Anil Singh And Ors. vs N.D.M.C. [W.P.(C) 4247/1998, ...
2005 Latest Caselaw 231 Del

JUDGMENT

Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. In this batch of writ petitions it has been prayed that appropriate writs, orders or directions may be issued to the Respondents for the regularization of the services of the Petitioners with all benefits as are being given to regular teachers and for prohibiting the Respondents from terminating their services. According to the Petitioners they have been engaged as Teachers by the NDMC on contractual tenures which has generally been extended on more than one occasion. The submission is that on the average these Teachers have served for about three years. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Respondents submit that the Petitioners have been engaged on contractual basis and it had been clarified that the engagement would not confer any right on them to claim regular appointment. On every occasion when the contract was renewed it had also been clarified that the extension would continue for the tenure or till posts are filled-up on regular basis, whichever is earlier. The Recruitment Rules prescribe that teachers who fall in category `C' must be selected by an independent body such as the DSSSB. All the Petitioners were engaged on the basis of "walk in interview" conducted by NDMC. Contrary to the submissions of the Petitioners the stance of the NDMC is that they have recently been engaged between the years 2001-2003. The earliest that any Petitioner has been engaged is of year 1999. During the pendency of the writ petitions on account of resettlement of jhugies outside NDMC area some schools had to be closed and/or merged with other schools, thereby rendering a number of teachers surplus. It is for this reason that the earlier requisition sent to the DSSSB has been withdrawn. Nine Balwari Teachers have been appointed by the DSSSB on regular basis. No vacancy to the post of TGT exists.

2. It appears that the NDMC has initiated steps to fill up the existing vacancies through the ageis of the Delhi Subordinate Services Selection Board (DSSSB) to whom it has sent its requisitions. Learned counsel for the Respondents' have argued that the power to effect appointments vests with the DSSSB but this is devoid of any merit. There is a distinction between selection and appointment; while NDMC may have no role to play in the former, the DSSSB has no say in the latter. These petitions have been filed in the wake of regular recruitment through the DSSSB and the consequent anxiety that services of the Petitioners shall be brought to an end. Learned counsel for the NDMC have firstly stated that it is not proposing to terminate the services of the Petitioners before the expiry of their respective contract periods. Secondly, they state that the NDMC also has no intention to replace the Petitioners by other teachers who would be engaged on a contractual basis. Thirdly, they assure the Court that consequent on recruitment by means of the regular selection process through the DSSSB, in the event of the Petitioners become surplus the policy of `last come first go' shall definitely be adhered to. Fourthly, learned counsel for the Respondents have also conceded that it would be legally impermissible for the Respondents to disqualify any of the Petitioners for regular selection on the ground of their having crossed the maximum age limit; if they choose to appear in the regular selection examinations, age relaxation shall be granted. These submissions have obviated any consideration of the impact of Article 14 on the facts of the case.

A. Contract Employee claim for equal pay for equal work

3. This legal principle had been invoked by learned counsel for the Petitioners during arguments. The preponderant view enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is that persons similarly placed as the Petitioners would not per se have the right to claim salaries equal to that of regular employees. The observations made in the thought provoking decision titled Randhir Singh vs. Union of India and Ors., , although it may not be directly apposite to the present case for the reason that the Hon'ble Supreme Court was not concerned with emoluments payable to contractual/ temporary/ ad-hoc employees, deserve to be thoroughly digested for its perspicuous legal content as well as its literary excellence:

'Equal pay for equal work' is not a mere demagogic slogan. It is a constitutional goal capable of attainment through constitutional remedies, by the enforcement of constitutional rights. So the petitioner claims; so the petitioner asserts. Article 39(d) of the Constitution proclaims, as a Directive Principle, the Constitutional goal of 'equal pay for equal work for both men and women'. Articles 14 and 19 guarantee respectively the fundamental rights to equality before the law and equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment and Art. 32 provides the remedy for the enforcement of the fundamental rights. So the petitioner has invoked the jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 32 and has asked us to direct the respondents to give him his due, the same as they have given others like him. True, he is the merest microbe in the mightly organism of the State, a little clog in a giant wheel. But, the glory of our Constitution is that it enables him to directly approach the highest Court in the land for redress. It is a matter of no little pride and satisfaction to us that he has done so. Hitherto the equality clauses of the Constitution, as other articles of the Constitution guaranteeing fundamental and other rights, were most often invoked by the privileged classes for their protection and advancement and for a 'fair and satisfactory' distribution of the buttered loaves amongst themselves. Now, thanks to the rising social and political consciousness and the expectations roused as a consequence, and the forward looking posture of this Court the underprivileged also are clamoring for their rights and are seeking the intervention of the Court with touching faith and confidence in the Court. The Judges of the Court have a duty to redeem their constitutional oath and do justice no less to the pavement dweller than to the guest of the five star hotel.

