G.C. Kaushal, Ips vs Presiding Officer Cat And Ors.
2002 Latest Caselaw 453 Del

JUDGMENT

S.B. Sinha, C.J.

1. These two writ petitions arising out of an order dated 28.09.1998 passed in the original application and an order dated 27.10.1999 passed in a contempt proceeding involving similar questions of fact and law were taken up for hearing together and are being disposed of by this common judgment.

2. The Civil Petition No. 6676 of 1999 is directed against the order dated 28.09.1998 passed by the Central administrative Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') dismissing O.A. No. 2790 of 1997 whereby and whereunder the expunction of the adverse remarks of the mutilated tampered Annual Confidential Report (in short, 'ACRs') in his service book allegedly after the original ACRs were tempered and/or removed intentionally to deprive the petitioner of his due promotion, was dismissed.

3. The Civil Writ Petition No. 7079 of 1999 is directed against the order dated 27.10.1999 dismissing the contempt petition of the petitioner alleging nor-compliance of the order of the Tribunal dated 06.03.1998 passed in O.A. No. 2791 of 1997.

4. Before proceeding to advert into the questions, it may be recorded that the respondent Nos. 4 to 8 were not imp leaded as parties before the learned Tribunal. They have been imp leaded as parties herein without obtaining the leave of the Court.

5. The fact of the matter is as follows:-

6. The petitioner was allegedly denied his cadre post and was posted as Superintendent of Police (Leave Reserve) as Police Head Quarter, Shimla in the year 1986. He questioned the same before the Tribunal and the respondent State was directed to give cadre post to the petitioner with duties.

7. The first information report (in short, 'FIR') being FIR No. 1/88 dated 20.02.1998 was lodged against the petitioner, which was subsequently quashed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh. However, a departmental proceeding was initiated against him. The petitioner was also denied promotion.

8. Allegedly at the intervention of he Governor, the petitioner was promoted, but the departmental proceeding continued.

9. The petitioner contended that in the year 1990 allegedly exposed the then DGP for fabricating his date of birth, which infuriated him resulting in causing harm to the petitioner in a number of ways.

10. Admittedly, adverse remarks for the period from 01.04.1991 to 31.03.1992 and 17.08.1992 to 31.03.1993 were communicated to the petitioner on 06.09.1993. The petitioner contends that such communication having been made beyond the statutory period, the same could not stand in the way of his career.

11. According to the petitioner, he later came to learn that the said adverse ACRs were forged and fabricated and the same were prepared upon tampering with the original ACRs. He thereupon made a representation to the Additional Chief Secretary, who was the competent authority, therefore as the State of Himachal Pradesh was under the President's Rule at that time.

12. Allegedly, expunction of the adverse entries was directed on the ground of belated communication. the petitioner, however, contends that by mistake further step of "pasting' of expunction had not be carried out as required under the Rules. However, the said ACRs were placed before the Chief Minister for acceptance, who instead of accepting the same made severe entries and further spoiled his ACRs.

13. Aggrieved by the said decision, the petitioner filed an original application before the Central Administrative Tribunal Chandigarh (in short, 'CAT, Chandigarh') on grounds of belated communication, which was dismissed by the CAT, Chandigarh by an order dated 14.09.1995. The petitioner contends that at that time he was not aware of tampering and forging of the original ACRs and the Tribunal also did not peruse the said ACRs.

14. The petitioner questioned the disciplinary proceedings, which had been initiated against him before the CAT, Chandigarh and by an order dated 11.08.1994, the said enquiry was directed to be completed within 4 months. Again an original application was filed by the petitioner, which was marked as O.A. No. 2791 of 1997, wherein the disciplinary proceedings pending against him was directed to be quashed by an order dated 06.03.1998.

15. On or about 16.08.1995, he lodged a complaint before Special Judge Shimla against the DGP and others under the Scheduled Caste & Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 ( in short, 'the Act'). The said complaint, however, was rejected. The petitioner moved the High Court thereagainst, which was also dismissed.

