Dr. (Mrs.) Usha Puri vs Governing Body, Aditi ...
2000 Latest Caselaw 492 Del

ORDER

A.K. Sikri, J.

1. A neat and interesting question of law falls for determination in the present writ petition. There are certain allegations against the petitioner who is working as Principal of Respondent No.1 College relating to financial and other irregularities. In view of these allegations, governing body of the Respondent No.1 College, namely, Aditi Mahavidhyalaya which is affiliated to University of Delhi has passed Resolution dated 5.3.2000 deciding to hold an enquiry into the allegations of irregularities and to place the petitioner under suspension during the pendency of this. However, as per the provisions of Ordinances XII & XVIII of the Calendar of University of Delhi, prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor, University of Delhi is needed to suspend the petitioner. Therefore, this suspension cannot come into effect unless prior approval is accorded. However, vide Resolution dated 5.3.2000 itself while deciding to suspend the petitioner and seeking approval of the Vice-Chancellor, it has also been decided that "petitioner be sent on administrative leave with immediate effect till further orders" and Chairman was also authorised to make the alternative arrangement. It is this part of Resolution No.3 which is challenged in the present petition filed by the petitioner on the ground that there is no power with the governing body to force the petitioner to go on administrative leave. The question, therefore, to be decided is as to whether petitioner can be asked to go on administrative leave by the governing body pending decision of the Vice-Chancellor to grant or not to grant approval to the proposed action of the governing body to suspend the petitioner from service?

2. We may rush to the factual matrix, in brief, so far as it is relevant for the purposes of deciding aforesaid question. Petitioner was appointed as College Lecturer in the year 1970. She got promotion first as Reader and thereafter as Senior Reader in Shyama Prasad Mukherjee Mahavidhyala. Aditi Mahavidhyala was started in the year 1984 and petitioner was appointed OSD of this College by the Vice-Chancellor of Delhi University to work as its founder Principal. In 1986 she was selected as Principal of the College and as such she started functioning as regular Principal of the College. Petitioner claims that because of her devotion, dedication and hard work she has established this College which is in deep rural area of outer North West Delhi and motivated orthodox parent of the area to allow their daughters to be graduated. The College has been showing excellent results and has started new innovative courses. However, she is in difficulty today. A Special Audit of the College accounts was carried out for the period 1994 onward. It submitted its report as per which there were serious financial and administrative irregularities committed. Responsibility of this according to report was of the petitioner. According to the petitioner there was nothing abnormal or serious in the accounts and some procedural irregularities of minor nature were found and suggestions were made to see that such procedural defaults do not occur in future. She also submits that she was not given proper opportunity to explain the procedural irregularities pointed out by the Audit Report. However, when later governing body asked her to submit her reply, she submitted a detailed reply with annexures to Audit Report. A meeting of the governing body was held on 31.10.99 and it was resolved to constitute one man committee of a sitting/ retired Judge to probe into the alleged administrative and financial irregularities. It was also decided to take legal opinion as to whether petitioner could be suspended. Legal opinion was taken which was placed before General Body Meeting held on 24.11.99 and governing body was informed that petitioner could not be suspended without the approval of Vice-Chancellor. It was also decided to send the reply given by the petitioner with all annexures to the Delhi Government, from where it can be inferred that before the meeting of 24.11.99 Delhi Government was not even sent the reply given by the petitioner to the Special Audit Report. It was also decided to constitute a Fact Finding Committee consisting of 5 persons with Prof.M.G.Hussain as its Convener. Prof.M.G.Hussain sent notice dated 14.12.99 calling for the meeting of members of the Fact Finding Committee to be held on December 26,1999. In that meeting it was decided that Prof.Hussain was authorised to conduct the investigation and prepare the report. This report was thereafter placed before governing body on 5.3.2000 when the aforesaid Resolutions were passed. It may be recorded here that no approval to the proposed suspension of the petitioner has been accorded by the Vice Chancellor so far.

3. To complete the narration of facts, it may be mentioned that after the Resolution dated 5.3.2000 petitioner was written separate letter on the same date informing her that it was decided to send her on administrative leave with immediate effect till further orders and she being on leave, office car with all its accessories will be parked in the college premises. Thereafter, one Ms.Sadhna Jain, Lecturer in FCW of the College was asked to lookafter the work of the Principal. However, as she refused to discharge the duties, Chairman appointed one Dr.(Mrs.)Sharda Lal as Officer on Special Duty in place of the petitioner who is Lecturer in Mata Sundri College. A letter dated 10.3.2000 addressed to petitioner to this effect shows that she has been appointed for one year or till outcome of the enquiry in allegations against the petitioner is known and resultant action by the governing body is decided whichever is earlier.

