P.L. Bhasin And Ors. vs Union Of India (Uoi)
2004 Latest Caselaw 1470 Del

JUDGMENT

S. Ravindra Bhat, J.

1. The petitioners here question under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the validity of acquisition proceedings initiated in the year 1980, which culminated in a declaration under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereafter ''the Act'') n the grounds that the same are beyond the time prescribed.

2. Two notifications were issued under Section 4 of the Act; one on 5.11.1980 and the other, on 25.11.1980. In the first notification the Government proposed acquisition of areas in the villages of Tughlakabad, Tigri, Deoli, Khanpur, Said-ul-Ajaib, Nebarai, Hauz Rani and Khirki. The subsequent notification proposed acquisition of the entire lands situated in the revenue estates of the villages Chatterpur, Satbari, Maidan Garhi, Shayur Pur and Rajpur Khurd. The declarations in respect of these notifications were made under Section 6 on different dates, namely, 27.5.1985, 6.6.1985, 7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986. The question raised in these petitions is that those declarations, are beyond the period of three years prescribed in that regard under Section 6 of the Act. None of the petitioners filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act.

3. During the interregnum period between the publication of the notification under Section 4 and declaration under Section 6, many Writ Petitions had been filed before the Court on the ground that the acquisitions were bad as hearing under Section 5-A ha not been given to the landowners. When those proceedings were pending, certain interim orders had been made.

4. The effect of the interim orders made during the course of writ petitions and the question as to whether declaration under Section 6 was made beyond the time prescribed in terms of Section 6 of the Act was considered by a Full Bench of this Court in Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India ( hereafter ''Balak Ram-I''). That decision dealt with all the notifications concerned including those arising for our consideration. The context, or the occasion for the reference to the Full Bench was a divergence n opinion; one Bench taking the view that the acquisitions were beyond time and the other that the acquisitions were within the time prescribed by law.

5. The Full Bench in its judgment considered different situations that would lead to passing of interim orders or stay orders. In the light of those, it considered the impact or scope of Explanation 1 to the first proviso to Section 6(1) (hereafter call d ''the Explanation'') and held as follows:

'' 30. Secondly, the nature of proceedings in which stay orders are obtained are also very different from the old pattern of suits confined to parties in their scope and effect. Section 4 notifications are challenged in writ petitions and it is now settled law that in this type of proceeding, the principle of locus standi stands considerably diluted. Any public spirited person can challenge the validity of proceedings of acquisition on general grounds and when he does this the litigation is not inter partes simpliciter : it is a public interest litigation which affects wider interests. The grounds of challenge to the notification may be nothing personal to the particular landholder but are, more often than not, grounds common to all or substantial blocks of the land owners. In fact, this group of petitions now listed before us raise practically the same contentions just as the previous batch of writ petitions challenging the notifications under S.4 raised certain common contentions. To accept the contention that the challenges and interim orders in such petitions should be confined to the particular petitioners and their lands would virtually provide persons with common interests with a second innings. If the initial challenge succeeds, all of them benefit; and, if for some reason that fails and the second challenge succeeds on a ground like the one presently raised, the first batch of petitioners also get indirectly benefited because of the impossibility of partial implementation of the scheme for which the acquisition is intended.

31. We have, therefore, to give full effect to the language of the section and the stay orders in question, in the above context and background. The use of the word ''any'' in the explanation considerably amplifies its scope and shows clearly that the explanation can be invoked in any case if some action or proceeding is stayed. It may be a complete stay of the operation of the entire notification or may even be a partial stay--partial in degree or in regard to persons or lands in respect of whom it will operate. The words used in the explanation are of the widest amplitude and there is no justification whatever to confine its terms and operation only to the cases in which the stay order is actually obtained.''

After the above discussion, the Full Bench proceeded to hold as follows, at para 39:

''39. We have, for the reasons stated above, come to the conclusion that the period during which stay orders were in force should be excluded in computing the validity of the declaration under Section 6. So far as the notification dated 25-11-1980 is concerned, we find that the latest of the Section 6 declarations was on 26-2-1986. The stay order (in CMP No. 668 of 1981) was in operation from 18-3-1981 to 15-11-1983 i.e. for a period of 2 years, 7 months and 27 days. They are, therefore, in time having been issued within three years plus 2 years 3 months, i.e., 5 years 3 months of the Section 4 notification. So far as the notification dated 15-11-1980 is concerned, we find that the latest of the Section 6 declaration was issued on 7-6-1985, i.e. 4 years 7 months after the Section 4 notification. The stay order in CMP No. 4226 of 1981 was operative from 30-9-1981 to 15-11-1983, i.e., for 2 years and 1-1/2 months. If this period is excluded the declaration is within time. We answer the principal issue debuted before us accordingly.''

