Institute Of Mechanical ... vs Union Of India (Uoi) And Anr.
2003 Latest Caselaw 656 Del

JUDGMENT

Badar Durrez Ahmed, J.

1. In this petition the petitioner, inter-alia, has sought a writ, order or direction in the nature of certiorari quashing the notification dated 10.06.2002 (hereinafter referred to as 'the impugned notification') issued by the respondent No. 1 derecognising the examinations in Part-I and Part-II of the Technicians Engineers Examination and the section 'A' and section 'B' examination of the Associate Membership of Mechanical Engineering conducted by the petitioner [Institute of Mechanical Engineering (India)] and the certificates issued pursuant thereto. The petitioner also seeks a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing, commanding and requiring the respondent No. 1 to recognise the said examinations conducted by the petitioner and the certificates issued pursuant thereto.

2. The impugned notification reads as under:-

"Government of India

Ministry of Human Resource Development

(Department of Secondary & Higher Education)

New Delhi, the 10th June, 2002

NOTIFICATION

No. F-23-2/2001-TS.III. The High Level Committee for recognition of Educational Qualifications in its special meeting held on 12.02.2002 and 15.05.2002 in pursuance of the direction of the Hon'ble High Court of Delhi dated 31.01.2002 in the matter of Civil Writ Petition No. 3577/2001 and LPA No. 49-50/2002 relating to Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India), Mumbai reviewed the recognition granted to Part I and II of Technical Engineers Examination (T) and Section A & B of Associate Membership Examination of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India), Mumbai for the purpose of employment under Central Government.

2. After giving a fair hearing to the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India), Mumbai, the High Level Committee took following decisions:-

i) Recognition of Associated Membership Examination of Section A & B and Part-I and II of Technician Engineers Examination (T) of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India), Mumbai for the purpose of employment under Central Government stand withdrawn with immediate effect.

ii) Withdrawal of the recognition will be effective prospectively, i.e., students who have already got Section A & B and Part-I and II awards from IME (India), Mumbai will continue to be eligible for employment in Central Government.

iii) IME (India), Mumbai will be at liberty to approach the Ministry of Human Resource Development for recognition of awards granted by them for employment purposes in the Central Government as and when they remove all deficiencies with regard to revision and upgradation of curriculum, examination system, procedure for appointment and qualification of examiners, and other related issues, as pointed out by the Group constituted by the High Level Committee.

-sd-(V.S. PANDEY)

Joint Secretary (Tech.) & Member Secretary,

High Level Committee for Educational Qualifications"

3. The petitioner's case in brief is that the impugned notification has been issued by the respondent No. 1 withdrawing the recognition granted for purposes of promotion and appointment in Government jobs to the certificates awarded by the petitioner at the behest of certain members of the petitioner who lost at the elections of the Governing Council of the petitioner held on 30.08.1999. It is the petitioner's case that the said persons, after having lost control over the management of the petitioner, made false and frivolous complaints against the petitioner to the respondent No. 1. It is alleged by the petitioner that the respondent No. 1 without giving the petitioner a fair opportunity of hearing and without considering the material and documents placed by the petitioner before the High Level Committee of the respondent No. 1 has passed the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002 withdrawing the said recognition granted by it. On behalf of the petitioner it was also contended that in terms of the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002, the petitioner was ready and willing to remove the deficiencies, if any, and implement suggestions with regard to revision and upgradation of curriculum, examination system, procedure for appointment and qualification of examiners as required by the respondent No. 1 provided a list of alleged deficiencies which the respondent No. 1 wants the petitioner to remove are pointed out by the respondent No. 1 and the curriculum and system of examination which the respondent No. 1 wants the petitioner to follow is made available to it.

4. In the impugned notification there is a reference to the directions of this Court dated 31.01.2002 in LPA Nos. 49-50/2002 as also to a writ petition being CW No. 3577/2001. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the background facts as regards the LPAs and the said CW 3577/2001. The petitioner had filed the said CW 3577/2001, inter-alia, seeking the following relief:-

"a) issuance of Certiorari or any other appropriate writ, order or direction to set aside as illegal and bad in law the proceedings and conclusions of the 3rd High Level Committee held on 09.05.2001 and the subsequent Notification (60) dated 23.05.2001 issued by the Respondent."

In the 3rd High Level Committee Meeting held on 09.05.2001, three persons represented the petitioner and matter was discussed in detail and after a hearing the following action was directed to be taken within a period of three months:-

"(a) An amendment to the Constitution of the Society so that no office bearer can hold one post more than three years and no office bearer can remain in office (for all posts together) for more than six years.

(b) A special AGM be convened under the auspices of the Registrar of Societies so that fresh elections under the new Constitution are held at once, after due notice to all the voting members.

(c) Accordingly a notification dated 23-5-2000 to the above effect has been issued to Govt. of India Press, Faridabad for publication in the Gazette of India under intimation to IME (I) and all others concerned."

The Notification (60) dated 23.5.2001 which was also impugned in the said CW 3577/2001 was as under:-

"No. F.7-4/95-TS.IIIA (.) The High Level Committee for Educational Qualification in its 3rd meeting reviewed the recognition granted to Part I & Part II of Technician Engineers Examination (T) and Section A&B of Associated Membership Examination of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (I). On the basis of the report submitted by the Expert Committee formed by the High Level Committee and after a fair hearing of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (I), it was decided by the High Level Committee to temporarily suspend the recognition granted to the above examinations for a period of three months. The recognition will be withdrawn if the Institute fails to remove the shortcomings pointed out by the Expert Committee within the stipulated time. In addition, the Committee also desires the following action to be taken within the same time frame:-

(i) An amendment to the Constitution of the Society so that no office bearer can hold one post for more than three years and no office bearer can remain in office (for all posts together) for more than six years.

(ii) A special AGM be convened under the auspices of the Registrar of Societies so that fresh elections under the new Constitution are held at once, after due notice to all the voting members."