4. It is the common case of the parties that the petitioner cannot be suspended unless there is a prior approval of the Vice Chancellor as per the provisions of Ordinance-XII of the Delhi University Ordinances. Challenging the impugned action of the respondents, Respondent No.2 forced the petitioner to go on administrative leave and not to allow her to discharge the duties of Principal of the College.

Mr. Sanjiv Khanna, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the impugned action of the governing body was without jurisdiction and without any authority of law inasmuch as:

(A) there was no provision in the University Ordinance and Statute to send a person on administrative leave. On the contrary as per Ordinance-XVIII, Clause-9, no decision to terminate or suspend any Teacher or Principal could be taken without the approval of the Vice-Chancellor. This ordinance is in the following terms:

"No decision for the termination of the services of any teacher or Principal appointed as substantive basis whether on probation or permanent, or for his suspension, shall be taken by the College or the institution concerned without the prior approval of the Vice-chancellor."

5. Further Clause-6 of Ordinance XII dealing with suspension reads as under:

"Notwithstanding anything contained in any other Ordinance, where a Principal or a teacher is placed under suspension, with the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor or under Ordinance XIII-A, he shall during the period of his XIII-A, he shall during the period of his suspension be disabled from exercising any rights, duties or privileges attached to the membership of the Governing Body or any Committee of the College of which he may be a member."

Para-7 of Ordinance XII, which is "FORM OF AGREEMENT OF SERVICE FOR COLLEGE TEACHERS" also stipulates that the question of termination or suspension of a Principal or teacher shall not be decided by the College/Institution without prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor. Therefore, it was contended that the petitioner could be suspended only with the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor and without any approval being there, there was no power with the College (or for that matter governing body of the College) to suspend the petitioner. Admittedly, according to him there was no provision in the Statutes for directing the petitioner to proceed on administrative leave;

(B) It was argued that what cannot be done directly, it could not be achieved indirectly. According to Mr.Sanjiv Khanna, asking the petitioner to go on administrative leave amounted to suspending her inasmuch as it had the effect of not permitting her to do her duties as a Principal. Therefore, respondent-governing body was trying to achieve the same purpose i.e. suspending the petitioner when the governing body was not authorised to do so in normal course;

(C) To go on leave was right and privilege of an employee and it is the employee only who could exercise such a right and decide as to whether he/she wants to go on leave or not. It could not be thruster upon the employee.

6. Counsel relied upon the following judgments in support of the submissions:

1. Baldev Raj Chadha Vs. Union of India and Others .

2. Dr. Dattatraya Mahadev Nadkarni (since deceased by his L. Rs.) Vs. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay .

(D) The action was sought to be challenged also on the ground that it was actuated with mala fides Learned counsel tried to demonstrate that the different tenors in the Resolutions of the governing bodies could be discerned from the members attending the particular meeting of the governing body. The submission was that when the meeting was attended by the University nominees, Lecturers, representatives or the members who were professionals, the decision was more balanced keeping in view the provisions of law but in the absence of such persons attending a particular meeting, the decisions were such which tended to harm the petitioner. It was further submitted that in the meeting held on 31.10.99 it was decided to place the petitioner under suspension even when legal opinion was yet to be sought about the procedure for effecting the suspension decision. After this opinion was obtained and discussed in the meeting of 24.11.99 when the composition of members attending the meeting was different. The governing body decided to first constitute a Fact Finding Committee before taking action on the suspension of the petitioner. It was further submitted that the decision to suspend the petitioner taken in the meeting held on 31.10.99 was taken in tearing haste inasmuch as by that time the reply submitted by the petitioner to the Special Audit Report was not even sent to Director, Higher Education, Government of NCT of Delhi and even minutes of meeting dated 24.11.99 would show that the said reply had not been sent even by that time as it was only in the meeting it was decided to send the reply. Thus the governing body took the decision purportedly on the basis of Special Audit Report without even sending the replies of the petitioner to the said Report. It was also contended that after the constitution of Fact Finding Committee, the very first notice for convening of the meeting disclosed predetermined mind of the Prof.Hussain as would be amply clear from the language of the said notice which, inter alia, mentioned as under:

"The members are already aware that the special audit report made a number of observations which show the financial irregularities made by Dr.Mrs.Usha Puri, Principal, Aditi Mahavidhyalaya during her stay in office. Besides this, many teaching ad non-teaching staff members have grievances and reservations against the said officer".

