Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 3284 Del
Judgement Date : 21 August, 2009
UNREPORTABLE
* IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ WP (C) No. 5581 of 2008
% Reserved on : July 30, 2009
Pronounced on : August 21, 2009
Jaypee Institute of Information
Technology Society . . . Petitioner
through : Mr. Amol Sinha with
Mr. Praveen Chauhan, Advocates
VERSUS
Director General of Income Tax
(Exemptions), Delhi . . . Respondent
through : Ms. Prem Lata Bansal with
Ms. Anshul Sharma and
Mr. Paras Chaudhary, Advocates
CORAM :-
THE HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI
THE HON‟BLE MR. JUSTICE NEERAJ KISHAN KAUL
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers may be allowed
to see the Judgment?
2. To be referred to the Reporter or not?
3. Whether the Judgment should be reported in the Digest?
A.K. SIKRI, J.
1. The petitioner is a registered society under the Societies Registration
Act, 1860. It is running an institute known as "Jaypee Institute of
Information Technology" (hereinafter referred to as the „Institute‟).
According to the petitioner, the object with which the petitioner
Institute was registered is to impart formal education and the
institution exists only for the said educational purpose and there is no
element of profit involved, as envisaged under the Income Tax Act,
1961 (hereinafter referred to as the „Act‟). It is also declared as a
„Deemed University‟ by the University Grants Commission (UGC)
vide Notification dated 1.11.2004 issued under Section 3 of the
University Grants Commission Act, 1956. It is registered under
Section 12A as well as Section 80G of the Act. However, its
application for registration under Section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act has
been rejected by the respondent vide its order dated 26.3.2008. The
main reason given by the respondent is that education is not the only
objective of the petitioner Institute inasmuch as the objective clause
in the Memorandum of Association (for short, „MOA) of the
petitioner Institute mentions that the institute is also established for
"undertaking extra mural studies, extension programmes and field
outreach activities to contribute to the development of society".
This order is challenged by way of the present writ petition.
2. The core question which falls for consideration is as to whether
aforesaid activities stipulated in the object clause is educational
activity or it would be termed as an activity other than for
educational purpose. In order to decide this question, it would be
necessary to give the factual matrix of the case and also the
contentions advanced by counsel for either side.
3. The petitioner Institute was registered on 5.5.2004 under the
Societies Registration Act, 1860. It is not in dispute that it is
imparting formal education by running the aforesaid Institute,
namely, Jaypee Institute of Information and Technology from Plot
No. A-10 & A-12, Sector-62, Noida (UP). According to the
petitioner, the institute actually exists for the purpose of education
only and there is no element of profit. When it applied to the UGC
for declaration as „Deemed University‟, request of the institute was
accepted by the UGC and Notification dated 1.11.2004 was issued,
which reads as under :-
"NOTIFICATION
In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 3 of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956, the Central Government, on the advice of the University Grants Commission, hereby declare the Jaypee Institute of Information Technology (JIIT), Noida (Uttar Pradesh) as Deemed to be University under De-novo category for the purpose of the aforesaid Act with immediate effect subject to review after three years.
The grant of de-novo Deemed to be University status to Jaypee Institute of Information Technology, Noida is subject to the conditions that (i) JIIT, Noida will revise/amend its MOA/ Rules as per UGC Model MOA/Rules for deemed Universities;
(ii) JIIT, Noida will get its land transferred in the name of JIIT Society; and (iii) It will adhere to the guidelines/instructions issued by UGC and AICTE from time to time as applicable to the Deemed Universities."
Sd/-
(Ravi Mathur) Joint Secretary to the Government of India"
4. This status of „Deemed University‟ was conferred upon the Institute
subject to the condition that the institute revises/amends its
MOA/Rules as per the UGC model. UGC has issued guidelines for
considering proposals for declaring an institute as a „Deemed
University‟ under Section 3 of the UGC Act. These guidelines are
annexed with the writ petition as Annexure-A. Para 3 of these
guidelines provides that to qualify for recognition of status as a
University, the institution should have, among its primary objectives,
post-graduate instruction and training in such branches of learning as
it may deem fit, and research for the advancement and dissemination
of knowledge. Para 4(a)(i), which is relevant for this case, stipulates
as under :-
"4(a) For the purpose of recognition as a university as institution should generally be:
(i) Engaged in teaching programmes and research in chosen fields of specialization which are innovative and of very high academic standards at the Master‟s (or equivalent) and/or research levels. It should also have a greater interface with society through extra mural, extension and field action related programmes."