5. Initially, by an order dated 30.05.2001 in CM No. 6240/2001 (in CW 3577/2001) this Court directed that the notification dated 22.05.2001 shall not be gazetted until the next date of hearing. This interim order was continued from time to time. By an order dated 18.09.2001, after recording the statements of the Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner would file a response to the report of the Expert Committee dated 20.12.2000 within two weeks and would attend the hearing thereafter before respondent No. 1, the learned single Judge directed that the response be filed on or before 03.10.2001 and the hearing be held on 10.10.2001 at 2.00 p.m. The petitioner submitted its detailed representation on 03.10.2001 for consideration by the Expert Committee. It also submitted an additional representation dated 10.10.2001. On 10.10.2001, the representative of the petitioner Along with counsel reached the venue of meeting in time. They were, however, told that due to Parliamentary hearing in which the concerned officer was involved, hearing in their case would be held at 3.00 p.m. or thereafter. According to the petitioner, its counsel waited up to 2.25 p.m. where after he left and gave his cell phone number to one of the officials with the request that he may be informed on the cell phone as and when the Committee wanted to start the hearing. When the meeting was convened by the Expert Committee, which started at 3.00 p.m., as nobody was present on behalf of the petitioner, ex-parte hearing was held. This resulted in passing of the order of rejection dated 05.11.2001 by the respondent No. 1 which read as under:-

"The compliance report submitted by the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India), Mumbai dated 3-10-2001 and the representation dated 10-10-2001 were considered by the Sub-Committee of High Level Committee for recognition of education qualifications. It has been found that the Institution has not taken any action to remove the shortcomings or to initiate improvements in the Constitution of the Society of Institute of Mechanical Engineers (India), Mumbai."

Thereafter, the matter came up for hearing before the learned single judge from time to time and the petitioner made the grievance that proper opportunity of hearing was not given by the respondent No. 1 before the order dated 05.11.2001 was passed. Ultimately on 09.01.2002 the learned single Judge was pleased to vacate the interim order dated 30.05.2001. Being aggrieved by the vacation of the interim order, the petitioner as well as a student (Ajay Mattoo) of the petitioner filed separate letters patent appeals being LPA Nos. 50/2002 and 49/2002 respectively. These LPAs were dismissed by the judgment and order passed by a Division Bench of this Court on 31.01.2002 subject to directions relating to giving another opportunity of hearing to the appellant. In the said judgment dated 31.01.2002, it was clearly indicated as under:-

"For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the opinion that the appellants should be given another hearing. Order dated 5.11.2001 passed by respondent No. 1 is accordingly set-aside. The Committee would fix date and venue, as expeditiously as possible and in any case within 15 days from the date and after hearing the matter, respondent No. 1 would pass appropriate orders."

The Division Bench came to the aforesaid conclusion on, inter-alia, the following reasons:-

"The impugned order of the learned Single Judge would itself amply demonstrate that the explanation offered by the appellant to leave at 2.25 PM is virtually accepted. It is also accepted that it is the respondents who should have conducted the hearing at the time ordered by the court, namely, at 2 PM. It is also accepted that no definite time was mentioned by the respondents as to when hearing would start. In such a situation when the respondent No. 1 is also at fault, taking such a strict view by the learned Single Judge simply because appellant left the venue of hearing at 2.25 PM may not be appropriate. It could have been better had appellant waited up to 3PM. However, keeping in view the medical condition of the counsel for the appellant coupled with the fact that no definite time as to when hearing was to start was given by the Expert Committee and that the appellant had in any case left its cell phone number, to enable the respondents to inform the appellant about the scheduled time of hearing, would indicate that the appellant was not to be blamed entirely and, therefore, it could not be concluded that the appellant was not anxious in the least to go ahead with the hearing. After all the appellant's representative and its counsel had come to Delhi from Bombay and reached the venue at appointed time. Therefore, we feel that when the Expert Committee was to start the hearing, the least that was expected was to inform the appellant on cell phone number given by the appellant. In view of this lapse on the part of the respondents as well as other circumstances favoring in favor of the appellant institute pointed out by the learned single Judge in the Impugned order itself, we are of the opinion that the appellant are not dealt with fairly in the conduct of proceedings on 10.10.2001.

When the respondents had agreed to give hearing to the appellant, it should have been an effective opportunity. May be both the parties are to be blamed. However, still we feel that ends of justice demand that the appellants be given another opportunity by the Expert Committee.

There is yet another reason to arrive at this conclusion. The Committee which had earlier deliberated, consisted of 14 members. However, on 10.10.2001 it is the sub-committee which allegedly conducted the proceedings. Therefore, even the hearing is not by the Expert Committee with all its members. The intention behind passing order dated 18.9.2001 was to accord the hearing to the appellant by the Expert Committee and not its sub/committee."

6. Thus, from the decision of the Division Bench dated 31.01.2002, it is apparent that the main focus was with regard to the hearing held on 10.10.2001 pursuant to the direction of the learned single Judge dated 18.09.2001. The Division Bench held that an effective opportunity of hearing had not been granted to the petitioner and that the hearing in any event had not been conducted by the full Committee but merely by a sub-Committee. It is extremely important to keep these facts and circumstances in mind while coming to a decision in the present writ petition. This is so because the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002 has been passed after the hearings granted on 12.02.2002 and 15.05.2002 pursuant to the directions given by the Division Bench by its said judgment and order dated 31.01.2002. In this petition, we have merely to see as to whether the directions given by the Division Bench have been followed or not. In other words, it has to be examined as to whether the petitioner has been given a hearing as directed by the Division Bench. The question is not so much as to the result of the hearing as it is to the fact of an appropriate opportunity of hearing. If the petitioner has been heard and full opportunity has been granted, it cannot have any grievance insofar as the result or the decision of the respondent No. 1 is concerned.