16. The petitioner filed an application for grant of special relief before the Supreme Court by way of SLP No. 2680 of 1995. The Apex Court on 16.08.1985. passed the following order:-

"We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned order but in view of the special facts of he case we feel that if the petitioner makes as representation to the Centre for his transfer outside the State for the time being, the same may be considered sympathetically. The SLP is dismissed."

17. The CAT, Chandigarh, however, by an order dated 14.09.1995 held that belated communication of the ACRs were not fatal. The SLP thereagainst filed by the petitioner before the Supreme Court also did not succeed.

18. The petitioner thereafter approached the Union Ministry of Home Affairs for implementation of the order dated 16.08.1995 for his posting outside the State of Himachal Pradesh and allegedly discovered that his career-graph was spoiled by his ACRs, which have been summoned by the then Home Minister in his presence.

19. He thereafter made another representation for expunction of the adverse remarks on the ground that the same were forged and mutilated. He again filed applications under the said Act as also the Indian Penal Code (in short, 'IPC') by lodging three FIRs being FIR Nos. 9/1996, 10/1966 and 11/1996 making complaint of forgery and fabrication of ACRs as also alleged malicious prosecution of the petitioner making the then Chief Minister and DGP as the accused therein.

20. The petitioner also approached the National Commission for Scheduled Castes & Scheduled Tribes (in short, 'the National Commission') for a direction for providing seniority to him and case being entrusted to the Central Bureau of Investigation (in short, 'CBI').

21. On or about 14.01.1997, the petitioner was suspended. He filed a representation before the Supreme Court, which was marked as WP (Crl.) No. 29 of 1997 seeking transfer of investigation of the said FIRs to the CBI and also rial of the case from Shimla to Delhi.

22. According to the petitioner, the Hon'ble Supreme Court was also aware that the National Commission was seized with the matter. The said petition was disposed of directing:-

"(Crl.) 29/97 : Mr. G. Ramaswamy, learned Senior counsel appearing for the State of Himachal Pradesh, candidly states that should the petitioner move for a transfer of cadre from Himachal Pradesh to another, the State of H.P. shall support the case of the petitioner whole heartedly and would relieve him without any hitch. On that basis, Mr. Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, withdraws this petition with liberty to avail of the remedies known to law. Ordered accordingly."

23. Pursuant to the said order, the petitioner filed an application for his change of cadre, but the same was not acceded to by the Central Government.

24. The petitioner again filed applications before the Tribunal seeking for the following reliefs:-

"(i) Summon ACRs of the Applicant for periods 1991-92, 1.4.1992 to 16.8.1992, 17.8.1992 to 31.3.1993 and 1.4.1993 to August, 1993 from the National Commission of SC/ST, New Delhi where they are currently lying and also another set thereof which is currently in the custody of the Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Govt. of India, North Block, New Delhi; And

(ii) Expunge the adverse entries made in the Annual Confidential Reports of the applicant for the periods 1991-92, 1.4.1992 to 16.8.1992, 17.8.1992 to 31.3.1993 and 1.4.1993 to August, 1993; and

(iii) As a consequential relief pass orders directing the respondents to promote the applicant to the post of Dy. Inspector General of Police with effect from 1.1.1991, Inspector General of Police with effect from 1.1.1994 and Addl. Director General of Police with effect from October, 1996 which promotions were not given to him on account of tampered/mutilated adverse entries in his Annual Confidential Reports for the periods stated earlier; and also

(iv) Issue directions to the respondents to implement the order dated 5.5.1997 passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India for change of cadre outside the State of H.P. as a result of which the applicant had made application (Annexure-A7) through the State of Himachal Pradesh for his posting after aforesaid promotions, to U.T. Cadre (Delhi Police)."

25. He also field another original application being O.A. No. 2791 of 1997 praying inter alia for:-

'(i) revocation of order suspending the petitioner;

(ii) grant of promotions which were overdue."