7. In fact one of the members, Mr. Lalit Bhasin even objected to the aforesaid language in the notice by his letter dated 15.12.99 addressed to Prof. M.G. Husain mentioning that the language of the notice dated December 14, 99 showed that he had already come to the conclusion that petitioner had committed financial irregularities and he ought to disassociate himself from the Fact Finding Committee. Fact Finding Committee held only two meetings. In the first meeting held on 26.12.99 the Chairman was authorised to make personal contact with both teaching and non-teaching staff of the College and submit his report. Thereafter, he prepared the report and in the second meeting the report was approved. It was further stated that out of five, two members who were independent and professionals did not attend the meetings and did not subscribe to the report of the Fact Finding Committee. It was also argued that the act of the governing body and particularly Chairman of the governing body in asking another teacher to perform the function of Principal and thereafter to appoint Dr. (Mrs.)Sharda Lal for one year to act as Principal in place of the petitioner was without any authority of law inasmuch as prior approval of the University was required for this purpose and an outsider could not even be appointed as Principal which was clear from Clause-7(3) of the Ordinance-XVIII of University Ordinances, which reads as under:

"In case of a casual vacancy in the office of the Principal, the Vice-Principal, if any, shall until the appointment of the Principal, act as the Principal. In case there is no Vice-Principal, the senior most teacher shall act as Principal. The teacher so to act as Principal shall fulfill the minimum eligibility requirements for appointment as Principal of the College.

Such temporary arrangements shall be made ordinarily for a period not exceeding six months and shall require the prior approval of the University".

8. It was also submitted that the governing body had the audacity to take up the aforesaid steps in disregard to various provisions of the Ordinances and Statutes notwithstanding the fact that University of Delhi had deprecated and not authorised the same. Petitioner was not even paid salary for the last three months which, according to counsel further showed that the whole intention was to harass the petitioner.

9. Ms.Avnish Ahlawat, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the governing body of the College tried to the aforesaid arguments made on behalf of the petitioner. It was her contention that there was no mala fides in the action taken by respondent No.1. In fact the Special Audit Report of the Government of NCTD, which is the funding body as the College is maintained by Government of NCTD, brought out serious financial and administrative irregularities committed by the petitioner. The financial irregularities were to the tune of Rs. 28,44,000/-. In fact there was no role of the particular governing body in this inasmuch as the action had been initiated way back in the year 1997 with different governing body in existence and, therefore, allegations of the petitioner against the governing body were far fetched. It was also argued that the governing body has acted in accordance with law after taking legal opinion and, therefore, while passing the Resolution on 5.3.2000 to suspend the petitioner, the same was sent to the Vice-Chancellor for approval. Since without prior approval, petitioner could not be placed under suspension and in view of serious charges against the petitioner it was not possible to allow her to continue to perform her duties that too when she was holding high position in the institution, decision was taken to send her on administrative leave which was a bona fide decision in the overall interest of the institution. Once it was decided to send the petitioner on administrative leave the arrangement had to be necessarily made by giving the charge of the post of Principal to some other person. Attempt was made by offering the same to Mrs. Sadhna Jain, a senior teacher of the College but as she refused to discharge the duties, respondent No.1 had no alternative but to appoint somebody from the College and in these circumstances, Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Lal was appointed as Officer on Special Duty. Appointment was made for a period of one year and it was not possible to call a person from other College for a lessor period. Chairman made this appointment as he was authorised to do so in terms of governing body Resolution dated 5.3.2000. Therefore, according to learned counsel, there were no mala fides in the action and the impugned action was rather taken in the public interest.

