Laxman Singh Solanki vs Lt. Governor Of Nct Of Delhi And ...
2007 Latest Caselaw 437 Del

JUDGMENT

Swatanter Kumar, J.

1. The Lt. Governor of National Capital Territory of Delhi vide order dated 25th August, 2005 had compulsorily retired Mr. L.S. Solanki, member of Delhi Judicial Service. The legality and correctness of this order is challenged by the petitioner on the following grounds:

(i) Articles of Charge for which the petitioner has been found guilty are based on no evidence.

(ii) The said Articles of Charge are vague, uncertain and cannot in law form basis of guilt.

(iii) The impugned order suffers from the vice of non-application of mind by the disciplinary authority as the Inquiring Authority had found the petitioner guilty of only Articles of Charge 1 and 3, and Articles of Charge 2, 4 and 5 in the opinion of the Inquiring Authority had not been proved but the Disciplinary Authority had proceeded on the basis as if all the Articles of Charge were proved against the petitioner.

(iv) In terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors. , the impugned order and the proceedings stand vitiated for the reason that no show cause notice was served upon the petitioner particularly in relation to quantum of sentence, as such, the petitioner was not granted fair opportunity to put forward his case for consideration before the disciplinary authority.

2. Before we proceed to examine the merits of the contentions raised by the petitioner before us in the present writ petition, reference to the basic facts would be necessary.

3. The petitioner after completing his studies in law with outstanding performance in academic had started practice as a lawyer in the District Courts at Delhi in the year 1982. He appeared in the examination and was selected to Delhi Judicial Service in the year 1992. It is further averred by the petitioner that while performing his duties as a Judicial Officer his performance was adjudged by the competent authority as B+ till the year 2000. He worked as Civil Judge as well as a judge on criminal side during his tenure. His performance was appreciated by various Judges and particularly his performance was found to be outstanding to settle maximum number of cases in one day Lok Adalat held at Karkardooma Courts.

4. On 25th September, 2001, the petitioner visited the High Court premises to invite some of his friends and superiors for Bhagawati Jagaran, which was to take place at his house on 26th September, 2001 on the occasion of birthday of his only son. According to him, when he met the Registrar (Vigilance) in that regard, he came to know that there was an anonymous complaint making allegations of misconduct, immoral activity etc against the petitioner. He was not supplied with the copy of the complaint. He was also questioned as to whether the official accommodation allotted to him i.e. Flat No. 2117, D.A. Flats, Gulabi Bagh, Delhi was in occupation of some other person by the name of Mr. Krishan Lal Goyal. He denied this allegation. However, vide order dated 28th September, 2001, the petitioner was placed under suspension and statement of the petitioner was recorded on 2nd April, 2002.

5. It appears that preliminary fact finding inquiry was conducted where after memorandum dated 13th June, 2002 containing 5 Articles of Charge with statement of imputations in support of the Articles of Charge, list of witnesses and list of documents, which the department intended to rely upon were served upon the petitioner. The 5 Articles of Charge, which were framed against the petitioner, read as under:

1. That Mr. L.S. Solanki misused and permitted to be occupied by others the whole of the Government accommodation allotted to him (vide allotment letter endorsement No. 38192-97 Building/Gaz. Dated 3.8.1994 of which he took possession on 14.11.1994 as per his intimation letter dated 19.4.1995), and also charged rent from them without any permission of or intimation to the appropriate authority, in violation of Conduct Rules as applicable to the officers of the Delhi Judicial Service.

2. That Mr. L.S. Solanki, Civil Judge has been frequently communicating even during Court hours through his Cell Phone with advocates S/Sh. B.P.S. Chauhan and K.S. Verma. Mr. L.S. Solanki when called upon to explain his conduct regarding misusing the government accommodation and his being in league and connivance with the aforesaid Advocate Mr. B.P.S. Chauhan, made false statements before Registrar (Vig,.) of this Court. The suppression of true facts on the part of Mr. L.S. Solanki goes to show that he was in league and connivance with the said Advocates and his performance as a judicial officer was influenced by them which act is against Conduct Rules.

