Miss Sunint Kaur vs Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha ...
2005 Latest Caselaw 268 Del

JUDGMENT

Gita Mittal, J.

1. The petitioners in these petitions are aggrieved by the action of the Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University-respondent No. 1 in refusing to approve their admission to courses being conducted by the Guru Teg Bahadur Institute of Technology-respondent No. 2 in its management/minority quota. Inasmuch as the facts giving rise to the petitions and the issues raised in the two writ petitions are similar, both the writ petitions are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. There is no dispute so far as the factual matrix is concerned. The Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University respondent No. 1 had issued a Bulletin of Information for admission to the various courses being conducted under its aegis by different recognised institutes in Delhi. This Bulletin of Information sets out the courses for which admissions were available as well as the eligibility conditions for admission and the manner in which admissions would be granted.

3. As per the scheme of admissions notified in the Bulletin, the respondent No. 1 was required to conduct a Common Entrance Test(hereinafter referred to as the 'CET') for admission to the various courses being conducted by it and to draw up a common merit list. According to the Bulletin of Information, out of the total number of seats assigned to it in a course the respondent No. 1 was required to fill up 50% of the sanctioned intake from such merit list.

4. The respondent No. 2 is stated to be a self-financing 'minority status institution'. Clause 7.2 of the Bulletin for Information sets out that so far as institutes granted minority education institutes status is concerned, reservation for the minority community is provided. In such minority institutes, 50% of the total seats are reserved for the particular community to be filled by the management from the common entrance test in these institutions which have been granted minority status in such management quota.

5. The instant writ petitions are concerned with admissions for the academic year 2004 of candidates in such management quota in the respondent No. 2 institute which has been conferred minority status. As per Chapter 16 of the Bulletin for Information, a student seeking admission for a management seat was required to submit an additional application in the prescribed form III to the concerned institute Along with a process fee of Rs.200/- by 15th July, 2004 The admission against these seats was to be made at the institute level on merit as per the rank obtained by the candidate in the CET 2004 conducted by the university.

It is clearly stated that respondent No. 2 was to complete the admissions against these management seats and forward a copy of the same as well as the merit list of the students to the university by 23rd August, 2004 The last date was extended subsequently to 31st August, 2004 and later, further to 10th September, 2004 As per the scheme notified in the Bulletin, merit is the sole basis for admitting students and, therefore, the students seeking admission under the management quota were also required to take the CET 2004

6. The respondent No. 2 has been allocated a total of 60 seats in each of the courses in question namely Bachelor of Technology (Information Technology) and Bachelor of Technology (Computer Science and Engineering) Courses.

According to the Bulletin of Information, therefore only 30 seats in each course could be filled up by the respondent No. 1 university whereas 30 seats were left for allocation and admission as management seats to the respondent No. 2 institute.

7. In accordance with the scheme notified, applications were made by the petitioners and they participated in the CET 2004 which was held on 30th May, 2004 The result of the examination was declared on 11th June, 2004 Ms Sunint Kaur (petitioner in WP(C) No. 17468/2004) secured merit rank 8435 whereas Mr Taranver Singh Bajaj (petitioner in WP(C) No. 17470/2004) secured merit rank 5842. Both the petitioners in the two writ petitions participated in the first round of counselling but were not admitted on merit. It was pointed out that the petitioners did not participate in the second round of counselling which was held from 23rd to 28th August, 2004

8. It appears that there were certain drop outs from candidates who were admitted by the respondent No. 1 university in the courses of Bachelor of Technology (Information Technology) and Bachelor of Technology (Computer Science and Engineering) and seats in these disciplines fell vacant after their allocation to candidates by the respondent No. 1-University.

9. Ms Sunint Kaur petitioner in WP(C) 17468/2004 was seeking admission to the Bachelor of Technology (Information Technology) whereas Mr. Taranveer Singh Bajaj was seeking admission to Bachelor of Technology (Computer Science and Engineering).