10. Insofar as power of the respondent No.1 to direct the petitioner to proceed on administrative leave is concerned, learned counsel for respondent No.1 fairly concedes that there was no provision in the Statute and Ordinance for this purpose and there was no judgment directly on this point. However, it was her submission that such a power could be inferred from the principles in ordinary law which give inherent right to the employer to place a person under suspension even when there is no provision to this effect. It was permissible in service jurisprudence for an employer not to allot any work to a particular employee. In such a case the only right of the employee was to receive his/her salary and emoluments. Learned counsel relied upon the observations made in the cases of The Management of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi & Others Vs. Hotel Workers' Union, ; T. Cajee Vs. U. Jormanik Siem and another, ; R.P. Kapur Vs. Union of India and another, to contend that even in the absence of power to suspend specifically by any Statutes/Rules etc. this was the inherent power of the employer under law. Learned counsel tried to draw analogy from Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act as per which approval of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal etc. is to be taken before dismissing a workman under certain circumstances and pending such approval, in the absence of any power to suspend, the Supreme Court has held in aforesaid cases that such a power was there under the ordinary law and did not require any specific provision. Apart from reading extensively from the judgment in the case of Hotel Imperial (Supra) counsel relied upon the following observations in the case of V.P. Gindroniya (Supra) containing the same principles as laid down in Hotel Imperial case:

"Three kinds of suspension are known to law. A public servant may be suspended as a mode of punishment or he may be suspended during the pendency of an enquiry against him if the order appointing him or statutory provisions governing his service provide for such suspensions. Lastly he may merely be forbidden from discharging his duties during the pendency of an enquiry against him, which act is also called suspension. The right to suspend as a measure of punishment as well as the right to suspend the contract of service during the pendency of an enquiry are both regulated by the contract of employment or the provisions regulating the conditions of service. But the last category of suspension referred to earlier is the right of the master to forbid his servant from doing the work which he had to do under the terms of the contract of service or the provisions governing his conditions of service, at the same time keeping in force the master's obligations under the contract. In other words the master may ask his servant to refrain from rendering his service but he must fulfill his part of the contract."

11. It was further observed therein that ordinarily in the absence of such a power either in express terms in the contract or under the rules framed under some statute would mean that the master would have no power to suspend a workman and even if he does so in the sense that he forbids the employee to work he will have to pay the wages during the so called period of suspension. Where, however, there is power to suspend either in the contract of employment or in the statute or the rules framed thereunder, the suspension has the effect of temporarily suspending the relationship of master and the servant with the consequence that the servant is not bound to render service and the master is not bound to pay.

12. xxxxxxx It is equally well settled that an order of interim suspension can be passed against the employee while an enquiry is pending into his conduct even though there is no such term in the contract of employment or in the rules, but in such a case the employee would be entitled to his remuneration for the period of suspension if there is no statute or rule under which, it could be withheld. The distinction between suspending the contract of a service of a servant and suspending him from performing the duties of his office on the basis that the contract is subsisting the basis that the contract is subsisting the basis that the contract is term in every contract of service. When an employee is suspended in this sense, it means that the employer merely issues a direction to him that he should not do the service required of him during a particular period. In other words the employer is regarded as issuing an order to the employee which because the contract is subsisting, the employee must obey".

13. Mr. Anurag Gupta, learned counsel appeared for Delhi University. Although no counter-affidavit is filed by University of Delhi, however, he submitted that it was neither permissible nor proper for the governing body of the College to direct the petitioner to be sent on administrative leave. His submission was that unless there was prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor, suspension of the petitioner cannot take place and once that is the position the petitioner cannot be forced to go on administrative leave as well. In fact he supported the stand taken by counsel for the petitioner on this aspect. It was also submitted by him that action of the governing body in appointing Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Lal as Principal of the College for one year was contrary to Ordinance-XVIII and inasmuch as neither Dr. (Mrs.) Sharda Lal was eligible to be appointed nor there could be an appointment for more than six months and in any case in the absence of approval of the Vice-Chancellor, the governing body had no power to make such appointment. He went on to submit that University was even contemplating appropriate action in this behalf.

