delhi, the jurisdiction of the courts at

Delhi is not completely ruled out. At the same

time, the jurisdiction of courts at Bombay

cannot be ousted where the offence of

cheating or misappropriation continued by the

petitioner and other co-accused persons

which of-course would come to light only after

the investigation is complete. Under these

circumstances, when the case is at its initial

stage of investigation, it cannot be said that

CBI has acted malafidely while registering the

case at Bombay on the complaint of NAFED

received by it at Bombay and also in holding

investigation of the case at Bombay. May be,

for investigation of the case CBI has to

interrogate some of the officials of NAFED

placed at Delhi. But no investigation which

might be conducted by CBI at Delhi would not

rule out the jurisdiction by the court at

Bombay to enquire and hold trial of the

offence of cheating made out in the impugned

FIR at Bombay.

29. Learned counsel for the petitioner has

referred to Ishar Das case (supra) to

emphasise that courts at Bombay have no

jurisdiction to hold an enquiry or trial of this

case. In the said case, some blank forms

allegedly were stolen from the office of Punjab

National Bank and the appellant had

presented a forged draft and got the same

encashed with the help of co-accused who

also presented another draft at Bombay and

got it encashed and there was no other

branch of Punjab National Bank in Punjab

except its headquarter at Lahore. It was held

that it was the headquarter of Punjab National

Bank at Lahore which suffered losses in

consequence of the said frauds and therefore

the court at Lahore had jurisdiction to hold

the trial of the case.

30. In the present case, the offence of cheating

has been partly done and its consequences

ensued at Bombay. The local jurisdiction of

the Bombay Court cannot be questioned.

31. Since CBI has the jurisdiction to hold an

enquiry of the FIR registered by it on the

complaint of NAFED, now it is to be seen

whether it is appropriate for this Court to

invoke its power under Article 226 of the

Constitution read with Section 482 Cr.P.C.

and stay the investigation of the case by CBI

at Bombay and transfer the same for

investigation at Delhi.

32. As noted earlier, the power of the Court to

interfere with an investigation is limited and it

is only in appropriate circumstances, the

power can be exercised. In Naresh

Kavarchand Khatri's case (supra), it was

laid down as follows:

".............The power of the court to interfere with an investigation is limited. The police authorities, in terms of Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, exercise a statutory power. The Code of Criminal Procedure has conferred power on the statutory authorities to direct transfer of an investigation from one Police Station to another in the, event it is found that they do not have any jurisdiction in the matter. The Court should not interfere in the matter at an initial stage in regard thereto. If it is found that the investigation has been conducted by an Investigation Officer who did not have any territorial jurisdiction in the matter, the same should be transferred by him to the police station having the requisite jurisdiction.

6. ....... The undue haste with which the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction, in our opinion, should not be encouraged. Whether an officer- incharge of a police station has the requisite jurisdiction to make investigation or not will depend upon a large number of factors including those contained in Sections 177, 178 and 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In a case where a trial can be held in any of the places falling within the purview of the aforementioned provisions, investigation can be conducted by the concerned officer in-charge of the police station which has jurisdiction to investigate in relation thereto. Sub- section (4) of Section 181 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would also be relevant therefore.

We need not dilate more on analyses of the aforementioned provisions as the said question has been gone into by this Court on more than one occasion.

In Satvinder Kaur vs. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) : 1999 (8) SCC 728 this Court noticing various provisions of the Code of Criminal

Procedure opined:

"12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would make it clear that Section 177 provides for "ordinary" place of enquiry or trial. Section 178, inter alia, provides for place of enquiry or trial when it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offence was committed or where the offence was committed partly in one local area and partly in another and where it consisted of several acts done in different local areas, it could be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the crime".