By an order dated 06.03.1998, the Tribunal directed:-

"(A) Order dated 14.1.1997 is hereby set aside granting liberty to respondents to pass fresh order of suspension only after the orders of the respondent 3 are complied with.

(B) The order dated 28.1.1997 whereby the disciplinary proceedings have been initiated and in the circumstances that final orders have not yet been passed, the respondents are restrained forthwith from proceeding further with the inquiry and from passing the final order until the full compliance of the orders of the respondent 3 is reported to the commission.

(C) No order is required to be passed against the impugned order dt. 07.02.1997 quashing the same in the circumstances that the respondent have now stated that on 20.12.1997 the said orders have been withdrawn and in the circumstances the continuance of proceedings till 07.12.1997 from the year 1987, declared as lapsed by effect of time.

(D) With regard to the vires of OM dated 21.09.1988 and dated 13.08.1997, and Rule 3(1) of the All India Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1969, the question was left open for the reasons stated in the body of this decision.

(E) The relief sought by the Petitioner for promotion to the respective cadres which has been held up due to illegal filing and continuation of various criminal and departmental proceedings, is directed to be considered in accordance with law as if none of those proceedings were held or continued. The said proceedings can be continued only as per the directions now being issued but the same was not in any manner affect the consideration of the respondents for promoting the petitioner in accordance with the rules.

(F) The respondents shall also pass fresh orders as per the directions of the Supreme Court stated above, within one month from the date of the receipt of a copy of order and communicate the same to the Petitioner.

(G) The respondents are directed to issue appropriate orders in accordance with the directions issued by the respondent 3 forthwith as if the same has been issued by an authority within the Union of India and binding on all other respondents.

(H) NO specific relief has bene sought in this OA with respect to ACRs of the Petitioner, and that being the subject matter of OA 2790 of 1997 and the same is not decided Along with this OA. The registry is directed to list the same on for further adjudication of the said OA.

With this the OA has been allowed to the extent stated above with no order as to cost."

26. However, O.A. No. 2790 of 1999 was dismissed holding inter alia that the said petitioner was barred by constructive res judicata. An application for review of the said order was also dismissed by an order dated 18.02.1999.

27. The National Commission, however, by an order dated 15.07.1999 directed grant of promotion and consequential benefits to the petitioner in the rank of DIG w.e.f. 01.01.1991, Inspector General of Police w.e.f. 01.01.1994, Additional Director General of Police w.e.f. October, 1996 and DGP as per his eligibility.

28. The petitioner also filed a contempt petition for non-implementation of the order dated 06.03.1998 before the Tribunal, which was marked as CWP No. 7079 of 1999, as his representation for implementation of the order had not been replied to. The petitioner also made a further representation before the appropriate authority on the ground that his juniors have been promoted.

29. On his application for initiation of contempt, notices were issued pursuant where to the alleged contemnors filed reply affidavit that no contempt of the Tribunal was committed and the orders of the Tribunal had been complied with. By reason of an order dated 27.10.1999, the said contempt petition was dismissed. The writ petitions have been filed against the said orders.

30. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that in the backdrop of events, as noticed hereinbefore, the learned Tribunal committed a serious illegality in holding that the application of the petitioner was barred by constructive res judicata.

31. The learned counsel would contend that having regard to the fact that in the earlier original application filed before CAT, Chandigarh, the question raised in the original application could not be raised, as the petitioner was not aware of such purported forgery and fabrication.

32. It was contended that the question before CAT, Chandigarh was confined only on the ground of belated communication of the ACR and thus the principle of constructive res judicata was not applicable.

33. From a perusal of he order passed by the learned Tribunal, it does not appear that he pleadings of the earlier original application had bene filed for the purpose of substantiating the said allegation.

34. As regards the question of mala fide, the learned Tribunal held that not only the said contention had not been substantiated, even those against whom mala fide has been alleged had not been imp leaded as parties.