14. At the outset I may state that although both the parties have taken their respective stands, on the merits of the allegations against the petitioner i.e. while the petitioner has contended on the one hand she has not committed any financial or administrative irregularities and further that audit objections are not proper and her reply to the same is not given due weight age/attention and on the other hand the stand of the governing body of the College is that there are serious financial and administrative irregularities committed by the petitioner in view of Special Audit Report, I need not go into this aspect in detail. First of all final view in this matter is yet to be taken for which the competent authority would be the Enquiry Officer appointed for this purpose. Secondly, in any case it is not for me to go into this aspect in detail at this stage that too under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. For this reason, I am not going into the aspect of mala fides also in this judgment, although on this aspect also both the parties had made strong submissions in support of their respective stands. However, without expressing any view, I am not able to resist from making some observations about the manner in which Fact Finding Committee worked and gave its report. Governing body had constituted this Committee of five members. Convener of the Committee should not have used the language which is being used in first notice dated 14.12.99 which may create unnecessary doubt about his impartiality or doubt that he had already made up his mind and it compelled one of the members of the Fact Finding Committee to express his displeasure about the same and to suggest him to disassociate itself from Committee. Moreover, although the Committee was of five members, two members did not participate. Other three members along with Convener attended the first meeting and abdicated their power in favour of the Convener authorising him to make personal contact with teaching and non-teaching staff of the College and prepare the report. When the governing body had constituted the committee of five persons, it should have been the collective effort of all the five members rather than authorising Convener only to do the job and thereafter signing the report which was prepared by the Convener. In this manner five members committee constituted by governing body has in fact been reduced to one man Fact Finding Committee. Similarly how and in what circumstances Dr.(Mrs.)Sharda Lal is appointed as Principal who not even eligible under this Ordinance, that too for a period of one year and without the prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor leaves much to be desired. However, I leave the matter at that with remarks that these are only tentative observations.

15. I may now address myself to the core issue involved in this case. Let us first examine as to what is the meaning of "administrative leave". This expression is not conceptually defined anywhere either in the leave rules of the Government or other Bodies and in fact not known in the service jurisprudence. Leave rules of the Government prescribe various kinds of leave but administrative leave does not find mention therein. In fact this expression is coined to meet those contingencies where a person normally occupying high position is under some cloud and instead of taking extreme step of suspension he is asked to proceed on leave. Not that there is no power of suspension in such cases. The concerned officer can be suspended. However, authorities feel that extreme step of suspension be not taken at that point of time and instead the concerned officer is sent on leave. However, ultimately it is the concerned officer who proceeds on leave voluntarily and submits an application for this purpose.

16. However, whether such a step can be taken in such cases, as the instant one, where the decision of the governing body is to suspend the petitioner and pending approval of this proposed action governing body forces the petitioner to go on leave even when she does not want to go on leave. Petitioner knows fully well that she cannot be suspended unless there is a prior approval by the Vice Chancellor meaning thereby governing body has in its own cannot suspend her. Therefore, if she does not want to proceed on leave whether she can be forced to go on leave. Put it otherwise, when governing body asked the petitioner to go on leave without her choice will it not amount to suspension. The answer obviously is by directing the petitioner to go on leave when governing body does not want her to work it would amount to suspension. The learned counsel for the respondent in fact had this in mind and for this reason, as noticed above, the various judgments cited by learned counsel for the petitioner were on suspension contending that in the absence of power of interim suspension also suspension can be resorted to. I am of the considered view that the governing body has no power or authority to compel the petitioner to go on administrative leave. As already pointed out above, it is the common case of the psarties that the petitioner cannot be suspended without there being prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor of University of Delhi i.e. the position as per the Ordinances of the University having statutory force. In fact the governing body has no right to take a decision to suspend the petitioner without prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor. Once this is the position in law, can the same be achieved by forcing the petitioner to go on leave meaning thereby not allowing her to perform the duties of Principal. The answer has to be in the negative. It is well established Principle of Law that what cannot be done directly cannot be allowed to be done by indirect methods. The requirement of prior approval or sanction prescribed by the statutes is mandatory and governing body will have to receive the prior approval prescribed before making the suspension effective ( Superintendent of Police, Manipur and Others Vs. R.K. Tomalsana Singh (Dead) through Lrs., ; The District Collector, Chittoor and others Vs. The Chittoor District Groundnut Traders Association, Chittoor and others ). It is also well established Principle of Law that if the provisions of particular Rule or Statute require a particular act to be done in a particular manner then the said act is to be done in that manner or not at all.

Therefore, when there is no power with the governing body to suspend a person and prior approval of the Vice-Chancellor is needed for this purpose, there cannot be any power with the governing body to force a person to go on leave and not to take work from him/her which has the effect of "suspending the person".