3. Mr. L.S. Solanki deliberately suppressed and concealed the facts of his having constructed a building on a plot of land measuring more than 300 sq. yds. In village Badli sometimes in the year 2000/2001, and, also told a lie as to the period of this construction during statement made before Registrar (Vigilance) on 2.4.02/22.4.02 duly signed by him. The officer did not intimate the High Court about the expenses incurred on this building and source thereof. A simple look to this building indicates that the expenses incurred on it must be around a couple of lacs. He also concealed his rental income of Rs. 4000/- a month from this building and violated Conduct Rules.

4. Mr. L.S. Solanki furnished conflicting information about the agriculture land owned by his wife and son in U.P., as seen from his Annual Property Returns sent for the year 1992-1993, 2002-2001, and his letter dated 9/21.12.1996, and did not send any information as to the date on which the deal was finally struck and as to how the figures indicated the difference of 8 bighas of land in this intimation. This confusing and conflicting statement reveals deliberate suppression of material information against C.C.S. Conduct Rules.

5. Mr. L.S. Solanki also concealed and suppressed the facts of his having sold a plot of land measuring about 316 sq. yds. at Ankur Vihar, Delhi (as per property returns of 1992-93 but in U.P. As per his statement) which he sold somewhere in the year 1996-97 for a sum of Rs. 1.42 lakh, as per his own statement made before Registrar (Vig.). The officer made a contradictory statement about his having sent intimation to the High Court and, thereafter, placed on record photocopy of a letter mark `G' of his having allegedly written to the High Court, though, actually no such letter was ever received as per High Court records which fact stands confirmed from the office of District & Sessions Judge too. Mr. Solanki, thus, concealed the sale transaction and fabricated a false document (mark `G') to intentionally suppress his act of misconduct and has acted against Conduct Rules.

6. The aforesaid conduct on the part of Mr. L.S. Solanki is not only unbecoming of a government servant but is a serious violation of the Conduct Rules applicable to Delhi Judicial Service Officers.

7. The petitioner submitted his reply to the Articles of Charge on 26th June, 2002 wherein besides pointing out that the Charges were vague, the petitioner denied all the Articles of Charge. Inquiring Authority was appointed on 8th August, 2002, who conducted the departmental inquiry. The proceedings before the Inquiring Authority were concluded on 23rd September, 2004. The Inquiring Authority submitted its report on 22nd March, 2005 wherein a finding was recorded that Articles of Charges 1 and 3 were proved against the petitioner whereas Articles of Charge 2, 4 and 5 were stated to be not proved. The report of the Inquiring Authority was served upon the petitioner vide letter dated 13th April, 2005 to which the petitioner submitted his representation on 26th April, 2005 stating that the findings even in regard to Articles of Charge 1 and 3 had not been proved and the findings were perverse in nature. Without affording any opportunity to the petitioner of personal hearing, the respondent No. 2 imposed a major penalty of compulsory retirement from service against the petitioner vide order dated 30th August, 2005.

