Oamar Nisha And Others vs Mst. Hamida Begum
2001 Latest Caselaw 1334 Del

ORDER

Vikramajit Sen, J.

1. The facts of the case are that the Respondent/Landlady had filed a petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, (hereinafter referred to as DRC Act). In the Petition itself it had been clarified that the premises demised to the Petitioner Tenant was the First Floor of House No. 492, Ward No.11, Gali Matia Mahal, Delhi, as shown in the 'red' in the Site Plan attached to the Petition. The Tenant, However, allegedly carried out unauthorised construction on the roof of the First Floor as shown in 'blue' in the Site Plan. Consequently, evection was sought in respect of the entire property. It also appears that a civil suit for permanent Injunction had been filed by the Landlady in respect of the unauthorised and illegal construction being carried out on the roof of the First Floor. A Local Commissioner had been appointed by the Court, who has submitted his Report to the effect that a room covered by Tarpaulin was in existence. A temporary injunction was, thereupon issued against the Tenant.

2. A written Statement was filed in the Eviction proceedings in which the Tenant had denied the ownership of the Landlady and had asserted that she had alternate accommodation available with her; that the premises had not been let for residential purposes only; and that there were no bona fide requirement of the landlady. It will be seen from the above that almost every aspect of the Petition had been traversed by the Tenant. When the case was taken up for the recording of Petitioner's evidence, the parties entered into a settlement. The statement of the Counsel for the Tenant was recorded as well as the presence of the son of the Tenant. On the instructions of the Tenant, it was admitted that the Landlady is the owner of the property and that the demised premises was a Balkhana (as shown in 'red' in the Site Plan Ext. P-1) on the First Floor. It was also admitted that the premises had been let for residential purposes only, and that they were needed bonafide by the Landlady for her residence as well as for the residence of the family members dependent upon her. It was also admitted on behalf of the Tenant that the Landlady has no other reasonably suitable accommodation available to her. It was further stated that the Tenant had no objection in case an eviction order was passed against him. It was in these circumstances, that it was agreed upon by the parties that the Tenant would vacate the premises on or before 30.6.1999. The Statement of the Attorney of the Landlady was also recorded, consenting to the above-mentioned arrangement. The Additional Rent Controller (hereinafter referred to as ARC) has specifically mentioned that he was satisfied that the ingredients of Section 14(1) (e) had been made out. An eviction order was passed by him and in accordance with the compromise, granting time to the Tenant up to 30.6.1999 to vacate the property.

3. After enjoying virtually the entire period permitted to the Tenant to vacate the premises, an application for Review was filed by the Tenant. This was disposed off by the order dated 15.4.1999 passed by the Additional Rent Controller, Delhi. He held that the statement made by the Advocate on behalf of the Tenant was binding on the Tenant. It appears that this order was assailed up to the High Court, which dismissed the Petition in terms of its Order dated May 14, 1999.

4. Since the Tenant did not abide by the understanding and the undertaking given to the Court, the Landlady initiated execution proceedings in respect of the demised premises (stated to be the portion shown in the 'red' in the Site Plan). At this stage, Objections were filed by the Tenant under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. The first ground agitated was directed towards the statement made by Advocate for the Tenant and that it was given without authorisation and was not binding on the Tenant. This was not pressed before me and rightly so. since the matter had already previously received the attention of this Court. The second ground was that the order effected only a partial eviction and was therefore, illegal. In this respect, it should be reiterated that what was admittedly let to the Tenant was the First Floor. There is not even a shreds of doubt on the question that the construction on the roof of the demised premises was unauthorised as well as illegal. In order to overcome any possible objection, the Landlady had clarified that while eviction was sought in respect of the demised premises shown in the 'red', the existence of the illegal and unauthorised construction should not be over-looked. In fact, had this not been clarified in the eviction petition itself, the Tenant could have come forward with a plea that the Landlady had only sought partial eviction of the demised premises and that the construction on the roof of the First Floor constituted a part of the demised premises. The Court below has found no merit in the contention that there was a partial eviction of the property. I am in entire agreement with this finding.

5. The only other question which was urged before me was that the decree which was passed was without jurisdiction inasmuch as an eviction order can only be passed if the Court was satisfied that all the necessary concomitants of Section 14(1)(e) had been proved. It was submitted that an eviction order cannot be passed by consent of the parties. Reliance was heavily placed on a decision of M.D. Oswal Hosiery vs. Swami Krishnanand, 1982 Rajdhani Law Reporter, 148. This judgment is not of any avail or assistance to the Tenant. It had been observed by the Single Judge of this Court that since the Landlord had failed to establish that it was a public institution within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act, it was not entitled to an order of eviction. Since the admission was only to the effect that the Landlord was a Charitable Public Trust it was of no avail since the requirement of Section 22 had not been shown to exist. In the present case, as has already been observed, every aspect of Section 14(1)(e) was not only admitted by the Tenant, but the Additional Rent Controller was satisfied of their existence. Mr. Chadha, Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioner urged that since in the Written Statement a denial in respect of the various ingredients of Section 14(1)(e) had been made, any admission made in the compromise was of no relevance. I find this argument tot he wholly without merit. An admission can be made by a party at any stage of the proceedings even if it is contrary to its pleadings.

6. Reliance on Ferozi Lal Jain vs. Man Mal and another, is also misplaced, as has already been observed above, the Additional Rent Controller had categorically mentioned that he was satisfied that the grounds under Section 14(1)(e) had been established. On the contrary in Hiralal Moolchand Doshi vs. Barot Raman Lal Ranchhoddas (dead) by L.Rs., 1993(2) RCR 524, the Hon'ble Supreme Court found it to be perfectly in order for an eviction order to be passed on the basis of the admission of the Tenant; it observed that the satisfaction of Court in the matter may be based on the admissions made by tenant and that parties taking a number of pleas in the suit can give up any of the pleas at any stage.

7. It was also argued by Mr. Chadha that the Additional Tent Controller in her Order dated 1st December, 2000 (the impugned Order) has confused the Objections filed under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code with the application for Review filed under Order 47 which was disposed off by her predecessor on 15.4.1999. I am unable to detect or perceive any confusion. In the latter Order the Learned ARC had mentioned that her predecessor had disposed off similar Objections and as no new facts had come forward, the reasons which prevailed upon her predecessor still existed.

8. This is a case where a party's entire attitude smacks of mala fides and dishonest. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has set down that the challenge filed by the Tenant in respect of tenancies created under Section 21 of the DRC Act the Tenant must come to the Court at the earliest, and not wait for the time to expire before recording the challenge in Court. The same principle applies, with equal vigour, where a decree is passed on the basis of admission/compromise of the parties. The present case is therefore, a fit case for the imposition of exemplary/punitive costs since the Landlord has not only been made to suffer the anxieties of delay, but has also been put to inordinate expense in defending firstly the Review, thereafter the Objections and then the present petition. However, keeping in view the concise of the arguments of Mr. Chadha, Learned Counsel for the Petitioner, I am desisting from imposing costs.

9. The petition and the C.M. Stand dismissed.