17. It was tried to be argued by counsel for respondent No.1, that the power to suspend is as per general law for which purpose respondent's counsel relied upon various judgments referred to above. First of all these judgments are on suspension and the ratio laid down in these judgments is that even in the absence of any rule authorising the employer to suspend an employee pending enquiry, as there is inherent power with the employer to suspend an employee as per ordinary law. If the employer is authorised by the particular rule to suspend an employee pending enquiry then the subsistence allowance is to be paid as per said rule. Even in the absence of such rule, power is there to suspend (which is described as "interim suspension" by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments). However, in that case employer is to pay full salary and allowance to the employee. However, this is the position in the ordinary law. When the field is covered by specific provision/law then the applicability of ordinary law to the extent it is covered by specific law stands excluded.

18. In fact the principle of inherent power to suspend ordinary law finds route in Section 16 of the General Clauses Act. However, General Clauses Act itself mentions that this principle is applicable where there is no provision to the contrary. Therefore, Mr. Sanjiv Khanna was right when he submitted that this principle of ordinary law would have no application and placed reliance upon the judgments of Apex Court in the cases of Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of defense and others Vs. S. Daniel and Others 1990 Supplementary SCC 374 (Para-C at page 389) and Smt. Hira Devi and others Vs. District Board, Shahjahanpur .

19. In the instant case the procedure for suspending teacher/Principal of a College is specifically stipulated by the Statute and the authorities are bound to conform to the said procedure prescribed by the said statutory provisions. If the contention of the respondent No.1 is accepted it would make the provision relating to suspension as otiose or redundant. In fact the judgment cited by the respondent No.1 wherein it is mentioned that right, not to take work also includes amounts to interim suspension, goes in favour of the petitioner on the aspect that forcing the petitioner to go on leave indirectly amounted to suspension.

20. It may be mentioned that provision in the Ordinance XII and Ordinance XVIII relating to suspension was introduced with the objective to protect the interest of teachers/Principals of Colleges. The obvious intention behind such a provision is to ensure that action of the governing body is supervised by the independent and highest functionary namely., Vice-Chancellor and unless Vice-Chancellor has also satisfied himself to the effect that the case for suspension is made out, suspension would not be resorted to. Once this is the objective and Vice-Chancellor becomes the guardian to protect the service conditions of teachers/principal, governing body cannot be allowed to adopt indirect means to bye-pass such provision and take action in the manner in which it is taken. While interpreting the provisions of Ordinances XII & XVIII, one may also, therefore, take recourse to the Heydon's Rule. Having regard to the object of such a provision and the mischief, this provision seeks to avoid and, therefore, the same mischief cannot be allowed to be committed by the governing body through indirect methods. May be in some cases immediate suspension has to be resorted to keeping in view the gravity of charges. Vice-Chancellor may take immediate decision if he is convinced of urgency. However, for governing body to take action purpose there has to be some power with the governing body. In the present case there is none. One may usefully refer to the provision of Section-8 of Delhi Education Act. There also a teacher of a recognised school cannot be suspended without prior approval of Director of Education. However, if the situation is emergent and immediate suspension is required, the power is given to the Managing Committee of the School to take such action even before the approval and take the approval of the action within 15 days of such action. Section-8(4) dealing with this aspect reads as under:

Section-8(4)

"Where the managing committee of a recognised private school intends to suspend any of its employees, such intention shall be communicated to the Director and no such suspension shall be made except with the prior approval of the Director :

Provided that the managing committee may suspend an employee with immediate effect and without the prior approval of the Director if it is satisfied that such immediate suspension is necessary by reason of the gross misconduct within the meaning of the Code of Conduct prescribed under Section 2, of the employee;

Provided further that no such order of immediate to suspension shall remain in force for more than a period of fifteen days from the date of suspension unless it has been communicated to the Director and approved by him before the expiry the said period."

21. However, there is no such parallel provision in University Ordinances and in the absence of such a provision, it can be safely concluded that governing body has no such power as per the well-known principle of interpretation, namely., CASUS OMISSUS, which lays down that a matter which should have been, but has not been provided for in a Statute cannot be supplied by Courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction ( Dr. Waliram Waman Hiray Vs. Mr. Justice B. Lentin; ; The Commr. of Sales Tax U.P. Vs. M/s. Mangal Sen Shyam Lal, ).

22. This petition, accordingly, succeeds. Rule is made absolute. The impugned Resolution No. 3 of Resolution dated 5.3.2000 of respondent No. 1 and consequent letter dated 5.3.2000 addressed to the petitioner are hereby set-aside. Resultantly petitioner is to be treated as Principal of the College and she will have right to perform the duties of Principal. The petitioner shall also be entitled to costs which is quantified at Rs. 5,000/-.