On 31st August, 2004, the respondent No. 2 granted admission in the respective courses to the two petitioners against the seats which were within the quota allocation of the respondent No. 1 university and had fallen vacant on account of the students who were allocated the same having dropped out of the courses. These seats have been adverted to as the 'drop out seats' by the parties.

10. Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the total number of seats allocated in the two courses being pursued by the petitioners has not varied despite admission of the petitioners. According to the counsel for the petitioners, the petitioners were shown the conditions mentioned in para 18.8 of the Bulletin of Information at the time of their admission which merely states that admissions are provisional and that admission would be cancelled summarily if it was found at any stage that the candidate had furnished false or incorrect information in the application form or at the time of counselling/admission. According to the learned counsel for the petitioners, undertakings were taken from the petitioners which were stated to be required so as to comply with para 18.8 of the Bulletin of Information. It is also submitted that the petitioner was admitted because the respondent No. 1 university was permitting institutes to fill up the vacancies rendered on account of drop outs from the university allocation. According to the petitioner, the respondent No. 2 admitted the petitioners knowingly without notifying to the petitioners that they were being admitted against drop outs from the university allocated students.

Counsel for the petitioners contends that the petitioners were admitted to the courses and are pursuing the same even on date. To the utter shock of the petitioners they received letters dated 30th September, 2004 from the respondent No. 2 stating that as the respondent No. 1 was objecting to the admission of the petitioners, it would be difficult for the Institute to allow the petitioners to continue in it. The petitioners sent representations against this to the respondent No. 2 dated 18th October, 2000. Against this the respondent No. 2 addressed a letter dated 18th October, 2004 stating that the respondent No. 1 had not approved the admissions of the petitioners. The petitioners submit that if they are required to discontinue the course they will lose an academic year. These communications have been impugned in the present petition. It is submitted that on equitable considerations Courts have been requiring universities and institutes even to create additional seats in support of the interests of the students. Reliance has been placed on the judgment entitled Smt. Tarawati v. SCERT and others in support of this submission.

11. This claim of the petitioners is vehemently repudiated by the respondents. According to the respondent No. 2, the petitioners were low in merit and were aware that they could not get admission in the courses on merit in the second counselling. These candidates were also aware of the fact that there was no vacancy in the management quota and that the 30 seats wherein admission by the respondent No. 2 was permissible as per the Bulletin of Information, stood fully allocated and filled up.

12. As the respondent No. 2 could not have made admissions to such quota beyond 30 seats, the respondent No. 2 contends that it had informed the petitioners of the position. In these circumstances, both the petitioners and their guardians had submitted undertakings. The undertakings given by the petitioners and their guardians were voluntary and hand written. The petitioners were aware that such undertakings were not taken from the other candidates.

13. Respondent No. 2 submits that even with the admission of the petitioners, the total number of admissions to its institute in the courses has remained at 60 which is the total number of allotted seats and, therefore, it committed no violation of any legal requirement. It submits that the list of admissions was duly sent to the respondent No. 2 on 31st August, 2004 wherein the admissions granted to the petitioners were clearly mentioned as being against the university drop outs. According to the respondent No. 2, in these circumstances, the petitioners were put to notice and only given provisional admission subject to the approval of the respondent No. 1 university.

The respondent No. 1 did not approve the admissions of the petitioners and objected to the same. As such the petitioners were notified of the same on 30th September, 2004 and on 18th October, 2004 The reason for requiring the petitioners to dis-continue the courses in the respondent No. 2 was informed to the petitioners vide letters dated 30th September, 2004 as well as 18th October, 2004 Respondent No. 2 further submits that it has acted bona fide and assistance was also rendered to the petitioners by giving details of other colleges where admissions were still open in September and October, 2004 Counsel for the respondent No. 2 has contended that it has to abide by the directions of respondent No. 1 university and has no option in the matter.

14. The University arrayed as respondent No. 1 has vehemently objected to the manner in which the petitioners have been admitted. It is submitted on behalf of respondent No. 1 that the admissions granted to the petitioners do not suffer from mere irregularities but are wholly illegal and are in violation of the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India as well as by this Court.

