Balak Ram vs D.T.C.
2007 Latest Caselaw 1439 Del

JUDGMENT

Hima Kohli, J.

Page 2441

1. The present writ petition is directed against the notice to show cause dated 2.7.1992 issued by the respondent No. 2, and orders dated 29.6.1992 and 17.6.1992 issued by the respondent No. 3. Subsequently, the petitioner has given up his prayer assailing the order of punishment dated 17.6.1992.

2. A brief narration of the facts is necessary. The petitioner is employed with the respondent No. 1 as a Conductor since the year 1981. On 3.1.1991, a charge-sheet was issued against the petitioner to which Page 2442 he filed a reply. Pursuant thereto, inquiry proceedings were held by the respondent and the petitioner participated therein. On the recommendations of the Inquiry Officer, the disciplinary authority issued a notice to show cause dated 1.6.1992 to the petitioner proposing to impose the following punishment on the petitioner:

Stoppage of next due three increments with cumulative effect

3. A reply to the aforesaid show cause notice was duly filed by the petitioner. However, vide order dated 17.6.1992, the punishment as indicated above was imposed on the petitioner and the order attained finality as the petitioner did not challenge the same before the appellate authority.

4. On 27.6.1992, the petitioner was transferred to Nand Nagri Depot. Thereafter, vide letter dated 29.6.1992, the petitioner was informed that the appellate authority, viz. the Regional Manager did not agree with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, vide order dated 17.6.1992 and had decided to quash the said order. Pursuant thereto, another notice to show cause dated 2.7.1992 was issued to the petitioner, stating inter alia that the respondents proposed to impose a punishment of removal from service on the petitioner and the petitioner was called upon to render an explanation thereon. Immediately thereafter, the petitioner filed the present writ petition on 13.7.1992, assailing the second notice to show cause dated 2.7.1992. Vide order dated 14.7.1992, at the admission stage itself, this Court directed the parties to maintain status quo.

5. Counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned notice to show cause proposing to remove the petitioner from service is illegal and arbitrary for the reason that there is no power of review with the appellate authority inasmuch as it can neither enhance nor change the punishment imposed on the petitioner in the absence of any appeal filed by the petitioner. It is further stated that pursuant to the punishment imposed on the petitioner, the same was given effect to by making a noting regarding the same in his service book.

6. It is further stated by the counsel for the petitioner that the entire action of the respondent in proceeding to quash the punishment imposed on the petitioner of stoppage of his next three increments with cumulative effect and thereafter in proceeding with a proposal to remove the petitioner from service is without authority under the rules of the respondent/DTC. In this regard, reference is made to the letter dated 18.5.2006 issued by the respondent fixing the pay of the petitioner, to state that a bare perusal of the said letter, read in conjunction with the salary slip of the petitioner, shows that in fact the basic pay of the petitioner in the month of April, 2006 was Rs. 4,350/- whereas the pay fixation letter for the period 1.2.1993 to 1.4.2006 issued by the respondent shows the said basic pay as being effective from 1.4.2002.

7. Counsel for the petitioner also places reliance on the judgments rendered by this Court in the cases of S.S. Bhatia v. DTC, reported as Page 2443 and Ram Naresh v. DTC, being WP(C) 2894/1992 decided on 23rd May, 2006. It is stated that the facts of the present case are identical to the facts in the case of Ram Naresh (supra) wherein the petitioner was charge- sheeted on the allegations of misconduct and pursuant to a departmental inquiry, he was held guilty of the charges, as a result of which the DTC issued an order imposing penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect against the petitioner therein. The said punishment was also given effect to. However, subsequently, the respondent/DTC issued an order to the petitioner therein indicating that the charge-sheet had been re-opened after the stage of findings, and as per the orders of the appellate authority, another order was issued by the disciplinary authority provisionally proposing the penalty of removal from service against the petitioner therein. The petitioner therein protested against the issuance of the said show cause notice on the ground that the penalty had already been given effect to and nothing survived in relation to misconduct allegedly found proved and acted upon. Aggrieved by the aforesaid proposed penalty, the petitioner approached the High Court by filing a writ petition, which was decided by a Single Judge of this Court whereunder it was held as under:

12. The circumstances of this case show that the charges were investigated and the penalty had worked itself out. Indeed the petitioner's annual increment was withheld. There is nothing suggestive of the petitioner having approached the superior or appellate authorities, claiming to be aggrieved by the penalty of stoppage of one increment. Thereafter, in the absence of a power to review or re-open penalty, or in the absence of an appeal in which if there was a power to review the penalty after the show cause notice, it was not open to the DTC unilaterally on the re-appreciation of some official other than the disciplinary authority to re-open the issue. Even in the case of the disciplinary authority, such power has to be shown to exist positively. Nothing was shown in the course of the proceedings in support of the action cancelling the penalty as it were on 23rd August, 1992 and enabling the authority to issue the show cause notice on 3rd August, 1992.

13. In S.S. Bhatia's case, the Court had noted that in terms of Standing orders, the appellate authority could enhance the punishment only if an appeal had been preferred and was pending before it. The Court had also concluded the rules do not provide for exercise of suo motu power to review the order of the review authority by the appellate authority. It was, therefore, concluded in that case that the appellate authority, namely, the superior officer had no power to cancel or review the penalty which had been otherwise imposed and acted upon.

14. I am of the opinion, additionally, that the power of the DTC cannot fall outside the four corners of the statute or rules which exhaustively deal with all aspects of service. While there is a general proposition that an administrative authority can review its decisions having regard to the exigencies of the case, that principle, in my opinion, cannot apply to circumstances as in the present case where the power Page 2444 exercised is essentially quasi-judicial in nature and visits a person or citizen with adverse consequences.

8. Counsel for the respondent submits that the present writ petition filed by the petitioner is pre-mature inasmuch as it was only a notice to show cause that was issued to the petitioner and no penalty was imposed, and therefore he ought to have first filed a reply to the said notice to show cause instead of rushing to this Court by way of the present writ petition. It is further submitted that the case of the petitioner is very different from those relied upon by him, inasmuch as in the case of S.S. Bhatia's case (supra), the appellate authority enhanced the punishment whereas in the present case, the appellate authority had only quashed the order of the disciplinary authority and was yet to impose a penalty of enhancement of punishment. However, counsel for the respondent fairly states that the service book of the petitioner reflects punishment of stoppage of next due three increments and that there is no note thereon that the punishment had been quashed by the appellate authority.

9. In view of the facts and circumstances of the present case and perusing the judgment in the case of Ram Naresh (supra), it cannot be held that the facts of the present case are not identical to those in the aforesaid case. The relevant provision of law, i.e., Regulation 15 of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (Conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952 deals with the powers of the appellate authority to enforce the penalty. However, the said regulation does not provide for exercise of suo motu power of review the order of the disciplinary authority, and thus, any action taken by the appellate authority to suo motu quash the order of the disciplinary authority and issue a fresh notice to show cause to the petitioner for the same charge-sheet is not maintainable and permissible.

10. For the reasons stated hereinabove, this Court deems it just, fit and appropriate to hold that the petitioner is justified in contending that the notice to show cause dated 2.7.1992 is illegal and is liable to be quashed. The powers exercised by the disciplinary authority by imposing a punishment of stoppage of next due three increments with cumulative effect on the petitioner have not even been challenged by the petitioner and the appellate authority should not have visited the petitioner with another show cause notice for the same cause of action as the appellate authority has no power to cancel or review the penalty which has not only been imposed on the petitioner but has also been acted upon.

11. In view of the aforesaid findings, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned notice to show cause dated 2.7.1992 is quashed.

12. No order as to costs.