Rajender Jaipuria vs Tilak Raj And Ors.
2004 Latest Caselaw 411 Del

JUDGMENT

Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. In this Revision Petition the Orders dated 3.2.1998 granting leave and permission to the Plaintiffs to institute a Suit in a representative capacity, as envisaged in Section 92 of the CPC, has been assailed on various grounds.

2. It has firstly been contended by the Petitioner that the learned Trial Court fell into error in holding that there was no necessity to issue notice to the Defendant prior to granting or refusing of Leave under Section 92 as at that stage it was only the subjective satisfaction of the Court that was required and that such an order was of administrative nature. In this regard the observations in Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, Delhi Cantonment and others v. Amarjit Singh Sabharwal and others, AIR 1984 Delhi 39 are apposite. It had been observed therein that the object of Section 92 is to protect the public trust of a charitable and religious nature from being subjected to harassment by suits being filed against them; that before permission/leave is granted the public trust has a fight to be heard and the decision should be incorporated in a reasoned and speaking order. The observations of the learned Trial Court, therefore, cannot be sustained but as it would be seen, this error in regard to the perception and exercise of jurisdiction does not vitiate the Order. The Defendant was already before the Trial Court and although an opportunity to file a Reply may not have been afforded, an opportunity of being heard was granted. Furthermore, there is a basic contradiction in the stand taken by the Defendant Revisionist in that if it is predicated that the Trust, as pleaded by the Plaintiff, in fact does not exist, the grant of Leave by the learned Additional District Judge under Section 92 cannot possibly visit any prejudice or injury to the Defendant. In the present case the Revisionist/Defendant has asseverated that the ownership of the suit property has devolved on the Revisionist, namely, Mr. Rajinder Jaipuria in an individual capacity, in which case, so far as he is concerned Section 92 does not apply and the grant of permission would be a surplusage. As has already been noted, this Section is intended to protect a Trust from vexatious litigation. When the Defendant adopts the stand that the ownership of the land in question does not vest in a Trust, he cannot be heard to object to permission being granted under this Section.

3. Objections, at this stage of the Suit, pertaining to the public or private nature of the Trust alleged to exist by the Plaintiff; and whether the Trust Deed in which Smt. Jai Devi, wife of Rai Sahib Seth Ram Kumar Jaipuria, the Predecessor in Title of the Revisionist as per his own case, pertains to the Suit land also, does not also fall for determination. The earliest occasion when these matters can be considered is only once pleadings have been completed and that too if there is an admission on the subject. Otherwise it can be decided only after the recording of evidence.

4. It has next been contended on behalf of the Revisionist that his application under Order VI Rule 5 dated 22.8.1994 has not been disposed of The grievance which was articulated in this application was that the Plaint, inter alia, failed to disclose the monetary worth of the Suit property. However, an application dated 17.7.1997 under Order VI Rule 17 has been filed by the Plaintiff averring inter alia that -"the total annual receipt by way of rent from the tenants and other charges from the occupants of the property and donation offered in the temple is in between Rs. 1,50,000/- to 4,50,000/- so the petitioners value the present Suit for the purposes of jurisdiction at Rs. 4,50,000/-". Learned counsel for the Revisionist has drawn my attention to Bakshi Lochan Singh and Ors. v. Jathedar Santokh Singh and Ors. where it has been held that the High Court of Delhi, by virtue of Section 5(2) of the Delhi High Court Act, (26 of 1996) leaves no room for doubt that the High Court of Delhi also enjoys the status and powers of a Civil Court of original jurisdiction. This argument of learned counsel for the Revisionist must be accepted, but it begs the question since the pecuniary jurisdiction for a Suit valued at Rs. 4,50,000/- vests with the District Judge. Learned counsel has contended that the market value of the Suit property would be in the region of Rs. 4,50,00,000/- and, therefore, the High Court and not the District Court would possess pecuniary jurisdiction to entertain the Suit. Again, this argument loses sight of the fact that the Suit is at its threshold stage where the pleadings in the Plaint have to be looked at only. In this regard, by the impugned Order the learned Trial Court has ordered that the amended Suit on the file is taken on record, the only inference being that the application under Order VI Rule 17 had been accepted, and the objection of the Revisionist in his application under Order VII Rule 5 stood sustained to that extent. No doubt, the learned Additional District Judge should have been more careful and ought to have been explicit in the manner in which he had dealt with and decided those applications. However, such matters are inherently interim and interlocutory in nature and ought not be upset or reversed in the exercise of revisory powers. The proper stage for returning a finding as to whether the Suit property is of the value of Rs. 4,50,00,000/- or thereabout or Rs. 4,50,000/-, as has been pleaded in the Plaint, would properly arise after the pleadings are complete and the Issues are framed. It does not fall for cogitation at the stage where an application under Section 92 comes to be considered and decided. For this very reason a consideration of the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in The Bihar State Board of Religious Trust, (Patna) v. Mahanth Sri Biseshwar Das, and Dhirendra Singh and Ors. v. Dhanai and Ors., AIR 1983 Allahabad 216 is entirely prepipitate. The learned Trial Court will, no doubt, return a finding as to whether a Trust at all exists and if it does, whether it partakes of a public or a private character.

5. It has next been contended that the Plaintiffs' own case is that they are tenants in the property and have been paying rents to Defendant No. 1, that is, Rai Sahib Seth Ram Kumar Jaipuria Charity Trust. It is submitted that the Plaintiffs, therefore, do not have any personal interest in the Trust. Keeping in view the averments in the Plaint, and the documents placed on record, such as the Rent Receipts in favor of the Plaintiff issued by Defendant No. 1 Trust, and legal/Advocate's Notices issued to the Plaintiffs on behalf of the said Trust would prima facie show not only the existence of that Trust as a legal entity but it would also indicate that there is some justification for the Suit in that Revisionist/Defendant No. 3 had usurped the powers of the Trust. The Plaint contains several statements laying the foundation for the Plaintiff's assertion that they are presently interested in the Trust. The fact that the Suit property has been assessed to property tax cannot be held to be binding on the Plaintiffs at the primary stage of the litigation.

6. I find no reason or justification to exercise the revisory jurisdiction under Section 115 of the CPC. The Petition is accordingly dismissed.