35. Despite the aforementioned findings, the Tribunal went through the individual ACRs, as also the files pertaining for expunction of the records and held:-

"....Records show that the applicant did not submit "self assessment" in time at least once. In any case, guidelines provide that if the officer reported upon submits his "Self appraisal" in time, but the reporting or reviewing officers cause undue delays, without explanation, it is latter who are required to be taken up by still higher authorities and the applicant need not feel too much apprehensive of belated communications. The averment of the applicant that it is only the then DGP (Shri Verma) who had been nursing malice against him is not borne out by records. We find that several other officers have also reported against the applicant. Authorities at the highest level of Chief Secretaries -not one but quite a few of them in succession-have accepted the view of reporting as well as reviewing officers. On the basis of thorough scrutiny of records available before us, we are not able to persuade ourselves that there have been series of mutilations, forgeries at all levels and that too over all the four periods, as alleged. In the absence of clinching documents/evidence we are not in a position to enter into a definite finding that all the reports have been forged maliciously.

11. It is true that there are a few cuttings/ erasings in some of the reports, but they do not vitiate the "Grading" given to the petitioner. Consistency in remarks at the level of Chief Secretaries over the entire periods commands acceptance. If past records of 1979 onwards( when he finished his probation) are of any indication, we find the petitioner is mostly in receipt of "Average" gradings and has never been put finally on a category above "Good". There were three occasions in the pat when major shortcomings were noticed in his performances and the petitioner reprimanded accordingly."

36. This Tribunal also in its order dated 27.10.1999 passed in C.P. No. 85 of 1999 arising out of O.A. No. 2791 of 1997 dealt with the allegations made by the petitioner in great details and came to the conclusion that order had been substantially complied with. The Tribunal recorded its findings in paragraph 6 of the impugned judgment and held:-

"It was also stated that the Appointment Committee of the Cabinet also did not approve the cadre change of the petitioner from Himachal Pradesh to UT (AGMU) or Punjab cadre, in this order dated 1.9.98 which is annexed by the petitioner to the CP. Thus, it is clear that respondents 1 & 5 have considered the application of the petitioner afresh as directed and passed an elaborate speaking order. the learned counsel for the petitioner, however, raises various grounds to contend that the order does not reflect the true spirit in which the order was passed by the Supreme Court. We do not agree. We have closely perused the order. the authorities concerned have considered all aspects of the issue and found that it was not possible to accede to the request for transfer. It should be kept in mind our jurisdiction in this matter is narrow and limited only to examine whether the directions have been faithfully complied with. It may be that the order passed is not strictly legal. that is entirely a different issue in which we will not normally enter. It is not as though the petitioner is left without any remedy. If he is aggrieved by the order it is open to him to agitate the same before the appropriate forum."

37. As regards, non-compliance of the directions issued by the Tribunal in paragraph 9(B), 9(E) and 9(G) having regard to the dispute as to whether such directions had been complied with or not, the Tribunal recorded:-

"It was directed that the respondents should be restrained from proceedings further with the enquiry initiated against the petitioner by order dated 28.1.97. In the counter affidavit file by R-4, it was stated that accordingly the State Govt. Of Himachal Pradesh stopped proceeding with the enquiry and passing the final order and no fresh order of suspension was passed against him although liberty was given by the tribunal in the direction 9 (A) to pass such an order.

In order to satisfy ourselves about the genuineness of the action taken by the respondents in finding the petitioner unfit for promotion we have perused the ACRs of the applicant for the relevant years which have been considered by the Screening Committee on 23.2.99. We are satisfied that in view of the adverse entries in some of the relevant ACRs, the petitioner was found 'unfit' for promotion. None of the disciplinary proceedings pending against him affected the denial of his promotion. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that there could be no adverse entries against the petitioner inasmuch as no adverse entries have been communicated to him. But, in the counter-affidavit it is stated that the OA 2790/97 filed by the petitioner, challenging the adverse entries in ACRs, ended in dismissed by judgment dated 28.9.98. Moreover the question whether the entries were communicated to the petitioner or not or whether they should have been taken into consideration without being communicated does not fall for consideration in this matter. As we find that none of the disciplinary case affected his promotion, or were taken into consideration, we have to hold that the directions in this regard have been complied with.