8. The stand taken by the respondent No. 2 in their counter affidavit is that on a meaningful reading of the Articles of Charge, it is clear that the Charge do not stem from any single incident and were not related to each other in any manner or form. Two Articles of Charge were proved against the petitioner, which were sufficient for imposing the impugned punishment. The dominant objective behind such an approach is apparent from the role played by the judiciary and is not one that can be taken lightly. The Judicial Officer holds an office of public trust and private life of the judicial officer must adhere to high standard of probity and propriety than those deemed acceptable for others. Heavy reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of C. Ravichandran Iyer v. Justice A.M. Bhatacharjee . According to the respondents, petitioner was given adequate opportunity as well as sufficient legal representation to defend himself against the Charge framed against him. In fact the petitioner had not taken such a plea during the departmental inquiry proceedings. On the contrary, number of witnesses, who in fact were tutored, were produced by the petitioner during departmental inquiry and following the general rule in conformity with the Principles of Natural Justice, the departmental inquiry was conducted. Mr. Krishan Lal Goyal was not only found in occupation of the premises but a telephone connection in the name of said person was also found in existence at the Govt. accommodation allotted to the petitioner. There were serious contradictions in the statements made by the petitioner before the Registrar (Vigilance) and during the departmental inquiry. He had even refused to accompany Registrar (Vigilance) to his residence when at the very instance he was asked to get his residence checked up in order to avoid any further inquiry or action. The Charge were certain and noway vague. The report of the Inquiring Authority containing findings relating to irregularities and misconduct on the part of the petitioner was placed before the Full Court, which accepted the findings of the Inquiring Authority. The case in turn was forwarded to the competent authority for appropriate orders. The inquiry proceedings were conducted in accordance with the rules and principles of Natural Justice. It is specifically averred by the respondents that each Articles of Charge was supported by the evidence and the story concocted by the petitioner that property returns for the year 2001 contained a typographical error is apparently frivolous and was, thus, denied. It was obligatory upon the petitioner to declare his correct income and properties. It is also the case of the respondents that it was not obligatory upon the respondents or the disciplinary authority to grant any personal hearing to the petitioner. Rule 15 of CCS (CCA) Rules as applicable to the judicial service imposes no obligation to issue any show cause notice to the charged officer after the inquiry report is accepted by the authority concerned. The Disciplinary Authority had applied its mind and in the facts and circumstances of the case, it passed the order imposing punishment upon the petitioner in accordance with law.

9. The inquiry report proceedings have been annexed to the writ petition but even the original records were produced before the court during the course of hearing. First of all we may deal with the plea of the petitioner under contention, non-application of mind by the disciplinary authority and that the Articles of Charge as framed were vague and uncertain. We are unable to find any merit in both these contentions raised on behalf of the petitioner. The Articles of Charge as framed are clear and unambiguous. In fact the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner was unable to demonstrate before the Court as to how the Articles of Charge are vague to the extent that the charge sheet itself would be liable to be set aside. All the five Articles of Charge relate to different incidents and provide sufficient particulars so as to be independent Articles of Charge. They are really not interconnected or interdependent. As far as Articles of Charge 2 and 4 to 6 are concerned, the petitioner hardly has any ground to raise any grievance as he has not been found guilty in relation to those Articles of Charge. The findings recorded in respect of these Articles of Charge are not effecting the correctness or validity of the findings given by the Inquiring Authority in relation to Articles of Charge 1 and 3, which were stated to be proved. Both these Articles of Charge are again clear and are unambiguous. Simple allegation against the petitioner was that the Government accommodation, which was allotted to him vide letter dated 3rd August, 1994 of which he took the possession on 14.11.1994, was given by him to somebody and was even charging rent, which was a mis-conduct. Under Article of Charge 3, the petitioner is stated to have suppressed and concealed the fact having constructed a property in Village Badli sometimes in the year 2000/2001 and he had given no intimation to the High Court of such investment and was receiving a rent of Rs. 4000/- per month from the building, which again was not disclosed to the High Court as an income and there was violation of conduct rules. Unlike charge in a criminal offence, in a disciplinary action, the Article of Charge has to state clearly what is against the delinquent officer for which the department wishes to proceed in accordance with Rules. This has to be examined from the point of view of a reasonable person and it essentially need not contain every fact. Furthermore, the memorandum served upon the petitioner also contained a detailed statement of imputations and when the Articles of Charge 1 and 3 were read with the statement of imputations, there is certainly no ambiguity in the Charges so as to render them liable for interference by the Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction.

10. The reliance placed by learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner upon the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of M.V. Bijlani v. Union of India and Ors. is of no help to him. In that case the Court recorded a finding that the evidence recorded by the Inquiry Officer and inference drawn by him were not commensurate with the Charge and the Charge were in fact vague. We have already said that the Charge are specific and clear.