Referring to the Bulletin of Information, it is contended that the respondent No. 2 had no authority whatsoever to make admissions to any seats beyond 50% of the management quota which was restricted to 30 seats only. No exception thereto is permissible.

It is, therefore, contended that admission to a 31st candidate against the management/minority quota is illegal.

Placing reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court of India entitled TMA Pai Foundation and others v. State of Karnataka and others and entitled Islamic Academy of Education v. State of Karnataka it is submitted that Apex Court had directed that the management of a minority education institution can make admissions only to 50% of the total seats. The respondent No. 2 had admittedly filled up 30 seats out of the total 60 seats available in the course and as such could not have legally admitted the petitioners against the 31st seat in the course.

15. It is further submitted that the practice of having endless and repeated counselling was deprecated by the Supreme Court of India in the judgment entitled Neelu Arora v. UOI. It was categorically held in this case that there can be no admission to a course after second counselling.

16. So far as courses conducted by the respondent No. 1 are concerned, this court vide judgment dated 27th September, 2004 in WP(C) 14451/2004 entitled Maharaja Agarsain Institute of Technology v. Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University of Delhi and others held that there can be no admission after the second counselling. The judgment rendered in the writ petition was impugned before the Division Bench in the LPA 952/2004 entitled Maharaja Agarsain Institute of Technology v. Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha Univertisy and was affirmed in the said Appeal vide judgment of the Division Bench dated 16th November, 2004

17. It is submitted that in view of the settled position in law, the admission made in favor of the two petitioners cannot be sustained for any reason and that no equitable considerations could over ride the settled position in law.

18. I have given considered thought to the contentions made on behalf of all the parties. The spirit and intendment of the admission process entailing a centralised combined entrance test which is conducted by an authority for admission to different disciplines conducted in different institutes under that authority has come up for consideration in several cases. Admissions are effected in this manner today for admitting candidates to almost all professional courses including medicine, engineering, law and other technical courses where all India level examinations for lakhs of students seeking admissions to hundreds of institutes are conducted. The practice of physically calling a candidate and requiring him/her to opt for a course and institute in what is termed as ''counselling'' has been found effective in ensuring that the most meritorious candidate is being offered the first option for a chosen course and that almost all seats are filled up at the earliest.

Prior to limits being imposed on the number of counsellings, it was seen that insistence on offers being made in the order of merit for every seat that fell vacant for any reason including candidates dropping out a course, lead to endless counsellings and admission procedures not coming to an end despite commencement of academic courses.

19. The requirement of strictly adhering to the merit position in the entrance exam and attaining finality to admissions is thus required to be given precedence while examining any matter seeking admissions to courses where admission is granted based on a Central Entrance Test and counselling.

20. It appears that so far as the respondent No. 1 is concerned, pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court in the Islamic Academic case(supra), the Govt. of NCT of Delhi passed an order formulating certain policy guidelines on admission and reservation of seat covering the AICTE approved courses/institutes affiliated to the Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University for the academic year 2004-2005 which were circulated to all concerned on 10th February, 2004 This circular has been handed over in courturing the course of hearing. These guidelines have been noticed by the Division Bench of this Court in the aforestated judgment in the case of Maharaja Agarsain Institute of Technology (supra) delivered on 16th November, 2004 in the following terms:-

''8. Pursuant to the directions of the Supreme Court, in the Islamic Academy case, guidelines were formulated by the Directorate and made known to all concerned on 10.02.2004 The relevant portions of that order (hereafter called 'impugned order') are exracted below:

''A. ADMISSION

GGSIP University shall conduct the Common Entrance Test (CETs) for all AICTE approved Degree level Programmes offered at its affiliated Institutes and shall also conduct admissions in respect of Delhi seats i.e. 85% of the sanctioned intake except for BHMT for which 15% of all India seats shall also be filled up by the GGSIP University. The merit of students in the CET shall be the criteria for admission. GGSIP University shall ensure that the CET is conducted in a just and transparent manner and the admission of the candidates is done on the basis of their rank and merit. Appropriate counselling up to to two rounds, as per the current practice, shall be provided by the university in a manner so that seats in different professional Institutes are filled up through a fair, just and transparent manner. The schedule of counselling be so arranged as to minimize the possibility of drop outs. The drop out seats subsequent to second counselling shall not be filled up by the University or by the concerned Institute in any programme.

Xxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxx

The admission from the merit list of the Common Entrance Test in various courses/affiliated Institutes will be published on the website of the University. A copy of the same is also to be displayed on the Notice Board of the University for the information of the candidates.

The affiliated Institutions will not be authorized to make any admission after the cut off date fixed by the University for the purpose is announced. The seats remaining vacant subsequent to this cut off date will remain vacant.....''

21. It is, therefore, abundantly clear that neither the university-respondent No. 1 nor the institutes including the respondent No. 2 had any authority whatsoever to make any admissions to the drop out seats subsequent to second counselling. The respondent No. 2 was also precluded from effecting any admissions after the cut off date fixed by the respondent No. 1. Seats remaining vacant subsequent to the second counselling and the cut off date were required to be left vacant. The respondents were specifically notified in the letter dated 10th February, 2004 that drop out seats subsequent to second counselling shall not be filled up by either the university or by the concerned institute in any programme.

22. The judgment rendered in Writ Petition (Civil) 14451/2004 filed by Maharaja Agarsain Institute of Technology impugning the prohibition imposed by the respondents in admitting students to drop out seats clearly supports the submissions made on behalf of respondent No. 1.

23. It would be useful to refer to the further observations of the Division Bench made in the decision dated 16th November, 2004 in LPA 952/2004 entitled Maharaja Agarsain Institute of Tec2hnology v. Guru Gobind Singh Indraprastha University which are to the following effect:-

''31. In the absence of a basic challenge to the procedure itself, how does a challenge to one of the conditions, namely, prohibition from filling up of vacant seats after second counselling have to be viewed. That condition is again to a cut off date or point. Similar cut off dates or points in time have been indicated in the scheme such as the date of the entrance examination; the date on which the results are published; the period within which first counselling was held and the period within which the second counselling was held. Lastly and perhaps importantly, the date on which classes for the course are to commence has also been indicated by the University. If one were to view prohibition from filling up of seats after second counselling as a restriction, even the dates within which the first and second rounds of counselling were held would also for similar reasons be open to scrutiny. However, they have not been challenged.

35. It would thus be clear that the scheme of counselling itself has been looked upon as a equitable and reasonable one among the available procedures for admission of students in various institutions.

36. In Dr. Naveen Jamval's case(supra), the Allahabad High Court while setting aside the direction of a learned Single Judge, who had required one further round of counselling after the last round of counselling prescribe, commented on the undesirability of that course by stating that it would virtually set a chain reaction in motion whereby candidates participating in the second round of counselling would like to participate in third round of counselling that would further lead to vacancy of certain seas and in turn lead to the demand of a fourth round of counselling ultimately delaying the admission process and also disturbing the entire academic schedule. This decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in Arvind Kumar Kenkane case(supra) with the following observation:

''It is clear that once an option is exercised by a candidate on the basis of which he is allotted the subject and thereafter that candidate is allowed to participate in subsequent counselling and his seat becomes vacant, the process of counselling will be endless and, as apprehended by the High Court, it may not be possible to complete the academic course within the stipulated period.''

Similar observations have been reiterated in the judgment reported as Neelu Arora (supra) where it is also held that the admission procedure should ensure that broad equality will have to be achieved when insisting upon mathematical exactitude.

37. If one keeps above observations in mind, it would be apparent that the system of counselling itself is designed to maximize allocation of seats in various institutions. However, that cannot imply that the process is endless; it has a definite terminus quo in point of time. In the present case, the date of commencement of classes was 02.08.2004 In spite of this, the second round of counselling was envisaged and that terminated on 28.08.2004 This fact is essential while considering the challenge to the reasonableness of the impugned condition. It shows that outer limit of acceptability of a student's absence from class after they commenced in the first term was about four weeks.