As to the request of the petitioner for providing security to him and to his family, it was stated in the counter-affidavit that it was enquired into through the Director General of Police, Himachal Pradesh and it was found that there was no precession of threat to the petitioner or to his family members. Hence, there was no need to provide security.

9. In the circumstances we are fully satisfied that all the directions issued by the Tribunal have been fully complied with by the respondents/alleged contemners."

38. It is not in dispute that the validity or otherwise of the ACRs communicated to the petitioner were the subject matter of challenge in O.A. No. 644 of 1994. The CAT, Chandigarh dismissed the said original application holding that belated communication of ACRs by themselves would not vitiate them.

39. As noted hereinbefore, the petitioner has not been able to demonstrate before the learned Tribunal that he came to learn about the alleged forgery and fabrication at a later point of time, as a result whereof a subsequent cause of action arose.

40. In that view of the matter, the learned Tribunal has applied, principles of constructive res judicata.

41. It is not in dispute that the principles of constructive res judicata are applicable in a proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India (in short, 'the Constitution') as also a proceeding under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act (in short, 'AT Act').

42. Having regard to the fact that the petitioner has failed to show that at the point of time when he filed the original application before CAT, Chandigarh, he was not aware of the purported forgery and he cannot be permitted to raise the said question, which he could have and ought to have raised.

43. In any event, the Tribunal n its order has gone through the said ACRs and has arrived at a finding, which had not been shown before us to be suffering from the vires of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety.

In Orissa v. Jugal K. Khatua, 1997 SCC (L&S) 1768 it has been held:-

"While exercising the power of judicial review in respect of adverse remarks in the ACR, the Tribunal does not function as an appellate forum in respect of the assessment made by a superior officer about the performance of an employee working under him."

44. So far as the question of malice is concerned the Tribunal in our opinion has rightly held that in absence of the persons against whom malice had been alleged having being imp leaded as a party, the same could not have been gone into.

45. Furthermore, we have ourselves perused the said ACRs, which had been produced by the Central government. Having perused the same, we are of he opinion that there had been no substantial cause for interfering that forgeries had been committed. The ACRs merely show that opinions, which were typed, had later on been changed, but the signature, writing, etc. clearly show that no forgery and/or fabrication was involved.

46. The power of judicial review of this court under Article 226 of the Constitution is well known.

In A Ratnam and Ors. v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, Education Department, Hyderabad, 2001(6) ALT 661 it has been held thus:-

"49. The difference between "appeal" and "review" is well established. An appeal is continuation of the original proceedings and is concerned with the merits of the case and requires examination of the correctness of the findings of both fact and law. Judicial review, on the other hand is concerned with the validity of the order than the merits of he case. In Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans it was held that "judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but a review of the manner in which the decision was made and that the judicial review is concerned not with the decision but with the correctness of the decision making process. In R. Entry v. Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay ex.p. Amin, the House of Lords observed that judicial review is entirely different from an ordinary appeal and that it is concerned not with the merits of a decision but with the manner in which the decision was made. These principles have been quoted with approval in Tata Cellular v. Union of India.

50. Further, on the premise that any error of law materially affects the decision making process, it had been held that only error of law apparent on the face of the record is amenable to judicial review under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. When a decision of the Tribunal is challenged before this Court, this Court can issue any writ, declaration or direction. A writ of certiorari may be issued if the Tribunal failed to exercise jurisdiction properly or exceeds jurisdiction vested in it. A writ of mandamus may also be sought against the decision of the Tribunal if the Tribunal after adjudication declines to exercise proper discretion in discharging its functions. Equally a declaration can be sought when the Tribunal though exercised, jurisdiction within its limits in accordance with the settle d principles of law, but arrives at a finding, which might be perverse on the face of it. (See Judicial Review: Law & Procedure by Richard Gordon; Sweet & Maxwell 1996).