7. I am in agreement with the submission of Mr Chidambaram, the learned Sr. Advocate who appeared on behalf of the petitioner, that there is no scope in this petition to go behind the judgment and order dated 31.01.2002 of the Division Bench. It is not open to any party to raise issues which had not been raised before the Division Bench and, therefore, the entire writ petition will have to be decided within the parameters of the directions given by the Division Bench. According to Mr Chidambaram, the fact that the Division Bench had directed another opportunity of hearing to be granted to the petitioner, ipso facto, meant that the hearing of 10.10.2001 was wiped out and the order of rejection dated 05.11.2001 was set aside. I am also in agreement with this submission of Mr Chidambaram.

8. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration in the present writ petition is whether the directions given by the Division Bench by its order dated 31.01.2002 have been complied with or not?

9. Before embarking on a discussion on the above question, it will be pertinent to note that the issue involved in the present writ petition relates to the recognition granted to the awards/certificates issued by the petitioner institute for the purposes of employment with the Government. Under the Allocation of Business Rules framed under Article 77 of the Constitution of India, the Department of Secondary and Higher Education in the Ministry of Human Resources Development is empowered under S.No. 34 to grant "recognition of professional technical qualification for purposes of recruitment to posts under Government of India". It is pursuant to such power that the respondent No. 1 constituted a High Level Committee on 15.02.2000 comprising of eleven members headed by the Secretary, Education and drawing representatives from various Departments, professional and technical bodies like AICTE (Respondent No. 2), UGC, AIU, ICAR, etc. This is a permanent body and has been constituted pursuant to an Office Memorandum dated 15.02.2000 in place of the Board of Assessment for educational qualifications earlier set up by the Government of India vide OM No. F.7-6/96.TS.IV dated 08.10.1996 whose term had expired. As indicated in the Office Memorandum dated 15.02.2000, the High Level Committee was constituted in consultation with the UPSC on a permanent basis. Paragraph 3 of the said Office Memorandum dated 15.02.2000 defined the scope of the High Level Committee as under:-

"The Committee will examine the standards of all educational qualifications except concerning health and medical subjects and will advise what recognition if any should be accorded for the purpose of recruitment to government posts."

10. From the above, it is clear that it is within the province of the High Level Committee to examine and advise on the question of recognition to be accorded for the purpose of recruitment to government posts. The petitioner institute, as indicated above, runs various courses/examinations, including Technicians Engineers Examinations and Associate Membership of Mechanical Engineering Examinations. The first examinations are diploma level examinations and the second examinations are degree level examinations. It is not in dispute that these examinations conducted by the petitioner institute had earlier been granted recognition for the purposes of recruitment to Government posts. This recognition, as pointed out above, was sought to be withdrawn as there were various alleged deficiencies in, inter-alia, the curriculum, examination system, structure of management, etc. Aggrieved by this decision, the petitioner institute filed the said CW 3577/2001 wherein, initially, an interim stay had been granted by the learned single Judge on 30.05.2001 which was ultimately vacated by an order dated 09.01.2002. This order of vacation of interim stay was upheld by the Division Bench by its judgment and/or order dated 31.01.2002. It may be recapitulated that the learned single Judge had, by an order dated 18.09.2001, after recording the statements of the Sr. counsel appearing for the petitioner that the petitioner would file a response to the report of the Expert Committee dated 20.12.2000 within two weeks and would attend the hearing thereafter before respondent No. 1, directed that the response be filed on or before 03.10.2001 and the hearing be held on 10.10.2001 at 2.00 p.m. The petitioner submitted its detailed representation on 03.10.2001 for consideration by the Expert Committee. It also submitted an additional representation dated 10.10.2001. However, the hearing on 10.10.2001 did not take place at 2.00 p.m. on account of non-availability of some of the members of the Expert Committee. The hearing took place later in the evening in the absence of the petitioner. This hearing of 10.10.2001 and the subsequent order dated 05.11.2001 were, in effect, set aside and the Division Bench by its judgment and/or order dated 31.01.2002 had directed that the petitioner should be given another opportunity of hearing. The respondent No. 1 was directed to pass appropriate orders after such hearing.

11. In view of the foregoing, what needs to be examined and considered is whether the hearing contemplated by the Division Bench in its judgment and/or order dated 31.01.2002 has been granted to the petitioner institute or not? If it is held that the opportunity of hearing was granted, then the petitioner can have no grievance on this ground. It is well-settled that in writ jurisdiction this Court does not sit as a Court of Appeal. Under Article 226 of the Constitution the High Court is concerned more with the propriety and legality of the decision making process than with the decision itself. It is also well-settled that the Court should not substitute its own decision in place of the decision arrived at by persons who have expertise in the field. It is clear that the High Level Committee comprises of experts drawn from various fields and it is they who are well-versed and have expertise with regard to the matter of examining the standards of educational qualifications and advising on what recognition, if any, should be accorded for the purpose of recruitment to Government posts. This Court is neither equipped with any such expertise nor should it interfere with a decision taken by an Expert Committee such as the High Level Committee specifically constituted for this purpose. In the light of these well-settled principles, it has to be examined as to whether the opportunity of hearing, if any, granted to the petitioner institute pursuant to the Division Bench decision dated 31.01.2002 was proper or merely illusory.

12. Mr U. Hazarika, the learned counsel who appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 1 submitted that the High Level Committee, though a permanent body, on an average meets twice a year to evaluate proposals from professional bodies seeking recognition of their awards/certificates for the purposes of Government employment. He further submits that it is only in the case of the petitioner institute and due to the orders passed by the Division Bench that the High Level Committee met twice, i.e., on 12.02.2002 and 15.05.2002 to consider the case of the petitioner institute. According to him, full opportunity of hearing was granted to the petitioner institute and the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002 was passed only thereafter. As such, the direction of the Division Bench had been fully complied with and the petitioner institute could have no grievance at all and the writ petition was liable to be dismissed.

13. From the Minutes of the Meeting of the High Level Committee held on 12.02.2002, it is apparent that it was a special meeting arranged pursuant to the direction of the Division Bench dated 31.01.2002 in the said LPA Nos.49-50/2002 concerning the petitioner institute which was a professional body conducting examinations for educational qualifications. In the said meeting, the following were present:-

"1. Shri. B.K. Chaturvedi, Secretary, Department of Secondary & Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development....Chairman

2. Prof. Ashok Chandra, Special Secretary, Department of Secondary & Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development.