11. The original records produced before us clearly show that the inquiry report of the Inquiring Authority finding petitioner guilty only of Articles of Charge 1 and 3 was placed before the Full Court in its meeting held on 21st May, 2005 and the Full Court while rejecting the written submissions submitted by the charged officer against the inquiry report, had accepted the report of the Inquiring Authority. After acceptance of the inquiry report by the Full Court, which recommended imposition of major penalty of compulsory retirement, the file was forwarded to the Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi for necessary approval and action by the Government. This was approved by the Lt. Governor, which then resulted into the impugned order dated 30th August, 2005. From the impugned order or from the record, it is not evident that the authorities have proceeded on the basis that all the 5 Articles of Charge are proved against the officer. The impugned order only reproduces 5 Articles of Charge where after it has been specifically recorded that the authority has considered the relevant material including the report given by the Inquiring Authority and then it recorded the finding that petitioner's conduct was unbecoming of a judicial officer and was in violation of the conduct rules and thereupon it imposed a penalty of compulsory retirement on the petitioner. The arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner, in fact, is without any basis and is contrary to the record and pleadings of the parties. Non-application of mind

12. Again reliance placed by the counsel appearing for the petitioner on the judgment of Supreme Court in the case of National Fertilizers Ltd. and Anr. v. P.K. Khanna is misplaced inasmuch as the present case is not of disagreement on the Articles of Charge between the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary Authority. In fact, as already stated, the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority were accepted all through i.e. by the Full Court as well as by the Lt. Governor of NCT of Delhi. Whether the present case is a case of no evidence or not:

The Inquiring Authority in his report examined at great length the evidence produced by the Presenting Officer as well as the delinquent officer. PW-6 and PW-7 were the witnesses examined by the Presenting Officer in support of the Articles of Charge. They, of course, did not give any direct evidence with regard to unauthorised occupation of the Government accommodation by other person but two material facts were brought on record viz. (i) that there is a LPG connection in the name of Mr. Krishan Lal Goyal in relation to official accommodation allotted to the petitioner and (ii) that a telephone was installed at the premises in question in the name of Mr. Krishan Lal Goyal, who was stated to be friend of father-in-law of petitioner. There was sufficient evidence produced before the Inquiring Authority and he considered the version of the charged officer at great length before recording a finding in question. At this stage, we may refer to part of the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority on Articles of Charge No. 1:

It is also not understandable as to why the telephone connection sanctioned in the name of the Charged Officer should have continued at his parental house if he was himself living in the Government accommodation. His plea that he was using a cordless telephone for using his telephone is contradictory to the statement (Ex.P-1) made by him before the Registrar Vigilance in which he stated that this telephone was at the flat in question. He stated that the extension of this phone was installed at his parental house. He did not say that at the flat he was using a cordless phone. The suggestion of the Registrar Vigilance in Ex.P-1 on 25.9.2001 that on that day even, the family of Shri Krishan Lal Goyal was residing in the flat allotted to the Charged Officer was brushed aside by the Charged Officer. Question No. 19 and its answer in Ex.P-1 read as under:

Q.19 The officer is not told that right now he can be made to talk to the family of Mr. Kishan Lal Goel at his Govt. allotted flat, and, if he wants,then, he can also br right now, taken to his flat to get to the real truth.

Ans. I can not say anything about this at this moment as I am busy in my family function which is to be organized at my Railway Colony parental house on 26.9.2001.