51. It is also equally settled that a Court of judicial review would not ordinarily interfere with the finding of facts however grave they may be. This Court is only concerned with grave error of lw which is apparent on the face of record. The error of law for instance may arise when a Tribunal wrongfully rejects admissible evidence or considers inadmissible evidence and records a finding. However, as observed by Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan, "it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt either to define or to describe adequately all cases of errors which can be appropriately described as errors of law apparent on the face of the record and the same must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of the legal provisions which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened." The principles of judicial review of decisions of the Tribunals noticed hereinabove were accepted by the Supreme Court in Syed Yakoob's case (30 supra). It is opposite to excerpt the following passage which is educative:

The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Court in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position on that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior Courts or Tribunals; these are cases where orders are passed by inferior Courts or Tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or improperly, as for instance it decides a question without giving an opportunity to be heard to be party effected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as a result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refuse d to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evince which has influenced the impugned finding.

52. The decision in Syed Yakoob's case was also followed in Jagdish Prasad v. Angoori Devi, .

In view of the binding authorities, the law is well settled that-

(i) The High Court is not an appellate authority over the decision of the Administrative Tribunals;

(ii) While exercising the power of judicial review, the High Court cannot be oblivious to the conceptual difference between appeal and review;

(iii) The petition for a judicial review would lie only on grounds of grave errors of law apparent on the face of the record and not on the ground of error of fact, however grave it may appear;

(iv) When the Tribunal renders a decision after determining the facts, no application for judicial review could be maintainable only on the ground that the Tribunal committed an error of fact, however, grave it may appear, unless sit is shown that such a finding of the Tribunal is based on no evidence and the error of fact itself can be regarded as error of law in the sense that admissible evidence was rejected and inadmissible evidence was relied on;

(v) The orders passed by the Tribunal by exercising discretion which judicially vests in it cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself is perverse or illegal in the sense the Tribunal did not follow an earlier decision of the Tribunal or binding authority of the High Court or the Supreme Court with reference to finding of facts and law;

(vi) When the Tribunal disposes of the original application by applying the binding precedents of the High Court as well as the Supreme Court, it cannot be said that the Tribunal has committed any error of law apparent on the face of the record; in such cases the limited review before the High Court would be whether the binding principle has been appropriately applied or not; the Tribunal's decision which is rendered in ignorance of the statutory law including subordinate legislation as well as the law laid down by the Supreme Court must be held to suffer an error apparent on the face of the record and requires judicial review;

(vii) Whether or not an error is error of law apparent on the face of the record must always depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and upon the nature and scope of legal provision, which is alleged to have been misconstrued or contravened;

(viii) The three parameters of judicial review of administrative action-illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety with necessary changes are equally applicable to cases of judicial review of the Tribunal's decision; and

(ix) A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract jurisdiction of High Court under Article 227; the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on High Court is limited to seeing that Tribunal functions within the limits of its authority and that its decisions do not occasion miscarriage of justice."

47. We, therefore, do not find any merit in CWP No. 6676 of 1999.

48. So far as CWP No. 7079 of 1999 is concerned, we are of the opinion that although having regard to the decision of the Apex Court in T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P. and Ors. (2001) 1 SCC 516 a writ petition may be maintainable, but the same principles as regard power of judicial review would arise for consideration in such matter also.

49. Moreover, the contempt is a matter between the Court and the party. If the Tribunal for cogent reasons had not proceeded for contempt because of a subsequent cause of action, the petitioner would be entitled to file a fresh original application. In our opinion, no case has been made out for interference with the said order having regard to the fact that the said observation is in consonance with the decision of the Apex Court in J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar and Ors. wherein it has been held:-

"The question is whether seniority list is open to review in the contempt proceedings to find out whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by e earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of he seniority list may be wrong or may be right or amy or amy not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the willful violation of the order. After re-exercising he judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned Single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the mater on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissible under Section 12 of the Act."

50. For the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned orders by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. There is no merit in this writ petition, which is accordingly dismissed. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there will be no orders as to cost.