Citation : 2009 Latest Caselaw 3215 Del
Judgement Date : 18 August, 2009
*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+ OMP.No.271/2000
% Date of decision: 18th August 2009
M/S NATIONAL RUBBER CORPORATION ....Petitioner
Through: Mr. Sanjay Parikh, Mr Abinash K
Mishra, Mr Titin Sahni and Ms Mamta
Saxena, Advocates
Versus
M.R. CHOUDHARY & ORS ... Respondents
Through: Mr Ambar Qamaruddin, Advocate for
Respondents No 2 and 3.
CORAM :-
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW
1. Whether reporters of Local papers may
be allowed to see the judgment? No
2. To be referred to the reporter or not? No
3. Whether the judgment should be reported No
in the Digest?
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW, J.
1. Petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act 1996 is
preferred with respect to the arbitral award dated 2nd August, 2000
of the respondent No.1 arbitrator. Disputes and differences had
arisen between the respondents No. 2 and 3 (Union of India &
Controller of Stores of the respondent No.2, Northern Railway) and
the petitioner out of the order dated 1st February, 1994 placed by the
respondent Railways on the petitioner for delivery of goods of the
total value of Rs 54,96,504/- with delivery period upto 1st March,
1994. Upon the failure of the petitioner to supply the entire quantity
of goods inspite of extension of delivery period till 25th November,
1994, the respondent cancelled the said order on 12th December,
1994 at the risk and costs of the petitioner for the balance quantity.
The bid of the petitioner was the lowest in the tender issued by the
respondent for the said purpose but the petitioner, inspite of
acceptance of its bid, failed to deposit the security leading to the
cancellation of the said bid also on 2nd May, 1995. In these
circumstances, the respondent Union of India claimed damages of Rs
23,90,806.60p from the petitioner. The petitioner also made a claim
for refund of security deposit of Rs 1,01,000/-
2. The arbitrator has in the award found that the respondent had
given enough opportunities to the petitioner to supply the balance
quantities but the petitioner had failed to supply the same. The
award also records that the general damages claimed by the
respondent were worked out on the market price on or around the
date of the breach of the contract since the advertisement for the
tender was opened on 17th August, 1995 and lowest rates were taken
into consideration for determining the prevailing market price. It is
also recorded that the rates taken into consideration in this regard
were for the goods of the same specification as the goods subject
matter of the agreement which had been breached. The award has
thus allowed the said claim of the respondent for general damages
and deducts therefrom the security deposit of Rs 1,01,000/-. Interest
at 18% per annum w.e.f. 15th December, 1995 being the date the
respondent had asked the petitioner to pay the said general damages
has also been awarded to the respondent.
3. The award also records that the petitioner had in its additional
written statement brought out certain other issues. The arbitrator
has held that he was appointed on 13th November, 1997 and any
challenge to his appointment ought to have been made within 15
days of appointment and which the petitioner had not done and the
issue of appointment raised in the additional written statement was
barred under the Act. The arbitrator held nine hearings till 5th May,
2000. The award records that most of the hearings were of the
duration of two hours each.
4. It is the case of the petitioner that in the hearing on 5th May,
2000 the representative of the petitioner alongwith the lawyer had
gone to attend the hearing before the arbitrator but the arbitrator
was not present in his Chamber till 3.25 p.m.; that even after arrival
of the arbitrator, the representative and advocate of the petitioner
were made to wait and only thereafter called upon to argue; that the
lawyer of the petitioner took a preliminary objection that the
arbitration proceedings could continue only under the 1996 Act and
the proceedings being conducted by the arbitrator were without
jurisdiction; that the arbitrator on hearing so lost his temper and
started shouting at the representative and advocate of the petitioner
as to why they had been wasting the time of the arbitrator if they
had objection to his appointment; that though the counsel for the
petitioner pointed out that the objections in this regard had been
taken as early as in October, 1998 but the arbitrator continued
shouting and abusing the representative and advocate of the
petitioner and threatened that he will write such an order against
the petitioner which the petitioner will not be able to challenge upto
the Supreme Court. The petitioner claims to have written a letter
dated 12th May, 2000 recording the aforesaid to the General Manger,
Northern Railway with copy to the arbitrator and other persons.
