Delhi High Court
State Trading Corporation Of ... vs Emirates Trading Agency on 23 February, 2006
Author: S K Kaul
Bench: S K Kaul
JUDGMENT
Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.
IA 10327/1999
1. The petitioner entered into an agreement with the respondent on 07.03.1991 for supply of 50,000 metric tonnes of wheat which was subsequently increased by two amendments to 1,10,000 metric tonnes. Disputes having arisen between the parties, and in view of the arbitration clause existing in the contract, the matter was referred for arbitration to arbitral tribunal of Sh. F.A. Favre, Chairman, Justice Satish Chandra (Retd.) and Sh. B.K. Vashisht. The arbitral tribunal made and published the award dated 24.03.1995 and by a majority decision held in favor of the petitioner. The respondent aggrieved by the same has filed objections under section 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940.
2. A perusal of the objections shows that the same are drawn up in the form of grounds of appeal against a judgment or decree of civil court. The respondent seems to be under misconception that this court sits as a court of appeal while scrutinising the award. The grounds raised are issues of the tribunal not appreciating the evidence correctly or not considering the merits of the arguments advanced by the respondent or not giving due weightage to the testimony available on behalf of the respondent. This is certainly not the scope of Section 30 and 33 of the said Act.
3. The position in law has been well settled and in M/s Sudarsan Trading Co. v. Govt of Kerala , the Apex Court had observed that so long as the view taken by the arbitrator is plausible, though perhaps not the only correct view, the award cannot be examined by the court. In such a situation, the High court was held to have no jurisdiction to examine different items clause by clause as awarded by the arbitrator. The Apex Court in Food Corporation of India v. Joginderpal Mohinderpal and Anr. had cautioned that unless an award is contrary to law and misconduct is with reference to either personal misconduct of the arbitrator or misconduct of law, an award ought not to be interfered with. It is not ordinarily for the court to re-appreciate the evidence and in the absence of the award being absurd, reasonableness is not a matter to be considered by the court. The Apex Court in State of UP v. Allied Constructions has once again emphasised and reported that Section 30 of the Act providing for setting aside an award is restrictive in its operation and unless one of the conditions specified therein is satisfied, an award cannot be set aside. The arbitrator is a judge chosen by the parties and his decision is final and thus the court is precluded from re- appraising the evidence.
4. The aforesaid legal parameters squarely apply to the grounds taken by the respondent and thus the objections cannot be sustained.
5. The only question which, in my considered view, needs examination is the rate of interest awarded by the arbitral tribunal. The tribunal has held that interest at 21 per cent per annum would be payable by the respondent from date of notice i.e. 06.07.1992. This court for the relevant period of time has held in various judgments/orders that the rate of 12 per cent simple interest is the prevailing commercial rate of interest and which, in my considered view, is the rate of interest which ought to be granted in the present case.
6. In view of the aforesaid, the objection stands disposed of.
CS(OS) 1523A/1997
In view of objections having been disposed of, the award of the arbitral tribunal as aforesaid dated 14.03.1995 is made rule of the court with the modification that the petitioner is allowed interest at the rate of 12 per cent simple interest in stead of 21 per cent from the date of notice i.e. 06.07.1992 till date of decree. The petitioner is also held entitled to future interest from the date of decree till date of realisation @ 9 per cent simple interest.
Parties are left to bear their own costs.
Decree sheet be drawn up accordingly.
