Ram Naresh vs Dtc
2006 Latest Caselaw 991 Del

JUDGMENT

S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

1. The writ petitioner in these proceedings questions an order dated 23.6.1992 as also a show cause notice dated 3.8.1992 proposing imposition of penalty of removal upon him, by his employer, The Delhi Transport Corporation (hereafter referred to as 'DTC').

2. The facts are not in dispute; the petitioner was appointed as a Conductor by the DTC in the year 1984. He was charge sheeted on allegations of mis-conduct on 20th February, 1992. The DTC found his explanation inadequate and directed a departmental enquiry. The Enquiry Officer after conducting a domestic enquiry, submitted his report, holding the petitioner guilty of the charges.

3. On 16th April, 1992, the DTC issued an order imposing the penalty of stoppage of one increment with cumulative effect. The order reads as follows:

DELHI TRANSPORT CORPORATION

(A GOVT. OF INDIA UNDERTAKING) OKHLA DEPOT: NEW DELHI

No. OD-1/AI(T)/C-20/92/1759 Dated: 16.4.92

The reply submitted by Shri Ram Naresh, Conductor B. No. 22077 in response to show cause notice No. OD-1/AI(T)/C-20/92/198 dated 31.3.92 has been considered thoroughly by the undersigned, but not found fully satisfactory. Hence, the following penalty is imposed upon him:

Stoppage of next due one increment with cumulative effect.

The subsistence allowance already ordered and paid to him during the period he remained under suspension is considered adequate.

4. Ms. Rasmeet K. Charya, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the above penalty was given effect to. The petitioner was entitled to his annual increment on 1st May, 1992. The increment was however withheld, pursuant to the penalty. Thereafter, on 23rd June, 1992 DTC issued an order to the petitioner indicating that in respect of the charge sheet dated 20th February, 1992 (for which the penalty had been imposed) had been 're-opened' after the stage of the findings, as per the orders of the Regional Manager. Later, on 3rd August, 1992 an order was issued by the Depot Manager provisionally proposing the penalty of removal from service as per para 15(2) of the Delhi Road Transport Authority (conditions of Appointment and Service) Regulations, 1952. The petitioner protested the issuance of this show cause notice. In his reply dated 10th August, 1992 he also mentioned that the penalty had been given effect to and, therefore, nothing survived in relation to mis-conduct allegedly found proved and acted upon.

5. The petitioner approached this Court at the threshold and by an order dated 19th August, 1992, the Court, while entertaining the petition directed that no further action ought to be taken pursuant to the letter dated 3rd August, 1992. Later Rule was issued and the interim order has subsisted till date.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the provisions of the DRTA and submitted that in the absence of any power or regulation, enabling the respondent to open a settled issue in a departmental proceeding, the DTC could not have reviewed the findings, cancelled the penalty and sought to impose a fresh punishment.

7. Learned counsel relied upon the decision of this Court in S.S. Bhatia v. Delhi Transport Corporation, . She submitted that the Court, in that decision, had taken into consideration various circulars and orders including the office Order No. 69.

8. Ms. Aarati Mahajan, learned Counsel for the respondent submitted that the order dated 3rd August, 1992 cannot be faulted with because the penalty imposed in this case was in violation of the binding of circulation dated 30th August, 1965. A copy of the circular has been placed on record. It enjoins every disciplinary authority to ensure that the punishment to be imposed on proven charges of mis-conduct ought to be commensurate with the gravity of the offence, by taking into consideration all relevant circumstances and the past record of the delinquent employee.

9. Learned counsel also submitted that the petitioner should not have rushed to the Court and ought to have awaited order in the departmental proceedings and preferred an appeal.

10. The facts of this case disclose that the petitioner was imposed with a penalty after finding a guilt was recorded, by order dated 16th April, 1992. That penalty was given effect to immediately thereafter w.e.f. 1st May, 1992 when the petitioner's annual increment fell due. The increment was withheld. The question is whether the DTC could have acted the way it did subsequently by seeking to re-open the entire issue and issuing a show cause notice on a re- appreciating of the circumstances, as it were.

11. It is too well settled that every action of an executive or a statutory authority has to be backed by, or relatable to a statutory provision, be it a rule, regulation or provision of an enactment. In any case, the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution binds every State Agency to non-arbitrary and fair behavior . This means that such agencies, particularly a statutory corporation like DTC, have to act on the basis of express powers, and not on whims and caprices.

12. The circumstances of this case show that the charges were investigated and the penalty had worked itself out. Indeed the petitioner's annual increment was withheld. There is nothing suggestive of the petitioner having approached the superior or appellate authorities, claiming to be aggrieved by the penalty of stoppage of one increment. Therefore, in the absence of a power to review or re-open penalty, or in the absence of an appeal in which if there was a power to review the penalty after the show cause notice, it was not open to the DTC unilaterally on the re-appreciation of some official other than the disciplinary authority to re-open the issue. Even, in the case of the disciplinary authority, such power has to be shown to exist positively. Nothing was shown in the course of the proceedings in support of the action cancelling the penalty as it were on 23rd August, 1992 and enabling the authority to issue the show cause notice on 3rd August, 1992.

13. In S.S. Bhatia's case the Court had noted that in terms of Standing orders, the appellate authority could enhance the punishment only if an appeal had been preferred and was pending before it. The Court had also concluded the rules do not provide for exercise of suo motu power to review the order of the review authority by the appellate authority. It was, therefore, concluded in that case that the appellate authority, namely, the superior officer had no power to cancel or review the penalty which had been otherwise imposed and acted upon.

14. I am of the opinion, additionally, that the power of the DTC cannot fall outside the four corners of the statute or rules which exhaustively deal with all aspects of service. While there is a general proposition that an administrative authority can review its decisions having regard to the exigencies of the case, that principle, in my opinion, cannot apply to circumstances as in the present case where the power exercised is essentially quasi-judicial in nature and visits a person or citizen with adverse consequences.

15. In view of the above findings, the writ petition has to succeed. It is accordingly allowed. Rule is made absolute in the above terms.