3. Shri B.B. Dhar, Director, AIU, New Delhi.

4. Dr. T.R. Kem, Joint Secretary, UGC.

5. Shri B. Swarup, Joint Secretary, UPSC.

6. Shri Ved Prakash, Deputy Secretary, UPSC

7. Shri W.R. Deshpande, Senior Director, Deptt. of Information Technology.

8. Dr. N.L. Maurya, Assistant Director General (Education Division), ICAR.

9. Dr. S.K. Srivastava, Adviser, AICTE.

10. Shri P. Sukumar, Deputy Secretary, [Represented JS (HE) Deptt. of Secondary & Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development.

11. Shri Madan Mohan, Senior Research Officer, Planning Commission (Education Division).

12. Prof. C. Amarnath Mechanical Engg. Department H.P. Bombay.

13. Prof. S.L. Bapat, Mechanical Engg. Department, IIT, Bombay

14. Shri V.S. Pandey, US (T), Department of Secondary & Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development ...Member Secretary

Dr. D.K. Sharma, Additional Apprenticeship Adviser (T) and Shri J.P. Agarwal, Assistant Educational Adviser (T), in the Department of Secondary & Higher Education, Ministry of Human Resource Development were also present in the meeting."

In the said meeting, the petitioner institute was represented by the following 8 persons:-

1. Shri Sunil Chawla, Chairman Review Committee, IME (I)

2. Shri Vinod Gupta, Delhi Bureau, IME (I).

3. Shri Kaushik Desai, Council Member IME (I).

4. Shri R.A. Shah, Advocate, IME (I).

5. Ms. Manjari Shah, Advocate, IME (I).

6. Shri A.N. Pareekh, Senior Advocate

7. Ms. Poonam, Advocate

8. Shri Roy Eddington Charles-IME (I).

It is clear that the High Level Committee comprised of experts drawn from various expert bodies. The petitioner institute was also well represented. It is recorded in the Minutes that the Member Secretary briefed the Committee about the background of the case of the petitioner with regard to the complaints, etc., as well as the decision taken in the previous meetings, specially those held on 27.04.2001 and 09.5.2001. Reference was also made to the notification dated 23.05.2001 whereby recognition of examinations of the petitioner institute were temporarily suspended for three months. The subsequent proceedings in this High Court were also referred to and after this briefing of the Committee by the Member Secretary, the representatives of the petitioner institute were called in for hearing. It is apparent from the minutes of the said meeting of 12.02.2002 that the representatives of the petitioner gave the background of the petitioner institute, its functions, examinations and educational qualifications awarded. The representatives of the petitioner elaborated on the role of regular technical institutions imparting formal education and the role of professional institutions in conducting examinations and awarding educational qualifications. They made submissions about the shortcomings found by the High Level Committee and expressed their views on it. In particular, the minutes record as under:-

"It was stated by IME (I) representative that syllabus was found satisfactory by the Expert Committee during visit in April, 1997 to IME (I), Mumbai. On the decision taken in Nov., 1997 by the Board of Assessment for educational qualifications, the report of that expert committee was sent to AICTE for comments. AICTE, intimated some deficiencies in Part-I and II of Technician Engineers Examination (T) in January, 1999. The Institute submitted its revised syllabus on 15.07.1999 on which no comments have been received from AICTE. Also no comments with regard to Sections A& B of Associate Membership Examination of IME (I) have so far been received from AICTE. The thrust of their arguments was, however, that the passing percentage of students has been between 4 to 5% and not 1% as it has been noted by the Committee. Committee advised them to substantiate that with documentary evidence which they agreed to produce after few days.

Above submissions of IME (I) took about 2 hours. They informed the Committee that they further required 4 to 6 hours more for completing their submission, however, documentary evidences be made available after few days. As a sequel to this, they requested the Committee for adjournment to a future date. The representatives of IME (I) requested the Committee to grant atleast six weeks time to enable them to produce documentary evidence in support of their arguments and also to make further submissions regarding other issues. The Committee agreed for adjournment for six weeks as per their request, to give them full opportunity to present their case. The Committee further advised them that in the next meeting they should come prepared with all the supportive documents, so that hearing gets completed on that day itself. The institute agreed to comply the same.

The meeting ended with vote of thanks to the Chair."

14. It is apparent that insofar as the meeting of 12.02.2002 is concerned, the petitioner can have no grievance with regard to it. The petitioner's representatives were given full opportunity of hearing and for presenting their case before the Committee. The submissions on the part of the petitioner, as recorded in the minutes themselves, took about two hours. The petitioner requested for some more time and sought an adjournment which was acceded to by the Committee in order to grant the petitioner full opportunity to present its case. The Committee, however, advised the petitioner's representatives that they should come fully prepared with all supporting documents so that the hearing could be concluded in the next meeting itself. The representatives of the petitioner agreed to comply with this.

15. The next meeting of the High Level Committee took place on 15.05.2002. As recorded in the minutes of the said meeting held on 15.05.2002, the Member Secretary briefed the Committee about the background of the case of the petitioner and in particular he pointed out that the group constituted by the High Level Committee in its meeting of 03.07.2000 had in its deliberations held on 29.12.2000 noticed the following deficiencies in the functioning of the petitioner institute:-

"i) IME (I) is being operated in an ad-hoc manner. No records of the activities are being maintained.

ii) The management of IME (I) is not along accepted norms.

iii) No documents were provided to the Group to show that the curriculum was revised. No proof regarding the meetings of the Curriculum Committee was produced. In the absence of any record of minutes, it could not be confirmed whether the meeting of the Curriculum Committee ever took place.