5. The next date before the arbitrator was 15th May, 2000.
However, none on behalf of the petitioner appeared before the
arbitrator on that date. The arbitrator as such adjourned the hearing
and vide letter dated 12th June, 2000, admittedly delivered to the
petitioner, fixed the next date as 3rd July, 2000. It is further the case
of the petitioner that the advocate representing the petitioner before
the arbitrator and who is the same advocate as representing the
petitioner herein, vide letter dated 20th June, 2000 to the petitioner
expressed inability to appear on 3rd July, 2000 owing to the
humiliation meted out on 5th May, 2000 and asked the petitioner to
make alternative arrangement. It is the admitted position that none
on behalf of the petitioner appeared before the arbitrator on 3rd July,
2000 also and on which date the arbitrator concluded the
proceedings and thereafter published the award dated 2nd August,
2000 (supra). The petitioner thereafter wrote a letter dated 4th
September, 2000 to the arbitrator and sought copies of the
proceedings.
6. Thus it will be seen that though the petitioner had contested
the claim of the respondent before the arbitrator by filing a reply
thereto but the petitioner did not chose to make submissions before
the arbitrator.
7. The counsel for the petitioner has before this court also at the
outset taken the same plea as before the arbitrator on 5th May, 2000
and which is alleged to have led to the arbitrator losing his temper.
8. It is not in dispute that the arbitrator was appointed vide letter
dated 13th November, 1997 of the appointing authority and entered
into reference on 20th November, 1997. As per the terms and
conditions of the agreement between the parties, the disputes were
to be referred to the sole arbitration of a Gazetted Railway Officer to
be appointed by the General Manager, Railways.
9. The petitioner has as annexures to its petition filed its letter
dated 18th December, 1997 in response to the letter dated 20th
November, 1997 of the arbitrator informing of having entered into
reference and inviting remarks and claims and counter claims from
the petitioner. The petitioner in the said letter dated 18th December,
1997 did not take any objection to the appointment of the arbitrator
or found fault therewith and only contended that it had not been
furnished the copy of the claim of the respondent Union of India and
sought direction for being supplied copy thereof. The same was
supplied to the petitioner under cover of letter dated 2nd January,
1998 of the arbitrator. The petitioner filed a written statement dated
10th March, 1998 to the said claim petition and in which also no
challenge was made to the appointment of the arbitrator. On the
contrary, the petitioner made a counter claim for refund of its
security deposit of Rs 1,01,000/- with interest before the arbitrator.
Had the petitioner had any objection to the appointment of the
arbitrator, the question of the petitioner making the counter claim
would not have arisen. The respondent thereafter filed a rejoinder
and reply to the counter claim on 15th September, 1998.
10. An additional written statement appears to have been filed by
the petitioner before the arbitrator alongwith an application seeking
directions, in or about October, 1998. In the said additional written
statement the petitioner for the first time took a plea that the
arbitration proceedings being under the 1996 Act, had to be before
an arbitral tribunal of three arbitrators, one each to be appointed by
each party and the third to be appointed by the two arbitrators. In
the application it was also submitted that the arbitrator should lay
down the procedure to be followed after assessing from the parties
the points of disputes and whether they would like to examine any
witness.
11. The arbitrator vide his letter dated 19th April, 1999 called upon
the respondent Union of India to file the response to the said
additional written statement.
12. The pleadings were thereafter completed on the same also. In
the meanwhile, the petitioner also wrote letters proposing the name
of its arbitrator and calling upon the respondent to nominate its
arbitrator under the procedure which, according to the petitioner,
was applicable under the 1996 Act.