It was furthermore held:

"15. Hence in the present case, the High Court committed a grave error in accepting the contention of the respondent that the investigating officer had no jurisdiction to investigate the matters on the alleged ground that no part of the offence was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the police station at Delhi. The appreciation of the evidence is the function of the courts when seized of the matter. At the stage of investigation, the material collected by an investigation officer cannot be judicially scrutinized for arriving at a conclusion that the police station officer of a particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. In any case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(c) of the Criminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of the several local areas an offence was committed, or where it consists of several acts done in different local areas, the said offence can be enquired into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of investigation that the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was not having territorial jurisdiction,

is on the face of it, illegal and erroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo that no proceedings of a police officer shall be challenged on the ground that he has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court has completely overlooked the said embargo when it entertained the petition of Respondent 2 on the ground of want of territorial jurisdiction."

33. Thus it is clear that only in the event of

investigating officer, having regard to the

provisions contained in Sections 154, 162,

177 and 178 of Cr.P.C. arrives at a finding

that the alleged crime is not committed within

his territorial jurisdiction, can forward the

first information report to the police station

having jurisdiction in the matter. The High

Court can interfere only if there are malafides

shown in the investigation of the case in the

manner that investigating officer was

investigating the case without jurisdiction.

34. In the present case, I do not find any

malafides in the investigation of the case by

the CBI. On the face of the allegations

contained in the FIR and the complaint of

NAFED, a major part of cause of action arose

at Bombay. The CBI, therefore, was within its

jurisdiction to register a case on the

complaint received from NAFED and proceed

with its investigation.

35. It is pertinent that the principal accused SGI

and its proprietor G.S. Srivastava had filed a

writ petition in the High Court of Bombay on

16.10.2006 seeking quashing of the FIR and

the FIR was registered only on 21.09.2006.

This writ petition was filed on 20.11.2006.

When these two writ petitions were filed, the

investigation was still at its initial stages.

However, the writ petition filed by G.S.

Srivastava was dismissed by the High Court

on 19.12.2006. Against the said order of

dismissal, G.S. Srivastava filed special leave

petition (Crl.) No. 1822/2007 before the

Supreme Court seeking quashing of FIR.

Though, G.S. Srivastava, accused, succeeded

in getting an ex-parte stay order on

20.04.2007 whereby the investigation of the

case was stayed, but failed to get the relief

prayed as the said petition was dismissed by

the Supreme Court on 26.11.2007. G.S.

Srivastava had also moved an application

seeking anticipatory bail, wherein he was

granted interim bail and finally he was

successful in getting a bail order in his favour

subject to certain conditions from the CBI

Court at Mumbai on 4.10.2006.

36. It is not out of place that the petitioner also

filed an anticipatory bail application No.

1349/2006 before the Special Judge, Mumbai

on 14.11.2006 i.e. six days before the filing of

the present writ petition and succeeded in

getting an anticipatory bail in his favour vide

order dated 4.1.2007 on the basis of parity

with G.S. Srivastava. Since the principal

offender SGI and its proprietor G.S.

Srivastava have submitted themselves to the

jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court without

any objection and do not dispute the

territorial jurisdiction of the Bombay Courts

to take cognizance of the offence partly

committed at Bombay, it would not be in the

interest of justice to transfer the investigation

of the case to Delhi on the request of the

petitioner. In view of provisions contained in

Section 179 Cr.P.C., it can be safely

concluded that there are no malafides on the

part of NAFED in filing its complaint with CBI

at Bombay. No malafides can be imputed

against the CBI for having proceeded with the

registration of the case soon on receipt of the

complaint on the same day and proceeding

with the investigation of the case. At this

stage of investigation, it cannot be said that

CBI at Bombay has no territorial jurisdiction

to investigate the crime alleged to have been

committed by the accused persons named in

the FIR and or by some other persons whose

name might surface during the investigation

of the case.

37. The offence of cheating has been committed

partly in one local area and partly in other

and consists of several acts done in different

local areas and therefore, the alleged offence

under Sections 420/120B IPC can be enquired

into and investigated by CBI at Bombay

specially when no malafides are attributed to

the CBI, and when it has exercised its

jurisdiction and power to investigate the case

within the ambit of law.

38. Under these circumstances I find no reason to

transfer the investigation of the case from

Mumbai to Delhi as prayed. Hence, petition

being without any merits is hereby dismissed.

February 06, 2009                       (ARUNA SURESH)
rd                                          JUDGE