It, thus, specifically provides that in order to get recognition as
a University, an institute should have a greater interface with society
through extra mural, extension and field action related programmes.
Along with these guidelines, model constitution of MOA/Rules which
has to be adopted by all such institutions applying for „Deemed
University‟ status is prescribed. It mentions that every such institution
has to be registered as a „Society‟ under the Societies Registration Act,
1860 or as a Trust with trustees being appointed and vested with
legal powers and duties and has to frame the MOA/Trust Deed, Rules
and Bye-laws. The draft outline of the MOA is also provided, which
specifically points out as to what would be the objectives mentioned
in the MOA. It reads as under :-
"3. Objectives
The objectives for which the Institute is established are :
(i) to provide for instruction and training in such branches of learning as it may deem fit.
(ii) to provide for research and for the advancement of and dissemination of knowledge.
(iii) to undertake extra mural studies, extension programmes and filed outreach activities to contribute to the development of society.
(iv) to do all such other acts and things as may be necessary or desirable to further the objects of the Institute.
The objectives should be well-defined and well known to the students, teachers and non-teaching staff of the proposed deemed to be university."
Para 8 of the model constitution of the MOA mandates that
income and property of the institute is to be applied for its objectives
only as set forth in the MOA. Para 9 further clarifies that income and
property of the institute is not to be paid or transferred by way of
profits.
5. It is clear from the aforesaid that before an institute can apply to the
UGC for declaration as „Deemed University‟ under Section 3 of the
UGC Act, it has to be registered either as a Society or as a Trust.
Further, it has to have MOA on the lines of model constitution
provided by the UGC which specifically stipulates the objectives
which are to be mentioned in the MOA of the institute. Undertaking
extra mural status, extension programmes and field outreach
activities to contribute to the development of the society is
specifically stipulated as one of the objectives which each such
institution is bound to satisfy. This is so mentioned even in the
guideline No. 4(a)(i). Therefore, inclusion of this objective is
imperative, without which the UGC would not accord the status of
„Deemed University‟ to the applicant Institute.
6. It was because of the aforesaid guidelines that the petitioner Institute
was obliged to have its MOA in the said form. However,
notwithstanding this, the respondent has rejected the application for
grant of exemption under Section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act for the
assessment year 2007-08 holding that the Institute does not exist
solely for educational purposes as the purpose/objective of "greater
interface with society through extra mural, extension and field action
related programmes" is also stipulated in the MOA. According to the
respondent, the aforesaid objective does not relate to formal
education. The Institute is having model objectives, of which
education is only one of them. Each objective is independent of the
other and, therefore, it cannot be said that one of them is the
primary objective and the others are ancillary to it. The mental
process of the respondent can be gazed in the following discussion
contained in the impugned order :-
"9. I have considered the case of the applicant in the light of the above provisions of the Act, and the judgments of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and the High Court of Gujarat. The sub-clause (iii) of clause 3 of the MOA of the applicant society does not relate to formal education as defined by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court and High Court of Gujarat in the cases cited above. The Society is having multiple objectives of which education is only one of them. Each object is independent of the other and it cannot be said that one of them is the primary object and the others are ancillary to it. It can also not be said that the main object is education and the others are related to it. Each object exists for a specific purpose for which it has been laid down. Due to the amendments brought about in the Income Tax Act and Income Tax Rules, approval u/s 10(23C)(vi) is no longer limited to periodical approval of three years. The approval is now given from a particular assessment year onwards and it is a one time approval till it is withdrawn. Hence, it has to be ensured at the time of giving approval u/s 10(23C)(vi) that a Society by virtue of its objects exists only for the purpose for which it is claiming approval. By leaving the non-educational object loose ended, the applicant will always be at liberty to apply its income towards these objects. This is
not what is envisaged in Section 10(23C)(vi). The applicant must exist solely for education. The word solely as defined, in „The Law Lexicon" by P. Ramanatha Aiyer means "alone", "single", "used in contradistinction to joint". Further, solely means "exclusive". This shows that the objects, primary or ancillary must be solely for education and not for any other charitable purpose."
7. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, we are of the
opinion that a very narrow, pedantic and orthodox approach has
been adopted by the respondent in turning down the application of
the petitioner.
8. No doubt, as per Section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act, the requirement is
that a University or educational institution, in order to get exemption
under the aforesaid provision, is to exist solely for educational
purposes. This provision reads as under :-
"Any university or other educational institution existing solely for educational purposes and not for purposes of profit, other than those mentioned in sub-clause (iiiab) or sub-clause (iiiad) and which may be approved by the prescribed authority."
9. In what manner the „education‟ is to be imparted is explained by the
Supreme Court in the case of Sole Trustee Loka Shikshana Trust v.
Commissioner of Income Tax, (1975) 101 ITR 234 (SC). The Court
refined the expression „Education‟ as appearing in Section 2(15) of
the Act, which is extracted by the respondent as well in the
impugned order. It reads as under :-
"The sense in which the word "education" has been used in Section 2(15) is the systematic instruction, schooling or training given to the young in preparation for the work of life. It also connotes the whole course of scholastic instruction which a person has received. The word "education" has not been used in that wide and extended sense according to which every acquisition of further knowledge constitutes education - What education connotes in that clause is the process of training and
developing the knowledge, skill mind and character of students by normal schooling."
10. We also take note of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in the
case of Saurashtra Education Foundation v. Commissioner of Income
Tax, (2005) 273 ITR 139 (GUJ), which has been relied upon by the
respondent in the impugned order wherein the Gujarat High Court
discussed the term "other educational institutions" as appearing in
Section 10(22) of the Act in the following manner :-
"...white a trust holding property for the charitable purpose of education, as defined in Section 2(15) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, may also be an education institution existing solely for the purpose of education, the two institutions cannot be treated as belonging to the same class. An institution may be carrying on educational activities as are being carried on by the assessee herein without imparting formal education and without being affiliated to or accountable to any authority. Such a trust can certainly be considered as qualifying for exemption u/s 11(1)(a) read with section 2(15), it is the activities which are in focus whereas, in section 10(22) both the institution and the activities are in focus. An educational institution u/s 10(22) is, therefore, more than a body carrying on charitable activities in the field of education as contemplated by section 2(15). The expression other educational institutions in the section would mean an institution imparting formal education in an organized and systematic training where the institution would be accountable to some authority and where there would be teachers and taught, the former having some degree of control over the later. Although the expression "other educational institution" may not be confined to school or colleges, the expression does contemplate an institution imparting formal educational or training."
11. No doubt, the aforesaid parameters are to be kept in mind. In fact,
these are satisfied in the present case, inasmuch as, the petitioner is
running an educational institute imparting education in a systematic
manner. The very fact that it is granted the status of „Deemed
University‟ by the UGC, for which notification under Section 3 of the
UGC Act has been issued, would be a clinching factor insofar as
institutionalized education conducted by the petitioner is concerned.
It is imparting education in an organized and systematic manner and
is accountable to UGC even for maintaining the standards of
education. It is not in dispute that in the petitioner Institute teachers
are employed and students enrolled are taught by these teachers
under their control and they remain under their control and
supervision.
12. On the contrary, the Supreme Court has given wider meaning to the
expression "any educational institution" occurring in Section
10(23C)(vi) of the Act. Under this phrase, even those institutions
would be covered which may or may not have to do anything with
the university. The courts have expressed the opinion, by catena of
judgments, that categories provided in the aforesaid provision are so
different that the university cannot be the genus and "other
educational institution" the species thereof. Once a college is
established by an institution, that would come within the expression
"other educational institution". {See - Addl. Commissioner of
Income Tax v. Aditanar Educational Institution, 224 ITR 310 (SC);
Addl. CIT v. M/s. Hamdard Dawakhana (Wakf), 157 ITR 639 (Del);
CIT v. M/s. Venkatasubbiah Reddiar (K.S.), 221 ITR 18 (Mad)}.