iv) IME (I) appeared to be reluctant to give full details of the names, qualifications and affiliations of all the examiners. Group felt that these appointments of examiners were done in an ad-hoc fashion. There were no committee meeting minutes to support that the appointments of the examiners were being done in a systematic manner. In fact, IME (I) itself stated that they had no records of qualifications of examiners. Records also showed that some individuals acted as examiners/paper setters for several (twenty plus) diverse subjects. Likewise, some individuals examined hundreds of projects singularly. Some examiners do not appear to be even degree holders in Mechanical Engineering.

v) Coaching classes were found to be closely associated with IME (I). This was proved from the fact that Governing Council had gone on record to thank the coaching classes for their support.

vi) A few individuals were found to have extensively travelled abroad on IME (I) funds incurring excessive expenses for short visits. No records were produced by IME (I) to show that these visits brought any benefits to the institution.

vii) The Governing Council and the corporate members, over the years, did not show any concern about the affairs of IME (I) despite being aware that Ministry of Human Resource Development had withdrawn its recognition of several IME exams 20 years ago. Ministry of Human Resource Development perhaps restored recognition a year later upon a promise by IME to reform its systems but this does not seen (sic) to have happened.

viii) With a very poor passing percentage, IME seems to have benefited a miniscule percentage (around 1%) of registered candidates and most of the others have contributed their valuable earnings to the huge cash reserves and assets of IME."

After the Committee was so briefed, the representatives of the petitioner institute who were present in the meeting, were then requested to advance their arguments in support of their case. They were specifically requested to make presentations on the points relevant to revision of course curriculum, examination system, including system of paper setting, appointment of examiners, holding of meetings of various Committees concerned with the conduct of examinations and other related matters. As indicated in the minutes themselves, the discussion centered around the following issues:-

"i) Revision of course curriculum.

ii) Details of examiners and methodology of the their appointments, their qualifications, etc.

iii) Holding of regular meetings of various committees concerned with the conduct of examinations.

iv) IME (I)'s association with coaching classes.

v) IME (I)'s student pass percentage."

With regard to the above five points, the petitioner's submissions before the Committee were as under:-

"i) Revised syllabus as per AICTE's direction was submitted to HRD and AICTE way back in July, 1999. Either the revised syllabus submitted be accepted by HRD as final or if desired, fresh revised syllabus shall be submitted.

ii) Details of examiners (names, qualifications, affiliations) and methodology of their appointments shall be complied and submitted, as desired.

iii) There is no nexus between the Institution and the coaching classes. The Institution neither runs any coaching classes nor imparts any instructions/guidelines to any coaching classes.

iv) The percentage passing result figures for the last five year (1995-2000 & 2001) will be submitted within few days."

As recorded in the minutes, the petitioner's representatives also agreed that any suggestion made by the Expert Committee or by the High Level Committee shall be considered and appropriate action would be initiated to improve the examination system. The minutes then disclose that after the petitioner's representatives had completed their presentation, one Mr R.N. Engineer claiming himself to be the President of the petitioner, was allowed to make a presentation before the High Level Committee. It appears that Mr R.N. Engineer is no longer with the petitioner institute and has filed various complaints against the functioning and management of the petitioner institute. However, as recorded in the minutes, the Committee did not go into these aspects inasmuch as the Committee was of the view that it was only concerned with the recognition of the awards given by the petitioner institute for the purposes of employment in Central Government. As such, the presentation of Mr R.N. Engineer was considered to be irrelevant. Accordingly, allegations with regard to his participation in the said meeting are also of no consequence.

16. It is specifically recorded in paragraph 8 of the said minutes of the meeting of 15.02.2002 that the Chairman invited comments and opinion of all the members present in the meeting and that the Members of the High Level Committee went into details of each and every points and expressed their opinion. The minutes finally reveal that:-

"The unanimous view that emerged from the deliberations was that the standard of Associate Membership Examination of Section A & B and Technician Engineers' Examination(T) Part-I & II of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (I) for the purposes of employment in Central Government were not up to the mark. The examination system that is in place at present is full of shortcomings. Members were deeply concerned to know that one person who did not even have requisite qualification was examining hundreds of projects single handedly and one individual setting papers for large number of subjects for years together. Governing Council meetings were not held regularly to monitor various processes, and minutes were not kept properly. The representative of the IME (I) supplied a couple of copies of the minutes of earlier Council meetings which contained blank spaces and were undated. These facts conclusively prove that the Institution does not possess a system to conduct its affairs impartially and in a fair manner. Keeping in view the above mentioned facts, the Committee unanimously decided that:-

i) recognition of Associate Membership Examination of Section A&B and Diploma Level Examination Part-I & II of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers (India), Mumbai for the purposes of employment under Central Government be withdrawn with immediate effect.

ii) Withdrawal of the recognition will be effective prospectively, i.e., students who have already got Section A & B and Part-I & II awards from IME (I), Mumbai will continue to be eligible for employment in Central Government.

iii) IME (I), Mumbai will be at liberty to approach the Ministry of Human Resource Development for recognition of awards granted by them for employment purposes in the Central Government as and when they remove all deficiencies with regard to revision and up-gradation of curriculum, examination system, procedure for appointment and qualification of examiners, and other related issues, as pointed out by the Group constituted by the High Level Committee."

This view of the High Level Committee has been reproduced in the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002 which has been set-out earlier.