13. The first question urged before this court also is that under the
1996 Act, the arbitration could not be of a Gazetted Officer of the
Railways appointed by the General Manager concerned of the
railways as agreed between the parties and had to be by an arbitral
tribunal of three arbitrators. Prima facie, finding the said
proposition of the counsel for the petitioner to be preposterous, it
was indicated to the counsel that if he pressed the same, it would be
subject to costs, if unsuccessful. The counsel for the petitioner has
vehemently pressed the said objection before this court and relied
upon on MMTC Ltd Vs Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd (1996) 6
SCC 716; Thyssen Stahlunion GMBH Vs Steel Authority of
India Ltd (1999) 9 SCC 334; Shetty's Constructions Co. Pvt Ltd
Vs Konkan Railway Construction (1998) 5 SCC 599. I am
however unable to find any of the said judgments laying down any
such proposition, that upon coming into force of the 1996 Act, the
agreement between the parties providing for sole arbitration of the
Gazetted Officer of the railways appointed by the General Manager
concerned of the railways to have become void.
14. The counsel for the petitioner also referred to the provisions of
Sections 10 and 11 of the Act but again this court was unable to
comprehend as to how on the basis thereof submissions as aforesaid
could be made. Inspite of making it so clear to the counsel, no
explanation was forthcoming.
15. It was sought to be suggested that under the 1996 Act there
cannot be an arbitration of a sole arbitrator and also that once
Section 10(1) and Section 11(2) give freedom to the parties to
determine the number of arbitrators, the agreement of a date prior
to the coming into force of the Act providing for a sole arbitrator to
be appointed by one of the parties is no longer good and enforceable.
However, the argument again is found to be preposterous. The Act
in Section 10(1) and Section 11(2) does not purport to interfere with
the existing agreement of the parties. If as per the existing
agreement the arbitration is to be of a sole arbitrator or if the said
sole arbitrator is to be appointed by one of the parties, that
agreement's sanctity has not been disturbed by the Act. No
provision of the Act makes the existing agreements of arbitration
otiose. In fact, Section 85(2) of the Act provides for arbitration
under Agreements of a date prior to coming into force of the new
Act, under the provisions thereof and no where suggests that the
parties shall have to arrive at a fresh agreement as to the
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Even otherwise the purport of
the new Act was not to remodel the existing contracts between the
parties qua arbitration. In fact, the Supreme Court in Narayan
Prasad Lohia Vs Nikunj Kumar Lohia (2002) 3 SCC 572 has gone
to the extent of dismissing the challenge to an arbitral award in an
arbitral proceedings commenced after coming into force of the new
Act on the ground of the arbitration being of an even number of
arbitrators in contravention of Section 10(1) of the Act. Further,
Section 10(2) of the Act expressly recognizes the arbitration of a sole
arbitrator.
16. Attention of the counsel for the petitioner was invited to
Northern Railway Administration, Ministry of Railway, New
Delhi Vs Patel Engineering Company Ltd (2008) 10 SCC 240 and
Union of India Vs M/s Singh Builders Syndicate 2009(4) SCALE
491. The Supreme Court in Singh Builders Syndicate (supra) also
has not held such government contracts providing for appointment of
an arbitrator by an appointing authority of the concerned
department of the Government to be bad under the 1996 Act. All
that has been done is to suggest that the government department
should consider restructuring their contracts to provide for
arbitration by a neutral person rather than by their own officers.
17. The next contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the
arbitrator ought to have dealt first with the objection taken under
Section 16 of the Act. It is urged that the award is bad for the reason
of the arbitrator having not first rendered a decision on the said
aforesaid objection and in straightway pronouncing the award.
18. In my view the aforesaid contention of the petitioner does not
arise in the facts of the present case inasmuch as the petitioner after
raising the said objection stopped appearing before the arbitrator.