38. Another aspect of the matter is that the prohibition from filling vacant seats after the second counselling, appears to be dictated by certain policy considerations. The permissibility of a further round would mean that there would be further drop oats from other institutions leading to complaints by them and uncertainty in the admission process, as described in the judgment quoted above. Such an uncertainty at the commencement of the academic year itself, in our opinion, is unacceptable.

39. Learned counsel for the appellant is right when he submits that the decisions dealing with counselling essentially relate to medical college admissions in the 15% all India quota. Yet that by itself does not detract from the logic dictated in not having any further admission procedure after the second counselling. Furthermore, the observations of the Supreme Court are a sequal to the admission processes which were introduced by the Courts mandate. This process of admission through counselling has been in place for over 10 years. Whenever there have been challenges or distortions in the scheme, the Supreme Court has dealt with it. The present scheme has to the extent of adoption of the system of counselling, modelled itself on that procedure. We therefore, find nothing arbitrary or unreasonable so as to warrant interference with the scheme. The impugned condition contained in the order dated 10.02.2004 is therefore valid.''

24. Furthermore the prohibition to effecting admissions was duly notified by the administration in the communication dated 10th February, 2004 The law in this behalf has been laid down in the Single Bench judgment dated 27th September, 2004 affirmed by the Division Bench in the judgment dated 16th November, 2004 in the case of Maharaja Agarsain Institute of Technology (supra) and the law laid down by the Supreme Court of India by which I am bound.

25. In view of the settled position in law that the respondent No. 2 had no authority or jurisdiction to effect any admissions to vacancies created on account of drop outs against the university allocations and also had no authority to effect any admissions after the second counselling, I have no hesitation in holding that the two petitioners could not have been admitted by the respondent No. 2 to the respective courses.

26. The fixation/restriction of quota for institute/ management allocation and reservation has a laudable objective behind it. It is prescribed in order to attain a balance between what may sometimes be conflicting interests. Several considerations including those of social upliftment, encouragement to management to set up institutes, improvement of available facilities and the need to ensure that merit is not ignored so as to achieve academic excellence have weighed with the courts and the authorities while laying down parameters. The Supreme Court has examined this issue at length in TA Pai's case and Islamic Academic of Education (supra). Based on the law laid down, the appropriate Government and the respondent No. 1 has put restrictions on the authority of the respondent No. 2 to effect admissions to more than 50% of the allocated seats.

27. The Apex Court had occasion also to examine the issue relating to mid-session admissions on the ground of vacancies to courses remaining unfilled. In the judgment entitled Medical Council of India v. Madhu Singh and Others, the court observed as under :-

''22. It is to be noted that if any student is admitted after commencement of the course it would be against the intended objections of fixing a time schedule. Infact, as the factual position goes to show, the inevitable result is increase in the number of seats for the next session to accommodate the students who are admitted after commencement of the course for the relevant session. Though, it was pleaded by learned counsel for Respondent 1 that with the object of preventing loss to the national exchequer such admissions should be permitted, we are of the view that the same cannot be a ground to permit midstream admissions which would be against the spirit of governing statutes. His suggestion that extra classes can be taken is also not acceptable.

The time schedule is fixed by taking into consideration the capacity of the student to study and the appropriate spacing of classes. The students also need rest and the continuous taking of classes with the object of fulfillling the requisite number of days would be harmful to the students' physical and mental capacity to study. In fact such a session was held to be grossly inappropriate in Dr. Dinesh Kumar case.

23.There is, however, a necessity for specifically providing the time schedule for the course and fixing the period during which admissions can take place, making it clear that no admission can be granted after the scheduled date, which essentially should be the date for commencement of the course.

