D.D.A. vs Salwan Furnishing Co.
2003 Latest Caselaw 917 Del

JUDGMENT

S.K. Mahajan, J.

1. The appellant DDA has filed this appeal to challenge the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge whereby the objections filed by the appellant under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act to set aside the award of the Arbitrator were dismissed and award was made rule of the Court and decree in terms of the award was passed. The facts in short relevant for deciding this appeal are:-

2. An agreement was entered into between the parties, for supply of chairs of certain drawings and specifications mentioned therein. There was an arbitration clause in the agreement entered into between the parties. During the execution of the contract, it appears that drawings of the chairs as well as the material of which they were to be made was changed and the respondents, therefore, claimed higher price for the chairs to be supplied under the agreement to the appellant. It also appears that at the instance of the appellant, the respondents had used extra wood in making the chairs and they, therefore, submitted bills for such use of extra wood. Bills submitted by the respondents at higher rate for 960 chairs and for use of extra wood in some other chairs were not approved by the appellant. Disputes thus having arisen between the parties, the matter was referred to the Arbitrator in terms of the Arbitration clause in the agreement between the parties. The Arbitrator after hearing the parties made and published his award directing the appellant to make certain payments for the claims made by the respondents to the appellant. On the award being filed in Court an application/ objections were filed by the appellant under Section 30 of the Arbitration Act for setting aside the award on the ground that the Arbitrator had misconducted himself and proceedings and had acted beyond the agreement between the parties. The objections were dismissed by the learned Additional District Judge by the impugned order which is now challenged by the appellant by filing the present appeal.

3. The contention of Mr. Sapra appearing on behalf of the appellant is that in terms of the agreement the chairs were to be supplied by the respondents at the rates to be approved by the appellant. It is submitted that though the respondent had quoted higher rates, however, the appellant did not approve the same. The appellant had allegedly approved the supply of chairs @ Rs.473/- per chair for one design of chairs and Rs.497.20 paise for the other design. It is submitted that once the rate had been approved by the appellant, the respondent was not entitled to be paid any other rate except what had been approved by the appellant. In respect of the claim for using extra wood, the contention of Mr. Sapra is that the Arbitrator has not referred to the letters dated 2.4.1982 and 16.4.1982, written by the respondents themselves where they had specifically agreed that if extra wood is used in the making of chairs because of change in design, etc., they would not claim extra price for the same. It is submitted that since the respondents themselves had agreed not to claim extra price for extra wood used in the making of the chairs, the Arbitrator has clearly exceeded its jurisdiction by allowing said claim of the respondents. It is, therefore, submitted that the Arbitrator having committed misconduct in making the award, the order in respect of these two claims was liable to be set aside.

4. While deciding the objections for setting aside the award, the Court must bear in mind that it is not sitting as Court of appeal over the decision of the Arbitrator. The Arbitrator is the final arbiter of disputes between the parties. The award is not open to challenge on the ground that the arbitrator has reached a wrong conclusion or has failed to appreciate facts. The jurisdiction of the Courts in such matters is very limited. As already stated above, it cannot sit in appeal over the views of the arbitrator by re-examining or reassessing the material before him. In the present case, the Arbitrator has given sufficient reason as to why the respondents were entitled to extra rate for providing extra wood and as to why the rate which has been quoted by the respondents for chairs for designs 6 and 7 should be paid to them and why the DDA cannot insist to pay at the rate allegedly approved by it after the supply of chairs by the respondents to them. The Arbitrator having decided that the rates quoted by the respondents in terms of the Clause 13A of the agreement between the parties were binding and the appellant had to pay for the chairs supplied by the respondent at said rate, this Court cannot go into the question as to how and why the Arbitrator has arrived at that finding. I, therefore, do not see any reason as to why the award of the Arbitrator should be interfered in respect of claim no.1. Insofar as claim no.2 is concerned, no doubt the respondents had written letters mentioned that they will not charge any extra rates for the extra wood used in making the chair, however, the said letters were issued while the parties were negotiating the rates before the agreement was entered into between the parties. In the agreement between the parties, no such clause was incorporated. The parties were, therefore, bound only by the agreement and not by any letter or negotiations which may have taken place before the agreement between the parties. The Arbitrator in these circumstances was fully justified in holding that the respondent was entitled to the cost of extra wood used in making the chairs.

5. In view of the foregoing, there being no ground to interfere with the award, the trial Court was fully justified in dismissing the objections filed by the appellant and in making the award the rule of the Court and passing a decree in terms thereof. I do not find any merit in this appeal and the same is, accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.

6. The interim order passed on 15.1.1986 stands vacated.