4. What then are the nature of the rights that are created and/or evolved in favor of the Petitioners consequent on their contractual/temporary engagement? In Jaswant Singh and Ors. vs. Union of India and Ors., 1980 SCC (L&S) 36, it was held that no Government servant can claim entitlement to a declaration that he is in quasi-permanent service, because that does not depend upon the mere fact of his being in service for a particular number of years. Certainly his terminal benefits could be protected. It was further observed that work-charged employees are engaged on a temporary basis and are eligible to claim protection under the Industrial Disputes Act. The decision in State of Maharashtra vs. Purshottam and Ors., , refers to and follows the dialectic of Jaswant Singh's case (supra). The Hon'ble Court observed as follows:

"6. At the outset, it may be stated that a work-charged establishment means an establishment of which the expenses, including the wages and allowances of the staff, are chargeable to `works'. The pay and allowances of employees who are borne on a work-charged establishment are generally shown as a separate sub-head of the estimated cost of the work. The work-charged establishment employees are engaged on a temporary basis and their appointments are made for the execution of a specified work. From the very nature of their employment, their services automatically come to an end on the completion of the works for the sole purpose of which they are employed. The character and nature of their tenure has been fully discussed by this Court in the case of Jaswant Singh v. Union of India. In the service jurisprudence the expression `cadre' means the unit of strength of a service or a part of it as determined by the employer. And it is too well settled that services rendered by an employee in one cadre cannot be taken into account for determining the seniority in another cadre unless by any rules of seniority this privilege is conferred. This being the position, ordinarily the services rendered by an employee in a work-charged establishment is not to be taken into account for his seniority in the regular establishment particularly when the tenure in the work-charged establishment is of a precarious nature and it automatically ceases after that project is over. The normal rule of seniority is the date of entry into the cadre or the position obtained in the examination when appointment is made by any competitive examination. Therefore, in the present case ordinarily seniority would have been determined on the basis of the date of absorption of the employee in the regular establishment, but the State Government itself has passed the resolution deciding a deemed date of absorption of the employees who were initially recruited in the charged establishment and later on absorbed in the regular establishment. ...."

In State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Jasmer Singh and Ors., , it has been opined that daily-wagers should not be equated with regular workman and can at best claim payment of minimum wages only. A different Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has made an essentially identical enunciation of the law in State of Haryana vs. Surinder Kumar, . In State of Rajasthan vs. Kunji Raman the Hon'ble Supreme Court recognised that work-charged employees and employees on regular establishment of the PWD comprised two separate and distinct classes and therefore the former's claim for granting them project allowance as also their claim that they should be given all the benefits which were made available to regular employees, were misconceived.

5. The following observations made in Delhi Development Horticulture Employees' Union v. Delhi Administration, Delhi and Ors., , were in regard to ad hoc or work-charged employees who, in my opinion, are on firmer grounds for regularization after they have put in long periods of engagements:

"15. Apart from the fact that the petitioners cannot be directed to be regularised for the reasons given above, we may take note of the pernicious consequences to which the direction for regularisation of workmen on the only ground that they have put in work for 240 or more days, has been leading. Although there is Employment Exchange Act which requires recruitment on the basis of registration in the Employment Exchange, it has become a common practice to ignore the Employment Exchange and the persons registered in the Employment Exchanges, and to employ and get employed directly those who are either not registered with the Employment Exchange or who though registered are lower in the long waiting list in the Employment Register. The Courts can take judicial notice of the fact that such employment is sought and given directly for various illegal consideration including money. The employment is given first for temporary periods with technical breaks to circumvent the relevant rules, and is continued for 240 or more days with a view to give the benefit of regularisation knowing the judicial trend that those who have completed 240 or more days are directed to be automatically regularised. A good deal of illegal employment market has developed resulting in a new source of corruption and frustration of those who are waiting at the Employment Exchanges for years. Not all those who gain such back-door entry in the employment are in need of the particular jobs. Though already employed elsewhere, they join the jobs for better and secured prospects. That is why most of the cases which come to the courts are of employment in Government Departments, Public Undertakings or Agencies. Ultimately it is the people who bear the heavy burden of the surplus labour. The other equally injuries effect of indiscriminate regularisation has been that many of the agencies have stopped undertaking casual or temporary works though they are urgent and essential for fear that if those who are employed on such works are required to be continued for 240 or more days have to be absorbed as regular employees although the works are time-bound and there is no need of the workmen beyond the completion of the works undertaken. The public interests are thus jeopardised on both counts.