In conclusion

(i) there is no scope for admitting students midstream as that would be against the very spirit of statutes governing medical education;

(ii) even if seats are unfilled that cannot be a ground for making mid-session admissions;

(iii) there cannot be telescoping of unfilled seats of one year with permitted seats of the subsequent year;

xxxxxx xxxxxxxx

24. The High Court was obviously in error in directing mid-session admission. The impugned order is, therefore, set aside. But as was earlier directed by this Court, the admission of Respondent 1 would not be affected by allowing the appeal.''

28. This position was again emphasised in the judgment entitled Neelu Arora v. UOI and Others, when the court directed that even if seats are unfilled, that cannot be a ground for making mid-session admissions. The scheme which has been notified must be adhered to and there can be no additional counselling.

The principles laid down in the aforestated judgments would be binding upon me and would guide the adjudication on the issues raised in the present writ petition.

29. The admissions of the petitioners were effected on 31st August, 2004 after the second counselling came to an end on 28th August, 2004 In view of the position in law, there is possibility of candidates of the particular community who had achieved a higher position in rank than the petitioners who may have desired to seek admissions to the courses but did not do so on account of the prohibition upon the respondent No. 2 in effecting the admissions after its 50% quota was filled up or after the second counselling. It was contended that the petitioners alone are entitled to the admission as only they have come to court.

30. Such questions fell for consideration before a Full Bench of this Court which conclusively decided the matter so far as medical admissions were concerned in the judgment entitled Sandhya Kabra v. University of Delhi and others.

31. The Full Bench considered scheme of admissions which was similar to the one at issue, filing up of vacancies and the requirement of effecting admissions on merit. Even the rights of a candidate being more meritorious than a petitioner but had failed to seek admission or agitate its claims in a writ petition was considered by the Full Bench which held as under:-

''40. Before concluding in regard to Sandhya Kabra's case, it is pertinent to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. Ajay Pradhan v. State of M.P., explaining the nature of the course and while holding that there was no right to admission to a seat falling vacant in the midst or towards the end of the academic year. It was observed by the Supreme Court as follows :-

''10. As per the Regulations framed by the Medical Council of India, the PG course in MD/MS is a three years' course including one year's house job. This is followed by a two years' degree course. The two years' degree course in a medical college is prescribed by the Medical Council of India is a period of intensive training. A post-graduate student has not only to write a dissertation or thesis under the supervision of the Professor or Associate Professor who is his guide, but has also to take part in seminars, group discussions, clinical meetings besides attending classes. There is also emphasis on in-service training not on didactic lectures. The in-service training requires the student to be a resident in the campus and he has the graded responsibility in the management and treatment of patients entrusted to his care. For this purpose, adequate number of posts of clinical residents or tutors are created. The period also includes adequate training in the basis sciences of Anatomy, Physiology, Bio-Chemistry, Bio-Physics, Pharmacology and Pathology in all aspects relevant to the speciality concerned. He is also required to participate in the teaching and training programmes of under-graduate students or interns in their subjects. The examination for the PG course in MD/MS consist of (i) thesis or dissertation, (ii) written papers, (iii) clinical, oral and practical examination. There are four theory papers for the post-graduate degree examination, of which one has to be on Applied Basic Sciences. The clinical examination is aimed at eliciting the knowledges of the student to undertake independent work as a Specialist. The oral and practical examinations are meant to test his knowledge on investigative procedures, techniques and other aspects of the specialty. The syllabus prescribed by the Medical Council of India for the PG course in MD/MS as also the student-teacher ration of 1:1 virtually negate the right of admission to a seat falling vacant in the midst of or towards the end of the academic year to which it pertains.''

41. One other contention raised by Sh. Mariaputham, on behalf of the respondent, was that the petitioner in any case cannot be allowed change of subject for the simple reason that there are candidates in the merit list who are senior to her and had also opted for the same subjects namely, M.D. (Paediatrics) and M.D. (Medicine). In this connection the learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Kerala v. T.P. Roshana, . This case was concerned with admission to Medical Colleges and at page 589, t was observed by the Supreme Court that the selection of the students to whom relief was to be given was not to be confined to those who have moved the Supreme Court or the High Court because ''The measure is academic excellence, not mitigative persistence It will be thrown open to the first 30, strictly according to merit measured by marks secured.

