Delhi High Court
Mathuradas Narandas And Sons ... vs The Asstt. P.F. Commissioner And ... on 31 August, 2007
Author: H Kohli
Bench: H Kohli
JUDGMENT
Hima Kohli, J.
1. With the consent of the parties, the matter has been heard and disposed of finally at this stage.
2. In the present writ petition the petitioner has assailed the order dated 28.11.2006, passed by the Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as `the Tribunal'), rejecting the appeal filed by the petitioner against the order dated 30.5.2006, passed by the APFC, Rajkot. The petitioner's grievance is that its appeal has been rejected only on the ground that the same was barred by delay and laches of 114 days, for which there was no explanation offered by the petitioner.
3. Counsel for the respondent draws the attention of this Court to Rule 7 (2) of the EPFAT (Procedure) Rules, 1997, which stipulates that any person aggrieved by a notification issued by the Central Government or an order passed by the Central Government or any other Authority under the Act, may within 60 days from the date of issue of the notification/ order, prefer an appeal to the Tribunal. The said provision further stipulates that if the Appellate Tribunal is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the prescribed period, then it may extend the said period by a further period of 60 days. Counsel for the respondent states that there is no infirmity in the impugned order inasmuch as the petitioner failed to show just and sufficient cause to seek extension of time for filing the appeal before the Appellate Tribunal.
4. A perusal of the impugned order shows that the petitioner had filed an application before the Tribunal and sought condensation of delay by stating inter alia that documents relevant to the case submitted before the APFC, Rajkot in the proceedings under Section 7 of the Act could not be taken back due to which there was delay in filing the present appeal. On enquiry from the counsel for the petitioner as to whether those documents have been obtained now and if so, whether they have been placed on record, the answer is that the documents are not available till now and have still not been filed on the record of this Court. There is no explanation much less plausible explanation offered on behalf of the petitioner as to why the documents in question could not be taken back, what efforts, if any, were made by the petitioner to take them back, and what were the impediments in taking them back from the office of the R.P.F.C., Rajkot.
5. Counsel for the petitioner has also sought to contend that there was a justification for the delay in filing the appeal inasmuch as the Appellate Tribunal was not functioning in the absence of a Presiding Officer from 1.12.2005 to 23.9.2006. The aforesaid contention is however, devoid of merits as the petitioner chose to file an appeal against the order of the A.P.F.C., Rajkot dated 30.5.2006, only on 21.11.2006. Thus, the said plea of absence of the Presiding Officer can be of no assistance to the petitioner.
6. In support of his submissions counsel for the respondent has sought to place reliance on the following judgments:
(i) Additional Regional Provident Commissioner, Meerut v. Employees Provident Appellate Tribunal and Ors. 2005 (7) AD Delhi 155
(ii) Manu Valley Tea Company Ltd. v. Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal and Anr. WP (C) No.23038/2005, decided on 14.12.2005.
(iii) Megacity Cement Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. WP (C) No.8858/2006, decided on 30.5.2006.
(iv) Punjabi Academy v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and Ors. WP (C) No.14231/2005, decided on 16.10.2006.
(v) Prudential Spinners Ltd.Vs. The Employees P.F.Appellate Tribunal, 2007 (3) AD (Delhi) 41.
7. All the aforementioned judgments point out that limitation under the Rules cannot be extended beyond a period of 60 days. The relevant extract from the judgment of this Court in the case of Punjabi Academy (supra) is being reproduced herein under, wherein, after referring to its earlier judgments in the cases of Manu Valley Tea Company (supra), Additional Regional Provident Commissioner (supra) and M/s Megacity Cement Pvt. Ltd. (supra), it was held as below:
Para 4 - The petitioner is citing the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bihar and Ors. v. Kameshwar Prasad Singh and Anr. 2001 (1) All India Service Law Journal 76, in which general observations about the approach required to be adopted by the court in condoning the delay has been advised. However, in the present case the limitation is prescribed by a specific rule and the condensation of the delay also has to be considered within the purview of that specific rule. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Additional Regional Provident Commissioner, Meerut v. Employees Provident Appellate Tribunal and Ors. 2005 (7) AD Delhi 155 has held that limitation under these rules could not be extended beyond a period of 60 days. Two judgments following the Division Bench judgment are also cited by the respondents' counsel. These judgments have been rendered in the case of Manu Valley Tea Company Limited v. Employees Provident Fund Appellate Tribunal and Anr. in WP(C) 23038/2005, decided on 14.12.2005 and in the case of Megacity Cement Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and Ors. in WP(C) 8858/2006, decided on 30.5.2006. Copies of these two judgments have been handed over by Mr.R.C. Chawla. Let them be placed on the record.
Para -5 In view of the settled position of law, the original claim of the petitioner in the present writ petition cannot be considered on merit. The Appellate Tribunal has rightly found the appeal to be time-barred. No interference by this Court is called for.
8. In the course of arguments, counsel for the petitioner states that the petitioner is ready and willing to deposit 75% of the amount in Court if the appeal is directed to be entertained by the Tribunal. In view of the fact that the petitioner has failed to make out any case for crossing the hurdle of gross delay and laches in filing the appeal, the said offer of the petitioner of depositing 75% of the awarded amount for entertaining his appeal at this belated stage is not acceptable.
9. In view of the aforesaid position of law and failure on the part of the petitioner to make out any just and sufficient cause to extend the period for filing the appeal beyond the prescribed period of 60 days, this Court declines to interfere with the impugned order dated 28.11.2006, which is neither perverse or arbitrary nor does it suffer with any material irregularity. The writ petition and the pending application are therefore dismissed as being devoid of merits.