16. In the circumstances, it is not possible to accede to the request of the petitioners that the respondents be directed to regularise them. The most that can be done for them is to direct the respondent-Delhi Administration to keep them on a panel and if they are registered with the Employment Exchange and are qualified to be appointed on the relevant posts, give them a preference in employment whenever there occurs a vacancy in the regular posts, which direction we give hereby."

6. Similar observations were also recorded by another Bench of the Apex Court in State of Haryana and Ors., etc. etc. v. Piara Singh and Ors., etc. etc., , which are reproduced as under:

"12. As would be evident from the observations made and directions given in the above two cases, the court must, while giving such directions, act with due care and caution. It must first ascertain the relevant facts, and must be cognizant of the several situations and eventualities that may arise on account of such directions. A practical and pragmatic view has to be taken, inasmuch as every such direction not only tells upon the public exchequer but also has the effect of increasing the cadre strength of a particular service, class or category. Now, take the directions given in the judgment under appeal. Apart from the fact the High Court was not right - as we shall presently demonstrate in holding that the several conditions imposed by the two Governments in their respective orders relating to regularisation are arbitrary not valid and justified -- the High Court acted rather hastily in directing wholesome regularisation of all such persons who have put in one year's service, and that too unconditionally. We may venture to point out the several problems that will arise if such directions become the norm:

(a) Take a case where certain vacancies are existing or expected and steps are taken for regular recruitment either through Public Service Commission or other such body, as the case may be. A large number of persons apply. Inevitably there is bound to be some delay in finalising the selections and making the appointments. Very often the process of selection is stayed or has to be re-done for one or the other reason. Meanwhile the exigencies of administration may require appointment of temporary hands. It may happen that these temporary hands are continued for more than one year because the regular selection has not yet been finalised. Now according to the impugned direction the temporary hands completing one year's service will have to be regularised in those posts which means frustrating the regular selection. There would be no post left for regularly selected persons even if they are selected. Such cases have indeed come to this court from these very two States.

(b) In some situations, the permanent incumbent of a post may be absent for more than a year. Examples of this are not wanting. He may go on deputation, he may go on Faculty Improvement Programme (F.I.P.), or he may be suspended pending enquiry into charges against him and so on. There may be any number of such situations. If a person is appointed temporarily in his place and after one year he is made permanent where will the permanent incumbent be placed on his return? Two persons cannot hold the same post on a regular or permanent basis.

(c) It may also happen that for a particular post a qualified person is not available at a given point of time. Pending another attempt at selection later on an unqualified person is appointed temporarily. He may continue for more than one year. If he is to be regularised, it would not only mean foreclosing of appointment of a regular qualified person, it would also mean appointment of an unqualified person.

(d) Such directions have also the effect of disregarding and violating the rule relating to reservation in favor of backward class of citizens made under Article 16(4). What cannot be done directly cannot be allowed to be done in such indirect manner.

(e) Many appointments may have been made irregularly - as in this case - in the sense that the candidates were neither sponsored by the Employment Exchange nor were they appointed after issuing a proper advertisement calling for applications. In short, it may be a back door entry. A direction to regularise such appointments would only result in encouragement to such unhealthy practices.

These are but a few problems that may arise, if such directions become the norm. There may be many such and other problems that may arise. All this only emphasises the need for a fuller consideration and due circumspection while giving such directions.