42. This was followed by the Supreme Court in the case of Arti Sapru v. State of J and K, . While granting admissions to Medical Colleges the State was directed to fill up the seats on the basis of open merit and the relief was not confined to the petitioners therein.

43. Again in Punjab Engineering College v. Sanjay Gulati, , the Supreme Court was concerned with admissions to Engineering College. The question which arose was whether 16 writ petitioners were to be granted admission to the 16 available seats or were the admissions to be made according to merit. It was observed by the Supreme Court that ''we are unable to accept the submission made by the petitioners that they should be preferred for admission irrespective of merit. The circumstance that they filed writ petitions in the High Court, other similarly aggrieved did not, will not justify the granting of admission to them by ignoring those others who were higher up in the merit list.'' In arriving at the aforesaid conclusion, the Court followed its earlier decisions in the case of State of Kerala v. T.P. Roshana (supra) and the case of Ajay Hasia v. K.M. Sehravardi, and Arti Sapru'scase (supra).

47. The decision of a Single Judge of the Madras High Court in the case of R. Manjunath v. Indian Institute of Technology, and of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sumedha Kalia v. State of Haryana, A.I.R. 1990 Punjab and Haryana 238 where relief was granted to the petitioners and not the candidates who had a higher merit undoubtedly support the contention of Mr. Swatanter Kumar but, in our opinion, they do not lay the correct law. The said decisions of the two single judges do not refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of T.P. Roshana (supra), Arti Sapru (supra) and Punjab Engineering College v. Sanjay Gulati (supra).''

Therefore the present petitioners cannot possibly steal a march over any candidate more meritorious than they, even if admissions were permissible, which I have already held, were not.

32. It is an admitted position before me that the petitioners admission is in excess of the limits of the permissible management quota of 30 seats and for this reason also the admissions cannot be sustained.

33. It has been vehemently contended before me that the petitioners have pursued the course since 31st August, 2004 In case the orders dated 30th September, 2004 and 18th October, 2004 issued to them are not quashed the petitioners shall lose entire academic year. It has been submitted that the petitioners were not put to notice in respect of the aforestated legal position and that the respondent No. 2 ought to have notified them at the earliest. It is further submitted that no reasons for issuance of the aforestated communications are to be found in the two communications which are liable to be quashed for this reason alone and that for all the foregoing reasons, on equitable considerations the petitioners ought to be permitted to continue with the course.

34. I find that the petitioners and their guardians gave an unequivocal and unconditional undertaking clearly mentioning that their admission is provisional and is subject to approval of the respondent No. 1 university.

The undertaking given by the petitioners and guardians was to the following effect:-

'' UNDERTAKING

I have been informed and I accept that this admission is provisional subject to the approval of the GGSIP University. I fully understand its implications.

Candidate Guardian

SUNINT KAUR GURBIR SINGH

WITNESS''

'' UNDERTAKING

I have been informed and I accept that this admission is provisional subject to the approval of the GGSIP University. I fully understand its implications.

Candidate Guardian

T.S. BAJAJ (K.S. BHATIA)

WITNESS''

The undertaking reproduced above sets out clearly that the petitioners and his/her guardian fully understood the implications of the admission at the time of giving the undertaking. It is not possible, therefore, to believe that the petitioners were not aware of the true position with regard to their admissions. I also have no reason to believe that the undertaking was given for compliance of para 18.8 of the Bulletin of Information. The undertakings were taken only from the petitioners and not from any other student.

35. The scheme of admission clearly envisages merit is to be enforced. Strict restrictions on the number of seats to which admissions could be effected under the management quota have been laid down in order to obviate any compromise with considerations of merit. Admittedly, the merit position was also not enforced when granting admissions to the petitioners.