17. It is the contention of Mr Chidambaram, the learned Sr. Advocate who appeared on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner in the meeting of 15.05.2002 was given an opportunity to submit further written documents. He further states that these documents were infact submitted on 18.05.2002. But, these documents were not taken into account by the High Level Committee inasmuch as a bare reading of paragraph 8 of the said minutes would show that Members of the High Level Committee were invited to express their opinion immediately on 15.05.2002 itself without waiting for the documents to be submitted by the petitioner. It is his submission that the voluminous documents placed by the petitioner before the High Level Committee were not considered at all and as a result there has been gross violation of principles of natural justice and as such proper opportunity of hearing has not been granted and the Division Bench's order dated 31.01.2002 had not been complied with. I am unable to agree with these submissions. First of all, it is wrong to suggest that the petitioner, in the meeting dated 15.05.2002, was granted an opportunity to submit further documents. The minutes only record the petitioner's submission in para 5 (iv) thereof that the percentage passing results for the last five years (1995-2000 & 2001) "will be submitted within few days." This is what was submitted by the petitioner's representatives in the meeting. By no stretch of imagination can it be regarded as a permission granted by the High Level Committee to submit further written documents as has been alleged. No such permission to submit further written documents had been granted by the High Level Committee in the meeting of 15.05.2002. Hence, there was no question of any grievance being made with regard to the non-consideration of certain documents which had allegedly been submitted after the meeting concluded on 15.05.2002. Secondly, in the minutes in paragraph 7 thereof the opening words are "after the representatives of IME (I) completed their presentation.....". This has not been challenged by the petitioner. It clearly implies that the petitioner had completed its presentation and nothing further was required to be submitted by it. Thirdly, it must be recalled that in the minutes of the meeting held on 12.02.2002, it was clearly recorded that in the next meeting the petitioner should come prepared with all the supporting documents so that the hearing could be completed on that day itself. It is also recorded that the petitioner agreed to comply with this direction. Coupled with this is fact that as regards passing percentage, the petitioner had in the meeting of 12.02.2002 itself stated that documents in this regard would be submiited in a few days. This is clear from the following extract of the said minutes of 12.02.2002:-

"The thrust of their arguments was, however, that the passing percentage of students has been between 4 to 5% and not 1% as it has been noted by the Committee. Committee advised them to substantiate that with documentary evidence which they agreed to produce after few days."

The petitioner had time till 15.05.2002 when the next meeting was held: a full 3 months! Certainly much more than the "few days" that it had sought for producing documentary evidence. In this background, there can be no misunderstanding that the hearing of 15.05.2002 was to be the concluding hearing and that the petitioner was to produce all supporting documents. If it chose not to so produce the documents, it did so at its own peril. No blame, in this connection, can be foisted on the High Level Committee. Thus, the submission that documents submitted by the petitioner on 18.05.2002 were not considered has no merit. In this regard, there has been no violation of the principles of natural justice and the Division Bench order dated 31.01.2002 has been complied with.

18. It is also relevant to note, as highlighted by Mr P.V. Kapoor, learned Sr. counsel appearing on behalf of the Intervener (Forum for Fairness in Education), that the petitioner's letter dated 18.05.2002 clearly indicates that the petitioner had full knowledge of the exact nature of the deficiencies. The said letter dated 18.05.2002 also belies the petitioner's contention that the petitioner was required to give further written documents as indicated in para 5(iv) of the said minutes. The petitioner submitted that it was permitted to furnish percentage passing result figures for the last five years "within few days". This is not borne out by the contents of the letter dated 18.05.2002 and in particular paragraph 2(b) thereof wherein it is specifically recorded that the information had already been given Along with reply earlier. Furthermore, in the said letter dated 18.05.2002, it is clearly indicated that during the meeting held on 15.05.2002 the petitioner's representatives had handed over written arguments to all Members of the Committee running into 153 pages. It is also recorded that earlier also written arguments running into 199 pages were submitted on 12.02.2002 to the High Level Committee. In view of these admitted facts, it cannot be said that the petitioner institute was denied an opportunity of submitting written documents/arguments. As indicated above, full opportunity was granted to the petitioner.

19. Mr Chidambaram next submitted that the conclusions recorded in the minutes of the meeting dated 15.05.2002 and in particular in paragraph 8 thereof are vague, untenable and not supported by any facts and documents and have been arrived at wholly without application of mind. He submits that no facts or reasons have been recorded in support of the adverse conclusions regarding the standard of examinations and the examination system. The reference to one person who allegedly did not have requisite qualification and was allegedly examining hundreds of projects is vague and no name has been mentioned. Likewise, no name has been mentioned of the individual who was allegedly setting papers for a large number of subjects. No reference has been made to the alleged blanks in the minutes of the meetings. As such, Mr Chidambaram submits that the conclusions are vague and there are no reasons indicated in support of the conclusions. In this regard he submits that the conclusions cannot be sustained and have to be set aside. In support of this proposition, he referred to the Supreme Court decision in Union of India v. M.L. Capoor: AIR 1974 SC 87 wherein it was held that "reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions". Mr Chidambaram submits that the conclusions recorded in the minutes of 15.05.2002 are not supported by any reasons and, as such, the "links" between the material on record and the conclusions are missing. That being the case, he submits that the conclusions cannot be sustained and are liable to be set aside. In Union of India v. M.L. Capoor (supra), the Supreme Court was, inter alia, considering the question of whether the provisions of Regulation 5 (5) of the Indian Police Service (Appointment by Promotion) Regulations, 1955 had been complied with or not. The said Regulation 5(5) read as under:-

"(5) If in the process of selection, review or revision it is proposed to supersede any member of the State Civil Service, the Committee shall record its reasons for the proposed supersession."

So, it is clear that while passing an order under Regulation 5(5), it was incumbent on the Selection Committee to have stated reasons. It is in this context that the Supreme Court held as under:-

"Reasons are the links between the materials on which certain conclusions are based and the actual conclusions. They disclose how the mind is applied to the subject matter for a decision whether it is purely administrative or quasi-judicial. They should reveal a rational nexus between the facts considered and the conclusions reached. Only in this way can opinions or decisions recorded be shown to be manifestly just and reasonable. We think that it is not enough to say that preference should be given because a certain kind of process was gone through by the Selection Committee. This is all the supposed statement of reasons amounts to. We, therefore, think that the mandatory provisions of Regulation 5 (5) were not complied with."