17. Now coming to the direction that all those ad-hoc/temporary employees who have continued for more than an year should be regularised, we find it difficult to sustain it. The direction has been given without reference to the existence of a vacancy. The direction in effect means that every ad hoc/ temporary employee who has been continued for one year should be regularised even though (a) no vacancy is available for him -- which means creation of a vacancy (b) he was not sponsored by the Employment Exchange nor was he appointed in pursuance of a notification calling for applications which means he had entered by a back-door (c) he was not eligible and/or qualified for the post at the time of his appointment (d) his record of service since his appointment is not satisfactory. These are in addition to some of the problems indicated by us in para 12, which would arise from giving of such blanket orders. None of the decisions relied upon by the High Court justify such wholesale, unconditional orders. Moreover, from the mere continuation of an ad hoc employee for one year, it cannot be presumed that there is need for a regular post. Such a presumption may be justified only when such continuance extends to several years. Further, there can be no `rule of thumb' in such matters. Conditions and circumstances of one unit may not be the same as of the other. Just because in one case, a direction was given to regularise employees who have put in one year's service as far as possible and subject to fulfillling the qualifications, it cannot be held that in each and every case such a direction must follow irrespective of and without taking into account the other relevant circumstances and considerations. The relief must be moulded in each case having regard to all the relevant facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be a mechanical act but a judicious one. Judged from this standpoint, the impugned direction must be held to be totally untenable and unsustainable."

7. in State of Orissa and Ors. vs. Balaram Sahu and Ors., , the Apex Court had chartered a slightly different course in that it had stated that in connection with the claim of equal pay for equal work it is for the claimants of parity to substantiate a clear-cut basis of equivalence and a resultant hostile discrimination. The Court also pithily observed that equal pay for unequal work also negates the right under Article 14 i.e. that regular employees may in some circumstances be performing longer and more onerous duties with greater responsibilities, when compared with daily wagers and should not be similarly treated. Jasmer Singh's case (supra) was repeatedly referred to. These views have also been voiced in Ashwani Kumar vs. State of Bihar, and Dr. Chanchal Goyal vs. State of Rajasthan, . It would also be of advantage to note similar pronouncements made in Associated Banks Officers Association vs. State Bank of India, and Chief Superintendent, Government Livestock Farm Hissar vs. Ramesh Kumar, .

8. The manner in which the prayer is worded indicates that the claim for equal pay for equal work is prospective and, therefore, in the view taken in this Judgment loses almost all its sting and is rendered entirely academic. However, if a contractual employee does not possess the right to claim equal pay for equal work his demand for regularisation becomes even fainter and less forceful.

B. Right of regularisation for contract employees

9. The learned counsel for the Petitioners had drawn attention to the observations of the Constitution Bench in Rudra Kumar Sain & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., , in which the Court had referred back to its decision on the same subject in O.P. Singla & Anr. etc. v. Union of India and Ors., , where it had occasion to observe that the appointments to the Delhi Higher Judicial Service "were neither ad-hoc, nor fortuitous, nor in the nature of a stop gap arrangement." Although the facts of that case are entirely dissimilar to the facts in this batch of petitions the endeavor of learned counsel for the Petitioners in referring to the said case was to highlight the fact that the Petitioners should also not be viewed as ad-hoc, or fortuitous or stop gap employees. Where service contracts have been renewed on occasions and are against regular vacancies, it is certainly arguable that the protection which the Apex Court granted should a fortiori apply in their favor. On careful cogitation, however, the only similarity would be where an employer adopts the device of contractual employment in order to perpetuate arbitrary or fluid appointments so as to retain the power to employ persons at its whim and fancy. Ad-hoc employees would stand on similar footing in such cases, and it is this vice that the Hon'ble Supreme Court had sought to obliterate in State of Haryana v. Piara Singh, . In other respects, however, a person engaged on a contract cannot be equated with ad-hoc employees since the contractual employee is fully aware of the limited tenure of his appointment. The employees engagement on ad-hoc or temporary methods is open-ended and, therefore, the doctrine of legitimate expectations apply to their cases to a much greater degree. While they are always on tenter hooks apprehending that their services may be abruptly ended, it is more often than not seen that their services would continue on this basis for several years. Indubitably, compelling persons to work on successively renewed contracts or on temporary status is a practice which has to be deprecated especially where regular vacancies are in existence. In Hindustan Shipyard Limited and Ors. v. Dr. P. Sambasiva Rao and Ors., , the Apex Court enunciated that the process of regularization involves regular appointment which can be done only in accordance with the prescribed procedure. The directions of the High Court for regularization of medical officers engaged de hors the regular procedure was set aside. In Gujarat Agricultural University v. Rathod Labhu Bechar, 2001 1 A.D. (S.C.) 327, the Hon'ble Supreme did not automatically absorb the ad hoc employees, but instead observed thus -

