Delhi Tamil Education Assn. vs Sri J. Samimalai
2002 Latest Caselaw 366 Del

JUDGMENT

Khan, (J)

1. Petitioner alleges that respondent had threatened its Advocates and had also lodged a complaint against one of them. Whether the alleged threat extended to an Advocate on phone amounted to a criminal contempt is the question.

2. Petitioner society is running some seven schools in NCT Region. Respondent was its Secretary who is said to have been removed on 3.10.1999 resulting in some litigation between the parties. Petitioner has filed Suit No. 2301/01 against him and obtained an ex-parte restraint order on 15.10.1999. He had, in turn, sought vacation of this order and it was in or around this time that petitioner moved this contempt petition alleging that respondent had threatened its President Mr. Srinivasan, a Supreme Court lawyer and three other counsel M/s. Ravi, V. Sudeer and Senior Advocate Mr. Krishnamani on phone asking them to withdraw from the brief or face dire consequences. He had also scandalised the court by publicly declaring before students that petitioner had "purchased interim orders' and had also lodged a complaint against one Mr. Srinivasan before Bar Council and threatened other counsel of similar complaints before SC ST Commission. All this, it is asserted, amounts to criminal contempt of court.

3. Petitioner has also filed written submissions citing some judgments including 1947 (48) Crl. L.J. page 757 (N.L. Bhalla v. Kishori Lal), (Y.P. Sinha v. P.N. Sinha) and a Supreme Court judgment in 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 130 (R.A. Shukla v. Arvind Shukla) to support its case and to show that if an Advocate was threatened and insulated in the performance of his professional duties or was concerned to withdraw from the brief, it constituted a criminal contempt.

4. Respondent has filed a detailed counter affidavit denying the allegations and dubbing petitioner's action as motivated and directed to stall the vacation of the stay order obtained against him and the dismissal of the suit which according to him was based on false and fabricated documents. He admits and justifies the complaint lodged by him against Mr. Srinivasan before Bar Council for his alleged professional misconduct.

5. It requires to be made clear at the very outset that contempt of court jurisdiction is not invokable for adjudication of rights or liabilities of the litigating parties or for enabling them to settle their personal scores or to be used as a weapon to gain an upper hand or advantage in the litigative spirit. Nor was it available to satisfy one's feelings of grudge and vengeance. It was exercisable on the contrary to protect the dignity of the court and the majesty of law and also to safeguard the public right in the fairness and impartiality of administration of justice.

6. A contempt of court is a matter between court and the alleged contemner and a litigant inviting attention of the court in this regard does not become either a petitioner or a complainant in a contempt proceedings. He is at best an informer and his duty ends with bringing any factual or legal position before the court and it was then for the court to act or not to act depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case and to decide whether an act complained of amounted to a contempt, more so a criminal one and was liable to be punished. A litigating party would not assume the role of a prosecutor and insist upon committing of opponent for contempt irrespective of whether or not the court felt satisfied about it.

7. Contempt of Courts Act 1971 defines the contempt into civil and criminal contempt. Criminal contempt carries with it an element of criminality aimed at eroding the majesty of law and undermining the authority of court. Section 2(c) of the Act defines it to mean "publication of any matter or doing of any other act whatsoever which (i) scandalises the court or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of the court; (ii) prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with due course of any judicial proceedings; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere or obstructs or tends to obstruct administration of justice in any manner.

8. It becomes unnecessary to cite instances of the cases that could fall within either of the categories of the definition clause. But since petitioner was seeking to bring the case within the last two clauses, it would have to be seen whether the alleged threat extended on phone to its President Advocate or other Advocates interfered in the due course of any judicial proceeding or caused any obstruction in the administration of justice in any manner or tended to do so.

