Sh. Ravinder Pal Singh vs Hanif A. Haroon
2004 Latest Caselaw 497 Del

JUDGMENT

Manmohan Sarin, J.

1. By this second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, appellant assails the order passed by Shri S.M. Chopra, Additional District Judge, Delhi dismissing the appeal preferred by the appellant against the order passed by Shri Shailender Malik, Civil Judge, Delhi decreeing the suit under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C. The learned Civil Judge vide order dated 2-12-2003, decreed the suit based on admissions made by the appellant. The learned Civil Judge noted that after the summons of the suit were served and filing of the written statement, statement of the appellant was recorded under Order 20. Based on the averments made in the written statement and the statement recorded under Order 10, Rule 2, the learned Civil Judge reached the conclusion that the appellant had admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant and the rate of rent. The receipt of notice of termination of tenancy was also admitted. Based on these, he proceeded to decree the suit under Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C.

2. It appears that the appellant/defendant claimed payment of Rs. 62,000/- without any receipt, credit of which has also been given. The learned Addl. District Judge vide the appellate judgment had noted that at the instance of the appellant his statement under Order 10 was recorded for the second time. In the statements, the appellant admitted the rent agreement which was referred to as Ex. P-1. He also admitted the notice of termination of tenancy which was Ex. P-2. The appellant only contended that he had paid Rs. 62,000/- without any receipt.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant before me assails the judgment of the trial Court as well as of the appellate Court by urging that the case does not fall within the ambit of Order 12, Rule 6, C.P.C. Counsel submits that the appellant had not in a clear and unambiguous terms admitted the factum of ownership. He submits that rather in the written statement appellant had denied that respondent was landlord/owner of the suit premises. However, the agreement wherein the respondent is described as the owner/landlord, is admitted. In fact the appellant himself has quoted clauses of the said agreement in the written statement.

4. Be that as it may, even in reply to the notice given, where the respondent while terminating the tenancy had claimed himself to be the owner/landlord, this factum was not denied. Mr. S. S. Sidhu, counsel for the appellant also attempted to urge that the possession of one room of the tenanted premises had not been given to him. However, in the statement recorded under Order 10, he did not describe as to possession of which room had not been given. This plea was not taken in the written statement.

5. Lastly counsel relying on a judgment of the learned single Judge of this Court in the case of Smt. Radha Lal v. Jesop and Company, , wherein the Court did not decree a suit under Order 12, Rule 6 holding that where the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act were not applicable in view of Section 3(c) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, suit for possession would succeed on the strength of title of the plaintiff. In the cited case, the plaintiff had died and the defendant had taken the plea that apart from the plaintiff, the widow, other legal heirs were landlords and raised an objection of non-joinder of parties. In the present case this is not the situation. Moreover, as noted the agreement, execution of which is admitted and clauses of which have been reproduced in the written statement described the respondent as owner and the relationship of landlord-tenant is not denied. In the notice the plaintiff had claimed himself to be the owner. In reply this factum is not denied. Appellant has not even indicated if the plaintiff is not the owner, who else is the owner.

6. In these circumstances in view of the admitted agreement, reply to the notice and the statement recorded under Order 10, leave no doubt as to the factum of admission of ownership of the plaintiff even though denied in the written statement.

7. In view of the foregoing discussion, I do not find any ground made out under Section 100, C.P.C. or the appeal raising any substantial question of law requiring consideration. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.