36. Judicial discretion in matters relating to admissions specially to technical professional courses, cannot be guided by equitable considerations alone. The parameters within which judicial discretion has to be exercised have been laid down by the Apex Court. The court is precluded from permitting candidates from pursuing courses and taking examinations if their claim to such entitlement is based on admissions to courses being effected in violation of legal requirements. It has been so held in (i) 184 (1) SCC 307 entitled Krishna Priya Ganguly and Ors. v University of Lacknow and Ors.; (ii) entitled A.P. Christians Medical Educational Society v. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Anr. and (iii) entitled CBSE and Anr v. P.C. Sunil Kumar and Ors.

In the judgment entitled A.P. Christian Medical Society v. Govt. of Andhra Pradesh, the Apex Court held that the Court would not be justified in issuing directions to the University to protect the interest of such students who had been admitted to the college in clear transgression of the provisions of the University Act and requirements there under. The Court observed as under;

''We cannot by our fiat direct the University to disobey the statute to which it owes its existence and the regulations made by the University itself. We cannot imagine anything more destructive of the rule of law than a direction by the court to disobey the laws. The case of the medical college started by the Daru-Salam Trust appears to stand on a different footing as we find from the record placed before us that permission had been granted by the State Government to the Trust to start the medical college and on that account, the University had granted provisional affiliation. We also find that the Medical Council of India took strong and serious exception to the grant of provisional affiliation whereupon the University withdrew the affiliation granted to the college. We are unable to treat what the University did in the case of the Daru-Salam Medical College as a precedent in the present case to direct the University to do something which it is forbidden from doing by the University Act and the regulations of the University.''

37. So far as court orders directing admissions of students, permitting students to undergo courses and take examinations in violation of the statutes and the rules is concerned, the Apex Court has deprecated passing of even interim orders on equitable considerations inasmuch as there could be no question of granting final relief in matters where such issues arise for consideration and hence interim relief for such purposes ought not to be granted. It would be useful to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the judgment entitled Krishna Priya Ganguly and Ors. v University of Lucknow and Ors. where the court had observed as under:-

''17. xxxxxxxx The High Court could not have given a go-by to the rules framed by Admission Committee. It was a matter for decision of the academic body and since the academic body had applied for the rules in a bona fide manner to all the students equally, there was no jurisdiction whatsoever on the part of the High Court to interfere with the internal working of an academic institution concerned with imparting higher education in the field of post-graduate course in medicine. xxxxxx

25. The High Court could not device its own criterion for admission. Since the academic body has made the marks obtained in M.B.B.S. examination the criterion, admission had to be made by such a criterion. The High Court could not have introduced its own notions in such an academic matter. The High Court was not competent to do so and had no jurisdiction to import its own ideology.''

So far as other courses as the present are concerned the principles laid down would also guide the issues raised.

38. In view of such legal position, I am unable to hold in favor of the petitioners. The Bulletin for Information which is relied upon by the petitioners itself sets out the number of seats to which the respondent No. 2 could have effected admissions. The petitioners did not participate in the second counselling knowing their merit position. Admission has been taken by them on 31st August, 2004 The admission was in violation of the specific guidelines circulated on the 10th February, 2004

39. For all the foregoing reasons, even if it were permissible, which it is not, considerations of equity shall not override legal prohibition. According to respondent No. 2 it had informed the petitioners about other colleges where they could have obtained admissions on 30th September, 2004 and even in the communication dated 18th October, 2004 but they opted not to do so. The petitioners knew the position, both in fact and in law. Yet they took a chance and therefore cannot be permitted to assert any equitable considerations in their favor.

40. The judgment entitled Smt. Tarawati v. SCERT and others relied upon by the petitioners has no bearing on the issues raised in the present matter. The scheme for admissions in the instant case itself has fallen for consideration before this Court and pronouncements made on the issue by which I am bound.

41. In this view of the matter I find no merit in these writ petitions which are hereby dismissed.

There will be no order as to costs.