Rubfila International Ltd. vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr.
2004 Latest Caselaw 81 Del

JUDGMENT

Manmohan Sarin, J.

Rule.

With the consent of the parties the matter is taken up for disposal today.

1. By this writ petition, petitioner seeks quashing of Circular No. 17(RE-2003)/2002-2007 dated 10.10.2003 and Circular No. 22(RE-2003)/2002-2007 dated 11.12.2003 to the extent that they prescribe time limit up to 31st March, 2004, for utilisation of the existing advance license granted. Petitioner also seeks a direction in the nature of writ of mandamus directing the respondents to revalidate the licenses of the petitioner for the same period as the period for fresh licenses.

2. Petitioner is aggrieved by what he terms as inordinately short time granted to effect the imports under the advance license scheme. Petitioner had been granted advance licenses dated 19th February, 1998 and 30th March, 1999, for import of raw materials. Petitioner intended to import natural rubber, a major raw material for the manufacture of rubber threads. As a result of the ban imposed vide Circular No. 8/98-99-SALC dated 20.2.1999, on the import of natural rubber and imports being permitted only through STC, advance licenses dated 19.2.1998 and 30.3.1999, granted to the petitioner expired without imports being effected. The request for revalidation of these licenses was denied. Writ Petition No. 4915/2002, was filed which was disposed of with the direction that the representation of the petitioner be considered as per Policy.

3. In the event the High Court of Bombay quashed the impugned Circular dated 20th February, 1999. As a result of this the advance licenses granted earlier could be utilised for imports. Respondent permitted imports under the licenses from 10.10.2003, up to 31.12.2003. A further general extension has been granted up to 31.3.2004.

4. Learned counsel submits that the short period of about six months is totally inadequate for the petitioner or others to avail of the facility for imports. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that a lot of cash flow planning, production planning and arrangement for funds to stock the raw material is required. The above six months' period is woefully inadequate. In my view fixing time period for which extension ought to be granted for imports is a function of the executive and not of the Court in the exercise of writ jurisdiction. While it is true that if the period is fixed in a whimsical manner or is absurdly low without any co-relation to ground realities, the Court may interfere. However, it cannot be said that six months period would fall in the above class, calling for interference. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner has already placed Orders for import of about 500 metric tonnes and is desirous of importing remaining material also. It would be for the petitioner to place Orders and effect the import within the time frame as fixed and in case justifiable grounds are made out or other extenuating circumstances warrant extension, petitioner may make a representation to the respondent authorities, who would consider the same on merits.

5. The writ petition stands disposed of with the above observations.