The other issues raised before the Court were left for consideration by an appropriate Bench. Eventually, those were concluded by the second judgment in Balak Ram vs- Union of India2 where it was held that the mandate under Section 5-A of the Act had not been complied with, on certain grounds, and the writ petitions were allowed.

6. The Supreme Court had occasion to consider the correctness of the decision of the Full Bench ( in Balak Ram-I) in its decision reported as Abhey Ram -vs- Union of India3 ( hereafter called Abhay Ram's case). The court, in paras 5-8 set out various extracts from Balak Ram-I, and eventually, in para 9, affirmed the view taken by the Full Bench of this court.

7. After the decision in Abhey Ram's case, the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the matter relating to these acquisitions again, in its decision reported as Delhi Administration - vs- Gurdip Singh Uban4 ( hereafter called ''Uban-I''). In that judgment the court declined to give effect and application to Balak Ram-II to the litigants before it. The court held that the quashing of notification in Balak Ram-II did not result in the quashing or invalidation of the entire acquisition. In the course of this judgment in Uban-I, the Supreme Court referred to its earlier three judge bench decision in N.Narasimhaiah -vs- State of Karnataka5 ( hereafter called ''Narasimhaiah's case''). The matter was considered yet again a third time by the Supreme Court in Delhi Administration vs- Gurdip Singh Uban6 ( hereafter called ''Uban-II''). The Supreme Court, in this judgment, affirmed its view in Uban-I and stated that the decision in Balak Ram-II was confined to the petitioners.

8. Mr. Lekhi, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner contended that the view taken by the Full Bench and the Supreme Court in Abhay Ram are no longer good law in view of the subsequent Five Judges Decision in Padma Sunder Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu (hereafter called ''Padma Sunder Rao's case''). Learned counsel submits that Padma Sunder Rao too dealt with the interpretation of Section 6. According to him, the foundation upon which Uban-I was based, for the proposition that the quashing of notification only in respect of a few and not the entire acquisition itself, namely, the judgment in N. Narasimhaiah's case has been undermined since that judgment was expressly overruled in Padma Sunder Rao's case.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the effect of Balak Ram-II was that the notification stood invalidated as the judgment operated in rem. Such a declaration, submitted, went into the root of the matter and was not confined only to the litigants before the Court. Drawing inspiration from the judgment reported as Lazarus-Barlow v. Regent Estates Co. Ltd., it was contended that Balak Ram-I attained finality and that it amounts to a declaration in rem regarding the invalidation of the notification in question. It was further urged that if these facts and the judgment in Padma Sunder Rao's case are kept in mind, conclusion would be that the declaration is beyond the prescribed period.

10. Mr. Lekhi also relied upon the judgment reported as Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat and Anr. rendered in the context of the Explanation of Section 11-A which is framed in an almost identical fashion as the explanation.

11. Learned counsel submitted that though Padmasunder Rao's case does not expressly overrule Abhay Ram's or the subsequent judgments of the Supreme Court on the acquisitions in question at hand, the result of the declaration by the Five Judge Bench is that those decisions stand implidely overruled. To support this submission, Mr. Lekhi had relied upon the decision in C.N. Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan and Ors.

12. Ms. Geeta Luthra, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it is not open for the petitioner to contend that the Section 6 notification in issue in this petition was made beyond the period stipulated by law. She submitted that the series o three decisions in Abhay Ram, Uban-I and Uban-II by the Supreme Court have conclusively settled the law on the subject. Consequently, the stay or interim order secured by a litigant, in whatever form, in relation to a large-scale acquisition would imp de further stages in the finalization of the acquisition. She submitted that such an eventuality would be squarely covered by the Explanation. Therefore, such period or periods would have to be entirely excluded for while examining whether the declaration is within the period prescribed by Section 6. In the present case, there is no dispute that various stay orders were in existence. Hence, it is submitted that in terms of the Full Bench judgment, as endorsed by Abhay Ram it is not open to anyone to say hat the declaration is illegal as being made beyond the period prescribed by law.

13. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that on merits too, the submission of the petitioner is unsustainable. According to her, Parma Sundara Rao dealt with an entirely different situation. Counsel submits that in that decision, the issue involved was whether, after a declaration under Section 6 was quashed, another declaration could be published; if so, the period within which it could be made.

14. Section 6 of the Act may, at this stage, be extracted below: ''''6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose---(1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the Appropriate Government is satisfied after considering the report, if any, made under section 5A, sub-section (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such Government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its orders and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under section 4, sub-section (1), irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Section 5-A, sub-section(2):

Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Section 4, sub-section (1),--

(i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967 but before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or

(ii) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification: Provided further that no such declaration shall be made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority.

Explanation 1.--In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Section 4, sub-section (1), is stayed by an order of a Court s hall be excluded.

Explanation 2.--Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenues.''

15. In the present case, the preliminary notification under Section 4(1) was issued before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. It was, however, issued after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Act, 1967 (Act 13 of 1967)]. In terms of the proviso, to amended Section 6, a declaration cannot be made, in respect of any land covered by the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act after the expiry of three years or one year from the date of its publication, as the case may be. The proviso prescribes different periods of limitation. These depend on whether:

(a) the notification under Section 4(1) was published after commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 1967, but before commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, or

(b) the notification under Section 4(1) was issued after the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984.

In (a) the period is three years whereas in (b) it is one year, respectively from the date of the notification. The Explanation prescribes that in computing the period of three years, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification under Section 4(1), is stayed by an order of the court, has to be excluded.

16. The facts narrated above show that the acquisition in question in these proceedings were the subject matter of repeated judicial scrutiny, both by this court, as well as the Supreme Court. The Full Bench in Balak Ram-I dealt with both the fact situation arising in these cases, the notification and the declarations involved in these cases, as well as the issue of whether the Explanation applied to proceedings where no specific interim orders had been passed. The Full Bench returned a finding that in a l the cases, the stay or interim order in respect of one notification had the effect of holding up the entire acquisition; therefore, the Explanation had to be construed as applicable to the entire acquisition. On that reasoning, the contention about the declarations being made under Section 6 as being time barred, was repelled. In the absence of anything further, the Full Bench ruling itself binds us. Yet, as noticed, above, the Full Bench view was affirmed by the Supreme Court, in Abhey Ram, and considered in Uban-I and Uban-II. All these judgments of the Supreme Court are binding in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The reasoning of the Full Bench, on being affirmed or endorsed, became the reasoning of the Supreme Court, as far as the e notifications are concerned.

17. In Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, the Supreme Court held that even a brief order, endorsing the judgment of a High Court, (dealing with the validity of an enactment) would be binding upon the High Court, on the issue, and that subs tent Benches cannot depart from the reasoning so endorsed by the Supreme Court. In the present case, the reasoning of the Full Bench has been expressly approved in one judgment, and noticed in two other judgments of the Supreme Court. All these deal with he same issue, namely whether the notifications in question, including the ones challenged here, were made within time. We therefore, cannot take a different view.

18. The next question is whether the five judge decision of the Supreme Court in Padma Sundara Rao has impacted the law on the issue. In that decision, the issue considered was formulated thus:

''The controversy involved lies within a very narrow compass, that is, whether after quashing of notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ''the Act'') fresh period of one year is available to the State Government to issue another notification under Section 6''.

It would be immediately apparent that the Court was not concerned with the validity of the declaration under Section 6, in the context of the proviso, and applicability of the Explanation. The court was seized of a situation where the declaration its elf was quashed, and the question was whether a fresh period of one year was permissible from the date of quashing of the declaration. The court, ( at pages 541-42, SCC reports) concluded that:

''14. While interpreting a provision the court only interprets the law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for the legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. (See Rishabh Agro Industries Ltd. v. P.N.B. Capital Services Ltd.) The legislative causes omissus cannot be supplied by judicial interpretative process. Language of Section 6(1) is plain and unambiguous. There is no scope for reading something into it, as done in Narasimhaiah case1. In Nanjudaiah case4 the period was further stretched to have the time period run from date of service of the High Court's order. Such a view cannot be reconciled with the language of Section 6(1). If the view is accepted it would mean that a case can be covered by not only clause (i) and/or clause (ii) of the proviso to Section 6(1), but also by a non-prescribed period. Same can never be the legislative intent.