9. It must be made clear at this stage that all and every type of threat to an Advocate of a litigant does not and would not attract a criminal contempt jurisdiction of the court unless it was specifically shown and established to have bred a tendency to prevent or deter the Advocate concerned from discharging his professional duty. The threat must have a nexus with and impact on the pending judicial proceeding so as to interfere in it or tend to do so or to change or alter the course of justice. It must be a real and not a casual and imaginary and its degree must be such as to set an Advocate thinking and to constrain him to throw up his brief depriving the court of his assistance to do justice. It must also be so apparent on face and stare at the face of the court so as to prompt it to take steps to safeguard its authority and the majesty of law. If it is casual or personal in nature having no proximate connection with functioning of the court, criminal contempt jurisdiction would not be attracted. An Advocate could complain of a threat through phone or some other means of communication at his place or some place by way of some stratagem or tactics also to gain advantage in the litigation or to whether away the opposing party but that would not fit the bill. An Advocate is no doubt in a sense an officer of the court cast with a duty to inform the court of legal and factual position and to aid it to do justice. Bhagwati, J. in the celebrated judgment of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India and Ors., described lawyers as priests in the temple of justice. But a priest is a priest who can't assume the place and status of a temple. So can't the Advocate claim the status of the court for purposes of invoking criminal contempt jurisdiction of the Court for any and every act done to him or any harm caused to him which does not fly in the face of the court and reflect or undermine its authority. If the act complained of was trivial or appeared imaginary and could be traced to personal vendetta, malafide or grudge and had no impact on the discharge of professional duties of a lawyer and no nexus with it, it would not fall in any of the categories of Section 2(c) and would not constitute a criminal contempt.

10. There may, however, be cases where a lawyer is abused or insulted or an aspersion cast on him in the face of the court to deter, dissuade or prevent him from discharging his professional duties, which was liable to cause an interference in the judicial proceeding or even an obstruction in the administration of justice. Similarly, where he is threatened of prosecution, assaulted or beaten or intimidated during court proceedings, it would lead to the same result depending again on the fact situation of a case. It is noteworthy that court had taken cognizance of criminal contempt in incidents which had by and large taken place before the court or in or around court proceedings.

11. Therefore, it would not be out of place to hold that the threat complained of by an Advocate must be a real and not casual, imaginary or flimsy one and its degree must be such as to breed a tendency in him to throw up the brief depriving the court of his requisite aid and assistance and cause interference in judicial proceeding or obstruction in course of justice. It must have nexus with the demand made to him to do something or to refrain from doing something and must be writ large on record leaving little or no scope for doubt that it would tend to interfere or had interfered with due course of the judicial proceedings or would or had altered or obstructed the course of justice. No bald and wild allegations made in the litigative spirit or heat of the contest or out of any strategy or tactics or emanating from any personal ego or vested interest to gain an upper hand or advantage against the opposing party would o. And in any case it was for the court to proceed with or close the matter in the facts and circumstances of the case and the litigating party could not insist on committing a person to contempt where the court was not inclined to do so.

12. In the present case, parties seem to be involved in an inner power struggle for running of the affairs of the society and in this were fighting it out with no holds barred. They may have in all likelihood resorted to adopting threatening postures on phone also. But that would not suffice unless any adverse fall out on pending judicial proceedings or process was shown or established. It would be too much to maintain that mere threat on phone unaccompanied by any other factor or circumstances or the overall conduct of the alleged contemner would attract criminal contempt jurisdiction of the court. In any case, there was nothing on the record to suggest so nor to indicate as to how and in that manner the alleged threat had caused any interference in judicial proceedings or obstruction in the administration of justice or had tended to do so.

13. We have also gone through the judgments cited in support of petitioner's case which do not advance its case in any way. In Bhalla v. Kishori Lal (supra), the Advocate was threatened during court proceedings, while he was discharging his duties before the court. Similarly, the proposition laid down in Shukla's case does not help because even though an allegation was not denied specifically in a contempt proceeding, it was still for the court to decide whether even an un-rebutted allegation would constitute a criminal contempt.

14. For all this, we find no merit in this petition which is dismissed. Rule issued against respondent is recalled and proceedings dropped.