The arbitrator even in the absence of the petitioner was not required
to first render the finding on the same. Even otherwise I find that
the Bombay High Court in Scan Organics Ltd Vs Mukesh Babu
Financial Services Ltd 1998(3) RAJ 240 (Bom) has held that the
arbitrator is not required to, before proceeding further with the
matter, dispose of the plea taken under Section 16. The same view
was taken under the old Act in Premier Fabricators Vs Heavy
Engineering Corporation Ltd. (1997) 4 SCC 319. I am also of the
view that the arbitral tribunal is not bound to first adjudicate pleas
taken under Section 16 of the Act and in their wisdom/discretion are
entitled to defer the decision on the said plea till alongwith the
award. Though I must hurry to add that for the sake of economizing
time and costs, unless the arbitral tribunal for reasons to be
recorded holds that the said plea cannot be adjudicated, it is
preferable to adjudicate the same immediately. In the present case
the arbitrator has, in the award, dealt with the plea of the petitioner
and held that the plea was taken by the petitioner after the
prescribed time of 15 days and is not tenable. In view of my having
independently reached the conclusion that the plea aforesaid has no
merit, no ground for interference under Section 34 is made out.
19. The next contention of the counsel for the petitioner is that the
bias in favour of the respondent is evident from the conduct of the
arbitrator in the hearing on 5th May, 2000 as described hereinabove.
It is contended that the plea with respect to the said bias was taken
immediately after hearing on 5th May, 2000 and the arbitrator has
failed to deal with the same also. Reliance on the parameters of bias
is placed on Ranjit Thakur Vs Union of India (1987) 4 SCC 611,
Dr G. Sarana Vs University of Lucknow (1976) 3 SCC 585, Bihar
State Mineral Development Corpn. Vs Encon Builders (I) Pvt
Ltd (2003) 7 SCC 418.
20. In the present case, the petitioner after 5th May, 2000 when the
bias of the arbitrator in favour of the respondent is stated to have
spilled out, the petitioner did not appear before the arbitrator. On
the contrary, the petitioner merely wrote to the appointing authority
of the arbitrator in this regard. Of course the petitioner sent a copy
of the said letter to the arbitrator also but the same cannot be
equated with sending a written statement to the arbitrator in this
regard within the meaning of Section 13(2) of the Act. Moreover,
under Section 13(3) of the Act, unless the arbitrator so challenged
withdraws from his office, he is entitled to continue the arbitral
proceedings. The only remedy of a party in that case is to challenge
the award at the time of petition under Section 34 of the Act. That
being the position of law, no prejudice has been suffered by the
petitioner inasmuch as the plea of the petitioner is now for
consideration before the court.
21. Without the petitioner appearing before the arbitrator and
arguing bias and thereby inviting the arbitrator to return a finding
thereon, the petitioner cannot be permitted to take up the plea under
Section 34 of the Act. The petitioner in the present case by choosing
to deliberately absent itself from two consecutive hearings before
the arbitrator and of which hearings it had notice failed to press the
plea, if any, available to it of bias and is now precluded from raising
the same before this court. Even otherwise on the basis of the
averments aforesaid I am unable to make out any case of bias. The
officers of Union of India who in the matter of such contracts are
acting merely in the exercise of their official duties/functions have no
personal interest in the matters and merely by virtue of being an
officer of the Union of India cannot be said to be biased. If that were
to be so, most of the contracts where Union of India or its various
branches are parties and all of which provide for such arbitrations
would have come to a naught. Challenges such as this have been
made in the past and have not succeeded. For a case of bias to be
made out, the party alleging the same has to show something more.
In the present case there is nothing. It appears that the petitioner
after participating in the proceedings and after being unable to
prove its case decided to absent from the proceedings and set up the
ground of the incident of 5th May, 2000. Had any such incident
occurred the best fora to raise the same before, was the arbitrator
himself. However, the petitioner chose not to do the same. Perhaps
the petitioner feared that if it appeared before the arbitrator, the cat
would come out of the bag and the truth would have been recorded.
The petitioner thereafter filed the present proceedings before this
court and has already delayed the enforcement of the award by nine
years.
22. The reliance on NTPC Ltd Vs Siemens Atkeingesellschaft
(2001) 4 SCC 451, Konkan Railway Corporation Ltd Vs Rani
Construction Pvt Ltd (2002) 2 SCC 388 and SBP & Company Vs
Patel Engineering Ltd (2005) 8 SCC 618 is misconceived. I am
even otherwise reluctant to believe the incident of 5th May, 2000
alleged by the petitioner. No affidavit of the advocate for the
petitioner who is alleged to have been humiliated has been filed
before this court. Besides the lawyer, Shri Balwant Singh and P.S.