13. Had the plea of the Charged Officer been true and he and his family had been in occupation of the flat in question onthat day he would have readily asked the Registrar Vigilance to accompany him to the flat and see that Shri Krishan Lal Goyal was not residing there. The ration card and the electoral list produced by the Charged Officer do not establish actual and physical occupation of the flat in question by the Charged Officer. Such documents can be easily managed in anticipation of objection against sub-letting. The coinciding of the shifting of the telephone No. 3652174 of Shri Krishan Lal Goyal in November, 2001 to the shifting of the residence of Shri Krishan Lal Goyal to Shakti Nagar Extn. also indicates that in November, 2001 only Shri Krishan Lal Goyal and his family shfited from the flat in question. It is not explained as to why the only telephone connection and LPG connection of Shri Krishan Lal Goyal were given on loan to the father-in-law of the Charged Officer and how Shri Krishan Lal Goyal and his family was fulfillling their own requirements in respect thereof."

14. Similarly, on Articles of Charge 3 after detailed discussion, the Inquiring Officer recorded the following findings:

The Charged Officer contends that the property was described as `plot' only in the return x.PW-11/A for the reason that in the village a built-up property is called `plot' and vacant land is called `zameen'. According to him, the documents Exbts. DW-4/C and DW-4/E clearly show that when he purchased this property, it was having two pukka rooms with three side boundary walls and in Ex.DW-4/E the area of the plot was shown as 330 sq.yds. (in Ex.DW-4/C, it was shown as 270 sq.yds.). He also relies upon the statement of DW-2, a draftsman, who has proved report Ex.DW-2/A and stated that the constructions in this property were between the years 1988 to 1991.

It is shown that this property was described as a `plot' only in spite of the fact that it was having constructions and the Charged Officer was always trying to conceal the constructions as well as income there from. The affidavits Exbts. Dw-4/C and DW-4/E regarding sale of this property, produced by the Charged Officer, are not proper title documents and are contradictory inasmuch as in Ex.DW-4/E, it was mentioned as 330 sq.yds. This contradiction makes these documents unreliable and untrustworthy and they appear to be manipulated documents.

In these premises, it can be safely held by preponderance of probabilities that the Charged Officer had made additional constructions in the aforesaid property between 2000-2001 but did not intimate the High Court in respect thereof and the source of the amount spent thereon. He was also not giving correct information to the High Court about rent received from this property. The object of the Rules is to keep Government servants under check and discourage corruption. Such cases, therefore, have to be viewed seriously and whenever there is any clue regarding default, immediate action should be taken in accordance with law to keep the like minded under control.

15. The above findings of the Inquiring Authority are based upon cumulative appreciation of the documentary as well as oral evidence adduced during the course of inquiry on behalf of the department as well as the petitioner. In exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India, this Court does not sit as a Court of appeal to re-appreciate the evidence and interfere with the findings recorded by the Inquiring Authority only on the ground that in the facts of the case, it was possible to take another view by the authorities. Without assertion of a totally perverse finding or of a case of no evidence, the Court would be very reluctant to interfere with the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer.

16. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner argued that there has to be a definite proof in support of Articles of Charge and the evidence should directly link beyond reasonable doubt the officer to the guilt. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the cases of Narinder Mohan Arya v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. and Sher Bahadur v. Union of India and Ors. . Having perused these judgments, we are of the considered view that the contention raised is contrary to the principles of law stated by the Supreme Court in these judgments. The Supreme Court while explaining expression `sufficiency of evidence' stated that it postulates acceptance of some evidence which links the charged officer with the misconduct alleged against him and if the evidence, which is neither relevant in a broad sense nor establishes any nexus between the alleged misconduct and the charged officer is no evidence in law. It was further stated that there should be discussion on the evidence. We have already demonstrated and referred to the extract of the finding recorded on each of the Articles of Charge and find it totally unnecessary to discuss the detailed finding so recorded by the Inquiring Authority in the inquiry report. In light of the documents/statements specifically referred to and discussed in the inquiry report, the present case cannot be termed as a case of no evidence. In the case of Lalit Popli v. Canara Bank and Ors. , the Supreme Court clearly stated the limited scope of judicial review in such proceedings and also that doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Rather preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct. The Court held as under:

14. In the instant case, the enquiry officer and the disciplinary authority took pains to carefully consider the handwriting expert's report and also looked at the documents to arrive at their own conclusions.