In the present case, as mentioned above, the activity would
clearly fall within the expression „University‟ itself as the petitioner is
a „Deemed University‟ and, thus, has got the status of a university.
13. We have to remind ourselves that the main reason given by the
respondent in rejecting the application of the petitioners was that the
petitioner Institute is having multiple objectives, of which education
is only one of them. In coming to this conclusion, the respondent
has been swayed by the so-called other objectives, namely "greater
interface with society through extra mural, extension and field action
related programmes" stipulated in the MOA. What is perceived by
the respondent is that these objectives are independent of each other
and it cannot be said that the main object is education and others are
related to it. It is here where the authority faltered in its approach.
It is where the respondent faltered. The first aspect which was totally
ignored was that this object is included at the instance of UGC,
without which the UGC would not have entertained the application
of the petitioner Institute for grant of status of „Deemed University‟.
Obviously, the UGC would not insist on including an objective which
is unrelated to „education‟. There is a clear purpose behind it. The
aforesaid activity/objective is stated by the UGC as part of education.
Even in Sole Trustee Loka Shikshana Trust (supra), the Supreme Court
clearly observed that "what education connotes in that clause is the
process of training and developing the knowledge, skill, mind and
character of students by normal schooling". Normal schooling is
provided by the petitioner institution. What is emphasized by the
UGC by necessitating incorporation of the aforesaid objective is that
imparting of education is not limited to seeking knowledge through
text books alone. The UGC also wants students to have greater
interface with the society. That is necessary because of the modern
concept of education which needs to be imparted at schools and
universities level.
14. If pure learning, which is one of the purposes of the universities, is to
survive, it will have to be brought into relation with the life of the
community as a whole, not only with the refined delights of a few
gentlemen of leisure. Real education is one which makes a student
socially relevant. For this purpose, his greater interface with the
society is required. UGC perceives that this can be achieved through
extra mural, extension and field action related programmes. These
programmes may include NSS and NCC activities, other social service
programmes and projects. It is with this purpose in mind that the
aforesaid objective is introduced so that students in the petitioner
Institution are able to get „real‟ education. The main purpose,
therefore, remains „Education‟ which is imparted in a formal way by
the petitioner Institute with status of „Deemed University‟ through
the help of teachers. The aforesaid activities would only develop the
knowledge, skill or character of the students further by achieving
education in true sense.
15. The central task of „education‟ is to implant a will and facility of
learning; it should produce „not learned‟ but „learning people‟. Any
Rand highlights the following purpose of education :-
"The only purpose of education is to teach a student how to live his life by developing his mind and equipping him to deal with reality. The training he needs is theoretical, i.e. conceptual. He has to be taught to think, to understand, to integrate, to prove. He has to be taught the essentials of the
knowledge discovered in the past and he has to be equipped to acquire further knowledge by his own effort."
Webster defines „education‟ as the process of educating or
teaching. Educate is further defined as "to develop the knowledge,
sill or character of...". Thus, from these definitions, we might assume
that the purpose of education is to develop the knowledge, skill or
character of students. Unfortunately, this definition offers little unless
we further define words such as develop, knowledge and character.
Similar purpose is emphasized by Bill Beattie.
Therefore, formal education through schooling/university even
would be incomplete if student is not taught how to think, to
understand, to integrate and to prove.
16. The petitioner Institute, admittedly, fulfils the requirement of
imparting formal education by a systematic instruction, as noted
above. If the same university introduces the courses with the
objective of "greater interface with the society through extra mural,
extension and field action related programmes", these are not the
objectives independent of education but are aid to the education.
17. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the impugned order passed by
the respondent is unsustainable in law. The petitioner Institute fulfils
all the requirements of Section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act and is, thus,
entitled for grant of registration and consequently exemption under
the aforesaid provision of the Act. We, accordingly, make the rule
absolute and allow this writ petition. Impugned order dated
26.3.2008 passed by the respondent is quashed and mandamus/
direction is issued to the respondent to grant exemption to the
petitioner for the assessment year 2007-08 onwards as per the
provisions of Section 10(23C)(vi) of the Act.
No costs.
(A.K. SIKRI) JUDGE
(NEERAJ KISHAL KAUL) JUDGE
August 21, 2009 nsk
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