Bindra, representatives of the petitioner are also stated to have been
present in the said hearing. Their affidavits have also not been filed.
The petition is accompanied with the affidavit of only one Mr Ranbir
Singh, partner of the petitioner. In fact the petitioner has filed as
annexure Z to the petition an authorization letter dated 25 th April,
2000 whereby the petitioner had authorized Mr K.S. Walia to appear
on its behalf before the arbitrator on 5th May, 2000. Ordinarily such
authorization letter would be made only when the said Mr K.S. Walia
alone was to appear before the arbitrator on that date inasmuch as if
the advocate was also to be appearing, there would have been no
necessity to prepare such a letter. There is no explanation as to why
the said Mr K.S. Walia did not appear on 5th May, 2000 and why the
other representatives who are alleged to have appeared alongwith
the lawyer appeared on that date. I also find on the arbitral record
received in this court, a letter dated 5th May, 2000 of the arbitrator
recording the proceedings of that date. It is recoded therein that
due to pre-engagement of the lawyer of the petitioner he had to
leave early. It is further recorded therein that though the
representatives of the petitioner had earlier represented that they
had nothing to argue regarding the appointment of sole arbitrator
but the same had been raised again. It is also significant that though
the incident is stated to have been of 5th May, 2000, the first letter
thereafter is claimed to have been sent only on 12th May, 2000. Had
any such incident as alleged occurred, representation would have
been immediately made of the same. It appears that the letter dated
12th May, 2000 is an afterthought, after the petitioner decided to
absent from the arbitration proceedings.
23. Even if the challenge of the petitioner based on the incident of
5th May, 2000 is to be believed, the same still does not constitute any
case of bias. The arguments of the petitioner have been found to be
preposterous by this court also. As aforesaid, at the time of hearing
only it was informed to the counsel for the petitioner that in the
event of his being unsuccessful, he would be burdened with costs.
Even if the arbitrator is understood to have reacted sharply to the
argument challenging his appointment after arbitral proceedings had
been underway for some time and after arguments on merit having
commenced the same still does not make out a case of bias for the
award to be set aside on the said ground.
24. The counsel for the petitioner has next contended that the
claims were barred by time. The only basis of the said argument is
that while the first cause of action accrued to the respondent on 12 th
December, 1994 i.e., on termination of the contract, the claim
petition is dated 22nd December, 1997 i.e. after three years of the
said date. However, upon attention of the counsel for the petitioner
being invited to the letter dated 13th November, 1997 of appointment
of arbitrator, and which must be in pursuance to invocation of
arbitration prior thereto and to Section 21 of the Act, whereunder
the arbitration is deemed to have commenced on the date of
invocation, the counsel did not press the said argument further. The
premise of limitation being three years is also erroneous. I may
however notice that the counsel for the petitioner had attempted to
bring the plea of limitation also under Section 16 of the Act. That in
my opinion was a wrong approach. Limitation is a mixed question of
law and facts and cannot be said to be with respect to the
arbitrator's own jurisdiction or with respect to existence or validity
of the arbitration agreement.
25. The counsel for the petitioner lastly urged that the award does
not deal with any of the pleas of the petitioner in its written
statement. In my view the petitioner having stopped appearing
before the arbitrator, the arbitrator was not required to deal with
the various pleas in the written statement. The arbitrator has else
found the petitioner to be in breach and has awarded damages to the
respondent/railways therefor. The award to this extent is not found
to be in contravention of any substantial law of this country and
nothing has been pointed out that the award is contrary to any terms
of the agreement of the parties. No merit is found in any of the pleas
challenging the award. No case under Section 34 of the Act is made
out. The petition is dismissed. For the reasons aforesaid, the
petitioner is also burdened with costs of Rs 50,000/- of these
proceedings.
RAJIV SAHAI ENDLAW (JUDGE) 18th August, 2009 M
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