15. Great emphasis was laid on the Forensic Science Laboratory's report to say that the handwriting expert's report is not worthy of acceptance. We have looked at the report of the Forensic Science Laboratory. It only says that no definite opinion can be formed. That itself is an indication that a clean chit was not given as claimed by the employee.

16. It is fairly well settled that the approach and objective in criminal proceedings and the disciplinary proceedings are altogether distinct and different. In the disciplinary proceedings the preliminary question is whether the employee is guilty of such conduct as would merit action against him, whereas in criminal proceedings the question is whether the offences registered against him are established and if established what sentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, the mode of enquiry and the rules governing the enquiry and trial are conceptually different. (See State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, (1996) 67 SCC 417: 1996 SCC (L&S) 1455.) In case of disciplinary enquiry the technical rules of evidence have no application. The doctrine of "proof beyond doubt" has no application. Preponderance of probabilities and some material on record are necessary to arrive at the conclusion whether or not the delinquent has committed misconduct.

17. While exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution the High Court does not act as an appellate authority. Its jurisdiction is circumscribed by limits of judicial review to correct errors of law or procedural errors leading to manifest injustice or violation of principles of natural justice. Judicial review is not akin to adjudication of the case on merits as an appellate authority.

18. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India the scope of judicial review was indicated by stating that review by the court is of decision-making process and where the findings of the disciplinary authority are based on some evidence, the court or the tribunal cannot reappreciate the evidence and substitute its own finding.

19. As observed in R.S. Saini v. State of Punjab the scope of interference is rather limited and has to be exercised within the circumscribed limits. It was noted as follows:

16. Before adverting to the first contention of the appellant regarding want of material to establish the charge, and of non-application of mind. We will have to bear in mind the rule that the court while exercising writ jurisdiction will not reverse a finding of the inquiring authority on the ground that the evidence adduced before it is insufficient. If there is some evidence to reasonably support the conclusion of the inquiring authority, it is not the function of the court to review the evidence and to arrive at its own independent finding. The inquiring authority is the sole judge of the fact so long as there is some legal evidence to substantiate the finding and the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the court in writ proceedings.

17. A narration of the Charge and the reaons of the inquiring authority for accepting the Charge, as seen from the records, shows that the inquiring authority has based its conclusions on materials available on record after considering the defense put forth by the appellant and these decisions, in our opinion, have been taken in a reasonable manner and objectively. The conclusion arrived at by the inquiring authority cannot be termed as either being perverse or not based on any material part of the inquiring authority. Likewise, the High Court has looked into the material based on which the enquiry officer has come to the conclusion, within the limited scope available to it under Articles 226 of the Constitution and we do not find any fault with the findings of the High Court in this regard.

20. As noted above, the employee accepted that there was some lapse on his part but he pleaded lack of criminal intent. A bank employee deals with public money. The nature of his work demands vigilance with the inbuilt requirement to act carefully. Any carelessness invites action.

17. Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in the case of Syed Rahimuddin v. Director General, C.S.I.R. and Ors. AIR 2001 SC 2418 where the Inquiry Officer had dealt with Articles of Charge chronologically and the relevant materials on the basis of which the ultimate conclusion was arrived at, the Court refused to interfere and held that inquiry was not vitiated. It will be useful to refer to the dictum of the Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Patil and Anr. where the Court held as under:

16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decision of departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or grounds very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter of canvassing before the High Court in a writ petition filed under Articles 226 of the Constitution.

18. Even in the writ petition, there is no plausible explainable rendered by the petitioner as to how the telephone and gas connections in the name of Mr. Krishan Lal Goyal were installed at the official residence allotted to the petitioner and continued to be so for a considerable time. Another factor, which cannot be ignored by the Court is that at the very first instance itself, the Registrar (Vigilance) had given a choice to the charged officer to accompany him to his official residence to exactly know who was living there and what was the state of affairs on that very date. The Officer chose not to take benefit of such clear offer and even during the course of arguments no explanation has come as to why the officer decided to the contrary.