"In fact, taking work, from daily wage worker or ad hoc appointee is always viewed to be only for a short period or as a stop gap arrangement, but we find new culture is growing to continue with it for a long time, either for financial gain or for controlling its workers more effectively with sword of damocles hanging over their heads or to continue with favored one in the cases of ad hoc employee withstaling competent and legitimate claimants. Thus we have no hesitation to denounce this practice. If the work is of such a nature, which has to be taken continuously and in any case when this pattern become apparent, when they continue to work for year after year, only option to the employer is to regularise them. Financial viability no doubt is one of the considerations but then such enterprise or institution should not spread its arms longer than its means. The consequent corollary is, where work is taken not for a short period or limited for a season or where work is not of part time nature and if pattern shows work is to be taken continuously year after year, there is no justification to keep such persons hanging as daily rate workers. In such situation a legal obligation is cast on an employer if there be vacant post to fill it up with such workers in accordance with rules if any and where necessary by relaxing the qualifications, where long experience could be equitable with such qualifications. If no post exists then duty is cast to assess the quantum of such work and create such equivalent post for their absorption."

10. In Dr. Chanchal Goyal case (supra) a plethora of precedents was considered, the interpretation whereof by the Apex Court is binding on me. The following observations are extremely relevant:

"6. There is no scope of regularization unless the appointment was on regular basis. Considerable emphasis has been laid down by the appellant to the position that even for temporary appointment there was a selection. That is really of no consequence. Another plea of the appellant needs to be noted. With reference to the extension granted it was contended that a presumption of the Service Commission's concurrence can be drawn, when extensions were granted from time to time. This plea is without any substance. As noted above, there is no scope for drawing a presumption about such concurrence in terms of sub-rule (2) of Rule 27. After one year, currency of appointment is lost. The extension orders operated only during the period of effectiveness.

7. The decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant were rendered in different factual background. A decision is an authority for what it decides and not for what could be inferred from the conclusion.

8. Unless the initial recruitment is regularized through a prescribed agency, there is no scope for a demand for regularization. It is true that an ad hoc appointee cannot be replaced by another ad hoc appointee; only a legally selected candidate can replace the ad hoc or temporary appointee. In this case it was clearly stipulated in the initial order of appointment that the appellant was required to make room once a candidate selected by the Service Commission is available.

9. In fact, a candidate selected by the Service Commission was to replace the appellant, even if it is accepted as contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the selected candidate did not join. That is really of no assistance to the appellant. The fact remains that a person has been selected and the Service Commission has drawn up a list of selected candidates. If the person, who was to replace the appellant, did not join for some reason, obviously another selected person can be posted. Non-joining of the selected candidate does not confer any right on the appellant. As the initial order dated 27.11.1974 shows, what is required is the availability of a candidate selected by the Service Commission, and not the joining of the selected candidate.

