Delhi High Court
Brij Textile vs The Secretary, Ministry Of ... on 20 February, 2007
Author: B D Ahmed
Bench: B D Ahmed
JUDGMENT
Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.
1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioner being aggrieved by the order dated 03.09.2002 passed by the Joint Secretary and Chief Vigilance Officer, Department of Commerce, Ministry of Commerce and Industries (Supplies Division), Government of India. This order was passed on the ground that the petitioner had made supplies to hospitals and in particular to Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi which were found to be substandard. As a result of this order, a ban on commercial dealings / business dealings has been imposed on the firm in connection with supplies to the Government. The ban has been imposed w.e.f. 03.09.2002 for a period of 10 years.
2. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that on the basis of the alleged material collected during a surprise check, an FIR was also registered against the petitioner and three others under Sections 120-B/420 IPC and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. This FIR was registered on 05.02.1998.
3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that pursuant to the said FIR, investigation was carried out which resulted in the filing of the charge-sheet against one Sandeep Gupta, who is a partner in the petitioner firm (M/s Brij Textiles) and one Mr Sudarshan Malik, who is the Deputy Secretary of the Association of Corporations and Apex Societies of Handlooms (ACASH). The counsel further submitted that after the filing of the charge-sheet, at the stage of consideration of framing of charges, the learned Special Judge, New Delhi by an order dated 24.03.2005 was pleased to discharge both the accused [Sandeep Gupta and Sudarshan Malik]. The sum and substance of the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is that the criminal proceedings which had been launched on the basis of the very same surprise check and on the basis of the allegations that substandard material had been supplied by the petitioner had culminated in the order of discharge of the petitioner as well as the co-accused. Therefore, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner, there was no substance and / or material available against the petitioner and the ban order ought not to have been passed.
4. Mr Narula, the learned senior counsel who appeared on behalf of the respondents 1 and 2, submitted that criminal proceedings are different from civil proceedings and the degree of proof required in the two proceedings are different. Whereas under criminal proceedings, the case has to be established beyond reasonable doubt, in the case of the civil proceedings, preponderance of probabilities would be sufficient for sustaining an order. Mr Narula also submitted that the ban order had been passed on 03.09.2002 and the petitioner had accepted the same. It is only after the order on charge was passed by the Special Judge on 24.03.2005 in the criminal proceedings that the petitioner has filed the present petition in November, 2006. Therefore, according to Mr Narula, this petition ought to be dismissed.
5. Considering the submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties, I am of the view that the finding with regard to supply of substandard materials by the petitioner and the consequent ban imposed by the order dated 03.09.2002 ought not to be interfered with. However, there is some scope for a reconsideration of the extent of ban. The period of ban imposed is 10 years and the learned Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that since the petitioners have been discharged in the criminal case, this issue ought to be reconsidered.
6. Accordingly, this writ petition is disposed of with the direction that if the petitioner feels appropriate, he may move a representation before the Chief Vigilance Officer, Department of Commerce (Supplies Division), Ministry of Commerce and Industry within two weeks from today limited to the question of the period of ban. The said Chief Vigilance Officer shall, on receipt of such a representation, consider the case and take a decision within six weeks thereafter. It is made clear that the only scope of the representation that may be made to the Chief Vigilance Officer will be with regard to the period of ban. This writ petition stands disposed of. No costs.
