Sh. Raghbir Singh And Ors. vs Government Of Nct Of Delhi And Ors.
2003 Latest Caselaw 1116 Del

JUDGMENT

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. The petitioners are the children of one Late Shri Paras Ram. Respondent No. 6 is also the son of Late Shri Paras Ram. Shri Paras Ram had some land in Madangir Village which was sought to be acquired by a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 dated 13.11.1959. The award was also made on 13.05.1963. A Public Notice was taken out on 21st, 22nd & 23rd November, 1963 notifying the persons whose land had been so acquired that they may make applications by 15.12.1963 for allotment of alternative plots. However, Late Shri Paras Ram did not make any such application. In the present petition, the petitioners are seeking allotment of alternative plot of land.

2. While Late Shri Paras Ram did not make any such application for allotment of alternative land within the stipulated time, i.e., 15.12.1963, the respondent No. 6 applied 16 years later on 22.10.1979, after the death of his father (Late Shri Paras Ram). This application was initially entertained by the Land & Building Department which made a recommendation for allotment of a 250 Sq. Yds plot in favor of the respondent No. 6 on 15.03.1980. However, before the allotment itself could be made, the said recommendation was withdrawn by a letter dated 25.08.1982.

3. Being aggrieved by this withdrawal, the respondent No. 6 filed a writ petition in this Court being CWP 700/1983. The petitioners were not made parties to the said writ petition. The said writ petition was disposed of by an order dated 19.10.1984 on the basis of a decision of this Court in CWP 182/1983. The directions given were that a fresh show cause notice be issued to the respondent No. 6 (the petitioner in CWP 700/1983) and to reconsider the question of allotment after issuance of the show cause notice. The show cause notice was issued to respondent No. 6 on 07.02.1985 to which the respondent No. 6 responded by his reply dated 07.03.1985. After considering the reply of the respondent No. 6, the Secretary, Land & Building Department passed the impugned order dated 15.05.1985 whereby the claim of the respondent No. 6 for allotment of alternative plot was rejected on the ground that it was not made within time, i.e., by 15.12.1963 and that no explanation for the delay had been given. The present petition has been filed in 1999 after 14 years of the passing of the impugned order dated 15.05.1985.

4. Furthermore, the petition has been filed, not by respondent No. 6, but by the petitioners who are his brothers and sisters. In the course of proceedings in this petition, the petitioners were directed to file an affidavit to explain the delay in filing of the writ petition. In response thereto, an affidavit of Shri Raghbir Singh (the petitioner No. 1) was filed which indicates that some representations were made by respondent No. 6 in the year 1986 and one such representation was made in 1991. Thereafter, there has been no action taken by the respondent No. 6 in this matter. In the present proceedings also, respondent No. 6 has not entered appearance despite service of notice. For all practical purposes, it appears that respondent No. 6 has abandoned his request for allotment of alternative plot. The petitioners have now set up a case that respondent No. 6 had been representing for allotment of alternative plot not in his personal capacity, but on behalf of all the representatives/legal heirs of Late Shri Paras Ram. However, that does not appear from the entire records of the case. The original recommendation for allotment was made in favor of respondent No. 6. The writ petition (CW700/1983) had been filed by respondent No. 6 and respondent No. 6 alone. The show cause notice was also issued to respondent No. 6. The reply was filed by him and the order which is impugned herein was also passed in respect of respondent No. 6. It, therefore, appears that throughout it was respondent No. 6 who was pursuing the matter in his individual capacity. He made some representations in 1986 and one in 1991. Thereafter, there were no further representations. The petitioners, however, submit that one of them filed a representation sometime in 1997 which was addressed to the Director, DDA who responded that allotment could be made only after a recommendation was received from the Land & Building Department. Thereafter, she made a representation to the Land & Building Department in 1998. However, no response was received thereto despite reminders. Apart from this, the petitioners had done nothing to challenge the impugned order dated 15.05.1985 other than filing this writ petition 14 years later. The question is whether this writ petition could at all be entertained in view of the inordinate delay and whether the writ petition is not liable to be dismissed on the ground of laches.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in S.B. Kishore v. Union of India and Ors.: AIR 1990 SC 90, wherein, he submitted that, under the similar circumstances, the delay was overlooked by the Supreme Court. However, in all fairness, learned counsel also pointed out paragraph 6 of the said decision which reads as under:-

"This order is confined to the facts of the present case and shall not be taken as a precedent. No claim shall be entertained in regard to preferences."