19. In view of the above well settled principles of law and discussion on the factual matrix of the case, we are unable to find any merit even in this contention raised on behalf of the petitioner.

Violation of Principles of Natural Justice and Non-Issuance of Notice Prior To Imposition of Punishment

20. The inquiry was conducted in accordance with Rules and as it appears that the petitioner was granted adequate opportunity at all relevant stages. In the entire proceedings, no application was filed by the petitioner stating that there was violation of Principles of Natural Justice and/or he was not granted adequate opportunity by the Inquiring Authority. A copy of the report of the Inquiry Authority dated 22nd March, 2005 was duly furnished to the delinquent officer, who submitted a detailed representation putting forward his point of view as well as indicating his objections to the report. Even in this representation no specific reference was made to any alleged violation of Principles of Natural Justice. On the contrary, the representationist had discussed the entire oral and documentary evidence in some elaboration. In view of the detailed discussion, which was considered by the Full Court, there was hardly any occasion for grant of opportunity of personal hearing to the petitioner. Even Rule 15(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, which is applicable to the members of service, it is not obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to grant personal hearing to the delinquent officer but in any case no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner as his point of view has been duly considered by the Full Court as well as the Disciplinary Authority.

21. Counsel for the respondents has rightly placed reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma and Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad etc. etc. v. B. Karunakar, etc. etc. to contend that procedural rules are not mandatory and no interference is called for when no prejudice is caused to the concerned officer. It was also held that no inflexible rule can be laid down in compliance of Principles of Natural Justice. Mere technical violation is not sufficient to invite the objection of violation of Principles of Natural Justice.

25. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner then lastly while relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors. contended that it was obligatory upon the disciplinary authority to serve upon the petitioner a second show cause notice relating to quantum of punishment before inflicting the punishment of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner. Counsel for the respondent while relying upon the same judgment as well as the judgment of the Supreme Court in the cases of S.P. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. 1994 SCC (L&S) 1018 and Secretary, Central Board of Excise and Customs and Ors. v. K.S. Mahalingam 1986 SCC (L&S) 374 argued that the department was not required to serve second notice upon the petitioner and there has been no violation of any Rule or established procedure in that regard.

22. The Delhi Judicial Service Rules under Rule 33 makes a provision regarding applicability of CCS (CCA) Rules on the members of the service. The said Rules do not contain any provision, which makes it obligatory upon the Disciplinary Authority, to serve the second show cause notice in relation to quantum of punishment. In fact, none has been pointed by the petitioner. Before the report was accepted by the Full Court, show cause notice was served upon the petitioner granting him an opportunity to fully make the representation to the authorities and put forward his point of view on the merits of the Articles of Charge contained in the report as well as all other matters ancillary thereto. The show cause notice served upon the petitioner was noway restricted. Along with the notice admittedly copy of the Inquiry Report had been furnished to the petitioner and he made a very detailed representation before the competent authority. In the case of S.P. Mehta (supra) and even B. Karunakar (supra), the Supreme Court had held that after amendment of Articles 311 by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, Rule 15(4) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 was also amended deleting the requirement of the second notice with effect from 2nd September, 1978. The emphasis in the case of B. Karunakar (supra) is that before the report is accepted by the authority, the delinquent officer should have a fair opportunity to put forward his point of view and even question the correctness of the findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer.

This admittedly was done in the present case. Learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner has not been able to establish that petitioner had suffered any prejudice even in this regard. Articles of Charge 1 and 3, which is stated to be proved against the delinquent officer are the very foundation for inflicting the punishment of compulsory retirement upon the petitioner. This punishment, keeping in view the office that the petitioner held, cannot be said to be unreasonable, excessive or disproportionate to the Articles of Charge.

23. For the reasons afore-recorded, we find no merit in the writ petition. The same is accordingly dismissed while leaving the parties to bear their own costs.