''15. Two principles of construction - one relating to casus omissus and the other in regard to reading the statute as a whole - appear to be well settled. Under the first principle a casus omissus cannot be supplied by the court except in the case of clear necessity and when reason for it is found in the four corners of the statute itself but at the same time a casus omissus should not be readily inferred and for that purpose all the parts of a statute or section must be construed together and every clause of a section should be construed with reference to the context and other clauses thereof so that the construction to be put on a particular provision makes a consistent enactment of the whole statute. This would be more so if literal construction of a particular clause leads to manifestly absurd or anomalous results which could not have been intended by the legislature. ''An intention to produce an unreasonable result'', said Danckwerts, L.J., in Artemiou v. Procopiou (at All ER pp. 544-I), ''is not to e imputed to a statute if there is some other construction available''. Where to apply words literally would ''defeat the obvious intention of the legislation and produce a wholly unreasonable result'', we must ''do some violence to the words'' and so achieve that obvious intention and produce a rational construction. [Per Lord Reid in Luke v. IRC16 where at AC p. 577 he also observed: (All ER p. 664-I) ''This is not a new problem, though our standard of drafting is such that it rarely emerges.'']

16. The plea relating to applicability of the stare decisis principles is clearly unacceptable. The decision in K. Chinnathambi Gounder8 was rendered on 22-6-1979 i.e. much prior to the amendment by the 1984 Act. If the legislature intended to give a new lease of life in those cases where the declaration under Section 6 is quashed, there is no reason why it could not have done so by specifically providing for it. The fact that the legislature specifically provided for periods covered by orders of stay of injunction clearly shows that no other period was intended to be excluded and that there is no scope for providing any other period of limitation. The maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit highlighted by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has no application to the fact situation of this case.''

A careful analysis of the above extracts, which constitute the reasoning for the decision disclose that the court kept in mind that judicial interventions in acquisition proceedings were provided for expressly in some situations, as in the case of the Explanation, where the periods of stay were to be excluded whilereckoning the time under Section 6. However, the absence of any mention of such intervention in such cases, specifically ruled out the extension of the logic of the Explanation to other situations. In other words, the court held that the situation where a declaration was quashed and the issue of whether a fresh declaration could be made within one year, was a deliberate ''casus omissus'' which the courts could not fill through the interpretative process. The overruling of the previous decision in the Narasimhaiah case was in that context. The Court was not interpreting the effect of the Explanation and construing whether interim orders in one case could apply to the entire acquisition . The Court was concerned with a situation arising after Section 6 declaration was quashed.

19.In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the over-ruling of the Narasimhaiah case or the Nanjundaiah case ( which were referred to in Uban-I) in Padma Sundara Rao cannot lead to the conclusion that those two decisions, dealing with the same notifications and declarations, were impliedly overruled. As noted earlier, the decision of the Full Bench, as well as the judgments in Abhey Ram, Uban-I and Uban-II constitute law under Article 141, which cannot be ignored by us. In a somewhat similar situation, when a High Court chose to ignore the decision of its Full Bench, which had been endorsed by the Supreme Court, preferring to follow a later judgment of the Supreme Court, it was held ( in Shyamaraju Hegde v. U. Venkatesha Bhat) that:

''Judicial propriety warrants that decisions of this Court must be taken as wholly binding on the High Courts. That is the necessary outcome of the tier system. We may briefly refer to the observations of the Lord Chancellor in Cassell and Co. Ltd. v. Broom 1972 (1) All ER 801, where the Lord Chancellor administered a warning by saying:

''... I hope it will never be necessary to say so again, that, in the hierarchical system of courts which exists in this country, it is necessary for each lower tier, including the Court of Appeal, to accept loyally the decisions of the higher tiers.''

This has been approved by this Court on more than one occasion. Added to the above is the provision of Article 141 of the Constitution which unequivocally states that the law declared by this Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court should not have taken onto itself, the responsibility of saying that its earlier Full Bench judgment based upon a decision of this Court in the circumstances indicated above had lost its binging authority in view of two other judgments rendered in different situations and setting.''

20.For the same reasons, we do not agree with the contention that the declaration in Balak Ram-II amounted to judgment ''in rem'' and enured in favor of the petitioners.

21.As a result of the foregoing discussion, we dismiss these writ petitions.

22.Rule discharged. All interim orders made during pendancy of these petitions stand vacated. No costs.