Amar Kaur And Anr. vs Naresh Kumar
2002 Latest Caselaw 416 Del

JUDGMENT

R.C. Chopra, J.

1. This revision under Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act" only) assails an order dated 9.7.2001 passed by learned Additional Rent Controller, Delhi dismissing the petitioner's application for leave to defend and ordering their eviction from the premises in question under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25-B of the Act.

2. The facts relevant for the disposal of this petition, briefly stated, are that the respondent-landlord had filed a petition for eviction against the petitioners on the allegations that he was the owner-landlord and petitioners were his tenants in respect of the ground floor portion of the property in question. The respondent claimed that his family compromised of himself, his wife and three school going children but the accommodation available to him was only one room with toilet/bath on the second floor of property No. 2502, Nalva Street, Pahar Ganj which was owned by his father. The respondent was being asked to vacate the said premises and shift to his own house and hence the petition for eviction of the petitioners/tenants from one room, one varanda and opena read on the ground floor of the suit property No. 2494, Nalva Street, Chuna Mandi, Pahar Ganj, New Delhi shown in red in the site plan attached with the petition. It was also pleaded that the premises in question had been let out to Shri Batan Singh, late husband of petitioner No. 1 and after his death the petitioners had become his tenants.

3. The petitioners filed an applications for leave to defend the eviction petition mainly on the ground that the respondent did not require the premises bonafide and was having sufficient accommodation in other property in the same street. In was stated that the premises in question were let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes to the deceased husband of petitioner No. 1 (father of petitioner No. 2) who was a Carpenter and was doing his business also from the said premises. it was stated that there were other LRs also of the deceased-tenant who had not been imp leaded. it was pleaded that the petitioners had started paying rent to the respondent-landlord without seeing any document of his title in respect of the property in question and as such the payment of rent on misrepresentations did not confer any right, title or interest in respect of the property in question upon the respondent-landlord. it was denied that the respondent was the owner of the premises in question.

4. Vide impugned order dated 9.7.2001 the learned Additional Rent Controller, after considering the pleas raised by the petitioners in their leave to defend application came to the conclusion that no grounds for granting leave to defend were made out. Dismissing their application he ordered their eviction from the premises in question under Section 14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of Delhi Rent Control Act.

5. Before dealing with the questions raised in this petition, this Court must make it clear that its powers under Section 25(B)(8) of the Act are limited. In the absence of anything on record to show that the impugned orders passed by the learned Addl. Rent Controller were perverse, arbitrary or vitiated by some jurisdictional error this Court cannot be called upon to interfere with the same by way of re-appreciation of factual controversies. Section 25(B)(8) of the Act clearly lays down that no appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order for recovery of possession made by the Rent Controller in accordance with the provisions of Section 25B of the Act which are summary in nature. The proviso to the sub-section merely provides that the High Court may for the purpose of satisfying itself that an order made by the controller is according to law, call for the records of the case and pass such orders in respect thereto as it thinks fit. As held by the Apex Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. the powers of the High Court under this provision are only supervisory in nature and are intended to ensure that Rent Controller conforms to law when he passed an order under Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the High Court is required to scrutinise the records only for ascertaining as to whether any illegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passing the orders under Section 25-B of the Act. In para 6 of this judgment, it was observed as under:-

"It is not permissible for the High Court in that exercise to come to a different fact finding unless the finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is so unreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such a finding on the materials available."

6. Apex Court once again in Shiv Sawroop Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta, the limitations on the powers of High Court in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 25-B(8) of the Act.

7. The first and foremost contention advanced by learned counsel for the petitioners is that the learned Addl. Rent Controller had failed to exercise his discretion properly while holding that the respondent was the landlord/owner of the premises in question. A perusal of the impugned order and the material on record shows that not only the respondent had shown that he had become owner of the premises in question through a sale deed dated 15.1.1987 but he had also placed on record the admission of the petitioners in an earlier suit in which the petitioners had categorically admitted that their predecessor in interest Shri Batan Singh was a tenant in respect of premises in question and from 1987 the respondent had started receiving rent from the petitioner's predecessor in interest. It was also admitted that after the respondent had purchased the property in question from one Bhag Singh the predecessor interest of the petitioner Mr. Batan Singh had also started paying rent to him. In the face of the aforesaid admissions of the petitioners and the presumption under Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to challenge the respondent's ownership of the premises in question. The learned Addl. Rent Controller was, therefore, fully justified in coming to the conclusion that the respondent was the landlord/owner of the premises in question.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioners has further argued that all the LRs of the deceased-tenant were not joined in the petition and as such no eviction order could be passed against the present petitioners. In this regard also the learned Additional Rent Controller had referred to Para 5 of the written statement filed by the petitioners in an earlier suit between the parties in which the petitioners had categorically stated that they had inherited the tenancy. In view of this admission, there was no substance in the plea of the petitioners that other LRs also ought to have been joined in these proceedings.

9. Learned counsel for the petitioners has vehemently argued that the premises in question were let out for residential-cum-commercial purposes and as such the petition filed by the respondent was not maintainable even. It is true that the petitioners had raised a plea that the premises were let out to their predecessor in interest and were being used by him for residential-cum-commercial purposes, but there is no document on record to show that the premises in question were let out or were being used for commercial purposes. The premises in question consist of one room only which strongly militates against the plea that any business was being done there besides its use for residential purposes. The affidavit of one Liaquat Ali filed before this Court by the petitioners to say that the premises were let out for commercial purposes also and were being used as such by deceased Betan Singh is not only belated but a bald oral assertion in support of the petitioners which carries no weight in the absence of any other material in support of this plea. The learned Trial Judge had come to the conclusion that the premises were let out for residential purposes only and were being used as such calls for no interference by this Court in its revisional jurisdiction.

10. The contention that the respondent does not bonafide require the premises in question has been rightly repelled by the learned Addl. Rent Controller for the reason that the respondent is shown to be living in only one room in the property of his father and as such it cannot be said that his need for shifting into his own property is not bonafide. The fact that he, his wife and three children require the premises in question for their residential use and there is nothing on record to show that the respondent has any alternative accommodation is sufficient to hold that the need of the respondent is bonafide. The Apex Court in a judgment M.L. Prabhakar v. Rajiv Singhal reported in (2001) 2 SCC 355 and in Shiv Sawaroop Gupta v. Mahesh Chand Gupta has laid down detailed parameters for judging the question of the bonafide or genuine need of the landlord and have suggested that the Judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself as to whether in the given facts and circumstances, the landlord's need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real and honest. If the answer is found to be in the positive, then the need is bonafide. Applying the aforesaid principles to the present case this Court fully agrees with the view taken by learned Addl. Rent Controller that the respondent is in bonafide need of the premises in question.

11. In the result, this Court is of the considered view that no good grounds whatsoever are made out for interfering with the impugned order passed by the learned Additional Rent Controller declining leave to defend to the petitioners and passing an eviction order against them.

12. The petition, therefore stands dismissed.