Ramjan Son Of Tamijuddin vs State (G.N.C.T.) Of Delhi
2005 Latest Caselaw 17 Del

JUDGMENT

Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. The present appeal is filed by the appellant and is directed against the judgment of conviction passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge in SC No. 80/2000. By the aforesaid judgment, the appellant herein was convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and also sentenced to pay fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months.

2. A quarrel took place between the accused Ramjan Ali and Pramod on the issue of chappal on 26.5.2000. The accused started abusing Pramod for bringing the chappal from his room whereupon Dalip intervened and asked the accused not to abuse Pramod. On this, Ramjan Ali told Dalip that he will see him first and saying this he took out a knife and stabbed Dalip in his chest. There was only one single stab injury on the chest of the deceased from which the blood starting oozing out consequent to which Dalip fell down on the ground and later on he was declared brought dead in the hospital by the doctor.

3. The prosecution, in support of its case, examined as many as 22 witnesses. PW 9, PW 10 and PW 15 are stated to be eye-witnesses to the occurrence whereas the doctor, who performed the postmortem examination was also examined as a prosecution witness as PW-3. There were two investigating officers being PWs 17 and 21. After recording the evidence of all the witnesses and hearing arguments, the learned Additional Sessions Judge appreciated the evidence on record and after such appreciation held that it is the accused/appellant, who committed murder of Dalip and that the case is proved beyond reasonable doubt. The learned Additional Sessions Judge also held the appellant guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 Indian Penal Code. Thereafter after hearing the counsel for the parties, the learned Additional Sessions Judge passed the order on the sentence sentencing the appellant to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs. 2,000/- and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two months. Being aggrieved by the said judgment, the present appeal is filed on which we have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

4. Counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted that there was only one single blow over a quarrel which was trivial in nature. It was also submitted that there was no premeditation at all and the incident had occurred at the spur of a moment due to heat generated during the quarrel, which had taken place and, therefore, the present case cannot be said to be the case within the parameter of paras 1 or 2 of Section 300 IPC. According to the learned counsel, if at all, the accused could be said to have committed an offence under Part II of Section 304 IPC. In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shitla Prasad alias Baba v. State of U.P. and Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab . He has also referred to and relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Tholan v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in 1984 SCC (Cri) 164.

5. Mr. Chadha, Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State has, however submitted that the present case squarely falls within the ambit of clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC. He has submitted that knife blow was given by the accused in the present case on the chest of the deceased, which is a vital part of the body and, therefore, it should be deduced that the appellant had given the aforesaid blow with the intention of causing bodily injury to the deceased and that the said injury inflicted on the deceased was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. In support of his contention he has also relied upon the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab .

6. We have considered the ratio of the aforesaid judgments in the light of the evidence that is adduced in the present case.

7. Counsel appearing for the State has heavily relied upon the evidence adduced by the three alleged eye-witnesses, namely, PW-9 Ram Bali son of Shiv Bachan; PW-10 Ram Dev son of Kanhiya Ram and PW-15 Pramod s/o Chanar Yadav.

8. We have perused the deposition of the said PW-9, who has stated that the accused Ramjan Ali had taken away the chappal of Pramod, who had put an identification mark of nail in the chappal and that when Pramod brought the chappal back to his room, Ramjan abused Pramod by coming to his room and that Dalip intervened and separated Pramod from accused Ramjan. It is also stated that the said incident took place at about 5.30 in the morning. After about 10 minutes, Ramjan again came to the room of Dalip where Pramod was also sitting on cot. Accused Ramjan came and started abusing Pramod on the issue of chappal. When Dalip told accused Ramjan as to why he was quarreling, accused Ramjan Ali told Dalip as to why he was intervening. It is at this stage that Ramjan Ali said that he would see Pramod later and will see Dalip first and thereafter the accused Ramjan Ali took out a knife from his pocket and stabbed Dalip in his chest. It is stated that the accused Ramjan Ali was thereafter caught hold of by the other occupants of the rooms of the house. To the same effect is the evidence of PW-10 and PW-15. PW-15 is Pramod and he has reiterated what PW-9 had stated in his deposition. PW-10 is Ram Dev and his evidence is almost to the same effect as that of PW-9 and PW-15.

9. On the basis of the said evidence on record, it was sought to be submitted by the Additional Public Prosecutor that the intention of the appellant to cause bodily injury to the deceased was apparent as he had gone back to his room and brought a knife with him in his pocket. Clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC on which reliance was placed by the counsel for the State provides that a culpable homicide is murder if the act by which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or if it is done with the intention of causing bodily injury to any person and the bodily injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It is the contention of the Additional Public Prosecutor that the intention of the accused/appellant was apparent in giving a knife blow on the chest of the deceased after bringing a knife from his room.