However, the learned counsel for the petitioner submits that he is not placing this decision as a precedent but to show that the respondents have, in cases of delay, also allotted alternative plots.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents, Mr Sanjay Poddar, has placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan and Ors. v. D.R. Laxmi and Ors.: (1996) 6 SCC 445 wherein (in para 9), it is stated as under:-

"It is thus, well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loathe to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its power to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case, is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches. Reliance was placed by Shri Sachar on M.P. Housing Board v. Mohd. Shafi, in particular para 8, wherein it was held that compliance of the requirements is mandatory and non-compliance thereof renders all subsequent proceedings connected therewith unexceptionably illegal; but the question is what will be its effect. That was not the question in that case, since no award had come to be passed. In Nutakki Sesharatanam v. Sub-Collector, Land Acquisition, a two-Judge Bench of this Court had held that if the requirements of Section 4 are not complied with, all proceedings had become invalid and possession was directed to be re-delivered to the appellant. We are of the view that the ratio therein is not correctly laid down. The question whether violation of the mandatory provisions renders the result of the action as void or voidable has been succinctly considered in Administrative Law by H.W.R. Wade (7th Edn.) at pp.342-43 thus:

'Thus truth of the matter is that the court will invalidate an order only if the right remedy is sought by the right person in the right proceedings and circumstances. The order may be hypothetically a nullity, but the court may refuse to quash it because of the plaintiff's lack of standing because he does not deserve a discretionary remedy, because he has waived his rights, or for some other legal reason. In any such case the 'void' order remains effective and is, in reality, valid. It follows that an order may be void for one purpose and valid for another; and that it may be void against one person but valid against another. A common case where an order, however void, becomes valid is where a statutory time-limit expires after which its validity cannot be questioned. The statute does not say that the void order shall be valid; but by cutting off legal remedies it produces that result.' "

Mr Poddar also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. IDI Company Pvt. Ltd and Ors., reported in (1996) 11 SCC 501, wherein it was observed as under(para 29):-

"29. It is thus well-settled law that when there is inordinate delay in filing the writ petition and when all steps taken in the acquisition proceedings have become final, the Court should be loath to quash the notifications. The High Court has, no doubt, discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to quash the notification under Section 4(1) and declaration under Section 6. But it should be exercised taking all relevant factors into pragmatic consideration. When the award was passed and possession was taken, the Court should not have exercised its powers to quash the award which is a material factor to be taken into consideration before exercising the power under Article 226. The fact that no third party rights were created in the case is hardly a ground for interference. The Division Bench of the High Court was not right in interfering with the discretion exercised by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition on the ground of laches."

7. In view of the aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court, it is clear that when there is inordinate unexplained delay in approaching the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, then the Courts would be slow to entertain such petitions. In the present case, it is clear that respondent No. 6 had approached this Court by way of a writ petition where directions had been given and pursuant to those directions, show cause notice had been issued and the impugned order had been passed as far back as on 15.05.1985. Neither the respondent No. 6 nor any of the petitioners approached this Court till 1999. Merely making one or two representations would not ensure to the benefit of the petitioners and enable them to get over the question of delay and laches.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioners finally placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Raghu Nath Singh v. Union of India and Anr. in CW 3028/1985, delivered on 02.04.1991, wherein, according to learned counsel for the petitioners, under similar circumstances, such delay had been overlooked. However, if one were to examine the decision in detail and particularly the last portion of the same, it is to be seen that that decision is distinguishable on facts. The observation to the following effect would make this clear:-

"We are of the view that the case of the petitioner herein stand on a stronger footing, because according to the petitioner, the petitioner's father had applied within the time prescribed and the application to the petitioner was only in continuation of the request made by his father. The fact is not controverter by the respondents. Thus under the policy, the petitioner becomes entitled to plot in lieu of the land acquired for Planned Development of Delhi. In the circumstances, the writ petition is allowed. The impugned letter dated 21.06.1985 is quashed. The rules is made absolute. The Delhi Development Authority had reserved Plot No. B-6/Extn./22 measuring 100 sq. mts. in Safdarjung for the petitioner. Learned counsel for the petitioner however is unable to tell us whether this plot, still stands reserved for the petitioner. Thus, if the same plot is not available for allotment, we direct the respondents to allot a plot of land equivalent to the reserved plot at the same rate in South Zone to the petitioner within 8 weeks from today. There will be no order as to costs."

From the aforesaid, it becomes clear that in that case, the petitioner's father had applied within the time prescribed, whereas here the application had been made 16 years after the time prescribed. Furthermore, the facts in that case were not controverter by the respondents, whereas in the present case, the respondents have opposed the statements with regard to delay made by the petitioners. Lastly, in that case the impugned letter was dated 21.06.1985 and the writ petition was filed immediately, in 1985 itself, whereas in the present case, the impugned order was passed on 15.05.1985, whereas the writ petition was filed 14 years later, i.e., in 1999. Thus, the said Division Bench decision would not be applicable to the present writ petition.

9. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, I find that the writ petition cannot be entertained on the ground of delay and laches and, accordingly, the same is dismissed as such. There shall be no order as to costs.