10. In J&K Public Service Commission v. Dr. Narinder Mohan it was, inter alia, observed that it cannot be laid down as a general rule that in every category of ad hoc appointment if the ad hoc appointee continued for longer period, rules of recruitment should be relaxed and the appointment by regularization be made. In the said case in para 11 the position was summed up as under: (SCC pp.640-41, para 11) "11. This Court in A.K. Jain (Dr) v. Union of India gave directions under Article 142 to regularize the services of the ad hoc doctors appointed on or before 1-10-1984. It is a direction under Article 142 on the peculiar facts and circumstances therein. Therefore, the High Court is not right in placing reliance on the judgment as a ratio to give the direction to the PSC to consider the cases of the respondents. Article 142 -- power is confided only to this Court. The ratio in P.P.C. Rawani (Dr) v. Union of India is also not an authority under Article 141. Therein the orders issued by this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution to regularize the ad hoc appointments had become final. When contempt petition was filed for non-implementation, the Union had come forward with an application expressing its difficulty to give effect to the orders of this Court. In that behalf, while appreciating the difficulties expressed by the Union in implementation, this Court gave further direction to implement the order issued under Article 32 of the constitution. Therefore, it is more in the nature of an execution and not a ratio under Article 141. In Union of India v. Dr. Gyan Prakash Singh this court by a Bench of three Judges considered the effect of the order in A.K. Jain case and held that the doctors appointed on ad hoc basis and taken charge after 1.10.1984 have no automatic right for confirmation and they have to take their chance by appearing before the PSC for recruitment. In H.C. Puttaswamy v. Hon'ble Chief Justice of Karnataka High Court this Court while holding that the appointment to the posts of clerk etc. in the subordinate courts in karnataka State without consultation of the PSC are not valid appointments, exercising the power under Article 142, directed that their appointments as a regular, on humanitarian grounds, since they have put in ore than 10 years' service. It is to be noted that the recruitment was only for clerical grade (Class III post) and it is not a ratio under Article 141. In State of Haryana v. Piara Singh this Court noted that the normal rule is recruitment through the prescribed agency but due to administrative exigencies, an ad hoc or temporary appointment may be made. In such a situation, this Court held that efforts should always be made to replace such ad hoc or temporary employees by regularly selected employees, as early as possible. The temporary employees also would get liberty to compete along with others for regular selection but if he is not selected, he must give way to the regularly selected candidates. Appointment of the regularly selected candidate cannot be withheld or kept in abeyance for the sake of such an ad hoc or temporary employee. Ad hoc or temporary employee should not be replaced by another ad hoc or temporary employee. He must be replaced only by regularly selected employee. The ad hoc appointment should not be a device to circumvent the rule of reservation. If a temporary or ad hoc employee continued for a fairly long spell, the authorities must consider his case for regularization provided he is eligible and qualified according to the rules and his service record is satisfactory and his appointment does not run counter to the reservation policy of the State. It is to be remembered that in that case, the appointments are only to Class III or Class IV posts and the selection made was by subordinate selection committee. Therefore, this Court did not appear to have intended to lay down as a general rule that in every category of ad hoc appointment, if the ad hoc appointee continued for long period, the rules of recruitment should be relaxed and the appointment by regularization be made. Thus considered, we have no hesitation to hold that the direction of the Division Bench is clearly illegal and the learned Single Judge is right in directing the State Government to notify the vacancies to the PSC and the PSC should advertise and make recruitment of the candidates in accordance with the rules."

11. A perusal of the Judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in Jaidev v. Indira Gandhi National Open University & Anr., (DB), will disclose that the perspicuous Judgment in Dr. Chanchal's case (supra) was not then available. However, the Division Bench still arrived at the conclusion, after discussing Piara Singh's case (supra) also, that no direction can be given to bye-pass the regular selection process even in the face of the existence of regular vacancies. However, the benefit of the period spent by the Petitioners on duty should be extended to them.

12. It is always heart-rendering to refuse protection to a person who is likely to face a termination of his services. However, there are various public interests which must be weighed and balanced against individual rights. The usual sequence of events is that contractual employment is challenged only when persons falling in this group are faced with the prospects of cessation of their services because the employer has taken steps for selection of employees through the regular and prescribed procedure. It is a rarity for a contract employee to approach the Court at the inception of his service on the grounds that it is a mala fide device adopted either for the purpose of retaining power to hire and fire or to escape the rigours of equal pay for equal work. If a legal action is brought at the incipient stages the Court can at least direct that the regular vacancies should be filled up within a short period and /or ensure some beneficial or benevolent treatment towards persons who are already on the work-force.

13. There could be innumerable situations where vacancies occur which require the engagement of persons on a temporary basis. To cite one example there may be a requirement for 100 teachers against which a corresponding number of persons have been appointed. Some of these persons may resign or may meet with an untimely death. If these vacancies are not filled-up it would clearly strain the functioning of the School. What should the employer do in such cases? Assuming that recruitment must be done strictly in conformity with the Regulations which envisage the holding of a written examination and interview etc. some persons may be employed on a contract which covers a period within which the employer reasonably expects the vacancies to be filled-up in consonance with the Regulations. If these contractual employees are entitled to be regularised, the salutary Regulations can be easily circumvented. This would run contrary to the expectations of law. Alternatively an employer would rather suffer a set back to the efficient functioning of the Organisation rather than employ persons on a contractual basis.

14. In this analysis the only conclusion available is that rights to permanent/regular employment has not enured to their favor. Accordingly I reject these writ petitions accepting the assurances given by learned counsel for the Respondents recorded at the commencement of this Judgment. The NDMC shall be held to meticulously comply with all their assurances. Ordered accordingly.

15. The parties to bear their respective costs.