10. Counsel for the appellant, however, submits that no such intention could be deduced as only a single blow was given by the appellant to the deceased in the course of a quarrel, which was trivial in nature and that the said act was not premeditated.

11. Deposition of the three eye-witnesses clearly establishes that there was only one single blow in the chest by a knife. It is not brought on record by the prosecution as sought to be submitted by the Public Prosecutor that the accused went back to his room and collected a knife and put it in his pocket and thereafter coming to the room of Dalip, stabbed him in his chest. The knife was also stated to be in his pocket. If he had the intention of killing Dalip, he would have brought the knife in his hand and then would have stabbed Dalip. In the present case, evidence produced sufficiently proves that after the first incident had taken place, the accused had gone back to his room and he came back to the same room after about 10 minutes and then again picked up a quarrel with Pramod and not with Dalip. As Dalip intervened in the matter he took out a knife from his pocket and stabbed Dalip. Therefore, it cannot be said that the said action of the appellant in stabbing the deceased was in any manner premeditated. The quarrel was only between the accused appellant and Pramod and Dalip was not in the picture at all. But when Dalip intervened on behalf of Pramod, the attention was diverted to him. Therefore, injury and stabbing of Dalip was done at the spur of the moment. The accused had no quarrel with Dalip. There was a quarrel which started as Pramod had brought back the chappal from the room of the accused/appellant and the incident had taken at a spur of the moment and the appellant had stabbed the deceased, as he had tried to intervene and came in between the quarrel which was initially between the accused and the deceased. Presence of Dalip in the room of Pramod was accidental. It is only because he was present in the room and happened to intervene, he had to bear the brunt.

12. In this connection, we may appropriately extract paragraph 8 of the judgment in Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab (supra) :

"The next question is what offence the appellant is shown to have committed? In a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife. The incident occurred around 1.45 noon. The quarrel was of a trivial nature even in such a trivial quarrel the appellant wielded a weapon like a knife and landed a blow in the chest. In these circumstances, it is a permissible inference that the appellant at least could be imputed with a knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. Therefore, the appellant is shown to have committed an offence under Section 304, Part II of the I.P.C. and a sentence of imprisonment for 5 years will meet the ends of justice."

The ratio laid down in the aforesaid few sentences squarely cover the present case, the facts of which are almost similar.

13. In our considered opinion, the totality of the circumstantial evidence which are pointed out and proved in this case would lead to only one conclusion that the accused did not have any intention of causing bodily injury, which is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. But the accused had a knife in his possession and gave a blow with the said knife on the chest, which proved to be fatal and, therefore, it is proved that he had the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. In that view of the matter, we set aside the order of conviction and sentence of life imprisonment passed against the accused under section 302 I.P.C. and convict the accused/appellant by holding that the accused/appellant in the present case committed an offence which comes within the ambit of Part II of Section 304 IPC and he is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for seven years. While arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, we also derive support from the following observations of the Supreme Court in Tholan (supra). In paragraph 12, it was stated as under:-

".... Altercation with Sampat was on the spur of the moment, even the meeting was accidental. There arose a situation in which appellant probably misguided by his own egocentric nature objected as to why Sampat should ask him to leave the place and in this background he gave one blow with a knife which landed on the right side chest of the deceased, which has proved fatal. Could the appellant be said to have committed murder? In other words, whether Part I or Part III of Section 300 IPC would be attracted in the facts of this case. Even Mr. Rangam learned could for the State of Tamil Nadu could not very seriously contend that the appellant intended to commit murder of Sampat. His submission was that at any rate appellant, when he wielded a weapon like a knife and gave a blow on the chest, a vital part of the body, must have intended to cause that particular injury and this injury is objectively found by the medical evidence to be fatal and therefore Part III of Section 300 would be attracted. On this aspect, the decisions are legion and it is not necessary to recapitulate them here merely to cover idle parade of familiar knowledge. One can profitably refer to Jagrup Singh v. State of Haryana , Randhir Singh v. State of Punjab , Kulwant Rai v. State of Punjab and Hari Ram v. State of Haryana . To this list two more cases can be added: Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab and Ram Sunder v. State of U.P. [Criminal Appeal No. 555/83, decided on October 24, 1983]. Having regard to the ratio of each of these decisions, we are satisfied that even if Exception I is not attracted, the requisite intention cannot be attributed to the appellant. But in the circumstances herein discussed he wielded a weapon like a knife and therefore he can be attributed with the knowledge that he was likely to cause an injury which was likely to cause death. In such a situation, he would be guilty of committing an offence under Section 304 Part II of the Indian Penal Code...."

With the aforesaid modification in the order of conviction, the appeal stands allowed to the aforesaid extent.