In the case before the Supreme Court, the Selection Committee was duty-bound under the provisions of Regulation 5(5) to give reasons. In such a situation if reasons were not given, then the order would be illegal. That this is exactly what the Supreme Court has decided and it is in this context that the aforesaid observations have been made. In the present case, the facts are different. There is no mandatory provision requiring the High Level Committee to give any reasons for its conclusions. Nor is there any requirement for the respondent No. 1 to give reasons in respect of the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002. In this regard, I am in agreement with the submissions of Mr P.V. Kapoor, the learned senior counsel who appeared on behalf of the Intervener (Forum for Fairness in Education), that in the absence of any statutory rule or statutory instructions requiring the competent authority to record reasons in passing an order or rejecting a representation, the competent authority would not be under any obligation to record reasons. If the order is passed after consideration in a fair and just manner, the order would not be rendered illegal on the ground of absence of reasons and it would not be open to the Court to interfere with such orders merely on the ground of absence of any reasons. Reliance has rightly been placed on the following decisions of the Supreme Court:- (a) Union of India v. E.G. Nambudiri: (1991) 3 SCC 38; and (b) Mahabir Jute Mills v. Shibban Lal Saxena: (1975) 2 SCC 818. In Union of India v. E.G. Nambudiri (supra), the Supreme Court held:-

"There is no dispute that there is no rule or administrative order for recording reasons in rejecting a representation. In the absence of any statutory rule or statutory instructions requiring the competent authority to record reasons in rejecting a representation made by a government servant against the adverse entries the competent authority is not under any obligation to record reasons. But the competent authority has no license to act arbitrarily, he must act in a fair and just manner. He is required to consider the questions raised by the government servant and examine the same, in the light of the comments made by the officer awarding the adverse entries and the officer countersigning the same. If the representation is rejected after its consideration in a fair and just manner, the order of rejection would not be rendered illegal merely on the ground of absence of reasons. In the absence of any statutory or administrative provision requiring the competent authority to record reasons or to communicate reasons, no exception can be taken to the order rejecting representation merely on the ground of absence of reasons. No order of an administrative authority communicating its decision is rendered illegal on the ground of absence of reasons ex faice and it is not open to the court to interfere with such orders merely on the ground of absence of any reasons. However, it does not mean that the administrative authority is at liberty to pass orders without there being any reasons for the same. In governmental functioning before any order is issued the matter is generally considered at various levels and the reasons and opinions are contained in the notes on the file. The reasons contained in the file enable the competent authority to formulate its opinion. If the order as communicated to the government servant rejecting the representation does not contain any reasons, the order cannot be held to be bad in law. If such an order is challenged in a court of law it is always open to the competent authority to place the reasons before the court which may have led to the rejection of the representation. It is always open to an administrative authority to produce evidence aliunde before the court to justify its action."

In Mahabir Jute Mills v. Shibban Lal Saxena (supra), the Supreme Court held:-

"The learned Single Judge while allowing the petition set aside the order of the Government and directed the Government to make a reference to the Industrial Tribunal after ignoring the secret report sent by the Additional Regional Conciliation Officer. Another reason which the Single Judge gave was that as the order of the Government did not state any reason and was not a speaking order it was legally invalid and was fit to e quashed. The Division Bench of the High Court in appeal has not accepted, and in our opinion, rightly, this part of the order of the High Court which was set aside. The Division Bench has held that as the order of the Government was purely an administrative order, unless there was any provision which required the Government to give reasons for the order, the same could not be vitiated for the absence of the reasons. The High Court observed thus:

The function of the Government is administrative. In law administrative decisions are not generally required to be accompanied by a statement of reasons. There is nothing in the Industrial Disputes Act or the notification aforesaid requiring the State Government to state its reasons in support of its conclusion. There was nothing particular in the present case impelling the issuance of such a direction to the State Government.

We find ourselves in complete agreement with the view taken by the High Court on this point. In a diverse society such as ours the Government has to work through several administrative agencies which have got a very wide sphere and if every administrative order is required to give reasons it will bring the governmental machinery to a stand-still. It is well-settled that while the rules of natural justice would apply to administrative proceedings, it is not necessary that the administrative orders should be speaking orders unless the statute specifically enjoins such a requirement. But we think it desirable that such orders should contain reasons when they decide matters affecting rights of parties..........."

From these decisions, it is clear that unless the statute so requires, and administrative authority need not give reasons for the order that it passes. The non-supply of reasons would, in such cases, not render the decisions or orders to be illegal or violative of principles of natural justice. In the present case, there is no statutory requirement for giving reasons. In fact, even the Division Bench by its order dated 31.01.2002 did not require the High Level Committee or the respondent No. 1 to give reasons for its decision. The direction was merely to the effect that an effective opportunity of hearing be given to the petitioner before a decision was taken in the matter. Furthermore, the High level Committee has not acted in an arbitrary, unreasonable of whimsical fashion. It has given full latitude to the extent reasonable to the petitioner to put forth its case. It has considered and deliberated upon all the points raised and only then has it arrived at the said conclusions. In view of these facts and circumstances, the decision arrived at by the High Level Committee and the respondent No. 1 as indicated in the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002 cannot be faulted on this ground. In any event, the reasons for arriving at the conclusions have been, in my opinion, set out in the minutes of the meeting of 15.05.2002. It may be that all details and particulars are not mentioned. However, it cannot be said that no reasons at all have been given for the conclusions arrived at.

20. At this juncture it must not be forgotten that what are being considered are the minutes of a meeting and not a judicial or quasi-judicial order. As regards the nature and content of minutes, Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings: Seventh Edition: Sweet & Maxwell, has this to say (Page 81):-

"Minutes, as a rule, show only the decisions recorded at a meeting, preceded possibly by a short narration dealing with the essential points leading up to the decision."

Again, at page 169 of Horsley's Meetings, Procedure, Law and Practice: Second Edition: Butterworths, it is stated:-

"For the most part, minutes record no more than the occurrence of the meet, essential details of the proceedings and the decisions which were made, couched in a factual, affirmative way. They are confined to recording the things that were achieved. In general, minutes comprise resolutions (ie sentences commencing with the word "Resolved") with explanatory narrative only where necessary to provide essential information and circumstances leading to a resolution, or desirable to clarify reasons for, or a background to, a particular decision. They are concise, yet clear as to the pertinent points and are presented in a traditional format."

It is clear that, in minutes, only the decisions arrived at in a meeting need be recorded. A concise narration preceding the decisions recorded would suffice. The details need not be spelt out. The narration need only indicate the topics discussed and circumstances leading to the decisions. If this is done, it would be sufficient to show that the decisions have been arrived at after due consideration of the points in issue and are not arbitrarily or whimsically taken. The minutes of 15.05.2002 clearly indicate that points were raised, the petitioner was given full opportunity to rebut the same, the petitioner made a full presentation, a discussion amongst the members of the High Level Committee followed, deficiencies were indicated albeit shorn of details and unnecessary specifics and ultimately the conclusions were arrived at. The meeting lasted several hours. Surely, such a manner of decision cannot be termed as arbitrary, capricious, whimsical or unreasonable. The decisions taken by the High Level Committee have been arrived at after giving full and ample opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and after due deliberations. That is all that was required. There is no fault with the decision making process.

21. Insofar as the actual decision is concerned, this Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction cannot sit as a Court of Appeal and interfere with the same. The High Level Committee is an expert body constituted for a specific purpose. After considering the submissions of the petitioner, the High Level Committee has come to a particular conclusion. In Union of India v. Shah Goverdhan L. Kabra Teachers College: JT 2002 (8) SC 269, the Supreme Court in para 11 cautioned that the conclusion of an expert body should not be lightly tinkered with by a Court of Law without giving due weightage to the conclusion arrived at by such expert body. In view of these observations also, it would not be proper for this Court to interfere with the conclusions arrived at by the High Level Committee after due deliberations and after giving full opportunity of hearing to the petitioner institution.

22. Mr Chidambaram also submitted that the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002 was at variance with the minutes of the meeting recorded on 15.05.2002 and that no reasons were given in the impugned notification. It was his contention that the notification was issued by the respondent No. 1 and, therefore, it was essentially an order passed by responent No. 1 and there ought to have been some indication that the respondent No. 1 had applied its mind to the recommendations of the High Level Committee. According to him, there is no such indication of independent application of mind on the part of the respondent No. 1 and on this short ground alone, the impugned notification is liable to be set aside and/or quashed. This submission, though seemingly appealing, is also untenable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High Level Committee had come to certain conclusions as recorded in the minutes dated 15.05.2002. These conclusions were reproduced in the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002 which has been issued by the respondent No. 1. It is obvious that the respondent No. 1 had fully endorsed the conclusions of the High Level Committee recorded in the minutes dated 15.05.2002. Res ipsa loquitor. There is no requirement for any reasons to be recorded in the impugned notification dated 10.06.2002. Thus, this ground of challenge to the impugned notification also fails.

23. Now all that remains in this matter is to consider the submissions of Mr Manmohan (senior advocate), who appeared on behalf of a student - Intervener (Mr Ajay Mattoo). It may be noted that the said student had filed LPA No. 49/2002 which was heard together with LPA No. 50/2002 and in which the Division Bench passed the said order dated 31.01.2002. Initially, the said student had moved an application being CM 12483/2002 in the present writ petition for impleadment therein. However, as recorded in the order dated 18.11.2002, it was indicated that the said student would be satisfied if he was permitted to intervene in the matter and assists the Court. The application was allowed to the extent that the said student was permitted to intervene in the matter. It is in this background that Mr Manmohan was permitted to make submissions on behalf of the said student. He contended that the opportunity of hearing that was to be granted by virtue of the Division Bench order also extended to his client. Admittedly, the said student had not been given any opportunity of hearing in either of the meetings of the High Level Committee held on 12.02.2002 and 15.05.2002. As such, it is his submission that the order of the Division Bench has not been complied with in respect of his client and the impugned notification which essentially affects the students including his client is liable to be set aside on this ground alone. There was quite a lot of debate on the question as to whether the opportunity of hearing that was directed to be given was in relation to the "appellant" in LPA 50/2002 or to the "appellants" in both the LPAs. While Mr Manmohan contended that the direction with regard to opportunity of hearing related to both the petitioner institute as well as his client, Mr Hazarika who appeared on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and Mr P.V. Kapoor who appeared on behalf of the other Intervener (Forum for Fairness in Education) both contended that the direction related only to the petitioner institute. There was a lot of argument on semantics and whether the word "appellant" although used in the singular had reference to "appellants" in the plural sense and vice versa. In my opinion, it is not necessary to go into all the niceties of grammar and syntax. The entire issue is clinched by the sentence in the Division Bench order of 31.01.2002 at page 14 of the certified copy which reads as under:-

"The first question that needs to be determined as to whether the appellant institute was given proper opportunity on 10.10.2001."

From this, it is clear that the entire discussion with regard to opportunity of hearing related only to such opportunity being granted to the petitioner institute. There is no reference whatsoever to any denial of opportunity to the students and in particular to Mr Manmohan's client. It is further pertinent to note that this question of opportunity of hearing was entirely with reference to the hearing granted on 10.10.2001 by virtue of the learned single Judge's order dated 18.09.2001. In the latter order, there is no mention of any opportunity of hearing being granted to any person other than the petitioner institute. When opportunity of hearing was not directed to be granted in the first instance, Mr Manmohan's client cannot make any grievance in this regard. It is very clear that the opportunity of hearing that was to be granted was only in respect of the petitioner institute and none else. As such, the submission of Mr Manmohan is untenable.

24. Before concluding, it must be mentioned that some submissions were also made on behalf of the respondent No. 2 (AICTE). Essentially, it was submitted that the question involved in the present petition was only with regard to recognition for the purposes of Government employment and as such, the respondent No. 2 had nothing to do with it. The question of recognition for the purposes of Government employment was beyond the scope of AICTE. It was further submitted that the petitioner institute was not a technical institute within the meaning of the All India Council for Technical Education Act, 1987. There were some arguments advanced on this aspect of the matter, however, these need not be reproduced here as the same are not germane to the issues at hand which have already been discussed above.

25. In view of the foregoing facts and circumstances and discussion, I find no merit in the writ petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. There shall be no order as to costs.